D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) BY a notice dated July 12, 1990, the petitioner was sought to be retired prematurely under rule 56, Volume II, Part II to IV of the Financial Hand Book. The said order is Annexure-I to the writ petition. Mr. A. R. Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that by reason of government Order dated December 21, 1989, a Municipal servant outside the Centralized service could be terminated prematurely after attaining 50 years provided prior approval of the commissioner is received on the recommendation of the Screening Committee. In the present case no such approval was obtained therefore, premature retirement was invalid. ( 2 ) MR. Murlidhar assisted by Mr. P. K. Singhal, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that the retirement was effected in exercise of sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 3 of the Retrenchment and Retirement of Servants of Municipal Board, Regulation, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 1965 Regulation) therefore, there is no necessity of obtaining prior approval of the Commissioner in the present case. Mr. Murlidhar further contended that though power under Regulation 3 (2) of the 1965 Regulation was exercised but by mistake the notice has mentioned Rule 56 of the Financial Hand Book. Therefore, since it was within the competence of the authority to retire the petitioner under Regulation 3 since the petitioner had already attained 58 years, therefore, non-mentioning of the provision would not invalidate the order passed. He had relied on a decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Umesh chand Bhilwar v. State of U. P. and others, 1999 (1) ESC 176 (All) and Swendra Singh v. Cane commissioner/ Registrar Co-operative Societies, U. P. and others, 1989 AWC 1189, rendered by a Division Bench in support of his above contention. ( 3 ) I have heard both the learned counsel at length. ( 4 ) IN the case of Surendra Singh (supra), the Division Bench had held that "when an authority makes an order, which is otherwise within its competence, it cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision of law if it can be shown to be within its powers under any other provision ; a wrong label cannot vitiate an order which is otherwise within the power of the authority to make. The said decision was rendered relying on the decision in the case of Vice-Chancellor, Jammu University v. D. K. Rampal, AIR 1977 SC 1146 . ( 5 ) IN the case of Umesh Chand Bhilwar (supra), the Full Bench of this Court had held that it is well-settled principle that where an authority makes an order which is otherwise within its competence, it cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision of law, if it can be shown to be within its power under any other provision ; a wrong label cannot vitiate an order which is otherwise within the power of the authority to make. " The Full Bench decision had relied on the decision in the case of Hukum Chand Mills v. State of M. P. , AIR 1954 SC 1329 and P. Balakataiah v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 232 , as well as the decision in the case of Vice-Chancellor, Jammu University (supra), rendered by the Division Bench in (he case of surendra Singh (supra ). Before the Full Bench, the service of the employee, a probationer was sought to be terminated applying the provision for regular employees without observing the procedure. In the said case, it was held that the service of a probationer could be terminated without following the normal procedure of termination of a regular employee. Therefore, even if the service of a probationer was terminated under a wrong provision without following the procedure prescribed, any such power is well within the competence of the authority since the service of the probationer could be terminated without following the procedure for termination of a regular employee. In the background that even after expiry of the probation period, the probationer does not acquire any legal status, the said decision was rendered by the Full Bench. By reason of the above decisions, it is no more open for this Court to reopen the settled principle as has been contended by Mr. A. R. Dubey. Thus, it is well within the competence of the municipal authority to terminate the service of the petitioner under Sub-Regulation (2) of regulation 3 of the 1965 Regulation even though such termination was sought to be effected mentioning Rule 56 of the Financial Hand Book. In view of those decisions cited by Mr. A. R. Dubey. Thus, it is well within the competence of the municipal authority to terminate the service of the petitioner under Sub-Regulation (2) of regulation 3 of the 1965 Regulation even though such termination was sought to be effected mentioning Rule 56 of the Financial Hand Book. In view of those decisions cited by Mr. Murlidhar, the question cannot be gone into in this case with regard to the principle. Thus, if there are sufficient materials to attract the application of sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 3 of the 1965 Regulation, in that event termination of the service of the petitioner who had attained 58 years under Rule 56 of the Financial Hand Book can be sustained as an order under sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 3 of the 1965 Regulation. ( 6 ) THEREFORE, it is necessary to examine as to whether there are sufficient materials to arrive at a conclusion to retire the petitioner under Regulation 3 (2) of the 1965 Regulation. The only material that has been disclosed in the counter-affidavit is in paragraph 12, which reads as follows : "that the contents of paragraph No. 7 of the writ petition are not admitted. There is an entry dated 30. 6. 89 in the Character Roll of the petitioner that the work efficiency of the petitioner is totally unsatisfactory and he is not able to drive the tractor. The behaviour of , the petitioner Is also rough. " in support of the statement made in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit. Mr. Murlidhar had relied on the Service Book of the petitioner since produced in the Court. The Service Book contains endorsement in column 15 with regard to reference of recorded punishment, censure or revision of pay of the official. There are some entries in the Service Book. But the Service Book does not contain any adverse entry. On the other hand, Mr. Murlidhar points out from a sheet attached to the Service Book that there are some adverse entry. These are form of Character Roll contained in separate full scape sheets. The form contains statement of service in page one while page two prescribes for names of relatives in Boards employment as well as particulars of landed property. In the third page, there are space for remarks recorded by superior officers. The fourth page also contains the same column. These are form of Character Roll contained in separate full scape sheets. The form contains statement of service in page one while page two prescribes for names of relatives in Boards employment as well as particulars of landed property. In the third page, there are space for remarks recorded by superior officers. The fourth page also contains the same column. In third page, only one entry bearing dated June 30, 1989, has been shown. Except third and first page, all the other pages are blank. In the first page, the statement of service contains four columns though three of the columns are filled in but the third column is unfilled. The third column relates to pay. It appears that the said remark of inefficiency mentioned In the said sheet has not been entered in the Service Book. On the other hand, in reply to paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit, in the rejoinder-affidavit, it has been contended that this remark has never been communicated to the petitioner. Mr. Murlidhar has not been able to show that this was ever communicated to the petitioner. In the absence of any material to show that this remark was communicated to the petitioner and in the absence of any entry in the Service Book and the same having been attached in separate sheets, which also does not appear to be properly filled in, cannot justify placing of reliance by the Court on the alleged entry. Even if reliance is placed on that remark, in that event there is but one remark, which cannot justify the passing of the order under Regulation 56 of the Financial hand Book. Therefore, Screening Committee while recommending premature retirement appears to have acted mala fidely since the service record does not disclose any material to exercise the powers under Rule 56 of the Financial Hand Book. Now- after having passed such an order after recommendation by the Screening Committee, the authority cannot fall back on Regulation 3 (2) to support their wrong action. Then again the material as discussed above, cannot be treated to be sufficient to come to a conclusion that the petitioner was unfit or inefficient. Therefore. Regulation 3 (2) of the 1965 Regulation cannot be attracted in the present facts and circumstances of the case, even if the principle that mention of a wrong provision of law cannot vitiate the order. Therefore. Regulation 3 (2) of the 1965 Regulation cannot be attracted in the present facts and circumstances of the case, even if the principle that mention of a wrong provision of law cannot vitiate the order. In such circumstance, the order cannot be sustained. Therefore, the impugned order contained in Annexure-I cannot be treated to be an order under Regulation 3 (2) of the 1965 Regulation in the absence of any material. Even if it is treated to be an order under Regulation 3 (2) of the 1965 Regulation, still there being no material to attract such provision, the order cannot be sustained. Therefore the impugned order is quashed. ( 7 ) LET a writ of certiorari do issue accordingly. The petitioner be treated as in service till he attained the age of 60 years. Pay and notional service benefits, including retiral benefits as admissible in law be given to the petitioner within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. ( 8 ) LET a writ of mandamus do issue accordingly. No cost. .