JUDGMENT : Y. Venkatachalam, J.—Invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-management herein has filed the present writ petition seeking for a writ of mandamus forbearing the first respondent, the Presiding Officer, III Additional Labour Court, Madras, from proceeding with the adjudication of I.D. No. 57 of 1992 in so far as the petitioner is concerned. 2. In support of the writ petition, the petitioner herein has filed an affidavit wherein they have narrated all the facts and circumstances that forced them to file the present writ petition and requested this Court to allow the writ petition as prayed for. Per contra, on behalf of the second respondent a counter-affidavit has been filed rebutting all the material allegations levelled against them one after the other and ultimately they have requested this Court to dismiss the writ petition for want of merits. 3. Heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel appearing for the parties, I have perused the contents of the affidavit and the counter-affidavit together with all other relevant material documents available on record in the form of typed set of papers. I have also taken into consideration the various points raised by learned counsel appearing for the respective parties during the course of their arguments. 4. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, the only point that arises for consideration in this case is, as to whether there are any valid grounds to allow this writ petition or not. 5. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner as seen from the affidavit are as follows: The petitioner-company is engaged in business of manufacturing heavy-duty motor vehicle industrial and marine engines. For the purpose of its business, they have factories at Ennore, Hosur, Alwar and Bhandara. The petitioner employs about 7,500 workmen in its Ennore factory and considering the large area over which the factory is situated at Ennore and in view of the fact that valuable machinery and goods are stored, it has become necessary to provide for security to protect the factory premises. The petitioner, therefore, among others, employs certain persons to do watch and ward work. In addition to the work done by such employees there are several other areas where different kinds of duties relating to security have to be performed for safeguarding the property and premises of the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, among others, employs certain persons to do watch and ward work. In addition to the work done by such employees there are several other areas where different kinds of duties relating to security have to be performed for safeguarding the property and premises of the petitioner. The third respondent is an organisation, which has specialised in providing security services to industrial establishments, like the petitioner. In order to meet the special requirements of the petitioner, the third respondent entered into a contract with the petitioner for provision of such services by way of security. The petitioner is registered as a principal employer under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Similarly, the third respondent is also registered contractor under the Act. The relationship between the petitioner and the third respondent is covered by contracts, which are entered into from time to time, which are terminable in the manner provided in such contracts. The petitioner has nothing to do with the persons who are employed by the third respondent and the only liability of the petitioner is to pay the third respondent according to the contract entered into between them. That being so, the petitioner received an order u/s 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, filed by the second respondent herein dated July, 1991, from the Assistant Commissioner of Labour (Conciliation) wherein it was alleged that the second respondent was working under the third respondent from May 14, 1982, till his services were terminated from January 17, 1991. It was also alleged that he has not committed any misconduct of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Apart from the third respondent, the petitioner herein was also impleaded as a respondent in the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour. Hence, the petitioner filed a counter dated September 17, 1991, pointing out that as far as they are concerned the claim made is wholly without jurisdiction and not maintainable as admittedly the third respondent was never at any stage an employee of the petitioner and hence was not a necessary party to the proceedings. Since there is no "employer and employee" relationship between the petitioner and the second respondent, there was no question of claiming any relief as against the petitioner, and hence the petitioner requested the proceedings to be dropped against them. Since there is no "employer and employee" relationship between the petitioner and the second respondent, there was no question of claiming any relief as against the petitioner, and hence the petitioner requested the proceedings to be dropped against them. The Assistant Commissioner of Labour (Conciliation), Madras, submitted his conciliation failure report, and in view of Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the second respondent filed a claim statement before the III Additional Labour Court, Madras, raising a dispute regarding his non-employment, which was numbered and taken on the file of the first: respondent as I.D. No. 57 of 1992. In the dispute before the first respondent, the petitioner herein has been included as a party to the dispute and notice has been received by the petitioner to appear before the Court. Aggrieved by the proceedings initiated by the second respondent and left with no other efficacious remedy, the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court to forbear the first respondent from prosecuting the proceedings, in so far as this petitioner is concerned. It is contended by the petitioner that the industrial disputes raised by the second respondent is wholly not maintainable in so far as the petitioner is concerned, as admittedly the petitioner is not the employer of the second respondent. It is also not in dispute, as is evident from even the claim, filed before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour that only the third respondent is the employer of the second respondent and hence the proceedings before the first respondent are wholly without jurisdiction as against the petitioner herein. According to them, the dispute raised by the second respondent is not an employer and the second respondent is not an employee within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Further according to them, as held by the Supreme Court in 1985 II LLJ 20, when the contract system is in vogue, the workmen employed by the contractor are not the workmen of the principal employer. Further according to them, as held by the Supreme Court in 1985 II LLJ 20, when the contract system is in vogue, the workmen employed by the contractor are not the workmen of the principal employer. They also contend that in such circumstances, the relationship between the petitioner and the third respondent being governed by the provisions of the Act, the only liability that would be fastened on the petitioner is to pay the third respondent according to the contract, and if there is any fault on the part of the third respondent to pay wages to his employees, then petitioner as a principal employer has been made liable under the Act to make the payment and then recover the same from the contractor, viz., the third respondent. Further, according to them, however, this is not intended to completely alter the reality of the legal relationship that exists between the principal employer on the one hand and the contractor on the other hand, vis-a-vis, the persons who are actually employed by the contractors. Even from the point of view of common sense, it stands to reason that no person who is employed by a contractor can seek to fasten himself on the principal employer merely on the ground that the services of such a person are temporarily made available by this employer to the principal employer in consideration of the contract between the principal and such employer. Further basing on the Supreme Court judgment in (sic) when a person is not a workman, then the reference to the industrial dispute is without jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the dispute raised by the second respondent is wholly without jurisdiction and not maintainable in so far as this petitioner is concerned, as they are not the employer of the second respondent. It is also their contention that this view has been confirmed by this Court in a judgment in (sic). 6. In such circumstances, the dispute raised by the second respondent is wholly without jurisdiction and not maintainable in so far as this petitioner is concerned, as they are not the employer of the second respondent. It is also their contention that this view has been confirmed by this Court in a judgment in (sic). 6. Per contra, it is contended by the second respondent in his affidavit filed in the vacate stay petition that he was working under the management of Ashok Leyland Limited, Ennore, as a security guard, that he was recruited by the management of Security Service, Madras, and he was posted to work under the management of Ashok Leyland Limited, that he was illegally retrenched from service on and from January 17, 1991, without issuing any notice of retrenchment or order of retrenchment or retrenchment compensation and notice pay as contemplated u/s 25-F/25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Challenging the same he raised an industrial dispute in I.D. No. 57 of 1991 and the same is pending before the Third Additional Labour Court, Madras. It is stated by him that in the said industrial dispute he has made the Director, Security Service, Madras, and the management of Ashok Leyland Limited as: respondents and that there is a dispute as regards the fact as to whether his employer is the management of Ashok Leyland Limited or the management of Security Services, Madras. Therefore, according to him, when the said issue is in dispute, the said question of fact cannot be gone into and decided by this Court. It is also contended by the petitioner that, however, even assuming without conceding that he was employed by the management of Security Services, Madras only, and the Labour Court came to a conclusion that the Security Services, Madras, has to pay certain benefits to him, then in the event of the Security Services, Madras, failing to pay him the: amounts ordered to be paid, the liability to effect the payment of the said amount is fastened on the management of Ashok Leyland Limited as the principal employer, and hence in any event, the management of Ashok Leyland Limited is a necessary party to the said dispute. Therefore, it is the categoric contention of the second respondent that at this point of time, this Court cannot decide the disputed question of fact as to whether he was the workman of the Security Services, Madras or the Ashok Leyland Limited, Madras, and hence the present writ petition itself is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. It is also the grievance of the second respondent that he has been illegally terminated from service on and from January 17, 1991, and he continued to be unemployed till date and that even before the entire issue as regards his termination from service has been decided by the Labour Court, the respondent has on a preliminary approached this Court. 7. Having seen the entire material available on record and from the facts and circumstances of the case and from the claims and counter-claims made by the rival parties, it is seen that there is a dispute in between the parties, before the Labour Court. Admittedly, I.D. No. 57 of 1992 in between the parties is pending before the first respondent Labour Court. It is contended by the petitioner-management that since there is no "employer and employee" relationship between the petitioner and the second respondent, there was no question of claiming any relief as against the petitioner and hence the petitioner requests that the proceedings to be dropped against them before the Labour Court. According to them, the second respondent was employed by the third respondent, who is registered contractor under the Act, and the petitioner herein is a principal employer under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. The relationship between the petitioner and the third respondent is covered by contracts which are entered from time to time and which are terminable in the manner provided in such contracts and that, therefore, the petitioner-management has nothing to do with the persons who are employed by the third respondent and the only liability of the petitioner is to pay the third respondent according to the contract entered into between them. Even in the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, the petitioner took the same stand, but, however, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour (Conciliation), Madras, submitted his conciliation failure report and in view of Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the second respondent filed a claim statement before the Labour Court raising a dispute regarding his non-employment, which was numbered and taken on the file of the first respondent as I.D. No. 57 of 1992. In the dispute before the first respondent, the petition herein has been received by the petitioner to appear before the Court. Immediately thereafter the petitioner rushed to this Court by way of this writ and he has also got a limited stay order, and in such circumstances the said I.D. No. 57 of 1992 is still pending. That being so, it is the categoric contention of the second respondent employee that in the said industrial disputes raised by him, there is a dispute as regards the facts as to whether his employer is the management of Ashok Leyland Limited or the management of Security Service, Madras and that, therefore, it is contended by him that when the said issue is in dispute the said question of fact cannot be gone into and decided by this Court under Article 226. It is also contended by the second respondent that at this point of time this Court cannot decide the disputed question of facts as to whether he was the workman of the Security Services, Madras, or the Ashok Leyland Limited, Madras, and that, therefore, the present writ petition itself is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. In this regard it is also argued on behalf of the second respondent employee that even assuming without conceding that the second respondent was employed by the management of Security Services, Madras, only and the Labour Court come to a conclusion that the Security Services, Madras, has to pay him the amounts ordered to be paid, the liability to effect the payment of the said amount is fastened on the management of Ashok Leyland Limited as the principal employer and hence in any event the management of Ashok Leyland Limited is a necessary party to the said dispute. I see every force in the above contentions made by the second respondent, because the above position has also been accepted by the petitioner-management even in their affidavit. I see every force in the above contentions made by the second respondent, because the above position has also been accepted by the petitioner-management even in their affidavit. In the affidavit it has been specifically stated thus: (paragraph 7 of affidavit) "In such circumstances, the relationship between the petitioner and the third respondent being governed by the provisions of the Act, the liability that would be fastened on the petitioner is to pay the third respondent according to the contract and if there is any fault on the part of the third respondent to pay wages to his employees, then the petitioner as a principal employer has been made liable under the Act to make the payment and then recover the same from the contractor, viz., the third respondent." 8. Therefore, from the above, it is very clear that the petitioner-management cannot contend that they are not the necessary party to the dispute. Further, when admittedly the dispute is pending before the Labour Court, at this stage this Court cannot go into the factual aspects of the case also. Therefore, it is rightly contended by the second respondent that when the said issue is in dispute, the said question of fact cannot be gone into and decided by this Court. That being so, the various decisions relied on by the petitioner also do not advance their case. 9. Therefore, for all the aforesaid reasons and in the facts and circumstances of the case and also in view of my above discussions with regard to the various aspects of this case, I am of the clear view that the petitioner-management herein has failed to make out any case in their favour and that, therefore, there is no need for any interference with the proceedings of I.D. No. 57 of 1992 before the first respondent. Thus, the writ petition fails and the same is liable to be dismissed for want of merits. 10. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently the order of stay already made in W. M. P. No. 4803 of 1992 is hereby vacated.