JUDGMENT 1. - This misc. appeal has been directed against the order of learned Additional District Judge, Rajsamand dated 31.1.1998 by which he refused to grant ad-interim injunction to the appellant-plaintiff. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and gone through the impugned order. 3. Appellant is a plaintiff who filed a suit for specific performance and permanent injunction against the respondents No. 1 and 2. Later on amendment was allowed and the respondent No. 3 was impleaded. Facts are that plaintiff and defendant No. 1 Kishanlal entered into a written agreement on 26.12.1989 by which respondent No. 1 agreed to sell his land bearing Khasra No. 612 measuring 11/2 bigha and another 1/2 bighas of land which was recorded in the name of Inder Mal Kumawat for a consideration of Rs. 1,15,000/-. It was alleged that Rs. 20,001/- was paid as advance at the time of execution of agreement and balance as to be paid on 26.1.1990, possession was handed over to the plaintiff. In pursuance of the aid agreement sale deed was executed on 15.1.1990 in respect of 1/2 bighas of land recorded in the name of Inder Mal and the same was registered on 16.1.1990. On 7.3.1990 a sum of Rs. 15,000/- was paid by the plaintiff and the respondent No. 1 agreed that he will execute the sale deed. Thus a total sum of Rs. 60,001/- was paid to the defendant. Only a sum of Rs. 55,000/- remained to be paid. Plaintiff was always ready and willing to pay this amount. He asked the defendant many a time to execute the sale deed but ultimately on 14.11.1994 he refused and told that he was going to sell the property to another person. It was averred in the plaint that after executing the sale deed on 15.1.1990 the respondent No. 1 received Rs. 25,000/- on 16.1.1990 and Rs. 15,000/- on 7.3.1990. Thus the time as not essence of the contract between the parties and the defendant could not have frustrated the contract in this way. 4. An application for temporary injunction was filed in which it was prayed that injunction be granted, that the possession of the plaintiff may not be disturbed and he may not be evicted from the suit property. 4. An application for temporary injunction was filed in which it was prayed that injunction be granted, that the possession of the plaintiff may not be disturbed and he may not be evicted from the suit property. The reply of the respondent defendant No. 1 was that the price of the land which was registered in favour of the plaintiff was Rs. 60,000/- as agreed between the parties. It was further averred in the reply that the plaintiff was to pay the whole amount by 26.1.1990 and would also bear the stamp duty as well as registration charges. The amount which was paid to the defendant was towards the land which was already registered in favor of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff never wanted to purchase 11/2 bigha of land as he was not having money with him and, thus, the contract between the parties was cancelled. It has also been pleaded that the suit was time barred, therefore, there was no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. As stated earlier, the learned trial Judge refused to grant injunction. 5. The settled law is that the appellate Court shall be slow in interfering such an order. It can be interfered only when the order is absurd and against the principles of law. Reference may be made on AIR 1977 Rajasthan page 196, Smt. Vimla Devi v. Jung Bahadur. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the possession was handed over to the plaintiff when agreement was executed. But this is not correct. The trial court referred to the report of the Commissioner and found that there was no demarcation of land measuring 11/2 bigha nor it could be aid after going through the Commissioner's report to which portion of the land measuring 11/2 bigha was agreed to be sold to the plaintiff. The trial Court came to the conclusion that it was not possible to hold that the plaintiff was given possession of this piece of land. Thus, when the plaintiff was not in possession of the property, no such order could be passed that the plaintiff would not be dispossessed from it. Learned trial court was also of the view that the suit was time barred. Thus, when the plaintiff was not in possession of the property, no such order could be passed that the plaintiff would not be dispossessed from it. Learned trial court was also of the view that the suit was time barred. On this point, learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant cited AIR 1976 Bombay page 342, Shrikrishna Keshav Kulkarni and others v. Balaji Ganesh Kulkarni and others , and submitted that the starting point of limitation in a suit for specific performance was the time when the plaintiff has notice that performance was refused. The learned trial Judge, after going through the whole record, found that the plaintiff did not take any steps within three years from 7.3.1990 neither did he give any notice to the defendant when it was agreed that performance of the contract could be completed by 7.3.1990 neither did he give any notice to the defendant when it was agreed that performance of the contract could be completed by 7.3.1990. It also came to the conclusion that the amount alleged to have been paid in excess was actually the price of the portion of land which was the registered in favour of the plaintiff as such, according to the learned trial Judge, no prima facie case existed in favour of the plaintiff. I am of the view that the finding of the trial Court is definitely not perverse, therefore, it does not require any interference in the peculiar facts of this case when even the possession of the land is not with the plaintiff. The other two ingredients i.e. balance of convenience and irreparable loss were also not fund in favour of the plaintiff. 6. Consequently, I do not find any cogent reason to interfere in the order of learned trial Judge and dismiss this appeal. No, orders as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******