JUDGMENT SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J. This is an appeal by the plaintiff/appellant against the appellate judgment and decree dated 30.7.82 passed by 2nd Addl. District Judge, Palamu at Daltonganj in Title Appeal No. 6/81 confirming the judgment and decree dated 31.1.81 passed by the 4th Addl. Subordinate Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj in Partition (title) Suit no. 22/57 dismissing the plaintiffs/appellant's suit filed mainly for a declaration that the suit land described in Schedule II to the plaint has been allotted to the plaintiff in a amicable partition; the same is in possession of the plaintiff and that his title and possession is not affected by the decree for partition passed in Partition Suit no. 2/47 by the court of Subordinate Judge, Palamau which decree has been alleged by the plaintiff to be fraudulent, collusive, void and not binding on him since he was not a party to that suit. There is also an alternative relief sought in the plaint that if the court holds that there has been no partition in the past then a decree for partition may be passed. 2. This appeal against the concurrent findings of the courts below was admitted on 26.2.83 and the only substantial question of law raised and formulated was as follows :- "Whether in view of the fact that the relief prayed for by the appellant was for setting aside the decree passed in Title Suit no. 2/47 of the court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau on the ground that the same was obtained by fraud and collusion, the judgment of that suit will remain as res judicata?" 3. For determination of the aforesaid question of law in the facts of this case it is relevant to note the case of the parties in brief. The genealogy given in paragraph 1 of the plaint is admitted wherefrom it is apparent that one Deoki Sahu was the common ancestor and the suit relates to the lands which belonged to said Deoki Sahu. Deoki Sahu had three sons, Ragho Dayal Sahu, Kapil Sahu and Sheo Shanker Sahu. Two brothers of Ragho Dayal Sahu died leaving behind only their widows. Most. Jageshwar Kuar, widow of late Kapil Sahu and Most. Rampati Kuar, widow of late Sheo Shanker Sahu who were the original defendant nos. 8 and 9 in this suit. Ragho Dayal Sahu had two sons, Nameshwar Sahu and Motilal Sahu. Two brothers of Ragho Dayal Sahu died leaving behind only their widows. Most. Jageshwar Kuar, widow of late Kapil Sahu and Most. Rampati Kuar, widow of late Sheo Shanker Sahu who were the original defendant nos. 8 and 9 in this suit. Ragho Dayal Sahu had two sons, Nameshwar Sahu and Motilal Sahu. The widow and two sons of Nameshwar Sahu were defendant nos. 5, 6 and 7 in this suit whereas the plaintiff is one of the four sons of Motilal Sahu. Said Motilal Sahu and his other three sons were defendant nos. 1 to 4 in this suit. 4. The plaintiff's case, in brief, is that the three sons of Deoki Sahu died in joint ness. It is the further case of the plaintiff that after the death of Sheo Shanker Sahu defendant nos. 8 and 9 i.e. the widows rights in favour of the coparceners consisting of the plaintiff and defendant nos. 1 to 7 on the intervention of punches who gave an award making arrangement for maintenance of two widows and a daughter of Sheo Shanker Sahu. The punches allegedly divided the entire ancestral properties in two equal shares; one schedule was allotted to Nameshwar Sahu and his branch and the other to Motilal Sahu and his branch and, accordingly, the two sets of co-sharers came in possession over their separate schedules of land. According to the plaintiff, after his marriage in 1943 his wife could not pull on well with her mother-in-law and hence in 1945 he separated from his father in residence and in the year, 1951 there was a private partition in which the plaintiff was allotted a separate takhta of one anna seven pie four karant as given in the schedule at the foot of the Plaint, Thereafter, a registered partition deed was effected in the year 1955 and, accordingly the co-sharers including the plaintiff came in possession of their respective takhtas. 5. It is further case of the plaintiff that he came to know that defendant no.9, widow of late Sheo Shanker Sahu had executed a sale deed in favour of defendant no.10, an outsider to the family; allegedly without any consideration and that she had no interest in the property of the family after partition by Panchayati. Allegedly at the instigation of others defendant no.9 had filed a partition suit bearing no. Allegedly at the instigation of others defendant no.9 had filed a partition suit bearing no. 2/47 in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj in which admittedly Nameshwar Sahu and Motilal Sahu, the uncle and father of the plaintiff were parties but not their sons. The plaintiff has alleged that Nameshwar Sahu and Motilal Sahu did not contest the suit properly leading to a collusive and fraudulent decree dated 30.4.48 which, according to him, is not binding on him because he was not made a party to partition suit no. 2/47. 6. The defendants belonging to the branch of Nameshwar Sahu and Motilal Sahu supported the case of the plaintiff whereas defendant no.9, widow of Sheo Shanker Sahu and defendant no.10, her transferee contested the suit by filing separate written statements. The case of both these defendants is that soon after the death of Kapil Sahu there was separation in the family which then consisted of Sheo Shanker Sahu and his nephews and as a result of separation the family properties were divided half and half amongst Sheo Shanker Sahu and the descendants of Raghudayal Sahu. It was their further case that after separation Sheo Shanker Sahu constructed a separate house in which he lived till he died leaving behind defendant no.9 as his heir. It was contended that the story of surrender alleged by the plaintiff was utterly false. According to defendant no.9 Nameshwar Sahu and Motilal Sahu wanted to grab her property and for that purpose they fraudulently obtained her signature on a blank paper immediately after the death of her husband and later converted it into the so-called surrender and panchayati award. The suit was also challenged as barred by resjudicata on the ground that defendant no.9 had to institute title suit no.2/47 in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj in order to frustrate the evil design of Nameshwar Sahu and Motilal Sahu who were out to deprive her of her property. According to defendant no.9 Nameshwar Sahu was then the karta of the branch of Ragho Dayal Sahu. He was impleaded as defendant no.1 and his brother Motilal Sahu was also impleaded as defendant no.2 in the said title suit no.2/47 which was seriously contested by them in the capacity of representatives of their respective families but without any success. According to defendant no.9 Nameshwar Sahu was then the karta of the branch of Ragho Dayal Sahu. He was impleaded as defendant no.1 and his brother Motilal Sahu was also impleaded as defendant no.2 in the said title suit no.2/47 which was seriously contested by them in the capacity of representatives of their respective families but without any success. Nameshwar Sahu also preferred appeal against the judgment and decree in title suit no. 2/47 but without any success. Thus, according to the case of the defendants this suit was filed in 1957 by one of the sons of Motilal Sahu only with a view to some how get rid of the judgment and decree of title suit no. 2/47. According to them the present suit embraces the subject matter of the earlier suit in which also the father of the plaintiff and his uncle had unsuccessfully raised a plea of panchayati and surrender of her interest by defendant no.9. 7. As noticed earlier, the plaintiff lost in the trial court as also in the appellate court on definite issues. The trial court, while deciding the issues, gave a clear finding that Sheo Shanker Sahu was separate from Nameshwar Sahu and Motilal Sahu which was the case of the contesting defendants nos.8 and 9, the learned trial court came to a finding that there was no surrender of the interest of defendant no.9 in the properties of her husband and the alleged surrender and partition papers were forged and fabricated' and were never acted upon. Thus, it was after deciding all the issues in favour of defendant nos. 9 and 10 and against the plaintiff, that issue no.3 relating to the suit being barred by res judicata was taken up and decided against the plaintiff on the basis of the plaint, written statements and the judgemnt in partition suit no. 2/47. The learned trial court on the basis of evidences on record, came to a finding that it cannot be held that the plaintiff was separate from his father from before 1947. 8. The learned appellate court has also come to a definite finding that the suit was barred by res judicata and further, while affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court, came to a definite finding that there was nothing wrong in the judgment of the trial court. 9. Mr. 8. The learned appellate court has also come to a definite finding that the suit was barred by res judicata and further, while affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court, came to a definite finding that there was nothing wrong in the judgment of the trial court. 9. Mr. P.K. Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that since the property in question was ancestral property of 3 Hindu family, hence the plaintiff had a right in the same by birth and, therefore, section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure incorporating the principle of res judicata could not be applied against him because in the former suit he was not a party and secondly since he had interest in the property by birth, hence it cannot be said that he was claiming under his father who was party in the previous litigation. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied upon a Full Bench Judgment of Lahore High Court in the case of Lala Maha Deo and others Vrs. Ranbir Singh and others reported in AIR (31) 1944 Lahore 220. In that case it was held that where a mortgage or money decree is passed against a Hindu father, suit by son challenging existence of debt in order to avoid the liability of the joint family property in his hands, is not barred by section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure because a Hindu son does not claim under his father within the meaning of section 11 because a son in a joint Hindu family becomes entitled in his own right by birth. It was further held that the suit was not barred by explanation VI to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure because in that case it was found that the interest of the son clashed with those of his father and hence the latter cannot be said to have represented his son in the previous suit against him. It was further held that the suit was not barred by explanation VI to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure because in that case it was found that the interest of the son clashed with those of his father and hence the latter cannot be said to have represented his son in the previous suit against him. Thus, it is clear that in the case of Lala Maha Deo (supra) the suit was for avoiding the money decree where the interest of the son was found to be at a clash with those of his father and, therefore, it was held that explanation VI to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not attracted and hence the father could not be said to have represented his son in the previous suit. The facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. In the present case the suit is with regard to family property and the share in the same. The father of the present plaintiff had no clash of interest with plaintiff's interest, hence, since the father as well as the karta of that branch fully represented the interest of the plaintiff in the previous suit; explanation VI to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be clearly applicable so as to attract the bar of res judicata. The argument that a Hindu son with regard to ancestral property does not claim under his father may be valid as a principle of Hindu law but in relation to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; in the given circumstances, the son or other coparceners when represented by the karta of the family or a father representing the interest of other members of his family litigates bona fide, then a son or all persons being so represented, shall be deemed to claim under the person so litigating by virtue of explanation VI to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This principle of law 'stands fully supported by a Division Bench Judgment of this court in the case of Lakhanlal Jha and anr. This principle of law 'stands fully supported by a Division Bench Judgment of this court in the case of Lakhanlal Jha and anr. V. Jeewach Jha and others reported in AIR (35) 1948 Patna, 388 wherein it was held that the judgment given in the earlier case in which the plaintiff's father had sued as the karta of the family would bind the entire family even if there had been no such statement regarding the father being karta, if it could be shown that substantially it was a suit on behalf of the entire family; irrespective of the question of whether or not there were some minors who were or not impleaded. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes no distinction between plaintiff and defendant but only mentions of parties and hence the principle would be equally applicable in this case where the father of the present plaintiff clearly defended the earlier suit on behalf of the entire family. In the courts below the plaintiff/appellant failed to prove and establish that his father and .uncle had not defended the earlier suit bona fide. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has also cited and relied upon a judgment of Madras High Court in the case of Chandramani Prushati Vs. Jambeshwarraya Garu and others reported in AIR 1931 Madras, 530. The said judgment is on the same line as that reported in AIR 1944 Lahore 220 discussed earlier and is thus clearly distinguishable. 11. The last judgment cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is in the case of State Bank of India vs. Ghamandi Ram reported in AIR 1969 SC 1330 . In that case their lordships were considering the meaning of the term 'Hindu joint family' in the context of a notification issued by the Government of Pakistan under section 45 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance and propounded a well established concept that having regard to the juristic nature of the Hindu joint family; according to the doctrine of Mitakshra a Hindu joint family firm cannot be treated as individual within the meaning of the notification under the aforesaid Ordinance but must be treated as a body of individuals whether incorporated or not within the meaning of that notification. The said proposition has no application to the facts of this case learned counsel for the appellant also referred to Article 254 in Mulla's Hindu law according to which a decree obtained against father as a manager of a joint family is binding upon his sons if in the case of minor sons, he was acting on their behalf in their interest and in the case of majors with their assent. According to Mulla such a decree operates as res judicata by virtue of the provisions of explanation VI to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The aforesaid view of Mulla in the facts of the case, does not help the plaintiff/appellant. 12. Lastly it was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that as a final court of facts the lower appellate court ought to have come to its own finding on the case of the plaintiff that he had separated prior to 1947. In this regard it is worth noticing that the case of the plaintiff, as per the plaint itself, was a halfhearted contention that he had separated from his father only in residence some •times in 1945 whereas he also pleaded partition among his branch through a deed of partition in the year, 1955. The learned trial court came to a finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was separate from his father from before 1947. The judgment of the appellate court is a judgment of affirmance and therein also the learned appellate court has clearly held that the plaintiff's objection to the applicability of the decision of the previous suit as res judicata is far-fetched and frivolous and that there is nothing to show that the judgment in the present suit is unsupportable otherwise. 13. Considering the entire facts and circumstances and also the concurrent findings of the courts below' I find no illegality in the findings of the courts below that the judgment in title suit no.2/47 will bind the present plaintiff and operate as res judicata. Moreover, in my view, even on other issues on which the findings of the learned trial court have not been challenged, the plaintiff' appellant cannot succeed in the suit and hence I find no ground to interfere with the judgments and decrees challenged in this appeal. Moreover, in my view, even on other issues on which the findings of the learned trial court have not been challenged, the plaintiff' appellant cannot succeed in the suit and hence I find no ground to interfere with the judgments and decrees challenged in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed and the judgments and decrees of the courts below are hereby confirmed.