JUDGMENT : - A.K. Yog, J. The present petitioner Lallu, son of Sri Baldeo, is the owner of House No. 1191501 D-8 Darshanpurwa, Kalpi Road, Kanpur. Admittedly, the petitioner is residing in one room 12' x 8' and a Verandah 12' x 8' on the ground floor of the said house. Respondent No. 3 (Chandra Shekhar) is the tenant of other portion of the ground floor of the same measurement. The petitioner's said building has certain accommodation on first floor and second floor. 2. PETITIONER filed an application under Section 2jl (l) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. No. 13 of 1972) for short jelled the Act, for seeking release of the accommodation in the tenancy of respondent No. 3. Admittedly the family members of the petitioner comprise himself, his wife, his mother, 3 sons (one having been married) and unmarried daughter (at the time of filing of the release application in the year 1976). The said application (registered as case No. 78 of 1976 in the Court of the Prescribed Authority Annexure-1 to the writ petition), was rejected vide judgment and order dated 17th March, 1980 (Annexure IV to the writ petition). The Prescribed Authority took note of the fact that landlord/petitioner was letting out and al lowing other persons to occupy of the accommodation which has become available to him at the relevant time on first and second floor of his building. The Prescribed Authority was, however, pleased to observe that it was open to the applicant/landlord to file fresh release application in case he could make offer to respondent No. 3 for occupying the accommodation of first or second floor of his building. The Prescribed Authority, how ever, has accepted the case of the landlord that the accommodation, which came in his possession on first or second floor of the building, was not suitable for his old mother who could not be asked to lie in the said room. A perusal of the order of the Prescribed Authority shows that it had messed the two issues, concerning 'bona fide need' and 'comparative hardships. Feeling aggrieved, landlord filed an appeal being Appeal No. 150 of 1980 before the District Judge, Kanpur which was dismissed vide impugned judgment dated September 21, 1981. 3. SRI Nagendra Kumar Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner is present. Feeling aggrieved, landlord filed an appeal being Appeal No. 150 of 1980 before the District Judge, Kanpur which was dismissed vide impugned judgment dated September 21, 1981. 3. SRI Nagendra Kumar Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner is present. None appears on behalf of respondent even though list has been revised. 4. I have perused the impugned orders dated 17-3-1980 and September 21, 1981 (Annexures 4 and 11 to the writ petition) as well as counter and rejoinder affidavits. The learned District Judge in its judgment dated 21-9-1981 (Annexure 11 to the writ petition) has disagreed with the Prescribed Authority on the question of 'bona fide need' of the landlord. The appellate Authority has observed:, "this is evidently short of the normal requirement of the family and the contention of the appellant that he needs more space for residential purpose cannot be discarded in my view as dishonest. " 5. THE Appellate Authority has, how ever, dismissed the appeal, while recording a finding on comparative hardship against the landlord. Primarily having been moved this from the circumstances that he has been allowing the accommodation available on first and second floor to be occupied by other person and that he did not take the same for his personal use. 6. THE Appellate Authority, however, failed to take into account, the explanation of landlord for not utilizing first and second floor accommodation even though they could be taken in possession by him. THE case of the landlord was that the accommodations, which had fell vacant on first floor and second floor were not adequate and suitable. His case was that he could not adjust his mother on first floor and second floor. THE Prescribed Authority discarded this case of the landlord on the ground that that mother could remain on ground floor. THE Prescribed Authority cannot be said to be justified in discarding the said explanation. THE Prescribed Authority did not take into account the fact that landlord could not leave the old mother on the ground floor nor he could leave his wife or unmarried daughter on the ground floor. In any case the landlord could not be said to be unjust for seeking for ground floor accommodation in the tenancy of respondent No. 3. THE Prescribed Authority did not take into account the fact that landlord could not leave the old mother on the ground floor nor he could leave his wife or unmarried daughter on the ground floor. In any case the landlord could not be said to be unjust for seeking for ground floor accommodation in the tenancy of respondent No. 3. It is natural that a landlord, who is in possession of a portion on ground floor of his building, would like to acquire portion of ground floor itself, as use its entire ground floor as one unit for personal use. The Appellate Authority, though accepted the need of landlord being bona fide and rejected the release application on the ground that 'comparative hardship" was in favour of the tenant and on this ground an effort was made by landlord to give alternative accommodation on the second floor to the tenant, respondent No. 3 was not reasonable and just when he refused to vacate the accommodation in his tenancy on the ground floor and secondly the room offered on second floor was only 1/3rd of the ground floor accommodation. 7. THE learned District Judge, while deciding the issue on the question of comparative hardship' has taken into account that the accommodation offered by landlord on second floor was only l/3rd of the ground floor accommodation in the tenancy of respondent No. 3 thus it could not be said that offer of the landlord was in respect of an adequate and suitable accommodation to the tenancy. Learned District Judge failed to appreciate that the landlord could not be blamed for letting out the accommodation of first and second floor which was too inadequate and unsuitable. This circumstance should not be overlooked while deciding the issue of bona fide need. THE Prescribed Authority has committed manifest error on the face of record in not applying the criterion and test with equality to both the parties while deciding issue of bona fide need. In view of the undisputed fact, particularly extent of the landlord family, it could not be said that he did not require the accommodation bona fide. THE finding recorded on the question of comparative hardship, cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. THE District Judge was referred to the affidavits dated 4-5-1978and 27-7-1981. 8. In view of the undisputed fact, particularly extent of the landlord family, it could not be said that he did not require the accommodation bona fide. THE finding recorded on the question of comparative hardship, cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. THE District Judge was referred to the affidavits dated 4-5-1978and 27-7-1981. 8. THE application and affidavit, by means of which landlord had made "offer" of the alternative accommodation to the tenant had been filed as Annexure 5 to the writ petition. THE landlord also filed an application dated 27th July, 1981 (Annexure 7) before the Appellate Court intimated that his eldest son Ashok Kumar got married on April 30, 1980. Chandra Shekhar (respondent No. 3) has filed counter affidavit before the Prescribed Authority therein he mentioned that the landlord had accommodation on second floor also (Annexure 10 to the writ petition). The respondent No. 3 has also filed another affidavit before Appellate Authority dated 18th August, 1981 (Annexure 9) wherein he alleged that the accommodation on second floor was l/3rd of the accommodation in dispute on the ground floor. The District Judge/appellate Authority failed to appreciate that since the extent of the landlord family and its members is not disputed, it could not be said that his Contention that he needed accommodation in the ground floor was unreasonable in any manner. 9. THE learned District Judge, how ever, completely take in to account the fact that the family of the landlord was bound to expand in future. His daughter, who was only aged 2 years (at the time of filing of the release application) must be now aged 25 years. His eldest son Ashok Kumar, her married daughter during the pendency of the appeal must Wave got issue by now who must have should] going to school and college. 10. IN view off the above finding of the learned District Judge in its judgment dated 21-9-1981, ion the question of comparative hardship, is set aside and it is found that comparative hardship of landlord in fact fend circumstance of the case is much more that the likely hardship to be suffered by the respondent No. 3. 10. IN view off the above finding of the learned District Judge in its judgment dated 21-9-1981, ion the question of comparative hardship, is set aside and it is found that comparative hardship of landlord in fact fend circumstance of the case is much more that the likely hardship to be suffered by the respondent No. 3. In view of the above, impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority dated 17th March, 1980 (Annexure 4) and District Judge dated 21-9-1981 (Annexure 11 to the writ petition) to the extent it relate to the 'issue of "comparative hardship" against the landlord are being set aside and the release application filed by landlord (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) is allowed; Application for release (Annexure 1 to the petition) is allowed. No order as to cost. Petition allowed.