Research › Browse › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

1999 DIGILAW 916 (MAD)

Minor Sivasankari represented by her next friend and mother Nirmala alias Navajothi v. G. Subramaniam and another

1999-09-01

A.RAMAN

body1999
Judgment : Aggrieved by the Order passed by the lower court, in allowing an application for condonation of delay, this revision is filed. 2. After hearing the counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the respondents, I am satisfied that the order passed by the lower court cannot be accepted at all. The revision petitioner herein filed a suit in O.S.No.359 of 1990 for partition and separate possession of the plaintiffs share in the properties. There are two defendants in the suit. The 1st defendant is the father of the plaintiff. The 2nd defendant is the brother of the 1st defendant. In this case, we find that the 2nd defendant is not chosen to file any affidavit at any stage of the proceedings. It is only the 1st defendant, who has been filing affidavits alleging certain reasons. The 2nd defendant kept himself behind the scene. The 1st defendant has alleged that because his ill-health and medical treatment, he could not appear in court or contest the matter. If he is the sale defendant, perhaps one can understand the logic behind the explanation But, there is another defendant in the suit, who is none else than his brother and who is also equally interested in contesting the suit. It is not stated that the brother was unwell or that he could into for certain reasons participate in the court proceedings by taking active steps. The 1st defendant, who has been alleging medical grounds has not even chosen to produce any medical certificate. The 1st defendant would also allege that he has been suffering at the same time from number of aliments. It is stated that he was suffering from acute jaundice. It is also stated that he suffered from dyeheris. When the suit in O.S.No.359 of 1990 stood posted for appearance, the defendants did not appear. The suit was posted to 4. 1991 for appearance of the defendants. The defendants did not appear and therefore they were not set ex parte. An application was filed to set aside the ex parte order, where it was alleged that these was a over-sight by the clerk of the counsel. The said application in I.A.No.1717 of 1991 was dismissed for default by the court. Therefore, I.A.No.80 of 1993 was filed by the defendants to condone the delay of 37 days in filing the application to restores the said application. The said application in I.A.No.1717 of 1991 was dismissed for default by the court. Therefore, I.A.No.80 of 1993 was filed by the defendants to condone the delay of 37 days in filing the application to restores the said application. In the affidavit filed in support of the said application, it was stated that the petitioners defendants could not meet the counsel due to sickness of the 1st petitioner G.Subramaniam. It is stated that the was seriously ill from 29. 1993 to 112. 1993 and by that time, the final decree application was filed. In the final decree application, a Commissioner was appointed. Only at that stage, the petitioners defendant choose to file an application to restore the application in I.A.No.1717 of 1991, that was dismissed for default. In the application filed in I.A.No.80 of 1993, it was stated that they came to know of the dismissal of I.A.No.1717 of 1991 only after they received the notice from the Commissioner, and thus they could not file the application for restoration and they came to know of the same only from the Commissioner and thus, there is a delay of 37 days, and therefore, he filed an application in I.A.No.80 of 1993 to condone the delay in filing the application to restore I.A.No.1717 of 1991. Along with that, they had also filed an application in I.A.No.81 of 1993 for stay of all further proceedings in final decree. Application No.479 of 1994 is the application filed to restore I.A.No.1717 of 1991 to file. In the meanwhile, the defendants approached the High Court by filing an appeal against the order in C.M.A.No.1 of 1994, which was later dismissed as not pressed. The said order permitted appellate to prosecutor the application for restoration of connotation of delay. Meanwhile, the delay occurred in filing the application to restore I.A.No.479 of 1994 to file. The total number of days delay in 733 days. To excuse the same the application in I.A.No.750 of 1997 was filed. 3. Now in the background of the above facts, we have to consider whether the order of the court below is a proper exercise of jurisdiction. It is alleged by the revision petitions that while the defendants were filing petitions after petition, in the meanwhile they were selling away which are the subject matter of the decree. 3. Now in the background of the above facts, we have to consider whether the order of the court below is a proper exercise of jurisdiction. It is alleged by the revision petitions that while the defendants were filing petitions after petition, in the meanwhile they were selling away which are the subject matter of the decree. It is further alleged that the guardian of the plaintiff viz., the wife of the 1st defendant, Nirmala alias Navajothi had filed an application against her husband in Family Court in O.P.No.93 of 1995 and in that application, both the defendants have been present in court on all occasions. These allegations are not denied at all. Thus the circumstances of this case would show that the defendants have been filing petitions after petitions with the sale intention of dragging on the proceedings. While this dragging on the proceedings, they have, in the meanwhile disposed of the properties which are subject matter of the decree. The allegations about the illness of the 1st defendant are not supported by way medical evidence. There is absolutely no justification for the 2nd defendant to have kept quit. He could have defended the suit. There is no explanation for the same. In such circumstances, the lower court was not justified in ordering the application. 4. The observation of the lower court that there are acceptable reasons, is really astonishing. In the absence of any proof of the allegation and when the narration of the facts not out show that there is utter lack of bona fides, it is rather surprising that the lower court should have held that the reasons are acceptable. As to how he findings the explanation acceptable, no reason is stated in the order. The only reason stated by the learned Sub Judge is that with a view to arrive at a finality, it is necessary to set aside the order. It is not a ground upon which it is competent for a court to allow an application of this nature. The defendants did not appear in spite of service of summon. Having filed application to set aside the ex parte decree, they allowed it to be dismissed for default. To say that only in the course finally decree proceedings, when the Commissioner come to the property for the purpose of effecting division. the defendants woke up and filed application is tooage poll to swallow. Having filed application to set aside the ex parte decree, they allowed it to be dismissed for default. To say that only in the course finally decree proceedings, when the Commissioner come to the property for the purpose of effecting division. the defendants woke up and filed application is tooage poll to swallow. Meanwhile, they pursued the matter in the High Court. Then having lost it there they went before the trial court again, the ground of illness is not made out. Therefore, it is not a fit case, where the delay should have been condoned. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents would rely upon the decision reported in N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthi N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthi N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthi , (1990)7 S.C.C. 123 In fact, the Apex Court has held that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But, when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. 6. Here in this case, it is obvious that these applications are filed as a part of dilatory strategy. There has been a wilful lapse on the part of the defendants. The explanation given can hardly be believed. On the other hand, it direct of mala fides. The other brother viz., the other defendant has been only a spectator. assisting his brother, who has been a price actor in this drama. They have been disposing of the property in the meanwhile. Therefore, I am satisfied that the order passed by the lower court is against the proposition of law and natural justice. Hence, it has to be set aside. 7. In the result, this revision is allowed, with cost setting aside the order passed by the lower court. The petition filed by the defendants in I.A.No.758 of 1997 in O.S.No.359 of 1990 will stand dismissed, with costs. Consequently C.M.P.No.9726 of 1998 and 10584 of 1999 shall stand dismissed.