JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above appeal has been filed by the plaintiff in Civil Suit No.68 of 1998 invoking the powers under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore as applicable to the High Court of Himachal Pradesh read with Section 23 of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1966, read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh, against the order of learned Single Judge of this Court dated 8.4.1999 in OMP No.111/99 in Civil Suit No.68/98 wherein the learned Single Judge has come to pass the following order:— "This is an application for extension of time for making good the deficiency in court-fee. The extension was last granted on 24.2.1999 till 31.3.1999. Now, further extension has been sought. In the interest of justice, one last and final extension is granted. The deficiency in Court fee be made good by 31.5.1999. The application stands disposed of." 2. The Registry has raised an objection against the maintainability of the appeal under the provisions of law invoked, and on the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner reiterating that the appeal would be maintainable, subject to the objection regarding the maintainability the appeal has since been posted before this Court. Mr. Sharwan Dogra learned Counsel for the appellant while placing strong reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and another, (1981) 4 SCC and Baddulalakshmaiah and others v. Srianjaneya Swami Temple and others, (1996) 3 SCC 52, strenuously contended that the order under challenge in this appeal filed is a judgment or an appealable order in so far as it, according to the learned Counsel, has the effect of putting an end to the very case filed by the plaintiff-appellant and that the order works serious injustice to the appellant on account of the consequences flowing from the same. It is also contended for the appellant that the learned Single Judge while indicating in the order that the extension and the deficiency should be made good by 31.5.1999, the powers of the Court for granting further extension have been denied and the learned Single Judge ought to have countenanced the claim of the appellant by granting further time of one year. From the Memorandum of Appeal filed in this case, it is seen that the plaintiff-appellant has filed a civil suit for recovery of damages to the tune of Rs. 2,583/- lacs along with pendente lite and future interest and costs from the respondents-defendants. Along with the plaint, an application under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed since the appellant only paid a deficient court fee of Rs. 25,000/- along with the plaint, for seeking permission to depots the court fee in part. The said application registered as OMP No. 411/98 appears to have been disposed of on 9.8.1998 with the direction that the deficiency in Court fee be made good within eight weeks. Since the appellant could not arrange for the payment of the deficiency in Court fee within the time granted by the court, the appellant appears to have filed an application under Order 23, Rule 1(3) read with Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure for withdrawal of the part of the claim in the suit by abandoning to that extent the claim and the said application was said to have been registered as OMP No. 589/98. The appellant also appears to have moved another application OMP No. 597 of 1998 for extension of time to pay the deficient court fee even on the revalued claim and on 24.2.1999 it was again ordered that the deficient Court fee be deposited by 31.3.1999 and notices were said to have been issued to the defendants-respondents in OMP No. 598/98 to file reply, if any. While the matter stood thus the appellant has moved the application OMP No. III of 1P99, the order passed on which is subject matter of the present appeal, on 31.3.1999 for extension of time by one year to deposit the deficient Court fee. 3. Even before going into the question of grievance about the appellant not being given the time of one year as prayed for on merits, it becomes necessary to go into the question as to the maintainability or otherwise of the appeal and in this respect to go into the question as to whether the order under challenge is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. As noticed earlier, the learned Counsel for the appellant while placing reliance upon the decision reported in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and another (supra) particularly, on paragraphs 113, 115, 119, 120 and 121 has taken us through the consideration made by their Lordships of the apex Court in those paragraphs of the judgment. A careful reading of those paragraphs in the judgment would make it very clear that an interlocutory order, in order to be a judgment must contain the character and trappings of finality on account of such order deciding the valuable right or question in controversy, in an ancillary proceedings or the suit itself or part of the proceedings. It has also been observed therein that any discretion exercised or routine order passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience to or even some extent prejudice the one party or the other cannot by itself be sufficient to treat such order as a judgment. By inviting our specific attention to paragraph 120 (15) and paragraph 121, it has been highlighted that an order deciding the payment of Court fees against the plaintiff would be a judgment to attract the provisions of the Letters Patent to enable the filing of an appeal. In spite of our careful consideration of the matter, we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the plea taken on behalf of the appellant that the order of the nature could be held to be a judgment to entitle the plaintiff-appellant herein to file a Letters Patent invoking the powers under Clause 1 0 of the Letters Patent governing this Court. The institution of a suit or any proceedings or the presentation of a document before a Court of law to which the Court Fee Act applies will not be legal institution or presentation if the fee chargeable under such taw is not paid at the time of such institution or presentation. The institution of a suit or any proceedings or the presentation of a document before a Court of law to which the Court Fee Act applies will not be legal institution or presentation if the fee chargeable under such taw is not paid at the time of such institution or presentation. It is only keeping in view the said fact that Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure enable the Court in its discretion, at any stage to allow the person by whom such fee is payable to pay the whole or part as the case may be of such Court fee and declares further that upon such payment the document in respect of which such fee is payable shall have the same force or effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. The petitioner in Baddulalakshmaiah and others v. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple and others (supra), the apex Court was not concerned very much with the nature of the order or categories of orders of the Single Bench of a High Court which would answer the description of judgment for the purposes of the Letters Patent; nor were their Lordships of the apex Court concerned with the laying down any test which would decide the character of an order to answer the description of a judgment for the purpose of Letters Patent Appeal. On the other hand, the said decision of the apex Court dealt with the width and extent of the powers of the appellate Court exercising jurisdiction under the Letters Patent governing the Court concerned. 4. The law being that at the time of institution of a suit or other proceedings or presentation of a document, the fee chargeable under the law governing the same has to be paid at the time of such institution or presentation failing which it will not be a legal institution of the very proceedings. Wherein a case as the one before us on an application seeking for time to pay the fee otherwise chargeable and due on the proceedings instituted the learned Single Judge has chosen to grant time more than once and indicated that it will be last and final extension to be granted and it cannot be reasonably or legitimately contended that it is by virtue of the order of the learned Single Judge that the petitioner has to suffer any adverse consequences. The adverse consequences, if any, attendant upon the proceedings instituted being not accompanied with the necessary and chargeable fee and being a perfunctory one is the making of the plaintiff-appellant himself only and merely because the learned Single Judge was initially inclined to grant on more than one occasion sometime out not to the expectation of the plaintiff-appellant, it cannot be stated that the learned Judge has decided any controversy even in an ancillary proceedings or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings so as to prejudice the rights of the appellant. The appellant had no right in law to institute such proceedings without payment of the court fee due thereon and be entitled to be granted extension of time of his choice, failing which he could claim even any right to make any grievance. The suit as noticed earlier appears to be one for damages and the claim appears to be a fabulous and fantastic one. If the plaintiff has to make such a claim, he must be prepared to make the charges and the payment of the charges due thereon cannot be postponed indefinitely or by years holding the trial or further hearing in the case in abeyance till such payment, like a Damocles sword for an indefinite period on account of his professed inability to pay the charges or to suit his own convenience or a time of his choice. The exercise of discretion by the learned Judge in this case could not be said to be patently against any mandate of law. Reference can be usefully made in our view to a decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court reported in S.A. Balakrishna Ayyar and another v. Parvathammal and another, AIR (1928) Madras 154, wherein their Lordship of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court has held that an order refusing to extend time for furnishing security ordered to be deposited for staying an administration suit and thus dismissing the application for stay is not a judgment. The adverse effect, if any, could not be said to be either director immediate cause of the order but due to the default and omission of the plaintiff-alone. 5. The adverse effect, if any, could not be said to be either director immediate cause of the order but due to the default and omission of the plaintiff-alone. 5. For all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the order under challenge cannot be held to be a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent to enable or entitle the appellant to file an appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge. The appeal shall, therefore, stands dismissed on this only ground. The dismissal of this appeal shall not stand in the way of the petitioner obtaining orders in the application said to have been filed under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure in OMP No. 598/98. CMP NO. 32 of 1999 : In view of the dismissal of the appeal, this application is also dismissed. Appeal dismissed.