JUDGMENT 1. :- The instant petition has been filed against the order dated 13.2.1996 (Annexure-14) passed by the Authority under the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act, 1958"), by which the said Authority has directed petitioner to reinstate the respondent-workman with all consequential benefits. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that respondent-workman approached the said Authority under the Act, 1958 contending that he had worked with the present petitioner for more than six months continuously from 16.6.92 to 31.12.92; his services have illegally been terminated; he is entitled to be reinstated with all consequential benefits. The Authority issued show cause notice to the present petitioner, which filed reply in response to the said notice and also made submissions before the Authority. After considering the whole case, the Authority recorded the finding of fact that respondent-workman had worked for more than six months continuously and his services had been terminated illegally, thus, he was entitled for reinstatement with all consequential benefits. The Authority also held that even if for some time the respondent-workman had been appointed by a Committee whose constitution had been defective, the same would not have any adverse effect on merit of the case by virtue of the provisions of Section 51 of the Multi-States Co-operative Societies Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act, 1984"). Hence this petition.JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE : 3. Mr. Malik has contended that the Authority under the Act of 1958 had no competence to decide the case, or entertain the application submitted by the respondent-workman for the reason that the competence has exclusively been conferred in such a case upon the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under the Act, 1984. According to Mr. Malik, the provisions of Section 74 of the Act, 1984 are analoguous ad verbatim to the provisions of Section 64 of Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (for short, "Act 1960") and it provides that in matter or dispute relating to constitution, management or business of the society, the matter shall be referred to the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies and in the instant case, as similar provisions are there under Section 74 of the Act, 1984, the matter could have been referred to the Registrar and, thus, the Authority had no competence and impugned order is nullity for want of jurisdiction. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed by Mr. Malik on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sawai Madhopur Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. v. Rajasthan State Co-operative Tribunal, 1989(2) RLR 555=1989(2) RLW 321 , wherein the Court, after considering the provisions of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (for short, "Act 1965") held that any matter or dispute regarding employment of the employees falls within the ambit of constitution, management or business of the society and, therefore, the Registrar has the competence to decide the said dispute. 4. Similarly, in R.C. Tiwari v. Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. & ors., (1997) 5 SCC 125 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question regarding interpretation of Section 64 of the Act 1960 and held that the provisions of Section 64, as starts with non-obstente clause, would have an over-riding effect and, thus, the dispute regarding employment of any paid employee shall be dealt with by the Registrar. Section 64 of the Act, 1960 reads as under: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time-being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a society or the liquidation of a society, shall be referred to the Registry by any of the parties to the dispute." 5. In view of the above, Mr. Malik has vehemently submitted that as the provisions of Section 74 of the Act, 1984 are analogous to the aforesaid Section 64 of the Act, 1960 and provides for exclusive competence of the Registrar in case of any dispute regarding constitution, management or business of the society, which includes the terms and conditions of service of an employee, the Authority under the Act, 1984 has no jurisdiction. 6. Controverting the submissions made by Mr. Malik, Mr. D.K. Parihar, learned counsel for respondent-workmen has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the Chairman, Kulchandra Gram Seva Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. The Judge, Labour Court, Bikaner & Anr., 1999 (2) RLW 731 wherein this Court, after placing reliance on a large number of judgments, particularly R.C. Tiwari (supra); Sagar Mal v. District Sahkari Kendriya Bank Ltd., Mandsore, (1995) 1 SCC 125 ; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur, AIR 1980 SC 2181 ; J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & ors., AIR 1961 SC 1170 ; and U.P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shanker Jain, AIR 1979 SC 65 , came to the conclusion that an Arbitrator cannot decide the issue regarding termination of service. 7. The submissions made by Mr. Malik are preposterous and cannot be held to be tenable in law. The provisions of Section 74 of the Act, 1984 reads as under: "74. Disputes.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, if any dispute (other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a multi-State Co-operative Society against its paid employee or an industrial dispute as defined in Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act No. 24 of 1947) touching the constitution, management or business of Multi-State Co-operative Society arises......... Such dispute shall be referred to the Central Registrar for decision and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of such dispute........ " (Emphasis added). 8. The provisions of Section 74 of the Act, 1984 provide that the Registrar shall be the sole adjudicator of disputes in respect of constitution, management or business of the society. But an exception has been carved out that the Registrar shall not decide the matters or disputes regarding disciplinary action taken by the society against its paid employees or an industrial dispute as defined in Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, "the Act, 1947"). Therefore, the Legislature has consciously made a departure taking away the cases relating the disciplinary proceedings against the paid employees of the society and matters which may fall within the definition of "industrial dispute" as defined under the provisions of Section 2(k) of the Act, 1947 from the jurisdiction of the Registrar. Section 2(k) defines the "industrial dispute" as under: " 'Industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment of the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, or any person....." 9. In view of the above, undoubtedly, the instant case is in connection with employment of the employee and, therefore, falls within the definition of Section 2(k) of the Act, 1947. In view of the above, undoubtedly, the instant case is in connection with employment of the employee and, therefore, falls within the definition of Section 2(k) of the Act, 1947. Thus, it cannot be held that the Authority under the Act, 1958 had no jurisdiction and the contention raised in this respect by Mr. Malik is rejected.FACTUAL MATRDC : 10. The second submission made by Mr. Malik is that according to the respondent-workman himself, he had been employed on 16.2.1992 and he worked upto the end of December, 1992 and as there had been a break in service for a period of about two months, the workman had not completed six months continuously and, therefore, the case was not maintainable before the Authority under the Act, 1958. The issue was agitated tooth and nail before the Authority and after considering it elaborately, the Authority came to the conclusion that the workman had worked continuously for six months. The contention of the present petitioner to the extent that the services had been given to the respondent-workman by an incompetent person having no authority to do so,-did not find favour from the Authority after placing reliance upon the provisions of Section 51 of the Act, 1984, which reads as under. "Section 51-Act of Multi-State Co-operative Societies not to be invalidated by certain defects. - No act of a Multi-State Co-operative Society or any board or of any committee or of any officer of the society shall be deemed to be invalid by reasons only of the existence of any defect in the procedure or in the constitution of the society or of the board or of the committee thereof or in the appointment or election of an officer or on the ground that such officer was disqualified to hold office." 11. After comparing the provisions of Section 51 of the Act, 1984 with provisions of Section 144 of the Act, 1965, it has been contended that the employment given by the Authority not competent to do so, is invalid and thus inconsequential and respondent-workman cannot be given any benefit whatsoever. As the provisions of Section 51 of the Act, 1984 itself provides to the contrary laying down that no action can be held to be invalid merely on the ground that constitution of the society was not in accordance with law, no fault can be found with the impugned order. Mr. As the provisions of Section 51 of the Act, 1984 itself provides to the contrary laying down that no action can be held to be invalid merely on the ground that constitution of the society was not in accordance with law, no fault can be found with the impugned order. Mr. Malik has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Badrinath Dixit & ors., (1991) 3 SCC 54 , wherein it has been held that any appointment made by the incompetent Authority does not create privity of any kind to the relationship of the parties. There can be no quarrel to this legal proposition but here is a case where the statutory provisions of Section 51 prohibits challenging of such orders on the ground of incompetence of the appointing authority and the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is quite distinguishable. The issue raised in this regard is also rejected.SCOPE OF ARTICLE 227: 12. Mr. Malik has raised various trivial issues regarding finding of facts and tried to contend valiantly that findings of fact recorded by the Authority are perverse. The reasons given by the Authority are cogent and do not require any interference in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This Court has very limited scope of interference in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution as per the law laid down in (8-A) Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & ors., AIR 1984 SC 38 , wherein it has been held that even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For intervention, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice or where order of the Tribunal etc. has resulted in grave injustice. (Vide Constitution Bench judgments of the Apex Court in D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58 ; and Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division & Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398 ) . has resulted in grave injustice. (Vide Constitution Bench judgments of the Apex Court in D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58 ; and Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division & Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398 ) . For interference under Article 227, the finding of facts recorded by the Authority should be found to be perverse or patently erroneous and dehors the factual and legal position on record. (Vide Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895 ; Rukmanand Bairoliya v. the State of Bihar & ors., AIR 1971 SC 746 ; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & ors., AIR 1980 SC 1896 ; Laxmikant R. Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohan Singh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576 ; Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Pravinbhai Jasbhai Patel & ors., (1997) 7 SCC 300 ; M/s. Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. v. Sub-Judicial Magistrate & ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749 ; and Virender Kashinath Ravat & ors. v. Vinayak M. Joshi & ors. (1999) 1 SCC 47 ) . 13. It is well settled that power under Article 227 is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up-set conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. (Vide Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni, (1998) 3 SCC 341 ; Chandra Bhushan v. Beni Prasad & ors., (191,N) 1 SCC 70 ; Savitrabai Bhausaheb Kevata & ors. v. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja, (1999) 2 SCC 171 ; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. v. Dyes & Chemical Workers Union & Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 143 ) . finless the findings are patently erroneous and dehors the factual and legal position on record, exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution may not be justified and in that eventuality disturbing the findings of facts would amount to jurisdictional error. (Vide Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Resul Moulali Kotkunde, (1999) 4 SCC 1 ). Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. It should not alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (Vide Union of India & ors. v. Himmat Singh Chahar, (1999) 4 SCC 521 ) . 14. Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. It should not alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (Vide Union of India & ors. v. Himmat Singh Chahar, (1999) 4 SCC 521 ) . 14. Moreover, as the categorical finding has been recorded by the Authority that respondent-workman had continuously worked for a period of six months and even if in between, he had been appointed by a person having no competence, he has been held entitled for relief by virtue of the provisions of Section 51 of the Act, 1984, the contention raised by Malik is not tenable. There has also been much discussion regarding the judgments of this Court challenging the Authority of various persons who had taken over the society, illegaly which went upto the Division Bench of this Court and also contempt proceedings were initiated. But as the provisions of Section 51 regulate the action of the society not properly constituted also, the said judgments are of no help to the present petitioner. 15. Thus, in view of the above, I find no force in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.For the reasons recorded herein, the identical petitions Nos. 1471/19% and 1475/19% are also dismissed.Petitions Dismissed. *******