ORDER Dr. Maithli Sharan, J. This is a petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, filed by one Mohan Lal Sharma, posted as City Superintendent of Police at Gwalior, alleging himself to be adversely affected by the order dated 3-7-1999 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gwalior, in Criminal Case No. 7708 of 1999. To appreciate the allegations made in this petition, it would be worthwhile to go through the facts of the case, lying in a narrow compass, leading to the filing of this petition. A case u/s 34 of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, was registered against two trucks bearing No. M.P. 07-6924 and M.P. 04-K/2664, on 30-6-1999. The case was registered by the petrolling police party headed by Sub-Inspector Shri B.L. Kushwaha, who seized 1,123 carton liquor from the illegal possession of the truck drivers having no valid permit. The respondent No. 2, through the Managing Director Shri Surendra Singh Rathore, filed an application under sections 451 and 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of the concerning Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior, for the release of the seized trucks and the liquor. An affidavit was filed in support of the said application. In this affidavit there was no allegation made against the petitioner but thereafter one another affidavit was filed by the said Managing Director Shri Surendra Singh Rathore, in which allegation against the petitioner was made to the effect that the illegal seizure was affected by Sub-Inspector Shri B. L. Kushwaha on the instigation of the petitioner Mohan Lal Sharma. The learned Magistrate allowed the application filed by respondent No. 2 and also made an observation against the petitioner, as below:-- The petitioner has prayed for expunction of the above unwarranted remarks passed by the learned Magistrate. It is further prayed that as a consequence of this, the direction given by the learned Magistrate in the impugned order to the Inspector General of Police to hold an enquiry in this regard be also quashed. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Panel Lawyer for the State, as well as learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, at length and have perused the documents filed in the case. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Panel Lawyer for the State, as well as learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, at length and have perused the documents filed in the case. So far as the factual aspects of the instant case are concerned they are positively not disputed, nor there is any dispute in regard to the merits, propriety or otherwise of the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate in regard to allowing the application under sections 451/457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the respondent No. 2 for the release of the seized trucks and the liquor. The only point involved in this case is regarding the unwarranted disparaging remarks made by the learned Magistrate against the petitioner. Undisputedly, the petitioner was neither a party in the case nor he was before the learned Magistrate at the time of the disposal of the aforesaid application. It is also curious to note that the first affidavit filed by the respondent No. 2 along with the application for the release of the seized property did not contain even an iota of aspersion against the petitioner. However, the aspersion regarding the involvement of the petitioner was made by the respondent No. 2 in the second affidavit filed by it, the next day. Again, there is nothing in the second affidavit to indicate as to why such an aspersion was not made in the first affidavit. This fact by itself goes to indicate that it was an afterthought of the respondent No. 2 in this regard. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the petitioner, at the time of the disposal of the aforesaid application was not before the Court below to defend himself, and whatever was averred in the affidavit by the respondent No. 2 was taken to be granted by the Court below. I am of the view that this by itself is against all canons of natural justice. A person cannot be condemned and proceeded against without giving him an opportunity in this regard to be heard and defending himself. Hon'ble the Apex Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. I am of the view that this by itself is against all canons of natural justice. A person cannot be condemned and proceeded against without giving him an opportunity in this regard to be heard and defending himself. Hon'ble the Apex Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Mohammad Naim, has laid down the following three tests to be applied while dealing with the question of expunction of disparaging remarks against a person or authority whose conduct comes in for consideration before a Court of law:-- (i) Whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (ii) Whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (iii) Whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It is to be noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court has mentioned above tests to be applied in the case of person or authority whose conduct comes in for consideration. The instant case is on much more higher footing in favour of the petitioner, obviously because his conduct was not called in question there for consideration before the Court below, and still, it chose to pass the alleged disparaging remarks against him. The petitioner, as already observed above, had no opportunity of explaining or defending himself regarding his position. It is also very clear that in deciding the said application under sections 451/457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there was no necessity at all to dilate on the conduct of the petitioner. If at all it was to be discussed, it could have been so discussed in a separate proceeding in which the petitioner was summoned as a party and given an opportunity to defend himself in that regard. I am of the view that passing of such remarks in the said case of release of the seized properties was positively unwarranted and uncalled for. My view finds support by the view taken by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case reported in The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Mohammad Naim, , S.K. Viswambaran Vs. E. Koyakunju and Others, and Dr. Dilip Kumar Deka and Another Vs. State of Assam and Another, as also State of M.P. Vs. Mustaq Hussain Azad and Others, , a Division Bench judgment of this Court. Mohammad Naim, , S.K. Viswambaran Vs. E. Koyakunju and Others, and Dr. Dilip Kumar Deka and Another Vs. State of Assam and Another, as also State of M.P. Vs. Mustaq Hussain Azad and Others, , a Division Bench judgment of this Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion on the legal aspects involved in the case, this petition is allowed and the disparaging remarks passed by the learned Court below as well as the consequential direction given by it to the Inspector General of Police, occurring in the following words in the impugned order: