P. K. TRIPATHY, J. ( 1 ) ORDER D/- 13-9-1996 in Misc. Case No. 168 of 1991 under section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, 'the Code') of the Court of S. D. J. M. , Balasore is under challenge in this revision. ( 2 ) UNDISPUTED facts in the case are that petitioner and opposite party No. 1 are husband and the wife and opposite party No. 2 is their daughter. Petition under S. 125 of the Code vide Criminal Misc. Case No. 1/93 of 1982 filed by opposite party claiming maintenance was allowed on 1-6-1993 and monthly maintenance of Rs. 150/- and Rs. 70/- was ordered to be paid to opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. On the grounds of increase of the cost of daily use commodity and hike in the cost of living on 3-7-1991 petition under S. 127 of the Code for enhancement of monthly maintenance was filed by the opposite parties which was registered as Misc. Case No. 169 of 1991. During pendency of that Misc. Case opposite party No. 2 married and therefore, petition for enhancement of maintenance was not pressed for her. Opposite party No. 1 who prayed for enhancement of maintenance is the deserted wife of the petitioner and a physically handicapped woman being a dumb. Petitioner contested the said claim on the grounds that there is no justification for enhancement, good relationship developed between herself and opposite party No. 1, one Madan Bhakta, one of the brothers of the opposite party No. 1 is instrumental for the litigations between the parties. Petitioner is ailing person and because of large number of dependants and meagre income from salary he may not be able to pay maintenance at any enhanced rate. ( 3 ) AT the time of enquiry one Braja Mohan Bhakta, a brother of opposite party No. 1 deposed in her favour as the solitary witness and petitioner deposed in support of his case as O. P. No. 1. No other evidence was tendered from either side. On assessment of evidence in record, learned S. D. J. M. , Balasore allowed enhancement of maintenance from Rs. 150/- to Rs. 300/- in favour of opposite party No. 1 making it payable from the date of application i. e. 3-7-1991. No other evidence was tendered from either side. On assessment of evidence in record, learned S. D. J. M. , Balasore allowed enhancement of maintenance from Rs. 150/- to Rs. 300/- in favour of opposite party No. 1 making it payable from the date of application i. e. 3-7-1991. ( 4 ) MAIN thrust of argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner was that maintenance at the enhanced rate could not have been ordered to be paid retrospectively from the date of application. It was also argued that in the absence of evidence of opposite party No. 1 and in the absence of positive evidence showing the quantum of monthly income of petitioner, learned Magistrate should not have allowed the prayer for enhancement of maintenance. Aforesaid argument of the petitioner was repelled by the counsel for the opposite parties, who supported the impugned order. ( 5 ) KEEPING in view the objection raised by the petitioner regarding allowing enhancement of maintenance with effect from the date of application for the sake of convenience, reference may be made to relevant portions of Ss. 125 and 127 of the Code which are quoted as hereunder :-"125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.- (i) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to main-tain - (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) to (d) x x x x x x a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct : Provided that x x x x x x x Explanation - x x x x x x x (2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance. (3) to (5) x x x x x x x x x 127. (3) to (5) x x x x x x x x x 127. Alteration in allowance - (1) On proof of a change in the circumstances of any person, receiving under section 125 a monthly allowance, or ordered under the same section to pay a monthly allowance to his wife, child, father or mother, as the case may be, the Magistrate may make such alteration in the allowance as he thinks fit : Provided that if he increases the allowance, the monthly rate of five hundred rupees in the whole shall not be exceeded. (2) Where it appears to be Magistrate that, in consequence of any decision of a competent Civil Court, any order made under Section 125 should be cancelled or varied, he shall cancel the order or, as the case may be, vary the same accordingly. (3) Where any order has been made under S. 125 in favour of a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband, the Magistrate shall, if he is satisfied that - (a) the woman has, after the date of such divorce, remarried, cancel such order as from the date of her remarriage; (b) the woman has been divorced by her husband and that she has received, whether before or after the date of the said order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties, was payable on such divorce, cancel such order,- (i) in the case where such sum was paid before the date on which such order was made. (ii) in any other case, from the date of expiry of the period, if any, for which maintenance has been actually paid by the husband to the woman; (c) the woman has obtained a divorce from her husband and that she had voluntarily surrendered her rights to maintenance after her divorce, cancel the order from the date thereof. (4) At the time of making any decree for the recovery of any maintenance or dowry by any person, to whom a monthly allowance has been ordered to be paid under S. 125, the Civil Court shall take into account the sum which has been paid to, or recovered by, such person as monthly allowance in pursuance of the said order. " ( 6 ) RELYING on the case of Joydeb Chakraborty v. Smt. Bharti Chakravarty, 1994 Cri LJ 2234 learned counsel for the petitioner urged that order for enhancement of maintenance can be made prospective in operation and it cannot be given effect retrospectively. According to him, allowing application for payment of maintenance at the enhanced rate with effect from the date of application amounts to retrospective operation of that order. In the above cited case, learned single Judge of Calcutta High Court has indeed propounded that an order under S. 127, Cr. P. C. for enhancement of maintenance, in the aforesaid manner cannot be made applicable retrospectively. In other words enhanced rate of maintenance cannot be directed to be paid from the date of application. In that context, learned Judge has referred to the language in S. 127 and has made a comparison of the language in S. 125 and has reasoned out that provision in S. 127 stands at the footing of a proviso to S. 125 (1) and he has referred to the decisions from the Apex Court, viz. AIR 1959 SC 1012 : (1959 Cri LJ 1231); Tahasildar Singh v. State of U. P. , AIR 1961 SC 1596 ; Shah Bhojraj Kuvarji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, and AIR 1963 SC 1083 ; Hindustan Ideal Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India regarding the manner of interpretation of provision and its status vis-a-vis the main section. ( 7 ) AFTER careful perusal of the above cited decisions and the reasoning thereof advance by the learned Judge, this Court is unable to accept the logic and the reasonings accepted by him in rejecting the contention that maintenance at the enhanced rate can be paid from the date of application. The reasons for the same are enumerated hereinafter. ( 8 ) IT is the foregone conclusion of judicial dictum that provision in Chapter IX of the Code (Sections 125 to 128) is a beneficial piece of legislation to prevent vagrancy and destitution of the classified persons enumerated in S. 125 (i) of the Code. A beneficial provision of legislation should be given its true meaning in proper perspective and should not be screened or curtailed with irrational logic so as to defeat its object. A beneficial provision of legislation should be given its true meaning in proper perspective and should not be screened or curtailed with irrational logic so as to defeat its object. In that context, reference may be made to the case of Smt. Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat, 1986 Cri LJ 41 : ( AIR 1986 SC 984 ). The Apex Court while dealing with the subject as to whether an order for interim maintenance can be passed while a petition under S. 125 is pending adjudication, has observed that :"3. It is true that there is no express provision in the Code which authorises a Magistrate to make an interim order directing payment of maintenance pending disposal of an application for maintenance. The Code does not also expressly prohibit the making of such an order. The question is whether such a power can be implied to be vested in a Magistrate having regard to the nature of the proceedings under S. 125 and other cognate provisions found in Chapter IX of the Code which is entitled "order For Maintenance of Wives, Children and Parents". S. 125 of the Code confers power on a Magistrate of the first class to direct a person having sufficient means but who neglects or refuses to maintain (i) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (ii) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (iii) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child, is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself or (iv) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, to pay a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, as the case may be, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole as such Magistrate thinks fit. Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered from the date of the application for maintenance. S. 126 of the Code prescribes the procedure for the disposal of an application made under S. 125, S. 127 of the Code provides for alteration of the rate of maintenance in the light of the changed circumstances or an order or decree of a competent civil Court. S. 126 of the Code prescribes the procedure for the disposal of an application made under S. 125, S. 127 of the Code provides for alteration of the rate of maintenance in the light of the changed circumstances or an order or decree of a competent civil Court. S. 128 of the Code deals with the enforcement of the order of maintenance. It is not necessary to refer to the other details contained in the abovesaid provisions. 4. A reading of the above provision shows that they are intended to provide for a preventive remedy for securing payment of maintenance which can be granted quickly and in deserving cases with effect from the date of the application itself. The rate of maintenance that can be awarded is also limited even though under the law governing the parties a competent Civil Court may order payment of a larger sum by way of maintenance in appropriate cases. The Civil Court, have inherent power to grant interim maintenance pending disposal of the suit for maintenance. The point for consideration is whether the Magistrate can also make such an interim order or not. (Underlined by this Court to give emphasis) 5. xxx xxx xxx 6. In view of the foregoing it is the duty of the Court to interpret the provisions in Chap. IX of the Code in such a way that the construction placed on them would not defeat the very object of the legislation. In the absence of any express prohibition, it is appropriate to construe the provisions in Chapter IX as conferring an implied power on the Magistrate to direct the person against whom an application is made under S. 125 of the Code to pay some reasonable sum by way of maintenance to the applicant pending final disposal of the application. It is quite common that applications made under S. 125 of the Code also take several months for being disposed of finally. In order to enjoy the fruits of the proceedings under S. 125, the applicant should be alive till the date of the final order and that the applicant can do in large number of cases only if an order for payment of interim maintenance is passed by the Court. Every Court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are necessary to make its orders effective. Every Court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are necessary to make its orders effective. This principle is embodied in the maxim ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa asse non potest (where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist.) Whenever anything is required to be done by law and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something not authorised in express terms be also done then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Such a construction though it may not always be admissible in the present case however would advance the object of the legislation under consideration. xx xx xx" ( 9 ) IN the case of Joydeb Chakraborty (1994 Cri LJ 2234) (supra) learned Judge has held that Section 127 should be read as a proviso to Section 125 of the Code and according to the principle stated by the Apex Court, "the territory of a proviso is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and exclude something which otherwise would have been within the section. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear it (the proviso) cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting the main enactment or to exclude by implication what the enactment clearly save unless the words of the proviso are such that it has that as its necessary effect. " It is further held that "it has been held that as a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. But, provisos are often added not as exceptions or qualifications to the main enactment but as saving clauses, in which cases they will not be construed as controlled by the Section. " Referring to another decision from the Apex Court it is further held that "it has been held that there is no doubt where the main provision is clear its effect cannot be cut down by the proviso. But where it is not clear, the proviso, which cannot be presumed to be surplusage, can be looked into to ascertain the meaning and scope of the main provision. But where it is not clear, the proviso, which cannot be presumed to be surplusage, can be looked into to ascertain the meaning and scope of the main provision. " The above noted principle of the Apex Court regarding interpretation of the statute of a general provision and the proviso in a section, as humbly it may be stated, was not appropriately applied while making a comparison regarding applicability to Section 127 as a proviso to Section 125 of the Code. It is needless to say that on a bare reading of Sections 125 and 127 of the Code such an interpretation or construction regarding the general provision and exception or proviso cannot be adopted and if that is done then it will lead to misunderstanding the said two provisions. ( 10 ) IT is needless to say that relationship of Sections 125 and 127 of the Code stands at the footing of Section 125 being the genesis and Section 127 is the species. In the absence of an order under Section 125 in granting maintenance, an application under Section 127 of the Code is not conceivable. ( 11 ) WHILE Section 125 (2), of the Code provides that such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance", Section 127 (1) provides that on proof of a change in the circumstances Magistrate may make such alteration in the allowance as he thinks fit. In given type of cases relating to divorced wife, sub-section (3) of Section 127 provides for alteration in allowance by cancellation of maintenance in the event of remarriage, receipt of permanent alimony according to the custom or personal law etc. , which has the effect of making an order of alteration in allowance by cancellation of the order of maintenance retrospectively. In other words, after passing of an order of maintenance if an application under Section 127 is filed on any of the grounds covered by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 127 such orders of maintenance can be cancelled retrospectively or from the date of application, or even retrospectively from the date of order of maintenance. Thus, the statutory provision also by necessary implication, does not debar for giving effect to an order u/s. 127, retrospectively. Thus, the statutory provision also by necessary implication, does not debar for giving effect to an order u/s. 127, retrospectively. But everything depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case to make an order operative with effect from certain date as per the provisions of law. ( 12 ) SECTION 127 of the Code nowhere directly and substantially prescribes that an application under Section 127 if allowed should be operative only from the date of order. Giving such a restrictive meaning to the language used in Section 127 is to make the Magistrate handicapped in discharging his duty by use of proper discretion in appropriate case. However, an order to vary or rescind an order in normal circumstance shall be prospective unless it is required to be made operative from the date of application and that is the mandate of law in Section 125 (2) of the Code and that can beneficially be extended to the cases covered by Section 127 of the Code. ( 13 ) IN the case of Hiralal v. Balamba, AIR 1926 Bombay 419 : (27 Cri LJ 940) and Commissioner, Municipal Council, Telicheri v. Ramesh etc. AIR 1969 Kerala 109, Bombay and the Kerala High Courts have expressed the view that an order of payment of maintenance at an enhanced rate can be made applicable retrospectively from the date of application. ( 14 ) FOR the reasons indicated above, this Court is not inclined to follow the ratio in the case of Jayadev Chakraborty (1994 Cri LJ 2234) (supra ). On the other hand, following the above noted view of the Bombay and Kerala High Courts and relying upon the principles propounded by the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Savitri (1986 Cri LJ 41) (supra), this Court held that an order for enhancement of rate of maintenance, as in the instant case, can be made payable from the date of application, that being not opposed to the statutory provision of law in Section 127 of the Code or the scheme of the statute in Chapter IX of the Code. ( 15 ) CONTENTION of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is vulnerable due to non-examination of the opposite party as a witness is not found to be a lacuna at all in this case inasmuch as to prove the factum of enhancement of the cost of living, when that aspect was not contested by the petitioner, is not required to be proved by her own deposition by the opposite party. All that was required for her to prove the hike in the cost of living and that has been deposed to by her own brother as a witness under whose protection she resides being a physically handicapped woman. Argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that an interpreter could have been appointed for recording of her evidence is a far fetched contention. When she is not able to sustain her livelihood and has run to the Courts for years to get merciful order for enhancement of maintenance, it is too much to expect from her to bear the expenses of an expert being appointed to interpret the evidence of the dumb witness. If that was the contention of the petitioner he should have filed an application before the lower Court accordingly and he should have borne the expenditure and in the event of refusal by the learned Magistrate to examine the opposite party No. 1, the aforesaid contention of the petitioner could have been further considered. Under the given circumstance, the aforesaid contention has no merit and accordingly rejected. ( 16 ) THE other contention of the petitioner that while granting maintenance at the enhanced rate the exact income of the petitioner was not ascertained by the learned Magistrate. It is not disputed at the Bar and also it is the admitted case of the parties that petitioner is an employee under the State Electricity Board. The rate of maintenance has been enhanced from Rs. 190/- to Rs. 300/- per month. The petitioner cannot avoid to pay the same on a technical plea of not proving his actual monthly income. Judicial notice of the fact can be taken about the minimum salary of a Class IV employee under the Orissa State Electricity Board which is more than Rs. 1,000/- per month. Petitioner being a senior employee must be getting more than Rs. 1,000/- per month. Judicial notice of the fact can be taken about the minimum salary of a Class IV employee under the Orissa State Electricity Board which is more than Rs. 1,000/- per month. Petitioner being a senior employee must be getting more than Rs. 1,000/- per month. Apart from that during the period when his daughter, i. e. the opposite party No. 2 was not married, he was paying a consolidated sum of Rs. 270/- per month to both the opposite party members. Under such circumstances, an amount of Rs. 300/- cannot be said to be excess or disproportionate to the income of the petitioner. Hence, that contention of the petitioner is also devoid of merit. ( 17 ) IN the result, all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner fail and the criminal revision is dismissed on merit. Petition dismissed.