Honble CHAUHAN, J.– The instant writ petition has been filed for issuing direction to respondents to treat petitioner eligible for appointment on the post of Lecturer in Women Polytechnic. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner possesses to her credit Graduation Degree and she has also done Two Years Diploma Course from Government Girls Polytechnical College, Lucknow (U.P.) under the Board of Technical Education, Uttar Pradesh. She has been working as a Technician with respondent No. 1 since 1991. Respondent No.2 Commission issued an advertisement dated 20.1.97 (Annexure.1) for twelve vacancies on the post of Lecturer in Costumes, Design and Dress-making in Women Polytechnic. The req- uisite qualifications for the same, as required by the advertisement, have been that the candidate must possess the second class Degree in graduation from any recognised University and Three Years Diploma Course from any Board of Technical Education in Costumes, Design and Dress- making. In response to the said advertisement dated 20.1.97, petitioner applied and her candidature was rejected by the Commission vide order dated 5.6.97 as she had not done Three Years Diploma Course. Hence this writ petition. (3). The services on the said posts are being governed by the Rajasthan Technical Education Service Rules, 1973 (for short,``the Rules) Petitioner approached this Court mentioning clearly that the relevant rule providing for eligibility reads as under:- `For the post of Lecturer, the method of recruitment is 100% by direct recruitment. The minimum qualification for direct recruitment prescribed therein is Second Class Degree in appropriate branch/ faculty of a University established by law in India or qualifications recognised as equivalent there to by the Government, or Second Class Degree in Arts/ Science / Commerce of a University established by law in India with three years second class diploma: Remark : However, in branch/ faculty, where three years Diploma is not awarded, two years Diploma could be considered. (4). This Court considering the issue of eligibility as a debatable one, as the remark mentioned therein provided that two years Diploma could also be considered, passed an interim order to respondent No. 2 to consider the candidature of the petitioner provisionally. Respondents have filed replies wherein respondent No.2 has made allegations against the petitioner that she had suppressed the mate- rial facts. Respondents have filed replies wherein respondent No.2 has made allegations against the petitioner that she had suppressed the mate- rial facts. The said Rules stood amended in 1996 and had been issued strictly in consonance with the amended Rules, meaning there by that after the amendment in 1996, the remarks had been taken away/ deleted and it was provided that the qualification shall be a Graduation Degree and Three Years Diploma Course. Thus, petitioner has suppressed the material fact. It has further been submitted on behalf of respondents that petitioner had knowingly and purposely suppressed the fact regarding amendment in the Rules, otherwise she would have stated atleast in the rejoinder affidavit that she was not aware of the amendment but in that eventuality she ought to have taken a ground that the advertisement dated 20.10.97 was not in consonance with the statutory rules. Moreover, respondents have pointed out letter dated 9.4.1995 (Annexure. R..1/1) submitted by petitioner herself before the Authority, according to which petitioner had stated that she was not eligible. Thus, petitioner cannot agitate that she remained unaware of the amendment. (5). It is settled proposition of law that a candidate seeking appointment must be eligible as per the currently prescribed qualification. Petitioner cannot say that at one point of time prior to amendment of Rules, her case had been considered and, therefore, even today the respondents are bound to treat her eligible. The Honble Supreme Court, in Union of India & Anr. vs. Yogendra Singh (1), has held that in case of direct recruitment, an applicant must possess the requisite qualification as per the advertisement even if the vacancies had arisen prior to the date of amendment. The Court observed as under:- ``No candidate who does not possess the currently prescribed qualification and he possesses the qualification prescribed earlier, can be said to be qualified or have any vested right to appointment even against some earlier unfilled vacancies. Every candidate, who asspi- res to fill any vacancy, must possess the educational qualification that are then prescribed. (6). Same view has been taken by this Court in Kumari Luni Jogesh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2). (7). Every candidate, who asspi- res to fill any vacancy, must possess the educational qualification that are then prescribed. (6). Same view has been taken by this Court in Kumari Luni Jogesh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2). (7). In the instant case, as the rules have been amended which made the peti- tioner ineligible and the posts have to be filled-up by direct recruitment and even if the vacancies had arisen prior to the date of amendment petitioner cannot be held eligible in view of the judgment of the Hon`ble Supreme Court in State of J&K Public Service Commission &Ors. vs. Dr. Narendra Mohan & Ors. (3), wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:- ``It is difficult to accept the contention of Shri Rao to adopt the chain system of recruitment by notifying each years vacancies and for recruitment of the vacancies and for recruitment of the candidate found eligible for the respective years. It would be fraught with grave consequences. It is settled law that the Government need not imme- diately notify vacancies as soon as they arose. It is open, as early as possible, to inform the vacancies existing or anticipated to the P.S.C. for recruitment and that every eligible person is entitled to apply for and to be considered of his claim for recruitment provided he satisfies the prescribed requisite qualifications. Pagging the recruitment in chain system would deprive all the eligible candidates as on date of inviting applications for recruitment offending Articles 14 and 16. (8). Power to appoint includes the power to prescribe qualification to select suitable officers. It further includes the power to change the eligibility criteria, i.e. the educational qualifications and the same can be changed even for the employ- ees rendering them ineligible for promotion unilaterally for the reason that no employee can claim promotion as indefeasible right. (Vide S. Satyapal Reddy & Ors., vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (4); J. Rangaswamy vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (5); and State of J & K vs. Shiv Ram Sharma & Ors. (6). (9). A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Afzal Ullah vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (7), observed that validity of such a subordinate legislation must be tested by reference to the question as to whether the Authority had the power to provide for such a legislation. (6). (9). A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Afzal Ullah vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (7), observed that validity of such a subordinate legislation must be tested by reference to the question as to whether the Authority had the power to provide for such a legislation. Thus, if the Authority has the power to change the eligibility criteria, no fault can be found with the advertisement as the same was issued in consonance with the amended Rules and it is for the Government to prescribe the qualifications laying down the eligibility and Court cannot start probing the relevancy of the same. The Court cannot examine the wisdom, merit or efficacy of the policy of the legislature to see whether it effectuates the purpose of the Act. (Vide Maharastra State Board of Secondary & Higher Education vs. Pari- tosh B. Sheth (8). (10). In State of Mysore vs. P. Narasing Rao (9), the Apex Court held that the provisions of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution do not exclude the laying down of selective test, nor do they preclude the Authority from laying Down qualifications for the post in question such qualifications need not be only technical but they can also be general qualifications relating to the suitability of candidate for such service. (11). In State of Orissa vs. N.N. Swamy (10), the Honble Supreme Court held that the eligibility must not be confused with suitability of the candidate for appointment. (12). In V.K. Sood vs. Secretary, Civil Aviation & Ors. (11), the Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- ``Thus, it would be clear that, in exercise of the rule-making power, the President or authorised person is entitled to prescribe method of recruitment, qualifications, both educational as well as technical, for appointment or conditions of service to an office or a post under the State. The Rules, thus, having been made in exercise of the powers under proviso (2) to Article 309 of the Constitution, being statutory, cannot be impeached on the ground that authorities have prescribed tailor-made qualifications to suit the stated individual ...Suffice to state that it is settled law that no motives can be attributed to the le- gislature in making law. The Rules, thus, having been made in exercise of the powers under proviso (2) to Article 309 of the Constitution, being statutory, cannot be impeached on the ground that authorities have prescribed tailor-made qualifications to suit the stated individual ...Suffice to state that it is settled law that no motives can be attributed to the le- gislature in making law. The Rules prescribe qualifications for eligibility and the suitability of appellant would be tested by the Union Public Service Commission .....Moreover, it is for the rule-making authority or for the legislature to regulate the method of recruitment, prescribe qualifications etc. It is open to the President or the author- ised person to undertake such exercise and that necessary test should be conducted by the U.P.S.C. before giving certificates to them. It is not the province of the Court to trench into and prescribe qualifications in particular when matters are of technical nature. (13). The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, in State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa (12), up-held the similar entry in the Schedule observing that classification on the basis of educational qualifications made with a view to achieve administrative efficiency, cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstances and one has to bear in mind the facts and circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification. The court further held as under:- ``Classification is primarily for the legislature or for the statutory authority charged with a duty of framing the terms and conditions of service; and if, looked at from the stand-point of the authority making it, the classification is found to rest on a reasonable basis, it has to be up-held. (14). Thus,in view of the above, the Court has a very limited role and in exercise of that, it is not open to have judicial scrutiny regarding the qualifications prescribed by the Rules. Thus, the submission made by Mr. Kamal Joshi is not tenable in law. (15). Petitioner has been bent upon the unamended rules and this Court pass- ed interim order only being misguided. Thus, it is clear from her conduct that she has not approached this Court with clean hands, which every litigant is expected to do. Thus, the submission made by Mr. Kamal Joshi is not tenable in law. (15). Petitioner has been bent upon the unamended rules and this Court pass- ed interim order only being misguided. Thus, it is clear from her conduct that she has not approached this Court with clean hands, which every litigant is expected to do. It is settled propositions of law that when a person approaches the Court of Equity in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitu-tion, he should approach the Court not only with clean hands but with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective also. There is no need to cite any authority in this regard, but reference may be made to the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in the Ramjas Foundation & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (13); G. Narainswamy Reddy & Anr. vs. Government of Karanataka & Annr. (14); and K.R. Srinivas vs. R.M. Premchand & Ors. (15). Thus, there should be no suppression of material fact by the petitioner. (16). In Welcome Hotel & ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (16), the Apex Court held that if a party obtained an interim order by misleading the Court, it would be disentitled for any relief in equity jurisdiction. A Constitution Bench of the the Hon- ble Supreme Court, in Naraindas vs. Government of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (17), has held as under :- ``Now, there can be no doubt that if a wrong or misleading statement is deliberately and wilfully made by a party to a litigation with a view to obtain a favourable order, it would prejudice or interfere with the due process of judicial proceeding and, thus, amounts to contempt of Court. (17). Similar view has subsequently been reiterated by the Apex Court in the Advocate General, State of Bihar vs. M/s. M.P. Khair Industries & Anr. (18); and Delhi Development Authority vs. Skippers Construction & Anr. (19). (18). Thus, ``abuse of process of the Court calculated to hamper the due course of judicial proceeding or orderly administration of justice is a contempt of Court and if the instant case is examined in the light of judgments referred to above, petitioner can be held guilty of contempt of Court as she had obtained the interim order by misleading the Court placing reliance upon the Superseded rules. (19). (19). It is settled proposition of law that interim order merges in the final order and petitioner cannot take any advantage of interim order to consider her candidature provisionally, as there can be no quarrel on the legal proposition that no party can suffer by the action of the Court and when the High Court is exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised. The institution of litigation by a party should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. (Vide Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer & Ors. (20); Ram Krishna Verma etc. etc. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (21); State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. vs. M.V. Vyavasaya & Co. (22); and Smt. Rampati Jayaswal & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (23). (20). It is, also, settled law that no litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a Court of Law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed interim or- der and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim `Actus Curie neminem gravabit is applicable in such a case, which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no-one. In such a situation, the Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done by a party by the act of the Court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised as institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the Court. (Vide Dr. A.R. Sircar vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (24); Shiv Shanker & Ors. vs. Board of Directors, U.P. State Road Trans- port Corporation & Anr. (25); M/s. Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Ltd. vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. (26); Ugam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (27) and Konaria Chemicals & Industries Ltd. & Ors. (Vide Dr. A.R. Sircar vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (24); Shiv Shanker & Ors. vs. Board of Directors, U.P. State Road Trans- port Corporation & Anr. (25); M/s. Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Ltd. vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. (26); Ugam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (27) and Konaria Chemicals & Industries Ltd. & Ors. vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. (28). Therefore, the petitioner cannot get any benefit of the interim order passed in her favour as ultimately she has been found not entitled for any relief on merit. (21). There is another aspect of the matter. Petitioner has challenged the selection process after a delay of seven months as the advertisement was issued on 20.1.97 and the instant writ petition has been filed in July, 1997 after rejection of her application form. Petitioner has unnecessarily waited for rejection of her application form as she had knew that the Commission had no option but to reject her application form as certainly she did not possess the requisite qualification as per advertisement. Entertaining the instant petition would be discreminatory to those persons who had passed Two Years Diploma Course but did not apply in response to the said advertisement considering themselves not eligible. Had the petitioner challenged it at the initial stage, the matter could have been decided at the beginning, the situation could have been entirely different. (22). The next submission made by Mr. Joshi is that it is a very hard case and requires to be considered on equity. I am afraid, the equity does not lie in favour of the petitioner. The submission made by Mr. Joshi seems to be very attractive but no relief of equity can be granted in contravention of the statutory provisions. In Madamanchi Ramappa & Anr. vs. Muthaluru Bojjappa (29), the Supreme Courts has held that ``what is administered in Courts is justice according to law and consideration of fair play and equity, however, important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. Similarly, in Gauri Shanker Gaur vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (30). it has been held by the Apex Court that ``in construing a statute, equity will not relieve against a public statute of general policy in cases admitted to fall within the statute and it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the legislative intent. Similarly, in Gauri Shanker Gaur vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (30). it has been held by the Apex Court that ``in construing a statute, equity will not relieve against a public statute of general policy in cases admitted to fall within the statute and it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the legislative intent. Thus, equity can supplement to but cannot supplant the statutory provisions and if any room is given for equity or sympathy, the statutory rules would become nugatory and field would be left open for nepotism. Thus, it is not permissible to bend the law for adjusting equity. (Vide Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation vs. Virendra Kumar Jayantibhai Patel (31); and Smt. Rampati Jaiswal (Supra). It is also settled law that the Court cannot pass an order contrary to law, it has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in crystal clear words that the Court must not issue any direction either to refrain from enforcing the law or to act contrary to the law. (Vide Union of India & Anr. vs. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. (32); State of Rajasthan vs. Hitendra Kumar Bhatt, (33); State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Harish Chandra & Ors. (34); Vice Chancellor of University of Allahabad & Ors. vs. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra & Ors. (35); and Directorate of Enforcement vs. Ashok Kumar Jain (36). (23). Where the statutory provisions are clear and there is no ambiguity in law, the equitable relief is not warranted, nor equiable consideration can supersede public interest nor any order should be passed in favour of a litigant in misplaced sympathy. (Vide Dr. Meera Massey vs. Dr. S.R. Mehrotra (37); Central Board of Secondary Education & Anr. vs. P. Sunil Kumar & Ors. (38); Bhanwar Lal Bhandari vs. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises (39); Delhi Development Author- ity vs. Ravindra Mohan Aggrawal & Anr. (40); and Appa Narsappa Magduru vs. Akubai Ganpati Nimbalkar & Ors. (41). (24). In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Dharam Bir (42), the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under:- ``The plea that the Court should have a `human approach and should not disturb a person who has already been working on this post for more than a decade, also, cannot be accepted as the Courts are hardly swayed by emotional appeals. (24). In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Dharam Bir (42), the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under:- ``The plea that the Court should have a `human approach and should not disturb a person who has already been working on this post for more than a decade, also, cannot be accepted as the Courts are hardly swayed by emotional appeals. In dispensing justice to the litigating parties, the Courts should not only go into the merits of the respective cases, they also try to balance the equities so as to do com- plete justice between them. Thus, the Courts always maintain a human approach... .In fact, it is the `human approach which requires us to prefer the selected candidates over a person who does not possess even the requisite qualification. The Courts as also the Tribunals have no power to over-ride the mandatory provisions of the Rules on sympathetic consideration that a person, though not possessing the essential educational qualifications, should be allowed to continue on the post merely on the basis of his experience. Such an order would amount to altering or amending the statutory provisions made by the Government under Article 309 of the Constitution. (25). Thus, the submission made by Mr.Kamal Joshi is preposterous and accordingly rejected. (26). In view of the above, the petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.