JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner seeks to challenge the award dated July 30, 1985 of the Labour Court Jaipur II, whereby compensation in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded to him. The petitioner seeks reinstatement on the post of General Clerk with full back wages and continuity of service with all consequential benefits. 2. The contextual facts depict that the petitioner commenced his apprenticeship as General Clerk under the Apprenticeship Act, 1961 in the CIMMCO Wagon Factory of the respondent No. 2 on October 12, 1979. After completion of apprenticeship of one year on October 11, 1980, a in certificate was issue by, the Personal Manager in this regard on October 12, 1982. Thereafter the petitioner was appointed as General Clerk on January 18, 1981. The petitioner continued on the said post upto October 7, 1982 when the services of the petitioner were terminated. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute through the Joint Secretary, CIMMCO Staff is Employees Union, Bharatpur. The respondent No. 2 appeared before the Conciliation Officer, who did not choose to file reply and the Conciliation Officer submitted his failure report to the State Government. The State Government vide its Notification dated September 28, 1983 referred the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court Jaipur. By the impugned award the Labour Court held that the retrenchment of the petitioner was illegal and improper being in contravention of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the Act of 1947). The Labour Court however failed to grant necessary consequential relief prayed for by the petitioner. 3. The petitioner assailed the award in the Supreme Court of India by way of Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Special Leave Petition was however withdrawn on March 31, 1986 seeking liberty to file writ petition in the High Court. The grievance of the petitioner is that instead of granting reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits the Labour Court only granted the compensation in the sum of Rs, 5,000/-. 4. The respondent No. 2 submitted reply to the writ petition with the averments that the award was passed on July 20, 1985 but the writ petition to has been filed in August 1988 after a period of more than three years. Therefore the writ petition deserves to be dismissed being highly belated. 4. The respondent No. 2 submitted reply to the writ petition with the averments that the award was passed on July 20, 1985 but the writ petition to has been filed in August 1988 after a period of more than three years. Therefore the writ petition deserves to be dismissed being highly belated. The Special Leave Petition was withdrawn from the Supreme Court of India or March 31, 1986 and the writ petition was filed after two years and five months in this court. It was further averred that the Labour Court has fully considered ts the special circumstances of the case and has rightly awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The respondent No. 2 does not have any post vacant on which the petitioner can be offered appointment in the clerical cadre. It was further contended that from 1985 no non-graduate person has been employed in clerical cadre. The petitioner is not a graduate and he cannot be appointed as a Clerk. 5. The petitioner filed rejoinder stating therein that he commenced his apprenticeship as General Clerk under the Apprenticeship Act, 1961 on October 12, 1979. As per para 3(e) of the Standing Orders an `apprenticeship' means an employee who is a learner or under training with `5 or without any allowance or stipend during the period of his learning or training provided however, the period of his training or learning shall not exceed one year at one time. Subsequently this period was extended and the words two years' were inserted in place of one year. Since the petitioner's training was completed on October 12, 1980, therefore he cannot be go treated as apprentice after October 12, 1980. Even as per the amended standing order the term of training has expired on October 12, 1981, yet the petitioner was allowed to continue upto October 7, 1982. Therefore to is clear that the petitioner was appointed on the post of General Clerk with effect from October 13, 1980. Though there was no written agreement with regard to appointment, yet it can be presumed that the petitioner was verbally appointed in the year 1981. It was further stated that the petitioner is a Graduate and he did his Graduation in the year 1979. It was obligatory on the part of the respondent No. 2 to appoint the petitioner on the post of General Clerk as and when the vacancy arose. It was further stated that the petitioner is a Graduate and he did his Graduation in the year 1979. It was obligatory on the part of the respondent No. 2 to appoint the petitioner on the post of General Clerk as and when the vacancy arose. But ignoring the petitioner's rightful claim the respondent No. 2 appointed Shyam Sunder in August 1983 in Tool Store, Kan Singh Shekhawat in Time Office in 1983, Bad Shah Singh in Purchase section in 1988 and Manoj Kumar further in Purchase section in 1991. Thus it is clear that the appointments were made by the respondent No. 2 ignoring the preferential claim of the petitioner. 6. Mr. Sanjay Pareek, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner canvassed that the petitioner cannot be put to undue hardship in any manner by reason of delay in approaching the High Court for relief. It was further contended that the labour Court held that the termination of the petitioner was violative of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 and under these circumstances the petitioner ought to have been reinstated in the service with all consequential benefits. Reliance was place on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another v. Dolly Das (1999) 4 SCC 450 , Gammon India Limited v. Niranjan Dass (1984) 1 SCC 509 . 7. On the other hand Mr. Manoj Kumar Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 contended that the petitioner was rightly awarded compensation by the Labour Court as he could not have been taken back as apprenticeship. It was also contended that there is no vacant post of the Clerk and after such a long period the petitioner cannot be reinstated. 8. I have pondered over the rival submissions and carefully weighed the material on record. It is evident from the material on record that the petitioner to commenced his apprenticeship as General Clerk under the Apprenticeship Act, 1961 on October 12, 1979. The petitioner completed his training on October 12, 1930 and even as per the amended Standing Order the term of training expired on October 12, 1981. Therefore it is manifest that the term of apprenticeship or the petitioner could not be extended beyond October 12, 1981, yet the petitioner was allowed to continue upto October 7, 1982 by the respondent No. 2. 9. Therefore it is manifest that the term of apprenticeship or the petitioner could not be extended beyond October 12, 1981, yet the petitioner was allowed to continue upto October 7, 1982 by the respondent No. 2. 9. In State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh 1968(17) FLR page 9 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the similar circumstances and it was observed thus- "Immediately upon completion of the extended period of probation on October 1, 1960 the appointing authority could dispense with the services of the respondents if their work or conduct during the period of probation was in the opinion of the authority unsatisfactory. Instead of dispensing with their services on completion of the extended period of probation, the authority continued them in their posts until some time in 1963, and allowed them to draw annual increments of salary including the increment which fell due on October 1, 1962, The rules did nut require them to pass any test or to fulfil any other condition before confirmation. There was no compelling reason for dispensing with their services and re-employing them as temporary employees on October 1, 1960 and the High Court rightly refused to draw the inference that they were not discharged from services and re-employed. In these circumstances, the High Court rightly held that the respondents must he deemed to have been confirmed in their posts. Though the appointing authority did not pass formal orders of confirmation in writing, it should be presumed to have passed orders of confirmation by so allowing them to continue in their posts after October 1, 1960." 10. In the instant case the respondent No. 2 allowed the petitioner to continue upto October 7, 1982, therefore it will be presumed that the petitioner was verbally appointed as General Clerk by the respondent No. 2. In the rejoinder the petitioner has specifically averred that he did his Graduation in the year 1979 and this fact was not controverted by the respondent No. 2. Therefore I hold that at the time of termination of services the petitioner was holding the post of General Clerk and the finding of the learned Labour Court that the petitioner was apprentice at the time of termination of services is erroneous. 11. Therefore I hold that at the time of termination of services the petitioner was holding the post of General Clerk and the finding of the learned Labour Court that the petitioner was apprentice at the time of termination of services is erroneous. 11. In M/s. Swadesamitran Limited v. Their Workmen AIR 1960 SC 762 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 13 propounded thus- "Once it is found that retrenchment is unjustified and improper it is for the labour tribunals to consider to what relief the retrenched workmen are entitled. Ordinarily, if a workman has been improperly and illegally retrenched he is entitled to claim reinstatement. The fact that in the meanwhile the employer has engaged other workmen would not necessarily defeat the claim for reinstatement of the retrenched workmen, nor can the fact that protracted litigation in regard to the dispute has inevitably meant delay, defeat such a claim for reinstatement. This court has consistently held that in the case of wrongful dismissal, discharge or retrenchment, a claim for reinstatement cannot be defeated merely because time has lapsed or that the employer has engaged fresh hands." 12. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Doliy Das (supra) it was indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the person who approaches the High Court for a relief should not be put to undue hardship in any manner by reason of delay in approaching the court. 13. In Gammon India Limited v. Niranjan Das (supra) the Apex Court held that after termination is void abinitio the workman is entitled to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. 14. In the instant case the learned Labour Court through observed that the services of the petitioner were terminated flouting the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, yet awarded only compensation to the petitioner on the ground that he could riot have been reinstated as apprentice. As already stated here-in-above, the petitioner at the time of termination of services was working as General Clerk, therefore he is entitled to be reinstated in the services with all consequential benefits. 15. In the result the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated July 30, 1985 of the Labour Court Jaipur II is modified and it is directed that the petitioner shall be reinstated on the post of General Clerk with all consequential benefits. No costs.Petition Allowed. *******