Judgment :- C.M.A. 335 of 1993 has been filed against the award in M.C.O.P. No. 490 of 1989, C.M.A. 336 of 1993 has been filed against the award in M.C.O.P. No. 684 of 1989 and C.M.A. 337 of 1993 is against the award passed in M.C.O.P. No. 683 of 1989 all of them on the file of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, District Judge of Ramanathapuram at Madurai. The Transport Corporation who has suffered the three awards has filed the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. 2. In the same accident three persons died and the heirs of those deceased came up with the claim petitions. The accident occurred under the following circumstances On 16.3.1989 the deceased were travelling in the Ambassador Car bearing Registration No. TNW 3312 from Madurai to Tuticorin via Kovilpatti from north to south one of the deceased Dakshina Boopathi was the driver of the vehicle and the other two were the passengers. At about 4.15 p.m. when the was approaching Balaji Metal Works, Sattur Main Road the bus bearing registration No. T.C.P. 7989 belonging to the appellant-corporation driven by its driver collided with the car headon. The car was badly damaged and the two passengers Narasimha Rao and Renuka as also the driver Dakshina Boopathi sustained severe injuries and succumbed to the same. 3. The heirs of the deceased, as already stated, filed independent applications before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ramanathapuram at Madurai claiming damages. The heirs of Renuka claimed Rs. 15 lakhs, the Narasimha Rao claimed Rs. 20 lakhs and the drivers heirs claimed Rs. 4,50,500/-. The claims were opposed seriously by the appellant-corporation on several grounds. The Tribunal by a common judgment dated 13.8.1992 awarded compensation as follows; (i) In M.C.O.P. 490 of 1989 as against a claim of Rs. 4,50,500/- Rs. 71,000/- was awarded, (ii) In M.C.O.P. 683 of 1989 as against a claim of Rs. 15 lakhs Rs. 9, 35, 000/- was awarded and in M.C.O.P. 684 of 1989 as against a claim of Rs. 20 lakhs Rs. 12, 38, 000/- was awarded. 4. The Tribunal found that the accident was entirely due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle belonging to the appellant-corporation. With regard to the various sums awarded the Tribunal took into consideration the materials produced by the claimants, the oral and documentary evidence and arrived at the quantum. 12, 38, 000/- was awarded. 4. The Tribunal found that the accident was entirely due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle belonging to the appellant-corporation. With regard to the various sums awarded the Tribunal took into consideration the materials produced by the claimants, the oral and documentary evidence and arrived at the quantum. As against the same the present appeals have been filed. 5. Mrs. Kala Ramesh appearing for the appellant-corporation besides submitting that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus driver, further urged that in any event the amounts awarded were disproportionately on the high side and sought the amounts to be reduced. She also relied on a number of judgments and in particular with regard to the guidelines for fixing the quantum in accident matters. 6. Mr. Nazvi Ahmed and Mr. S. Kunalan appearing for the respondents sought to support the conclusion reached by the Tribunal. They also relied on a number of authorities. 7. So far as the negligence part of the matter is concerned a perusal of the common judgment of the Tribunal clearly shows that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus driver. The learned counsel for the appellant-corporation has not been able to satisfy us to how a different decision could have been reached. In this view we hold that me decision of the Tribunal that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver cannot be taken exceptionrto. 8. Let us now advert to the individual cases as regards the quantum fixed. “So far as C.M.A. 335 of 1993 is concerned as against the claim of Rs. 4,50,500/- the Tribunal made an award of Rs. 71,000/- We are satisfied that mis is based on relevant details available on record. We do not find any infirmity in the reasons given by the Tribunal in fixing the quantum at Rs. 71,000/- and the same is confirmed. 9. Coming to C.M.A. 336 of 1993 against M.C.O.P. No. 684 of 1989, it is seen from the records that the deceased Narasimha Rao was aged 34 years, he was at that time working as an Engineer in Tata Consultancy, Bangalore. At the time of the accident his salary was Rs. 5,352/-. 71,000/- and the same is confirmed. 9. Coming to C.M.A. 336 of 1993 against M.C.O.P. No. 684 of 1989, it is seen from the records that the deceased Narasimha Rao was aged 34 years, he was at that time working as an Engineer in Tata Consultancy, Bangalore. At the time of the accident his salary was Rs. 5,352/-. If he had lived he would have worked for another 26 years. He would have risen in the hierarchy and become the principal engineer or consulting engineer. Needless to say that the salary would have increased manifold. The Tribunal fixed the monthly average income at Rs. 4,000/- calculated the compensation by taking the multiplier as 25 and arrived at a figure of Rs. 12,38,000/- including the amounts payable for loss of consortium; love and affection, etc., 10. So far as Renuka was concerned, he was working as Deputy Chief Engineer at the time of accident. He was 49 years of age. His salary was Rs. 9,857/-. Just at the time of his death communication had been sent promoting him as Additional Chief Engineer on a monthly pay of Rs. 10,209. The Tribunal fixed the average monthly contribution of Renuka to his family at Rs. 7,500/-used a multiplier of 10 and arrived at a figure of Rs. 9,35,000/- as the compensation payable to his heirs and this amount included the amounts for loss of consortium loss of love and affection, etc., 11. It is not disputed that both Narasimha Rao and Renuka were holding very high posts in their organisations. Renuka was Deputy Chief Engineer and order promoting him as Additional Chief Engineer was received after his death. It is also in evidence that the organisation increased the salary of its employees every three years and both of them would have reached very high positions in the company where they were working in due course. 12. It would now be necessary to refer to the various authorities relied on by both councel. (i) In Concord India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi (1980 ACJ 55) the Supreme Court has observed that determination in accident cases must be liberal and not niggardly. 12. It would now be necessary to refer to the various authorities relied on by both councel. (i) In Concord India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi (1980 ACJ 55) the Supreme Court has observed that determination in accident cases must be liberal and not niggardly. (ii) In Hardeo Kaur and others v. Rajasthan State Roadtransport Corporation and another (1992 ACJ 300 (1992) 2 SCC 567 =1992-2-L.W. 732) a multiplier of 24 was adopted and deduction was disallowed for lumpsum payment and interest was increased from 6% to 12%. The Supreme Court also took into consideration the delay in the disposal of the claim petition in arriving at the final compensation. (iii) In General Manager, Kerala State Reod Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas and others , (1994) 2 SCC 176 ) the Supreme Court has explained the multiplier method and applied the same to determine the quantum of compensation. The Supreme Court observed as follows: “For assessment of damages to compensate the dependants, it has to take into account many imponderables, e.g., the life expectancy of the deceased and the dependants, the amount that the deceased would have earned during the remainder of his life, the amount that he would have contributed to the dependants during that period the chances that the deceased may not have lived or the dependants may not live up to the estimated remaining period of their life expectancy, the chances that the deceased might have got better employment or income altogether.” The Supreme Court further observed as follows:— “The manner of arriving at the damages is to ascertain the net income of the deceased available for the support of himself and his dependants, and to deduct therefrom such part of his income as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon himself, as regards both self-maintenance and pleasure, and to ascertain what part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of the defendants. Then that should be capitalised by multiplying it by a figure representing the proper number of years purchase.” In that case where the deceased aged 38 years and employed in a newspaper establishment on a monthly salary of Rs. 1,032/- died in a motor accident in February 1984 leaving behind his parents, widow and children as claimants, the Supreme Court held that a multiplier of 12 and multiplicand of Rs. 1,032/- died in a motor accident in February 1984 leaving behind his parents, widow and children as claimants, the Supreme Court held that a multiplier of 12 and multiplicand of Rs. 17,000/- per annum would be proper to adopt. (iv) In S. Chandran v. Pallavan Transport Corporation (1994) 2 SCC 189 ) which was decided on January 17, 1994 just 11 days after the decision in Susammas Case, another two Judges Bench has, where the deceased was 42 years, used a multiplier of 20. Apparently, the judgment in Susammas case was not brought to the notice of the latter Bench. (v) In Sarla Dixit and another v. Balwant Yadav and others ( (1996) 3 SCC 179 ) another two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the multiplier method as explained in Susammas case being a scientific method must be applied. In that case an army officer of the rank of Captain aged 27 years died in motor accident leaving behind his widow and a daughter. At the time of his death his gross monthly salary was Rs. 1,543/-. During his 7 years service period he had received several medals and became qualified for next promotion at the time of his death. The Supreme Court adopted a multiplier of 15 and quantified the compensation. (vi) In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others v. Trilok Chandra and others ( (1996) 4 SCC 362 = 1996-2-L.W. 366) a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court reiterated the method of working out the just compensation by using the multiplier method and that there should not be any departure from the multiplier method. The multiplier cannot exceed 18 years purchase factor, which is in conformity with the second schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act. (vii) In Rattan Lal Mehta v. Rajinder Kapoor and another (1996 ACJ 372) a Bench of the Delhi High Court has laid down the following principles for assessing the damages in motor accident cases. “(1) Full and fair compensation has to be paid for non-pecuniary damages and not as a matter of solace. (2) Victims who are unconscious be awarded for loss of amenities and loss of expectation of life. “(1) Full and fair compensation has to be paid for non-pecuniary damages and not as a matter of solace. (2) Victims who are unconscious be awarded for loss of amenities and loss of expectation of life. (3) Victims who are unconscious be also awarded for pain and suffering because the tortfeasor was not to gain an advantage by involving the victim in an accident which made him unconscious, (4) Awards already made for similar injuries may be taken into consideration but it would be necessary to increase the figure keeping in mind the effect of inflation over the period. (5) Both positive and negative factors may be taken into account extent to which the good things of life were taken away (loss of amenities) and the positive infliction of unpleasant things (pain and suffering). (6) Cases of injuries can be classified into four major categories; (a) total wreck, (b) partial wreck, (c) where limbs or eyes and other specific parts of the body are lost, and d) small injuries, Brackets or range for non-pecuniary damages may be made in conventional figures keeping pace with the times and taking into account inflation, advances in science, medicine and rehabilitation. (7) Compensation higher under one subhead or lower under another, than claimed, may be granted, so long as the award does not exceed the total amount claimed. (8) Separate itemisation under various subheads like pain and suffering, loss of amenities in life, loss of expectation of life, disfigurement and discomfort or inconvenience is necessary. (9) Non-pecuniary damages cannot be kept low because pecuniary damages are high. “ (10) There can generally be no discrimination between rich and poor victims for evaluating non-pecuniary damages.”, (viii) In M. Manoharan and another v. Gandhimathi and others (1996 ACJ 1030 = 1994-2-L.W. 382) a Bench of this Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in making any deduction for personal expenses of the deceased as it had not taken into consideration the future increments in his salary and the family had been deprived of additional benefits such as free medical aid, free travel facilities and availability of food articles at concessional rates in railway co-operative store. In that case a multiplier of 22 was adopted. 13. In that case a multiplier of 22 was adopted. 13. Bearing the above, principles in mind if we examine the cases on hand, it would be abundantly clearly that the Tribunal has made a proper assessment of the various things that had to be taken into consideration in arriving at the quantum, expect with regard to one or two aspects. 14. So far as Renuka was concerned the Tribunal had taken a multiplier of 10 for arriving at Rs. 9,35,000/-. He was getting a salary of Rs. 9,875/-. But it should be stated that the future increase in the salary had not been taken of by the Tribunal. As already noticed Renuka would have reached a very high position in the hierarchy and he would have been easily clearing more, than, ten thousand rupees per month. If we fix the Quantum of his monthly contribution to the family at not less than Rs. 7,500/-. on an average and fix the multiplier at 10, the loss would have been in the region of 10 lakhs rupees. The Tribunal has fixed the quantum at Rs. 9,35,000/-. The amount quantified by the Tribunal in MC.O.P. No. 683 of 1989 in C.M.A. Np. 337 of 1993 is therefore confirmed. 15. Coming to Narasimha Raos case, he was getting a salary of Rs. 5,352/- per month. He was 34 years old and he would also have reached a very high position in the organisation. The Tribunal has observed that if he had lived and had been promoted, his monthly salary would have been Rs. 12,215/-. His contribution could have been not less than Rs. 7,500 and if the maximum multiplier of 18 is used, the amount of compensation would have beeterlnuch more. However, the Tribunal has fixed the compensation at Rs. 12 lakhs. We do not find any infirmity in the award passed by the Tribunal. The award of the Tribunal in M.C.O.P No. 684 of 1989 is also/confirmed. All the appeals fail and they are dismissed. No costs.