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1999 DIGILAW 912 (RAJ)

Moti Ram v. State of Rajasthan.

1999-07-22

B.J.SHETHNA

body1999
Honble SHETHNA, J.– The petitioner has challenged in this petition the legality and validity of proviso to Rule 6 (3) of the Rajasthan Colonisation (Allotment and Sale of Government Land to Pong Dam Oustees and their Transferees in the Indira Gandhi Canal Colony Area) Rules, 1972 (for short ``the Rules) and prayed that the same may be struck down as ultra vires to the provisions of Section 41 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short ``the Act). (2). At the outset, it may be stated that the petitioner has not reproduced the proviso to Rule 6(3) of the Rules which ought to have been produced in the writ petition itself. Be that as it may. Before dealing with this, I would like to reproduce the Rule 6 (3) with proviso :- ``6 (3) Initially, the allotment shall be on Giar Khatedari tenure only, but Khatedar rights shall accrue in the land so allotted after the expiry or ten years from the date of allotment or after the full price of the land, together with other dues of the State Government if any, have been paid by him to the State Government, whichever is later : Provided that the right to sell the allotted land shall not accrue to the allottee before the expiry of 20 years from the date of allotment. (3). It may be stated that under the proviso to Rule 6 (3), as it reads after amendment on 22.4.1982, pursuant to the agreement between the Chief Minister of Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh at their meetings in September, 1981, the allo- ttee had no right to sell the land allotted to him before the expiry of 20 years from the date of allotment. (4).However, ten years later, the proviso was unilaterally amended to increase the period of 20 years from the date of allotment to 25 years by the notification dated 12.3.92. The same was challenged before the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Pradesh Pong Bandh Visthapit Samiti, Rajasthan and another v. Union of India and others (1) and the same amendment of 25 years from 20 years in the proviso to Rule 6(3) along with Rule 6-A of the Rules were held to be ultra vires and accordingly set aside. Meaning thereby, the original proviso of Rule 6(3) was restored. Meaning thereby, the original proviso of Rule 6(3) was restored. It may be stated that before the Honble Supreme Court in Pong Bandhs case (supra), no grievance was made about the original proviso to Rule 6(3) whereby the right to sell the allotted land to the allottee was restricted to twenty years from the date of allotment. (5). Learned counsel Mr. Acharya for the petitioner challenged the original proviso to Rule 6(3) of the Rules on the gound that it is against the provisions of Sec. 41 of the Act. Mr. Acharya submitted that under Sec. 41 of the Act, the Khatedari rights are transferable and it can be transferred at any time for which there is no restriction. He, therefore, submitted that the State Government in its Rule making powers cannot introduce such proviso and restrict the rights of Khatedars to transfer his khatedari rights not before 20 years from the date of allotment. (6). Rule 6(3) with original proviso is in Statute since 1982. The legality and validity of the same has not been so far challenged. Even in Pong Bandhs case (supra) there was no challenge to the original proviso whereby the restriction of 20 years was put. The Honble Supreme Court has only struck down the subsequent amendment raising 20 years to 25 years, however, the original proviso to Rule 6(3) was not held to be ultra vires. (7). That apart, it may be stated that the Rules were framed in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 28 read with Section 7 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 for allotment of Government land to the oustees of Ponga Dam in the Indira Gandhi Colony, the intention of the Legislature behind the enanctment of the Act and Rules has to be kept in mind by the Court while deciding such challenge to the vires of the Rules. Rajasthan Tenancy Act is totally different than the Rajasthan Colonisation Act. The Rules of 1972 are not framed under the Tenancy Act. (10). Under the circumstances, I fail to appreciate the submission made by Mr. Acharya and his submission that the original proviso of Rule 6(3) of the Rules is against the provisions of S.41 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. (11). In my humble opinion, this challenge seems to be totally frivolous and not well founded at all. (12). Even on merits, the contention raised by Mr. Acharya and his submission that the original proviso of Rule 6(3) of the Rules is against the provisions of S.41 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. (11). In my humble opinion, this challenge seems to be totally frivolous and not well founded at all. (12). Even on merits, the contention raised by Mr. Acharya regarding the validity and legality of the original proviso has no substance. The Rules were framed in 1972 for the benefit of those oustees who became landless because of the acqui- sition of the land within the territorial limits of the State of Himachal Pradesh on the construction of the Pong Dam on the river Beas commenced in the year 1960. They were to be rehabilitated in the State of Rajasthan and accordingly they were allotted the land with the intention and purpose that they will cultivate the land and maintain themselves out of its income. Rule 6(3) clearly provides that initially the allotment shall be on gair khatedari tenure only and the khatedari rights shall accrue in the land to a person only after the expiry of ten years from the date of allotment or after the full price of the land together with the other dues of the State Government, if any, have been paid by him to the State Government, whichever is later. Having reasonable apprehension in the mind of the state that if a person who has been allotted the land may not transfer the same by way of sale etc., the proviso was enacted to Rule 6(3) whereby the restriction is put to the person not to sell the land before the expiry of 20 years from the date of allotment. This is not only a reasonable restriction but also in the interest of genuine original allottees. Thus, it cannot be said that the original proviso to Rule 6(3) of the Rules is ultra vires to the Constitution or the Act or any provisions of law. (11). Mr. Acharya, then submitted that the learned Special Judge committed an error in not considering the legality and validity of the document i.e. agreement to sale. Mr. Acharya has drawn my attention to para 17 of the judgment of the learned Special Judge. In my opinion, the learned Special Judge was fully justified in observing that he was not deciding the rights of the parties. Mr. Acharya has drawn my attention to para 17 of the judgment of the learned Special Judge. In my opinion, the learned Special Judge was fully justified in observing that he was not deciding the rights of the parties. As per the Honble Supreme Court judgment in Pong Bandhs case, he has to only see as to whether there was any breach of the conditions or not, and if he is satisfied that there was any breach of the conditions, then the allotment must be cancelled. In this case, the petitioner was originally allotted the land in the year 1974 and as per the agree- ment to sell, the land was transferred in the year 1989 i.e. before 20 years which is not permissible under the law. Thus, there was a breach of condition. (12). Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned Special Judge has committed any error while passing the impugned order dated 1.6.1998. (13). In view of the above discussions, I do not find any substance or merits in the case. This petition fails and is dismissed. (14). At this stage, Mr. Acharya submitted that his contention regarding the proceedings between the parties under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act have not been dealt with by this Court. This was never argued before the learned Special Judge. Apart from that, once I have come to the conclusion that the learned Special Judge was right in passing the order on the ground that there was breach of the condition, then there was no need for this Court to deal with the same.