Honble GUPTA, J.– This petition u/S. 482 Cr.P.C. is directed against the order dt. 24.10.98 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sri Vijaynagar whereby he dismissed the application of the petitioners for dropping proceedings against them. (2). Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that the cause of action to file complaint u/S. 142 arises only after a notice is served by the holder of the cheque on its drawer but in this case the petitioner had not been served with a notice. Relying on the cases of Tomy Jacob vs. Dr. Thomas (1) and Chimanlal vs. State of Rajasthan (2), he submitted that the cognizance order be quashed. (3). The learned P.P., on the other hand, pointing out that the notice were sent to the petitioners within 15 days of the receipt of the information from the bank but they avoided the service of the notices, argued that it should be presumed that they had notice of the dishonour of the cheque. (4). I have considered the rival contentions of the parties. Under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1981, it is necessary that the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the amount of the cheque by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. (5). In the instant case, the cheque issued by the petitioners in favour of respondent M/s. Khurana Bros. was dishonoured by the bank on 4.5.98. The holder in due course (complainant) sent registered notice to the petitioners on 14.5.98. The notices were returned by the Postal Department with the report that the postman visited the establishment of the petitioners again and again and every time the employees informed him that the owner had gone out. After the respondent no.2 received back the registered envelops, he filed complaint on 24.6.98. The facts mentioned above clearly show that the holder in due course (complainant) had sent notices to the petitioner within 15 days of the receipt of the information of the dishonour of the cheque. It is obvious that there was compliance of Clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act by the complainant. (6). The facts mentioned above clearly show that the holder in due course (complainant) had sent notices to the petitioner within 15 days of the receipt of the information of the dishonour of the cheque. It is obvious that there was compliance of Clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act by the complainant. (6). The reports on the envelops show that the postman had taken the enve- lops to the establishment of the petitioners again and again but Om Prakash (owner) could not be personally served as he was not available. Clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act provides that the offence is committed when the drawer of the cheque fails to make payment of such amount to the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the `receipt of the notice. (7). It is no doubt true that in the instant case the petitioners had not received the notices personally. But the question is whether on the basis of the reports recorded by the Postal Department, it can not be presumed that they had notice of the dishonour of the cheque issued by them to the complainant. There may be cases where notice is returned undelivered on account of deliberate evasion by the accused, when the same was tendered by the postman. In my opinion, if tender of the notice by the postman at the address of the accused is proved, and it is established that the notice could not be personally served due to wilful default or deliberate evasion of the accused, then the same may constitute ``receipt of notice. Of course, the burden to establish these facts rests on the complaint. In this regard the observation of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Madan and Co. vs. Wazir Jaivir Chand (3) on the interpretation of service of notice in a case under J & K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act may be usefully reproduced :- ``We are of the opinion that the conclusion arrived by the Courts below is correct and should be upheld. It is true that the proviso to Cl. (i) of S.11(1) and the proviso to S.12 (3) are intended for the protection of the tenant. It is true that the proviso to Cl. (i) of S.11(1) and the proviso to S.12 (3) are intended for the protection of the tenant. Nevertheless it will be easy to see that too strict and literal a compliance of their language would be impractical and unworkable, the proviso insists that before any amount of rent can be said to be in arrears, a notice has to be served through post. All that a landlord can do to comply with this provision is to post a prepaid registered letter (acknowledgment due or otherwise) containing the tenants correct address. Once he does this and the letter is delivered to the post office, he has no control over it. It is then presumed to have been delivered to the addressee under S.27 of the General Clauses Act. Under the rules of the post office, the letter is to be delivered to the addressee or a person authorised by him. Such a person may either accept the letter or decline to accept it. In either case, there is no difficulty, for the acceptance or refusal can be treated as a service on, and receipt by the addressee. The difficulty is where the postman calls at the address mentioned and is unable to receive the letter. All that he can then do is to return it to the sender. The Indian Post Office Rules do not prescribe any detailed procedure regarding the delivery of such registered letters. When the postman is unable to deliver it on his first visit, the general practice is for the postman to attempt to deliver it on the next one or two days also before returning it to the sender. However, he has neither the power nor the time to make enquiries regarding the whereabouts of the addressee: he is not expected to detain the letter until the addressee chooses to return and accept it; and he is not authorised to affix the letter on the premises because of the assessees therefore, be equated to those of a process server entrusted with the responsibilities of serving the summons of a Court under O. V of the C.P.C. The statutory provision has to be interpreted in the context of this difficulty and in the light of the very limited role that the post office can play in such a task. If we interpret the provision as requiring that the letter must have been actually delivered to the addressee, we could be virtually rendering it a dead letter. The letter cannot be served where, as in this case, the tenant is away from the premises for some consi- derable time. Also, as addressee can easily avoid receiving the letter addressed to him without specifically refusing to receiving the letter addressed to him. Also, as addressee can easily avoid receiving the letter addressed to him without specifically refusing to receive it. He can also manipulate matters that it gets returned to the sender with vague endorsements such as "not found", "not in station", addressee has left" and so on. It is suggested that a landlord, knowing that the tenant is away from station for some reasons, could go through the motions of posting a letter to him which he knows will not served. Such a possibility cannot be excluded. But, as against this, if a regis- tered letter addressed to a person at his residential address does not get served in the normal course and is returned, it can only be attributed to the addressees own conduct. If he is staying in the premises, there is no reason why it should not be served on him. If he is compelled to be away for some time, all that he has to do is to leave necessary instructions with the postal authorities either to detain the letters addressed to him for some time until he returns or to forward them to the address where he has gone, or to deliver them to some other person authorised by him. In this situation, we have to chose the more reasonable, effective, equitable and practical inter- pretation and that would be to read the word ``served as ``sent by post, correctly and properly addressed to the tenant, and the word ``receipt as the tender of the letter by the postal peon at the address mentioned in the letter. No other interpretation, we think, will fit the situation as it is simply not possible for a landlord to ensure that a re- gistered letter sent by him gets served on, or is received by, the tenant. (8). No other interpretation, we think, will fit the situation as it is simply not possible for a landlord to ensure that a re- gistered letter sent by him gets served on, or is received by, the tenant. (8). In the instant case, in the complaint it is clearly averred by the complainant respondent no.2 that he had sent the registered notice to the petitioners within 15 days of the receipt of information from the Bank but the petitioners could not be served personally as they managed the report of the postal employees that they (petitioners) were not available. It is also averred that the petitioners know about the contents of the notices. It is thus a pure question of fact which can be investigated during the trial of the case as to whether the notices were actually taken by the Postal Department to the petitioners and they evaded the service of the notice. It is significant to point out that it is not the case of the petitioners that the address recorded on the notices was incorrect, or that the petitioner establishment was closed during those days. (9). It is not a case where the complaint does not disclose the necessary allegations. All the ingredients of the offence u/S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act have been stated in the complaint. The Apex Court has recorded a note of caution in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal (4) that the power of quashing the criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly. In the instant case when there are allegations in the complaint which constitute the offence and specific allegations have been made with regard to the service of the notice this Court cannot be justified in quashing over of taking congnizance. (10). Coming to the cases relied on by Mr. Jain, it may be stated that in the case of Tomy Jackob (supra) on facts it was held that the complainant had failed to prove that he had served a notice on the drawer of the cheque within the period prescribed u/S. 138 of the Act. It is in these circumstances the trial court had acquitted the drawer which order was maintained by the Apex Court. In the instant case, at this stage keeping in view the allegations in the complaint, it cannot be conclusively said that the notice was not served on the petitioners. (11). It is in these circumstances the trial court had acquitted the drawer which order was maintained by the Apex Court. In the instant case, at this stage keeping in view the allegations in the complaint, it cannot be conclusively said that the notice was not served on the petitioners. (11). So also in the case of Chimanlal (supra) the complainant had failed to file the copy of the notices sent by him. Secondly, in that case there were no such allegations that the accused had managed the report of the Postal Department regarding their non- availability. The ruling thus does not help the petitioners. (12). For the reasons stated above, there is no cause to interfere in the order of Magistrate taking congnizance as also in the order rejecting the application of the petitioners. (13). There being no merit in this petition, it is hereby dismissed.