Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. This judgment shall govern W.P. Nos. 3752 and 3890 of 1991 as the question is common, though, it concerns different parties. The second respondent in both the writ petitions were employees of the petitioner. They were dismissed by separate orders on October 18, 1983 and therefore, they filed appeals before the appellate authority under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 which appeals came to be registered as TNSE Nos. 3 and 4 of 1984. Both these appeals were delayed and in both these appeals, similar application for condonation of delay was filed on November 25, 1983. The appeals were adjourned from time to time at the instance of the respondent employees and when the appeals were posted on September 25, 1985, the respondent employees in both the appeals were not present. With the result, the appeals had to be adjourned to October 9, 1985 and when even on that date, nobody was present on behalf of the respondent employees, the appeals came to be dismissed in default by order dated October 24, 1985. It was a common order in both the appeals. However, applications for restoration were to be made on December 18, 1985. Though, these restoration applications were opposed tooth and nail by the petitioner employer by filing separate counters and though a specific objection was raised that the restoration applications could not have been filed beyond a period of 30 days, the first respondent seems to have allowed the restoration applications and ordered restoration of the appeals by its order dated June 20, 1986. It seems that the appeals could not be heard and ultimately came to be posted on September 28, 1989. Again on that date, the respondent employees were absent and therefore, the appeals came to be dismissed in default on October 20, 1989 after being adjourned to that date.Respondent employees again filed restoration application for setting aside the order of dismissal and claimed that they were not well on September 28, 1989 and their authorised representative was also out of station. In both the restoration applications identical reasons were given. In both the restoration applications identical reasons were given. Again, counter affidavits came to be filed on behalf of the petitioner employer and it was pointed out that the proceedings were merely being dragged and that, even the restoration applications were filed only on December 20, 1989 in complete contravention of Rule 9-A (3) of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') which provides that the restoration could have been only within 30 days of the dismissal. It seems that in spite of this objection, by the impugned order dated June 13, 1990, the appeals came to be restored and came to be posted for hearing on July 2, 1990. In the present writ petitions, the petitioner challenges the said restoration order on various grounds. Respondents, though served, have not chosen to appear before this Court nor have they chosen to contest the factual claims made by the petitioner by filing counter. Mr. P. Srinivas, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in both the writ petitions argues that concerned authority did not have any jurisdiction to restore the appeals either at the time of first restoration or even at the time of second restoration. Learned Counsel points out that dismissal of the appeals was on October 20, 1989 while the restoration applications were made on December 20, 1989 which was beyond a period of 30 days. He also points out that curiously enough in both the applications identical reason of ill-health was given. He also further points out that there were no supporting documents to suggest any ill disposition on the part of the respondent employees on the date when the appeals were posted for hearing i.e. on September 28, 1989 or when it was dismissed, i.e. on October 20, 1989. Learned Counsel therefore, says that the concerned authority lacked jurisdiction to restore appeals. He also further says that even if it could be said that the concerned authority had the jurisdiction, even then, the concerned authority ought to have taken into consideration the objection raised on behalf of the employer and such consideration would have been reflected in the orders.Learned Counsel has taken me through the order and has pointed out that the only reason given is that there were good reasons for restoration of appeals. Learned Counsel also very fairly makes a statement that in one other case in W.P. No. 4417 of 1991 by order dated June 24, 1999 this Court has chosen to dismiss the writ petition which is similar in nature in case of third employee in one M. P. Arumugham. However, according to the learned Counsel there are some distinguishing factors in the present writ petitions and therefore, these writ petitions cannot be disposed of in the manner in which W.P. No. 4417 of 1991 was disposed of by this Court on June 24, 1999. Rule 9-A of the Rules runs hereunder : "9-A Re-hearing of Appeals : (1) In any appeal preferred under the Act, if the employer or his representative fails to appear on the specified date, the appellate authority may proceed to hear and determine the appeal ex-parte. (2) In any appeal preferred under the Act, if the appellant fails to appear on the specified date the appellate authority may dismiss the appeal. (3) Nothwithstanding anything contained in sub-rules (1) and (2), an order passed under either of those sub-rules may be set aside and the appeal reheard on good cause being shown within one month of the date of the said order, notice being served on the opposite party of the date fixed for such rehearing." A glance at the rule suggests that where the employer or the representative fails to appear on the specified date, the appellate authority can proceed to hear and determine the appeal ex parte. Sub-rule (2) suggests, where the appellant fails to appear on the specified date, the appellate authority can dismiss the appeal. What is important is Rule 9-A(3). It specifically applies to both, sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2), meaning where the concerned authority has proceeded ex parte or where the concerned authority has dismissed the appeals in default, under Rule 9-A(3) there is power to restore such dismissed appeal under sub-rule (2). What is important is Rule 9-A(3). It specifically applies to both, sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2), meaning where the concerned authority has proceeded ex parte or where the concerned authority has dismissed the appeals in default, under Rule 9-A(3) there is power to restore such dismissed appeal under sub-rule (2). However, with one rider and that is cause for absence has to be shown within one month of the date of the order of dismissal or the ex parte order, as the case may be and notice has to be served on the opposite party of the date fixed for such rehearing.There is no dispute to the claim made by the petitioner that the applications for restoration came to be made only on December 20, 1989 which was clearly beyond the mandatory period of 30 days under Rule 9-A(3) of the Rules. Under the circumstances, the concerned authority could not have entertained the application made beyond 30 days, i.e. on December 20, 1989. The said authority has not at all considered Rule 9-A(3) of the Rules while restoring the appeals. In the appeals there is no mention of Rule 9-A(3). Learned Counsel points out that in fact, these objections were raised by way of a counter. The appellate authority in his restoration order does not seem to have taken note of any of the objections raised on behalf of the employer in the counter opposing the restoration. Thus, it is clear that the authority has acted without jurisdiction in first entertaining the restoration application, which was made beyond the period of 30 days, and consequently, in not considering the objection raised in that behalf by the employer. This position was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge who has decided W.P. No. 4417 of 1991. Therefore, there would be no escape from the conclusion that the restoration application could not have been entertained at all. Even on merits, the concerned authority has not considered any objection raised by the petitioner before it, by way of a counter nor has it chosen to give any reasons. I am afraid, merely saying that there are good grounds for restoring the appeal would not be a proper exercise of the discretion. Therefore, even on merits, the order lacks application of mind. I am afraid, merely saying that there are good grounds for restoring the appeal would not be a proper exercise of the discretion. Therefore, even on merits, the order lacks application of mind. Under such circumstances, learned Counsel is right when he says that the restoration would and could not have been ordered. The writ petitions therefore, succeed and the impugned orders are set aside. Rule already granted is made absolute in the above terms. No costs. Consequently, W.M.Ps are dismissed.