ORDER V.K. Agrawal, J. This revision is directed against the order dt. 11-11-1998 by IInd Civil Judge, Class-II, Raipur in Civil Suit No. 133-A/1998, whereby the application (Annexure A-5) of respondents Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 under Order 1, Rule 1 read with Rule 10 and 13 of CPC for impleading them as party in the suit filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs, was allowed. Undisputably, the plaintiffs/petitioners are the children of Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank. Brijlal Tank was also the son of said Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank and the brother of petitioners/plaintiffs. The property in dispute is Khasra No. 475/3 situate at Modhapara, Raipur. The plaintiffs/petitioners filed a suit, (copy of plaint Annexure A-1) alleging that the property in dispute was purchased in two instalments by Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank in the name of his son Brijlal Tank. By the first sale deed dt. 18-6-1953, 6090 sq.ft. of land of said Khasra No. 475/3 was purchased, while subsequently on 5-10-1955 by another sale deed 2813 sq. ft. of land of same Khasra was purchased. Both the sale deeds were got executed by Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank in favour of his son Brijlal Tank. After the purchase as above of the said property, Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank constructed several shops over the suit land. The shops are in occupation of various tenants. Out of the shops constructed on the suit property, a shop was in occupation of defendants/respondent No. 1 Ranjitsingh Dhuman, while two other shops were in possession of Brijlal Tank. Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank died in the year 1965. The case of plaintiffs/petitioners was that thereafter the aforesaid property in suit became the Joint Hindu Family ancestral property of the plaintiffs, in which plaintiffs and their brother Brijlal Tank had equal share. After the death of their father, Brijlal Tank realised rent from the tenants of the shops constructed on the suit property, and also continued to carry on his business in the shops in his occupation. Brijlal Tank died in the year 14-4-1997. The case of plaintiffs/petitioners further was that after the death of Brijlal Tank, defendants Nos. 1 to 3 instigated the tenant of the shops standing on the suit property, not to pay rent to the plaintiffs. They with mala fide intention also filed an application for mutation of their names setting up an alleged Will dt. 17-4-1994 allegedly executed by Brijlal Tank. 1 to 3 instigated the tenant of the shops standing on the suit property, not to pay rent to the plaintiffs. They with mala fide intention also filed an application for mutation of their names setting up an alleged Will dt. 17-4-1994 allegedly executed by Brijlal Tank. According to the plaintiff/petitioner the Will was a forgery and was obtained by fraud and was null and void. The plaintiffs/petitioners prayed for declaration : (a) that the suit property is the ancestral property of the plaintiffs and that they are the title holders and owners thereof; (b) that the alleged Will dt. 17-5-1994 alleged to be executed by Brijlal Tank was null and void. They also claimed relief of permanent injunction: (1) against the defendant/respondent No. 1 restraining him from transferring the suit property; (2) against defendants Nos. 4 and 5 not to record the names of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 on the suit property and to record the names of plaintiffs as the owners of the suit property. In the said suit respondents Nos. 6 to 9 filed an application (Annexure A-5), under Order 1, Rule 1,10 and 13, CPC for their impleadment in the suit. It was averred in the said application that they are also daughters of Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank, by his second wife Gomti Ben Tank and that Brijlal Tank was their brother. Therefore, the respondents Nos. 6 to 9 have also right, title and interest in the suit property and therefore they are necessary and proper parties. The said application was allowed by the impugned order and the applicants/respondents Nos. 6 to 9 herein have been ordered to be impleaded. The learned counsel for petitioners/plaintiffs in the first place urged that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and is free to frame the suit as he chooses. He cannot be forced to join the respondents Nos. 6 to 9 as parties. Reliance in this connection has been placed by the learned counsel on Muslim Wakf Board and Another Vs. Municipal Board, , wherein it has been laid down that plaintiff cannot be compelled against his wishes to implead any one as a defendant. He is perfectly at liberty to frame his suit in any way. 6 to 9 as parties. Reliance in this connection has been placed by the learned counsel on Muslim Wakf Board and Another Vs. Municipal Board, , wherein it has been laid down that plaintiff cannot be compelled against his wishes to implead any one as a defendant. He is perfectly at liberty to frame his suit in any way. As the persons who are not parties to the suit are not bound by the result, it does not at all matter to them as to how the case is decided. It has further been urged that the respondents Nos. 6 to 9 are neither necessary nor proper parties in the suit and therefore the plaintiffs/petitioners could not be directed to join them as party. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the Full Bench decision of this Panne Khushali and Another Vs. Jeewanlal Mathoo Khatik and Another, and Kishorilal vs. Lekhraj, 1981 (2) M.P. W.N. 65. As against the above, the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 6 to 9 has urged that, they are also the daughters of Late Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank and therefore, they have equal right over the property, as that of plaintiffs/petitioners. It has further been urged that the plaintiffs/petitioners has sought declaration that they alone are the owners of the suit property and an injunction in the nature of direction to Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 -Municipal Corporation, Raipur has been sought to record the plaintiffs/appellants' names over the suit property. In view of such a claim having been raised by the petitioners/plaintiffs the presence of respondents Nos. 6 to 9 was necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case. It has therefore been urged that the presence of respondents Nos. 6 to 9 is necessary for complete and effectual adjudication of the dispute, regarding the suit property; and therefore the trial Court was fully justified in directing their impleadment. The Apex Court in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia Vs. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, has observed that, the law as to who are necessary or proper parties to a proceeding is well settled. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. It is true that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and is free to frame the suit as he chooses and to implead such parties as he may think fit. However, Order 1, Rule 10(2), CPC empowers the Court to implead any person as party suo motu, who ought to have been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and to settle all the questions involved in the suit. Therefore, though the plaintiff is dominus litis but the Court has the power on consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case, as to whether prayer regarding impleadment deserves to be allowed under Order 1, Rule 10(2), Civil Procedure Code. Of course, such a discretion has to be exercised judicially, as laid down in Kamta Prasad and Others Vs. Smt. Vidyawati and Others, . It has been held therein that, if a person is vitally interested in the litigation and if the decree which may ultimately be passed in the said litigation is vitally to affect his right, he may apply to be added as a party under Order 1, Rule 10(2), Civil Procedure Code. In Razia Begum Vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and Others, it has been laid down as below: The question of addition of parties under Rule 10 or Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the Court, but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case, but in some cases, it may raise controversies as to the power of the Court, in contradistinction of its inherent jurisdiction, or in other words, of jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it is used in Section 115 of the Code. In a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject-matter of the litigation. In a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject-matter of the litigation. Where the subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is of the opinion that by adding that party, it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. In the instant case, though it appears that respondents Nos. 6 to 9 are not necessary parties to the suit, still the question that deserves consideration is as to whether the presence of respondents Nos. 6 to 9 in the suit would enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and to settle all the questions involved in the suit? From para 13 of the plaint (Annexure A-1) it would appear that the plaintiffs/petitioners inter alia claimed that they alone are the owners and title holders of the suit land and that they have also prayed that their names be recorded by respondents Nos. 4 and 5 in Municipal records, as owners thereof. The respondents Nos. 6 to 9 in their application (Annexure A-5) have stated that the plaintiffs are the children of Late Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank from his wife Prem Ben Tank, while respondents Nos. 6 to 9 are the daughters of Gomti Ben Tank, another wife of Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank. Therefore, they have also inherited the suit property and have the same interest therein as that of plaintiffs. Obviously, if the averments of respondents Nos. 6 to 9 as above are established and accepted then they also would have equal share along with the plaintiffs/petitioners in the suit property left by their father Jairam Bhijji Bhai Tank, and consequently the exclusive right and claim over the suit property as asserted by the plaintiffs, would stand negatived. Therefore, for completely and effectually deciding the controversy in the suit and before the relief claimed by the plaintiffs/petitioners could possibly be granted to them, it was necessary that the respondents Nos. 6 to 9 be also permitted to raise their contentions and heard in support thereof. Therefore, the presence of respondents Nos. Therefore, for completely and effectually deciding the controversy in the suit and before the relief claimed by the plaintiffs/petitioners could possibly be granted to them, it was necessary that the respondents Nos. 6 to 9 be also permitted to raise their contentions and heard in support thereof. Therefore, the presence of respondents Nos. 6 to 9 appears to be necessary in order to completely and effectually adjudicate upon and to settle the questions involved in the suit. In view of above, the prayer of respondents Nos. 6 to 9 for their impleadment was rightly allowed by the impugned order. In Panne Khushali and another (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioners, the plaintiff had brought a suit for specific performance of contract of sale. Some persons-strangers to the said contract filed the petition for impleadment claiming that they were also the co-owners of the contracted property. It was held that such strangers to the contract making a claim adverse to the title of the defendant (Vendor) and raising the contention that they are also co-owners of the contracted property are neither necessary nor proper parties. It was also observed in that case that, if the application of such strangers was allowed and they were impleaded as parties in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance as filed, would be enlarged and it would be turned into a suit for title. It was also observed that to decide the rights between the parties regarding the contract of sale, the presence of the applicants claiming to be the owner was not at all necessary. It was therefore held that the scope of the suit could not be widened and as the plaintiff is the dominus litis he could not be forced to add such persons as parties against whom, he does not wish to fight. In Kishorilal's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioners/plaintiffs, it appears that the dispute was between the tenant and landlord regarding demolishing the latrine. It was observed therein that the proper forum for deciding such a dispute was the Rent Controlling Authority and not the Civil Court. It was held therefore that Masjid could not be directed to be added as a party as there was no dispute between the plaintiff and the Masjid. It was observed therein that the proper forum for deciding such a dispute was the Rent Controlling Authority and not the Civil Court. It was held therefore that Masjid could not be directed to be added as a party as there was no dispute between the plaintiff and the Masjid. In the above view of the matter application under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC by Masjid was dismissed. However, the facts of the instant case as noticed above are entirely different. As noticed earlier, the presence of respondents Nos. 6 to 9 is necessary for effectually and completely deciding the dispute between the parties. The proposition of law as laid down in both the above cases relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioners/plaintiffs therefore does not render any assistance to their stand. Therefore, the discretion exercised by the. trial Court in permitting impleadment of respondents Nos. 6 to 9, as prayed by them appears to be properly exercised. Interference by this Court in the impugned order, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction does not appear to be called for. Accordingly, this revision has no merit and is dismissed. Parties shall however bear their own costs of this revision. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed