Judgment S.K. Chattopadhyaya, J. As the facts and points of law involved in these two cases are similar, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The petitioner in Cr. Misc. No. 1996 of 1994 are in-laws and second wife of Hira Lal, the husband of the complainant. In Cr. Misc. No. 6807 of 1996 the petitioners are Hira Lal and his other family members. In the first quashing application the petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 4.6.1993, by which the Magistrate has refused• to discharge them and framed charges under Section 494 read with Section 1208 of the Penal Code, whereas in the second case the petitioners have prayed to quash the entire proceeding of Complaint Case No. 292 (C) of 1989, giving rise to Trial No. 323 of 1995 including the order dated 12th January, 1996, by reason of which the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, refused the prayer of the petitioner to drop the criminal case by discharging them. A further prayer has been made in the second quashing application to the effect that a direction should be given to the trial court to pass an order on the compromise petition filed by the petitioners and five others and the complainant-opposite party no.2 on 16th of June, 1994, by accepting the said compromise and drop the proceedings against these petitioners and other five accused persons. 3. The facts of the case may be stated briefly : The complainant, Reeta Kumari, filed a complaint petition before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, on 16.5.1989 stating therein that she was married to Hira Lal on 20.5.1978 according to Hindu Rites and after the marriage she lived as wife with Hiralal in his house. However, after six months of the marriage Hiralal along with his family members started torturing her for not paying dowry of rupees twenty thousand by her father. She was being subjected to assault by the accused persons. She further alleged that Hira Lal in connivance with all the accused persons married Babita Kumari on 8th March, 1987, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 494 of the I.P.C. Other accused persons are also guilty of offence under section 120B of the I.P.C. and Hira Lal and four others were also liable to be punished under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 4. 4. The Magistrate examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and recorded statements of the witnesses before taking cognizance of the offence under section 494 of the Penal Code. Against the order taking cognizance the petitioners moved this court in Cr. Misc. No. 7457 of 1989 and Cr. Misc. No. 8399 of 1989. Both the applications were disposed of on 8.4.1991 with an observation that if a petition for discharge is filed at the time of framing of charge, the trial court shall dispose of the same in accordance with law. 5. Thereafter, it appears, the petitioners filed a petition under Section 245 of the Cr. P.C. praying therein to discharge them. It was urged before the court below that Hira Lal had already obtained a decree of divorce from the civil court before getting married with Babita and, as such, no offence was made out under Section 494 of the Penal Code. Other grounds were also taken but the learned Magistrate by his impugned order dated 4.6.1993 refused the prayer by dismissing the said application. He was of the opinion that the judgment or the decree of divorce obtained by Hira Lal against the complainant was yet to be admitted as evidence and the judgment of such civil court can only be considered at the trial when the same could be exhibited as a defence document. 6. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha followed by Mrs. Namrata Mishra has submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the learned Magistrate has failed to appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case, specially the subsequent events. He urged that when Hira Lal married Babita after obtaining the ex parte divorce decree from a Civil Court, the Magistrate was under an obligation to give importance to the civil Court's decree. According to him a decree of the Civil Court does not require any formal proof and, as such, the same should have been taken into consideration. He further contends that the complainant-opposite party though had filed a petition before the civil court for setting aside the ex parte decree of divorce but admittedly during the pendency of the said matter a compromise was arrived at between Hiralal and the complainant and to that effect on 16th June, 1994, a joint compromise petition duly signed by the petitioners and the complainant was filed. It was agreed between the parties that the husband Hiralal and the wife Reeta Kumari (complainant) shall remain as husband and wife and Reeta Kumari will have no objection 1n living with Babita Kumari and her children as members of the joint family. The said compromise petition has been annexed as Annexure-7 in Cr. Misc. No. 6807 of 1996. Similarly the compromise decree is Annexure 11/1. Learned counsel contends that when admittedly Hiralal solemnised second marriage with Babita after getting ex parte decree of divorce on 28.2.1989, no offence was made out by him. 7. Mr. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party, refuting the argument of Mr. Jha, has submitted that at this stage the High Court will not be justified in coming to a conclusion that Hiralal married Babita after obtaining ex parte decree of divorce. According to him, the complainant had filed a petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the C.P.C. to set aside the compromise decree and, as such, it cannot be said that the ex parte decree of divorce obtained by Hiralal has attained its finality. Continuing, he urged that even the compromise decree has been challenged by the complainant on the ground that the said decree was obtained by practising fraud on her. Strong reliance has been placed by him on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others reported in 1992 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 426. He has also placed reliance in the case of Chand Dhawan (SMT) v. Jawahar lal and others reported in 1992 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 636. 8. It is an uncontroverted fact that Hiralal married to complainant, Reeta Kumari, on 20th May, 1978 and filed a divorce suit in 1988 being Matrimonial Title Suit No. 3 of 1988. The suit was decreed ex parte on 28.2.1989 because even on personal service of summon upon Reeta Kumari, she did not appear to contest the same. Thereafter the complaint petition was filed on 16.5.1989 i.e. about three months after the said decree for divorce. In the petition date, time and place of occurrence have been given as 8th March, 1987, in between 7 P.M. to 10 P.M. at Dunda Das Thakurbari, Mohalla Bakarganj, P.S. Kadamkuan, District Patna. Thereafter the complaint petition was filed on 16.5.1989 i.e. about three months after the said decree for divorce. In the petition date, time and place of occurrence have been given as 8th March, 1987, in between 7 P.M. to 10 P.M. at Dunda Das Thakurbari, Mohalla Bakarganj, P.S. Kadamkuan, District Patna. According to the complainant, after six months of her marriage, she was subjected to torture and harassment by her husband and in-laws for dowry. However, at that stage, admittedly, no complaint petition was filed by her either against Hiralal or his parents and other relatives. The further allegation is that Hiralal in collusion and conspiracy of all the accused persons with agreement to each other married Babita Kumari on the date, time and place of occurrence as described above. However the complainant is silent about the said decree for divorce against her. There is no whisper in the complaint petition that even on receiving summon from the court in the aforesaid matrimonial suit, she did not contest the suit and, as such, the court passed the ex parte decree. There is no averment in the complaint petition that the complainant had filed a petition under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. to set aside the ex parte decree of divorce. Even after the learned Magistrate refused the prayer of the petitioners by his order dated 4.5.1993, a Joint compromise petition was filed by the complainant and all the accused on 16.6.1994 stating therein that with the intervention of the common friends and well wishers they have compromised the aforesaid case outside the court on certain terms and conditions. It appears that on 17.9.1994 the complainant filed a petition before the Magistrate in the said complaint case with request not to accept the compromise filed between the parties on the ground that the accused persons failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the compromise petition inspite of best efforts made by her. Her grievance was that Hiralal, as agreed in the court, did not take her with him to his residence. Pending disposal of the compromise petition and the objection thereto before the learned Magistrate, it appears that in the said divorce suit another compromise petition was filed by the complainant and Hiralal. On 6th June, 1995, the divorce suit was finally disposed of in terms of the compromise petition tiled by the parties. Pending disposal of the compromise petition and the objection thereto before the learned Magistrate, it appears that in the said divorce suit another compromise petition was filed by the complainant and Hiralal. On 6th June, 1995, the divorce suit was finally disposed of in terms of the compromise petition tiled by the parties. This decree of the civil court is Annexure-11/1. 9. From the aforesaid facts, it will appear that the complainant did not file the complaint before Hiralal got the ex parte decree of divorce. According to her the second marriage between Hiralal and Babita was solemnised in the year 1987 but what prevented her to file the complaint petition in 1987 itself is not explained. Similarly, uncontrovertedly she was aware of the divorce suit filed against her by Hiralal because summons were duly served on her but curiously enough she did not contest the said suit and only when the said ex parte decree was passed in favour of the petitioner on 28.2.1989, she filed the present complaint petition on 16.5.1989. This conduct of the complainant raises suspicion. Moreover, admittedly, a joint compromise petition was filed before the Magistrate in the said complaint case but before the Magistrate could pass any order on the said complaint case, she filed objection petition on 17.9.1994 praying therein not to accept the said joint compromise petition. Not only this, a joint compromise petition was also tiled in the said divorce suit no.3 of 1988 and admittedly on 6th June, 1995, the said suit was decreed on compromise. From the decree itself it is abundantly clear that the complainant agreed to live with Hiralal and his second wife Babita without any grudge. There is no averment in the counter affidavit of the complainant that against the said compromise decree of the civil court she has filed any further petition for setting aside the said decree. The averments made in paragraph-16 of the petition that the said divorce suit was decreed on compromise' have not been controverted by opposite party no.2. In reply to the said statements in Paragraph-12 of her counter affidavit she has merely stated thus : "That the statements made in paragraph Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the quashing application are matters of record and the same requires no comment." 10. In reply to the said statements in Paragraph-12 of her counter affidavit she has merely stated thus : "That the statements made in paragraph Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the quashing application are matters of record and the same requires no comment." 10. Under these circumstances the question falls for consideration is as to whether the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. should allow the criminal proceeding to be continued against the petitioners of both the cases? 11. It is true that normally the High Court will not look into any document of defence at the stage of quashing of the criminal proceeding or a complaint but in the instant case the order of the learned court below refusing to discharge has been questioned on the ground that it has failed to take into consideration the judgment and the decree of divorce obtained by the husband from the competent civil court. In the case of State of Maharahstra vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj and others reported in (1997)4 Supreme Court Cases 393 their Lordships have observed as follow : "8. The law on the subject is now well settled, as pointed out in Niranjan Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bijaya that at sections 227 and 228 stage the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the fact emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may, for this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. Therefore, at the stage of framing of the charge the court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence or that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against him and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead a conviction." 12. In the present case even without seeking independent corroboration it can be said that the learned court below failed to take into consideration the relevant documents produced by the accused even at this stage. In the present case even without seeking independent corroboration it can be said that the learned court below failed to take into consideration the relevant documents produced by the accused even at this stage. In the case of Satish Mehra vs. Delhi Administration and another, reported in (1996)9 Supreme Court Cases 766, their Lordships in paras 14 and 15 have held that "the object of providing such an opportunity as is envisaged in Section 227 of the Code is to enable the court to decide whether it is necessary to proceed to conduct the trial. If the case ends there it gains a lot of time of the court and saves such human efforts and cost. If the materials produced by the accused even at that early stage would clinch the issue, why should the court shut it out saying that such documents need be produced only after wasting a lot more time in the name of trial proceedings. Hence, we are of the view that Sessions Judge would be within his powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated in section 227 of the Code. But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date, we are mindful that most of the Sessions Court in India are under heavy pressure of workload. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time it is advisable to truncate or snip the proceeding at the stage of section 227 of the Code itself." 13. In such view of the matter, I am of the view that the learned court below has acted with material irregularity in refusing to rely on the certified copies of the judgment and decree of divorce passed by the civil court. Considering the case from all angles, it appears that the complainant filed the complaint petition with an oblique motive and in such cases the High Court is well within its jurisdiction to quash the proceeding for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. 14. Considering the case from all angles, it appears that the complainant filed the complaint petition with an oblique motive and in such cases the High Court is well within its jurisdiction to quash the proceeding for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. 14. In the result, I quash the proceedings of Complaint Case No. 292(C) of 1989 including the order dated 4.6.1993 framing charge by the Magistrate and discharge the petitioners. Both the applications stand allowed.