V.Kanagaraj, J.: This habeas corpus petition filed by the detenu Srinivasan Kanakaraj, son of Srinivasan, is with prayer to issue a writ of habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ or order of direction to call for and quash the detention order dated 7.9.1998 passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu, as per G.O.No.Sr.I/802-5/98, dated 7.9.1998, Public (SC) Department and to produce the body of the detenu, confined in Central Prison, Chennai, before the court and set him at liberty forthwith and award costs, damages and compensation. 2. The case put forth as per the affidavit filed by the detenu himself is that the first respondent/ State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Secretary to Government, Public (SC) Department, passing the G.O.No.SR.I/802-5/98, dated 7.9.1998, has detained him under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the COFEPOSA Act); that he is innocent and has not violated either the Customs Act, 1962 or the laws of Imports or any other law of the land; that he got arrested under the Customs Act, 1962 on 31.7.1998 and remanded to judicial custody by Addl. C.M.M.(E.O.) II, Egmore, Chennai, that prior to remand, the sponsoring authority not only extracted his incriminating statement subjecting him to coercion and torture and in exercise of undue influence but also warned him against making complaints before the Magistrate; that he was shocked and became psychologically upset. He would reiterate the already retracted statements made by him and would pray to declare that his detention order is void, invalid, arbitrary, discriminatory and unconstitution and would pray to set him at liberty. 3. It is relevant to assess the grounds based on which the order of detention dated 7.9.1998 came to be passed under Sec.3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA Act. As per the grounds of detention, on 31.7.1988, Srinivasan. Kanakaraj, the detenu, holder of an Indian Passport No.0892420, issued at Tiruchirapali on 4.3.1994 arrived from Dubai Via Muscat to Chennai by Gulf Air Flight No.GF V068/31.7.98 at Anna International Airport, Chennai and proceeded to Customs table No.21 along with his blue colour Zipper bag carried as hand baggage and two checked-in-baggage and had declared to the Superintendent of Customs, in the presence of witnesses, that he was not having V.C.R./T.V./ Video Camera/Gold/silver and that the goods in his possession were worth only Rs.20,000. He claimed ownership of the three bags and the contents therein and asserted that he was not in possession of goods worth more than Rs.20,000. Suspecting misdeclaration in the value of the goods, the detenu along with the three baggage was taken to the A.I.U. room for detailed examination wherein followed by search of his person, the three baggage were opened and goods such as wrist watches, contact lenses, optical frames etc. were recovered, as detailed in the recovery mahazar. 4. It is further contended that the detenu was not a registered importer nor had he been in possession of any licence to import the items recovered from the baggage in the presence of witnesses but has grossly misdeclared the valued of the goods brought by him to evade customs duty and the said items were seized under the cover of mahazar for action under the Customs Act, 1962 read with the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992. His travel documents viz., air tickets, boarding passes, customs clearance card, checked-in-paggage tags and their respective claim tags were all seized under the said mahazar for further action under the Customs Act along with an Indian Airlines ticket used of his travel from Bangkok to Calcutta and an unused coupon for travel from Calcutta to Bangkok. 5. The further contentions of the detention order are that in his voluntary statement dated 31.7.1998 given before the Customs Officer at Chennai International Airport, he has stated that he could read and write Tamil and English; that he is a B.Com. 5. The further contentions of the detention order are that in his voluntary statement dated 31.7.1998 given before the Customs Officer at Chennai International Airport, he has stated that he could read and write Tamil and English; that he is a B.Com. graduate; that using the same passport he had been to Hongkong and Bangkok several times and brought small quantities of goods like hair clips and key chains to Chennai and sold them and earned small profits that on 26.7.1998, he went to Dubai from Mumbai for the first time and with intent to earn more profit, he purchased the items seized and arrived at Chennai International Airport on 31.7.1998 along with the baggage containing the said goods detailed in the annexure to mahazar; that when he went to Dubai, he took 1,500 U.S. Dollars; that from one Ganesan, who is working in Dubai, he had a loan of 35,000 Dirhams and with the said money and the U.S.Dollars, he purchased the goods seized; that the said Ganesan asked the detenu to repay the loan amount to his nominee after selling the goods in Chennai; that since the goods are unauthorised and while being attempted to evade customs duty, the Customs Officer seized them and the said act had been perpetrated to his knowledge and he is aware that the smuggling of large quantities of such goods into India for trade purposes without licence and evading customs Duty is an offence; that only with intent to earn more profit he did it; that he gave the statement voluntarily; that in his further statement dated 31.7.1998 given before the Customs Officer, he had given his permanent address at No.6/129-1-25, Indira Nagar, Lakshmipuram post, Kovilpatti and as a follow-up action, the Customs Officials held a search of the said premises and found no incriminating goods or documents; that the act perpetrated in import of watches, contact lenses and optical frames and glass stones in trade quantity without a licence from the competent authority is prohibited by Sec.11(2)(u) of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Sec.3(3) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 by the import of the said goods without a valid permit or licence and by misdeclaring the value of goods in order to evade customs duty, the detenu rendered the goods liable for confiscation under Sec.111(d)(1) and (m) of the Customs Act, 1962 further the detenu himself becoming liable for penal action under Sec.112(a) of the said Act. 6. The other contentions of the detention order are regarding the arrest of the detenu on 31.7.1998 under the Customs Act, 1962 and causing his production with the Additional C.M.M., E.O. II, Chennai who initially remanded him to judicial custody till 13.8.1998 recording no complaint of ill-treatment, that his arrest was communicated to his father by telegram; that on 31.7.1998 itself, the bail application had been filed on his behalf in the said Magistrate’s court denying the allegations and retracting the confessional statements stating that they were not given voluntarily but recorded under coercion, threat and in exercise of undue influence. The said bail application was dismissed on 3.8.1998. Another bail application dated 3.8.1998 in the same Magistrate’s court was filed with the same averments further stating that the value of the baggage brought by him was less than the value adopted by the Customs Officials, who in their counter dated 6.8.1998 have denied the averments of the bail application as false and the said court dismissed the bail application on 1.6.1998. 7. The further contentions of the detention order are that the detenu had also sent the representation dated 3.8.1998 to the Commissioner of Customs stating that the goods were prohibited items but valued exhorbitantly and that he was compelled to write the statements under coercion and threat further giving the value of the said goods as Rs.1,75,000 for which the Customs Department in their reply dated 13.8.1998 have stated that the value adopted was based on the price list and market enquiries further pointing out that as per the provisions of Sec.77 of the Customs Act, he had not declared the real value of the goods; that as per the court’s order dated 17.8.1998, the detenu was directed to be produced on 27.8.1998 when the remand period got extended upto 10.9.1998; that from all the above materials placed, the state Government stated that it is necessary to detain him under the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act. 1974 with the view to prevent him from indulging in smuggling goods in future; that while arriving at the subjective satisfaction to detain him under the said Act, the State Government have taken into consideration all the facts and materials referred to above and relied upon besides the statements, mahazars etc., that the State Government are also aware of the fact that he is a remand prisoner in the Central Prison, Chennai and his likelihood of being released on bail; that in such event, while on bail the likelihood of the detenu indulging in acts prejudicial to the public interest and there is compelling necessity to prevent him from indulging in such activities and hence his detention under Sec.3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 is to prevent him from smuggling goods in future; that the detenu had also been informed that he had a right to make representation to the Detaining Authority/State Government and also the Government of India, if he so desired, in writing against the order of detention addressing the same to the Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, Public (L & O) Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9 or the Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue (COFEPOSA Section), Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, Janpath Bhavan, Janpath, New Delhi, as the case may be and forward the same through the Superintendent, Central Prison, Chennai, as expeditiously as possible; that he had also been informed that any representation made by him will be duly considered by the State and Central Governments and would also be placed before the State Advisory Board (COFEPOSA) for consideration of his case under Sec.8 of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, He had also been further informed that he was entitled to be heard in person by the State Advisory Board (COFEPOSA); he had also been informed that if he is desired to make any written representation before the Advisory Board against his detention, he might sent the same to the Chairman, State Advisory Board (COFEPOSA) Act, High Court Buildings, Chennai-104 through the Superintendent, Central Prison, Chennai without prejudice to his right to make oral representation before the said Advisory Board at the time of his personal hearing by the said Advisory Board and that if he desired to have the assistance of a friend other than a Lawyer at the time of personal hearing of his case by the State Advisory Board (COFEPOSA Act), he could keep his friend ready for that purpose. The above detention order has bene signed by the Secretary to Government, Public (SC) Department, Government of Tamil Nadu. 8. With the above facts and circumstances of the case as revealed by the detention order, the grounds of detention and as put forth by means of the habeas corpus petition, the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the first and second respondents, the representations made on behalf of the detenu by his father and the other communications had and the orders passed at different stages, the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents during their arguments would submit as follows: [Paras. 9 to 31 omitted - Ed.] 32. With the above facts and circumstances as put forth by parties in their respective pleadings and on perusal of the grounds raised on the part of the detenu and the explanation offered justifying the order of detention and the grounds of detention order and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, what comes to be known is that it is a preventive detention of the detenu based on subjective satisfaction and bereft of trial and the high sense of the duties and responsibilities cast on the authorities concerned in the process of making the order and thereafter in considering the representation made on the part of the detenu so as to arrive at the conclusion that they have arrived at in justifying the detention order and rejecting the representation of the detenu and at the same time without losing sight of the paramount consideration that are to be attached to the interest of the nation and the protection of the country and it is economy from the social menace of ‘smuggling’ as pointed out in the Full Bench judgment, of the Kerala High Court reported in Sivapackyam v. Commissioner and Secretary, Home SSA Department, Government of Kerala, Trivandrum, 1996 Crl.L.J. 840. Even though many number of grounds have been raised in the habeas corpus petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner, during his argument, would restrict himself only with certain important grounds and hence we too restrict our discussion, in order to arrive at the decision, with those grounds, which are alone relied upon by the detenu. 33. Even though many number of grounds have been raised in the habeas corpus petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner, during his argument, would restrict himself only with certain important grounds and hence we too restrict our discussion, in order to arrive at the decision, with those grounds, which are alone relied upon by the detenu. 33. At the outset, the detenu has raised the point that material documents such as the bail application dated 21.8.1998 and 4.9.1998 respectively made before the Court of Sessions and the High Court, the counters filed by the prosecution and the orders passed thereon have been suppressed and not considered and the very existence of those material documents on the date of order, invalidates the order of detention. In answer to this, it would be argued on the part of the respondents that the dismissed bail applications and the orders passed thereon are not the documents relied upon and that it is the settled law that once the bail application is dismissed, the bail application and the order passed thereon will not serve as material documents and non-placement of these documents before the Detaining Authority will not vitiate the detention order. To substantiate their claim, many number of judgments would be cited by the respondents. The first one being Syed Farooq Mohammad v. Union of India and another, 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 500, wherein it is held: “...Bail application having been rejected after passing of detention order, neither considered by Detaining Authority in coming to his subjective satisfaction, nor referred to in grounds - In the circumstances held, non-supply of the documents to the detenu did not prejudice him in making effective representation...” It is further held therein: “...firstly there is nothing to show from the grounds of detention that the rejection of this bail application by the Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay on January 5, 1990 was considered by the Detaining Authority before passing the impugned order of detention and as such this being not referred to in the grounds of detention, the documents had not been supplied to the petitioner, and it, therefore, cannot be urged that non-supply of this document prejudiced the petitioner in making effective representation against the order of detention. Art.22(5) of the Constitution, undoubtedly, mandates that all the relevant documents referred to in the grounds of detention and which are considered by the Detaining Authority in coming to his subjective satisfaction for clamping an order of detention are to be supplied to the detenu. The said document was not considered by the Detaining Authority in coming to his subjective satisfaction and in making the impugned order of detention. The non-furnishing to the detenu of the said document i.e., the bail application and the order passed thereon, does not affect in any manner whatsoever the detenu’s right to make an effective representation in compliance with the provisions of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. This ground, therefore, is wholly untenable.” The second judgment cited in this context is from Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India and others, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1. In this case, the Apex Court has cited yet another already decided case viz., Abdul Sattar Abdul Kadar Shaikh v. Union of India, (1990)1 S.C.C. 480 , wherein it is observed that the detenu himself was aware of the contents of the bail application and the orders made thereon and these documents were not relied upon by the Detaining Authority, thus the court inter alia has to look into the question whether the detenu is in any way handicapped in making an effective representation by refusal to supply those documents, placing reliance on the said judgment (1990)1 S.C.C. 480 , the Apex Court held: “...If the bail application and the order refusing bail are not placed before the Detaining Authority or even if placed, if the Detaining Authority does not refer to or rely upon or has failed to take them into consideration, that by itself does not lead to an inference that there was suppression of relevant material or in the alternative that there was non-application of mind or that subjective satisfaction was impaired. When these documents are neither referred to nor relied upon, there is no need to supply the same to the detenu.” In the very same manner, we are able to see that in the case in hand also, the bail petitions filed both before the Court of Sessions and thereafter before the High Court on behalf of the detenu, the counter-affidavit filed on the part of the learned Public Prosecutors before both the said courts, the orders passed by both the courts in consideration of the bail applications respectively dated 21.6.1998 and 4.9.1998 since not relied upon by the Detaining Authority on many reasons besides the dismissal of both the bail applications by the courts, the claim of non-supply of the same to the detenu is immaterial and the question of suppression of the existence of these documents does not at all arise. The non-supply of the documents would not at all affect the order of detention in any manner. Thus rejecting the claim of the petitioner on this ground. 34. The other ground raised by the petitioner is that he was only a B.Com. graduate in Tamil medium and that he has no working knowledge in English and in site of having prayed for the supply of the communication in Tamil, a language known to him, the same had not been complied with and that the English version of the mahazar had been prepared behind his back without being read over and explained to him in Tamil. The detenu would base his argument on the sound principles settled by the Apex Court in a case delivered in Powanammal v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 618, wherein the non-supply of the order of remand to the detenu in Tamil, a language known to her, since she could not understand English has caused prejudice to her leading the Apex Court to hold her continued detention illegal. It has been further held therein: “The law relating to preventive detention has been crystallized and the principles are well neigh settled. The amplitude of the safeguard embodied in Art.22(5) extends not merely to oral explanation of the grounds of detention and the material in support thereof in the language understood by the detenu but also to supplying their translation in script or language which is understandable to the detenu. The amplitude of the safeguard embodied in Art.22(5) extends not merely to oral explanation of the grounds of detention and the material in support thereof in the language understood by the detenu but also to supplying their translation in script or language which is understandable to the detenu. Failure to do so would amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making a representation against the order.” The other important case cited by the petitioner is Rivadeneyeta Ricardo Agustin v. Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and others, 1994 S. C. C. (Crl.) 354, wherein the detention order was quashed on ground that the imminent possibility of coming out on bail was not considered by the Detaining Authority and would say that the imminent possibility of coming out on bail has not been categorically translated and stated in the Tamil Copy of the grounds of detention. On the part of the respondents, it would be claimed that the detenu cannot seek protection under these Apex Court judgments, which are made available only for those who do not understand English. Powanammal and Rivadenyta Ricardo Agustin being ignorant of English, they were extended with the benefits that accrued on account of the non-supply of the documents in a language known to them. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner would cite yet another judgment of this Court reported in Jahafar Ali v. Union of India, 1992 L.W. (Crl.) 527, wherein the importance of supply of the vital documents in all fairness in the language known to the detenu before rejection of the representation made by the detenu is stressed. But the position of the detenu in this case is different. The very question of non-supply of the documents in Tamil to the detenu does not arise at all since the detenu during examination by the Customs Officials had answered in English besides confirming that he was a graduate of B.Com. and that he knew to read and write both English and Tamil. Moreover, the very fact that the detenu is a graduate of B.Com. and that he knew to read and write both English and Tamil. Moreover, the very fact that the detenu is a graduate of B.Com. has not been denied and it is common knowledge that even if the medium of instruction is Tamil, so far as the subjects are concerned, both in the school and the college, the first language is English and a graduate ought to have passed out the first language i.e., English lest he would not have become the graduate at all. Therefore, it could be safely held that the petitioner becomes disentitled to claim the benefit of the findings of the Apex Court rendered in the above cited cases and we hold that the order of detention does not in any manner gets affected or become stale on account of this baseless ground alleged on the part of the detenu. 35. The third ground raised by the petitioner is that his father Mr.Srinivasan’s representation dated 9.10.1998 to the Government of Tamil Nadu, requesting to forward the same to the Detaining Authority had not been attended to as a result of which a copy of the same had to be sent to the Government of India in a belated manner on 5.11.1998. While arguing on this point, the learned counsel would cite a judgment reported in Navalshankar Ishawarlal Dave v. State of Gujarat, 1993 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1126, wherein the indifference or callousness in consideration and disposal of the representation is deprecated and the satisfactory explanation that is to be ordered by the respondents in consideration of the representation of the detenu is emphasized and the Apex Court has rather warned the concerned authorities stating that if no satisfactory explanation has been given or is found to be wilful or wanton or supinely indifferent, it would be in breach of the constitutional mandate of Art.22(5). The liberty of a person guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution is a cherished right and it can be deprived only in accordance with law. The other judgment cited for the same proposition is one reported in K.M.Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India, 1991 S.C.C. (Crl.) 613. The liberty of a person guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution is a cherished right and it can be deprived only in accordance with law. The other judgment cited for the same proposition is one reported in K.M.Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India, 1991 S.C.C. (Crl.) 613. In this judgment, the representation received from the detenu has been considered by the Government after receiving the report of the Advisory Board and confirming the detention on that basis, it is held that cost confirmation consideration of representation is not unconstitutional, but the Government has to consider the representation independent of the opinion of Advisory Board, since the purpose of considering the representation is different from the purpose of obtaining the report of the Advisory Board. It would be answered by the first respondent, the State of Tamil Nadu saying that the representation of the detenu’s father dated 9.10.1998 was addressed to the Chief Secretary and not to the authorities stated in the grounds of detention and even this representation addressed to the Chief Secretary on 12.10.1998 only and remarks were called for from the customs Department on 13.10.1998 and on the same day, it had also been forwarded to the Central Government for necessary action and that the State Government is doing everything in accordance with law. This explanation offered, in the context of the available documents, being true and genuine, it has to be held that no prejudice is caused to the detenu much less to affect the order of detention. 36. The other ground raised by the petitioner is that the show-cause notice dated 8.10.1998 and the reply to the show-cause notice dated 3.11.1998 and its enclosures were not forwarded to the Advisory Board besides not supplying the Tamil version of the show-cause notice. Regarding the non-supply of the Tamil version of documents including the show-cause notice has already been dealt with and justified by the respondents. Since the detenu is a graduate in B.Com., and has come to be proved conversant with the English language. Regarding the non-supply of the Tamil version of documents including the show-cause notice has already been dealt with and justified by the respondents. Since the detenu is a graduate in B.Com., and has come to be proved conversant with the English language. However, relating to the non-supply of the show-cause notice in Tamil, the learned counsel for the petitioner would cite two reported judgments and one unreported judgment, among which the first is one reported in K.V.Jesudasan v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 137, wherein their Lordships citing a previous Division Bench judgment of this Court delivered in A.Vellanai v. Collector and District Magistrate, Tirunelveli, 1984 Crl.L.J. 68 and two other unreported judgments, have remarked as to how the responsibility of the Advisory Board in the scheme of preventive detention is extremely important. Further holding that the Detaining Authority has to abide by the opinion of the Advisory Board, since it is body constituted independent of the Detaining Authority and hence, the Detaining Authority cannot vest on himself any discretion regarding the opportunity of forwarding the relevant materials to the Advisory Board. The next judgment cited in this regard is one Smt.Zariha Hafees Hyder Rizvi v. State of Maharastra, 1999 Crl.L.J. 444. wherein also it is held that the non-placement of the show-cause notice before the Detaining Authority since leading to the non-application of mind, would vitiate the detention order. The other unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court made in H.C.R.No.603 of 1997, dated 25.2.1998, wherein also the non-placement of the sanction ordered by the sanctioning authority i.e., the Commissioner of Customs either before the Detaining Authority or the Advisory Board has been held to be illegal. We have extracted the relevant passage from these judgments during our discussion of the arguments by the learned counsel for the petitioner from paragraphs 12 to 14 supra. For this question, it would be answered by the respondents on facts that the show-cause notice dated 8.10.1998 was received by the Government on 30.10.1998; that the show-cause notice was not a document relied upon by the detaining authority for passing the detention order but the same placed before the Advisory Board and in consideration of the materials of which, the Advisory Board had ultimately arrived at the conclusion to reject the representation of the detenu. So far as the reply dated 3.11.1998 is concerned, it is not known when it got despatched by the detenu to the Customs Department. But within that time i.e., on 4.11.1998 itself, the meeting of the Advisory Board was held and hence there was no possibility for placing the said document before the Advisory Board. The above Explanations being true and convincing, at this ground also the habeas corpus petition fails to impress on us. 37. The next ground raised by the petitioner that it was voluntary disclosure on his part so far as the items of goods seized from his baggage and hence the question of non-declaration or misdeclaration much less under Sec.77 of the Customs Act, 1962 would not arise and in fact, the term ‘smuggling’ itself would become inapplicable and no contravention of Sec.111(d) nor any violation of the Sec.111(1) of the Customs Act had occurred is concerned, on the part of the respondents they would allege that the detenu did not volunteer to disclose the entire goods seized but filed a false declaration stating that the value of the goods was only Rs.20,000, even though the value of all the goods came to be estimated at Rs.6,96,647. Moreover, most of the goods brought in by the detenu are electronic goods classified as ‘notified goods’ under the Customs Act which could not be brought into the country without a valid licence or permit from the competent authority and that under Sec.77 of the Customs Act, a passenger is bound to make a true declaration. Since the detenu also brought watches many in number, which fall under Sec.123 of the Customs Act, burden of proof lies on the detenu and thus the said section becomes applicable and the averment that the detenu voluntarily declared the contents of the baggage as per law is false and liable to be rejected. Regarding commission of offence under Sec.77 of the Customs Act, it is pertinent to see the section, which runs as follows: “77. The owner of the baggage shall, for the purpose of clearing it, make a declaration of its contents to the proper officer.” Sec.78 of the Customs Act says that, ‘the rate of duty and the tariff valuation in respect of baggage, shall be determined based on the valuation in force on the date on which a declaration is made under Sec.77 of the Customs Act. For the purpose of Sec.77, Sec.78 of the Customs Act also should be read along with conjointly and Sec.77 shall not be dealt with in isolation from Sec.78. These two sections amongst many other sections fall under the heading ‘Special Provisions regarding baggage etc’ in chapter XI of the Act. Coming to the question of declaration of the baggage by the detenu, the big question that is to be answered is whether the declaration of the articles of the baggage and the valuation of the same are true and correct and in compliance of Secs.77 and 78 of the customs Act respectively. First of all, the true declaration of the articles contained in the baggage has not been made. For a specific question put by the Customs Officers, whether he was in possession of any V.C.R./ T.V. Video Camera/Gold/Silver, the detenu answered in the negative. But only on examination of the baggage, the concealment of the electronic goods and watches which are prohibited items and which could be imported only with proper permit or licence obtained from the competent authority of India, came to light. This is nothing but suppression of items contained in the baggage and hence the same cannot be called ‘declaration’ is the true sense of the term under Sec.77 of the Customs Act. Regarding valuation also, the detenu had not given the true valuation of those items brought in by him in the manner as afored issued. In spite of the goods contained in the baggage in his possession, on the date of declaration, were of the value of Rs.6,96,647 the detenu had valued the same at Rs.20,000 only. This is nothing but the attempt to cheat the Customs Officials and hence even the requirements of Sec.78 of the Customs Act have not been complied with. It is chapter IV-A which deals with detention of illegally imported goods, wherein Sec.11-A(d) gives the definition of ‘notified goods’, which means goods specified in the notification issued under Sec.11-D. It is Sec.11-B, which gives the power to Central Government to notify the goods and it is an admitted fact that watches fall under the category of ‘notified goods’. Hence, in order to posses or import those notified goods, the requirements of the provisions of the entire chapter have to be adhered to, lest, under Sec.111(d) of the Customs Act, those goods become liable to be confiscated. Hence, in order to posses or import those notified goods, the requirements of the provisions of the entire chapter have to be adhered to, lest, under Sec.111(d) of the Customs Act, those goods become liable to be confiscated. Hence, the only conclusion that could be arrived at regarding the conduct of the detenu at this juncture is that he not only made false declarations but also adopting the false valuation of the goods, deliberately and intentionally had attempted to cheat the Customs Officials by concealment of the goods and the value. Thus, this ground raised by the detenu also becomes liable to be rejected. 38. The next important ground offered by the detenu is that he has not given the incriminating statement dated 31.7.1998 voluntarily but the same was obtained by the Customs Officials under coercion and threat and in exercise of undue influence. It is his further contention that the said incriminating statement had been retracted at the earliest and that the retracted statement had not been reflected in the grounds of detention. Emphasis is laid that the awareness of the fact of retraction must get reflected in the grounds of detention. Regarding the nature of the incriminating statement the respondents besides vehemently denying that it had been extracted under coercion and threat and in exercise of undue influence, they would also contend that it was not the one and the only statement made by the detenu on 31.7.1998 but he also made another statement before the Customs Officials on the same day purely on his own accord and true to the facts. It would be pointed out on the part of the respondents at the time that he got produced before the trial Magistrate on 31.7.1998, for a specific question put by the Magistrate whether he was ill-treated by the Customs Officials, he answered in the negative, which was recorded by the Magistrate in his remand order dated 31.7.1998. The contention of the respondents regarding this point is quite convincing and acceptable and hence the theory of coercion, threat, undue influence etc. adduced anew by the detenu has to be rejected as a figment of imagination that hatched up as a result of afterthought. Coming to the point of retraction, it has been made in a letter dated 3.8.1998. The contention of the respondents regarding this point is quite convincing and acceptable and hence the theory of coercion, threat, undue influence etc. adduced anew by the detenu has to be rejected as a figment of imagination that hatched up as a result of afterthought. Coming to the point of retraction, it has been made in a letter dated 3.8.1998. If really the incriminating statement of the detenu had been obtained by the Customs Officials keeping him under coercion and threat or in exercise of undue influence, there was absolutely no hurdle or hindrance for the detenu to make a statement to the Magistrate to the said effect. The detenu not making use of the earliest possible opportunity afforded to him, would only go to show that there was no such coercion or threat or undue influence exercised on him thereby sanctifying the incriminating statement to be true to the facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the retraction loses its value. Regarding the awareness and application of mind by the Detaining Authority to the retraction made by the detenu, it has been dealt with in para No.(xxi) of grounds of detention. The Detaining Authority had also discussed the reply given by the Department dated 13.8.1998 in the said paragraph. Moreover, in the detailed counter to the bail application, he had denied, the averments made with regard to the retraction. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would cite a judgment reported in Smt.Panna v. A.S.Samra, 1994 Crl.L.J. 1111, defending the order of detention at this point wherein it is held that there is no reason to reject the affidavit of the Detaining Authority made before the High Court, wherein he has stated that he had gone through all the documents placed before him. Only on full application of mind, he culled out the grounds of detention insofar as the case on hand is concerned. Both bail application and the counter were placed before the Detaining Authority and only on careful consideration of the retraction made in the bail application, the Detaining Authority has passed the detention order. Regarding both the bail applications and the orders passed thereon, the Detaining Authority has considered the retraction made by the detenu and the averments regarding non-consideration of the retraction and non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority are all false and not tenable and the same are hereby rejected. 39. Regarding both the bail applications and the orders passed thereon, the Detaining Authority has considered the retraction made by the detenu and the averments regarding non-consideration of the retraction and non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority are all false and not tenable and the same are hereby rejected. 39. The next important ground raised by the detenu is that his father’s representation dated 9.10.1998, his letter of retraction dated 3.8.1998 and His counsel’s detailed reply to the show-cause notice coupled with the other documents have not been promptly considered without delay and with diligence and in accordance with the constitutional mandate and that the respondents should satisfy that the above documents came into existence after the order of detention has been placed before the Advisory Board and the copies were supplied to him in Tamil. So far as the supply of the copies in Tamil is concerned, that has been ruled out by us while discussing ground No.2 since it is held that the detenu is well conversant with English language and Tamil being not the only language known to him absolutely no prejudice has been caused to the detenu. Regarding the representation of the father of the detenu dated 9.10.1998, on the part of the respondents it would be explained that it was properly and promptly considered without any unreasonable delay. It was received by the concerned Secretary on 12.10.1998 and remarks were called for from the Customs Department on 13.10.1998, the Customs Department got the 26 pages Tamil representation translated into English and sent the same to the COFEPOSA Unit on 23.10.1998 wherein the comments were prepared and the file was sent for approval to the Assistant Commissioner on 29.10.1998 and after obtaining the approval on 29.10.1998 itself, the remarks were sent to the Government on 30.10.1998. The file got circulated to the Under Secretary (Law and Order), who considered it on 31.10.1998 and the file was sent to the Public (SC) Department on 2.11.1998. The file came back from the Public (SC) Department on 3.11.1998 and the Secretary, Public (Law and Order) Department considered the representation on 4.11.1998 and then the Secretary, Law Department considered it on 5.11.1998 and thereafter the file was sent to the Minister for law for his consideration, which he did and rejected the representation on 5.11.1998 itself. The file came back from the Public (SC) Department on 3.11.1998 and the Secretary, Public (Law and Order) Department considered the representation on 4.11.1998 and then the Secretary, Law Department considered it on 5.11.1998 and thereafter the file was sent to the Minister for law for his consideration, which he did and rejected the representation on 5.11.1998 itself. Thus, it would be explained on the part of the respondents that there was absolutely no delay caused at the level of the Government in considering the representation of the father of the detenu much less unexplained delay. Regarding the other allegations, the respondents would contend that the show-cause notice dated 8.10.1998 was received by the Government only on 30.10.1998 and the same was placed before the Advisory Board on 4.11.1998, though it is not a document relied upon by the Detaining Authority, Likewise, the reply to the show-cause notice dated 3.11.1998 was not able to be placed before the Advisory Board, which was held on 4.11.1998 and since this document also is not a relied upon document, non-placement of the same being neither wilful nor wanton, it cannot affect the order passed by the Detaining Authority in any manner. In short, from the explanation offered on the part of the respondents, it comes to be known that all the documents that were available with the Government and relevant have been duly placed before the Advisory Board so as to be considered at the time of the Advisory Board meeting on 4.9.1998 and satisfactory explanation has been offered on the part of the respondents for prompt consideration of all the documents, which were relied upon, with due diligence and in accordance with the provisions of law. 40. The next ground raised by the petitioner is that the Detaining Authority was unaware of the seizure and impounding of the passport, since there is no whisper about the same in the detention order thereby glaringly revealing the non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority on this vital and materials fact and that had he applied his mind to the impounding of the passport, the Detaining Authority would have realized that detenu’s indulging in prejudicial activities in future is only a surmise and would not have resorted to the Preventive Detention at all. Regarding impounding of the passport, it would be contended on the part of the respondents that merely because the passport is impounded, the detenu travelling abroad cannot be ruled out since the smugglers normally would possess many passports and see that they travel by several other means also and hence impounding of the passport cannot give any guarantee, that the detenu will not indulge in any more prejudicial activities of the like nature. It would further be urged that a similar question had been rejected by the Apex Court in its judgment in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India and others, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1, wherein it is held that the detention cannot be challenged on being based non-existence ground, and hence, merely impounding the passport will not be a guarantee for the future good conduct of the detenu and it is further held therein that ‘it cannot be said that since there were not antecedents and this being the solitary incident, the detention is unwarranted. It is the question of satisfaction of the Detaining Authority on the basis of the materials placed before it. Even a solitary incident which has been detected may speak volumes about the potentialities of the detenu’. Yet another case reported in Mohd. Saleem v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1989 Del. 340 would also be cited on behalf of the respondents wherein also it is held that “a reasonable person’s subjective satisfaction that a detenu whose passport has been seized is likely to travel abroad clandestinely to smuggle goods cannot be objectively examined, but whether the material on which such a satisfaction has been arrived at was communicated to the detenu, is open to judicial scrutiny. A detention made on undisclosed grounds to the detenu is not permissible.” Yet another judgment cited for the same proposition of law is from the unreported case in H.C.P.No.1056 of 1998, dated 17.11.1998, wherein also the proposition propounded by the earlier judgments had been confirmed. A detention made on undisclosed grounds to the detenu is not permissible.” Yet another judgment cited for the same proposition of law is from the unreported case in H.C.P.No.1056 of 1998, dated 17.11.1998, wherein also the proposition propounded by the earlier judgments had been confirmed. It would further be urged that while remanding the detenu on 31.7.1998, the Magistrate has clearly stated that the passport No.Q892420, dated 4.3.1994 has been retained, hence, there is no point that the Detaining Authority was unaware of the fact that the Detaining Authority was unaware of the fact that the passport was impounded; that it is well settled that each of detention and that in this case, the remand order is one of the documents relied upon wherein it is clearly stated that the passport had been retained by the trial court. Besides this, the Superintendent of Customs, Prosecuting Unit, Airport, Chennai, has clearly stated that the applicant also produced the Indian Passport No.Q892420, dated 4.3.1994 issued at Trichy, and it had been surrendered to and impounded by the trial court. The Detaining Authority had gone through the requisition made by the Customs Officials regarding the passport and the orders passed by the Magistrate at the time of remand regarding the impounding of the passport. Hence, non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority on this aspect is ruled out. The above explanation offered by the respondents is more than sufficient to hold that the Detaining Authority was fully aware of the fact that the passport was impounded and hence the question of the Detaining Authority arriving at the conclusion that the detenu on account of the impounding of the passport would not be able to indulge in such activities in future has no place and this plea becomes liable to be rejected. Consequently, it cannot be said that the alleged possibility of indulging in prejudicial activities in future is only a surmise and not based on any material on account of the seizure of passport. 41. For the next ground that no communication was sent to his parents about his Preventive Detention, the respondents would submit that a telegraph message was given to the father of the detneu, mentioning therein the place of detention and the date of arrest and the telegram is self-explanatory and informative and the receipt of which is not denied. 41. For the next ground that no communication was sent to his parents about his Preventive Detention, the respondents would submit that a telegraph message was given to the father of the detneu, mentioning therein the place of detention and the date of arrest and the telegram is self-explanatory and informative and the receipt of which is not denied. In so far as the other ground that the telegram should be confirmed by a subsequent signed statement is concerned, it is based on A.K.Roy’s case, 1982 Crl.L.J. 340, wherein the Apex Court says that the place and date of arrest and the place of detention should be informed to the relatives, so that the relatives can see the detenu and help him in all legal ways and means. From the above judgment, the underlying point is that the date and place of arrest and the place of detention should be clearly specified to the relatives and so far as these vital informations are concerned, the relatives should not be kept in dark. From this explanation of the respondents, it is clear that the. telegram was self-explanatory in so far as the required particulars, such as, the date and place of arrest, the place of detention etc. and hence the telegraphic information is not an insufficient one, so as to be confirmed by a signed statement and that no violation in whatever manner has been committed and it is the proper explanation offered on the part of the respondents and the same is acceptable by this Court. 42. The next ground is that the articles seized were assembled in cottages and without any label or brand and they are of marginal value and that the sponsoring Authority should have released the goods imposing redemption fine and a nominal personal penalty in lieu of confiscation under Sec. 125 of the Customs Act and that a request made to re-export the same under Sec.80 of the Customs Act has also been turned down. The respondents, in answer would submit that regarding the substandard nature of the case and on small value are concerned, it is only imaginary and no truth is attached to the same. The respondents, in answer would submit that regarding the substandard nature of the case and on small value are concerned, it is only imaginary and no truth is attached to the same. Moreover, the standard of the goods cannot be questioned in the Preventive Detention, which is a subject matter of the argument before the competent court or the adjudication proceedings of the Department and the assessment of the value cannot be challenged in the habeas corpus petition and the entire averments based on this ground are not correct and becomes liable to be rejected and accordingly rejected. For the next question that the request to re-export under Sec.80 and also Sec.123 of the Customs Act would not be applicable to the goods seized by the sponsoring authority has bene turned down are concerned, it would be answered that the wrist watches are numbering 398 and that Sec.123(2) of the Customs Act deals with watches also and hence, this section would aptly apply and the request to re-export under Sec.80 of the Customs Act has nothing to do with the detention order, since the detention order has been resorted to prevent the detenu from indulging in such prejudicial activities in future. This is a satisfactory explanation of the above grounds raised in the petition and hence, at this score also, the plea of the detenu becomes liable to be rejected. 43. So far as the other ground raised by the detenu regarding non-supply of the copies in Tamil and non-placement of the same before the Detaining Authority is concerned, the question of non-supply of the copies to the detenu in Tamil has already been discussed in detail and answered in para No.33 supra and ultimately it has been concluded that in the circumstances of the case, Tamil version of the copies need not be supplied to the detenu at all. Regarding the documents mentioned in para No.22 of the habeas corpus petition, it would be argued on the part of the respondents besides answering this ground in para No.36 of the counter-affidavit of the first respondent, from which it is clear that the proposal of the sponsoring authority, the customs price list and guidelines, the statement made before the table Superintendent at the Airport, the show-cause notice and the reply to the show-cause notice are all documents which are not relied upon by the Detaining Authority and hence neither the question of non-supply of these documents much less in Tamil to the detenu nor placement of the same before the Detaining Authority would arise and hence the case of the respondents is not shaken the least on this ground. So far the order extension of remand dated 13.8.1998 is concerned, the respondents would contend that when a copy application has been filed by the Superintendent of Customs, it had been endorsed and returned with the remark that ‘the remand is not extended but directed to produce the accused on 27.8.1998’ and on 27.8.1998, the Magistrate has endorsed “accused produced”. Investigation is pending. “Remand extended till 10.9.1998” and that there is material to show that the detenu was in judicial custody till 10.9.1998 and the detention order having been passed much earlier on 7.9.1998, the non-placement of the remand extension order dated 13.8.1998 cannot cause any prejudice to the detenu and the question of non-supply of the same to the detenu will not at all arise. So far as the contention of the detenu that he was not supplied with the statements of the mahazar witnesses is concerned, the respondents would reply that they are the witnesses only for the seizure and the question of supplying of the non-existent document will not arise. The explanations offered on the part of the respondents are quite convincing and reasonable and hence even regarding this ground of non-supply and non-placement of the said documents, the petitioner fails to impress upon as that some prejudice is caused to him. Thus, the case of the detenu on this ground also becomes liable to be rejected. 44. The next ground raised by the petitioner is that the Detaining Authority has not considered, in the grounds of detention, the total market value of the contraband. It is submitted by the respondents that there are several other materials available. Thus, the case of the detenu on this ground also becomes liable to be rejected. 44. The next ground raised by the petitioner is that the Detaining Authority has not considered, in the grounds of detention, the total market value of the contraband. It is submitted by the respondents that there are several other materials available. On record to show the total market value of the contraband viz., the arrest memo. (Available at page No.51 of the paper book) wherein the total market value is shown as R.6,96,647 the forwarding memo. (available at page Nos.39 to 41 of the list of document) which contains the nature of the goods, value of the goods and the total value of the contraband and the remand application (available at page No.55 of the paper book) which also contains the market value of the goods as Rs.6,96,647 and all these documents were placed before the Detaining Authority and on careful consideration of all these materials only he has passed the detention order and for the simple reason that the value of the goods is not quoted in the detention order, it cannot be said that the detention order is passed without the application of mind. This explanation offered on the part of the respondents is wholly acceptable and hence the case of the detenu is rejected at this score also. 45. The next ground raised by the petitioner is that the retracted statement of one M.Kaja Sherbudeen has not been placed before the Advisory Board nor the copy supplied to him. This explanation offered on the part of the respondents is wholly acceptable and hence the case of the detenu is rejected at this score also. 45. The next ground raised by the petitioner is that the retracted statement of one M.Kaja Sherbudeen has not been placed before the Advisory Board nor the copy supplied to him. The respondents would contend that the statement of one M.Kaja Sherbudeen dated 31.7.1998 was placed before the Detaining Authority, which did not contain anything incriminating about the detenu, that the detenu was not a friend of his; that though his statement was not incriminating, he had sent a letter of retraction dated 22.10.1998 addressed to the Assistant Commissioner, Airport and a reply had been sent by the Customs Department and the said retraction fell into the hands of the Superintendent, Customs on 3.11.1998, which was received by the State Government on 13.11.1998 and in the meantime, since the Advisory Board meeting had been held on 4.11.1998 itself, those documents could not be placed before the Advisory Board and hence the non-placement of the alleged retraction dated 22.10.1998 or the reply of the Customs Department dated 3.11.1998 before the Advisory Board will not in any manner vitiate the detention order especially in view of the fact that they are not relied upon documents. For the foregoing reasons offered on the part of the respondents, we are convinced that on account of the non-placement of the confessional statement of the said M.Kaja Sherbudeen, dated 31.7.1998 before the Detaining Authority, no prejudice is caused to the detenu especially in view of the fact that nothing is found incriminating against the detenu in the said statement and further considering the fact that the said statement is not a relied upon document by the Detaining Authority, it is decided that no concrete case is made out by the detenu on this ground also and we are left with only to reject the case of the detenu on this ground also. 46. The other ground raised by the petitioner denying his previous visits abroad and bringing small quantities of goods and contending that the detention order has been passed on solitary incident, the respondents would contend that the detention order can be passed even on a solitary incident, if the Detaining Authority is convinced and the same is in accordance with law. The other ground raised by the petitioner denying his previous visits abroad and bringing small quantities of goods and contending that the detention order has been passed on solitary incident, the respondents would contend that the detention order can be passed even on a solitary incident, if the Detaining Authority is convinced and the same is in accordance with law. Though the detenu has now come forward to retract the incriminating statement, the same had been considered supra and held to be true. Regarding the solitary incident, based on which the Detaining Authority getting convinced that the detenu will continue to indulge in such prejudicial activities in future, on the part of the detenu, the case in Avtar Chand Kehar v. Union of India and others, 1990 Crl.L.J. 481 would be cited, wherein it is held that the ‘order of detention stating that unless detained, detenu would smuggle goods in same manner shows non-application of mind and hence the order becomes liable to be quashed. On the contrary, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in support of his contention that even on a solitary incident, the detention order can be passed, would cite the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India and others, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1, wherein it is ruled that, “it cannot be said that since there were no antecedents and this being the solitary incident, the detention is unwarranted. It is the question of satisfaction of the Detaining Authority on the basis of the materials placed before it. Even a solitary incident which has been detected may speak volumes about the potentialities of the detenu and merely on the ground that there were no antecedents the detention order cannot be quashed. The authorities cannot and may not in every case salvage the antecedents but even a solitary incident may manifest the potentialities of a detenu in the activities of smuggling”. The authorities cannot and may not in every case salvage the antecedents but even a solitary incident may manifest the potentialities of a detenu in the activities of smuggling”. At this juncture, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would further contend that the said potentiality has to be gathered from the act of the smuggler and if the potentiality is higher in degree, taking into consideration of various circumstances such as items of smuggling, the worth of the goods, the manner in which it has been attempted to be smuggled etc., even from a solitary incident, the authority could arrive at the conclusion that there is the likelihood of the detenu indulging in smuggling activities in future. Since this ground of attack on the order of detention is also authoritively repelled by the respondents, we have to hold that the detenu has no axe to grind. 47. The next ground raised by the petitioner is that it is incumbent on the part of the respondents to satisfy that the report is submitted by the Advisory Board within eleven weeks and the confirmation order of detention was made in three months. For this, the respondents would contend that the meeting of the Advisory Board was held on 4.11.1998 and the report was sent on 5.11.1998 i.e., within a period of eleven weeks and similarly the confirmation order was passed by the State Government on 17.11.198 i.e., within a period of three months and thus there is no violation of the provisions of law as falsely contended by the petitioner. The explanation offered on the part of the respondents being true and convincing, on this ground also, the petition gets rejected since his contention is untenable and false. 48. The other ground raised by the petitioner is that the Detaining Authority has not applied his mind in passing the order of extension of remand dated 13.8.1998 and hence the subsequent extensions of remand would amount to illegal detention. For this, the respondents would say that this contention is false and incorrect besides contending that there is material to show that the detenu was the remand prisoner on 13.8.1998 and the same came to the knowledge of the Detaining Authority and hence there is absolutely no place for alleging that the Detaining Authority has failed to apply his mind. For this, the respondents would say that this contention is false and incorrect besides contending that there is material to show that the detenu was the remand prisoner on 13.8.1998 and the same came to the knowledge of the Detaining Authority and hence there is absolutely no place for alleging that the Detaining Authority has failed to apply his mind. This explanation submitted on the part of the respondents is not only true but also convicting and hence the case of the detenu has to be rejected on this ground also. 49. The last important ground of attack of the order of detention by the petitioner is that there is absolutely no application of mind by the Detaining Authority to the retraction of the incriminating statement made by the detenu as warranted by the decision of the Apex Court in K.T.M.S.Mohd. and another v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1831: 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 572. This ground had already been answered supra in para No.37 wherein it has been clearly stated that there was no coercion or threat or undue influence wedded on the part of the Customs Officials in the coming into being of the voluntary incriminating statements dated 31.7.1998 twice given and that from the very instance that thereafter when the detenu was brought before the Magistrate, he had nothing to offer against any torture, coercion or threat or ill-treated meted out to him and hence excepting to reject the retraction as a result of afterthought, there could be no other conclusion arrived at. So far as the application of mind by the Detaining Authority is concerned, besides having gone through the letter of retraction dated 3.8.1998, the Detaining Authority has also carefully considered the retraction made by the detenu in the bail application and after due application of mind only he has arrived the valid conclusion to reject the retraction and hence non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority has absolutely no place so far as the retraction made by the detenu is concerned. So far as the judgment cited from K.T.M.S.Mohd. and another v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1831:1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 572, it is held that, "...it is to be noted that merely because a statement is retracted, it cannot be recorded as involuntarily or unlawfully obtained. It is only for the maker of the statement who alleges inducement, threat promise etc. and another v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1831:1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 572, it is held that, "...it is to be noted that merely because a statement is retracted, it cannot be recorded as involuntarily or unlawfully obtained. It is only for the maker of the statement who alleges inducement, threat promise etc. to establish that such improper means has been adopted. However, even if the maker of the statement fails to establish his allegations of inducement, threat etc. against the officer who recorded the statement, the authority while acting on the inculpatory statement of the maker is not completely relieved of his obligations in at least subjectively applying its mind to the subsequent retraction to hold mat the inculpatory statement as not extorted. It thus boils down that the authority or any court intending to act upon the inculpatory statement as a voluntary one should apply its mind to the retraction and reject the same in writing." But in the case in hand, since there are ample evidence to show the application of mind by the Detaining Authority for rejecting the retraction as warranted by the above judgment, even this ground fails and the same is rejected. 50. All the above discussions touching the various aspects involved in the order or detention made by the Detaining Authority so far in detaining the petitioner herein under the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 is concerned, we are only able to see that warranting rules and procedures established by law and the propositions propounded by the upper forums of law, particularly that of the Honourable Apex Court have been thoroughly and systematically observed by the Detaining Authority and under none of the grounds raised on the part of the detenu, the detention order has caused prejudiced to the detenu nor any perversity in approach has been seen so as to warrant out interference into the detention order made by the Detaining Authority. Hence, we are left with no option but to arrive at the decision to confirm the detention order dated 7.9.1998. In result, the above habeas corpus petition fails and the same is dismissed. The detention order passed in G.O. Ms.No.Sr.I/802-5/98, dated 7.9.1998 Public (SC) Department by the Secretary of Government of Tamil Nadu, Public (SC) Department is hereby confirmed.