JUDGMENT This petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been presented by the petitioner for quashing Annexure 'P-15 and directions to the respondents to permit the petitioner to run the school. The petitioner claims that it is a society registered under the provisions of M.P, Societies Registration Act and its bye-laws are Annexure P-1. It runs a Higher Secondary School. Initially, a Primary School as established in the name of Ashaskiya Kanya Prathmik Vidyalaya, Haveli, Galetha, Tehsil Jaura, District- Morena. There was a dispute whether the first respondent Shiksha Prasar Samiti was running the said school or the petitioner-society was running the school. An enquiry was ordered to be made and a report was submitted to the Deputy Director of Education, Morena to the effect that the petitioner-society was running the Primary School. First respondent filed a writ petition No. 1483/94 which was decided on 5th December, 1995 and it was held that the enquiry be held and after giving an opportunity to the respondent-society, the matter be disposed of. On 19th June, 1986, a resolution was passed by the respondent to the effect that the school was run by the petitioner-society vide Annex. P-4. The panchayat of the village Galetha also certified that the Girls Primary School was being run by the petitioner-society. On 18th Oct. 1993, a letter was given by the President of the Managing Committee of the respondent-society that Primary School was run by the petitioner-society vide Annex. P-9. Similarly, the Head Master also submitted an application vide Annex. P-9. The Dy. Director of Education, Morena on 29.10.93 ordered that the petitioner will run the school. It was challenged in the High Court in a writ petition which was decided on 24th November, 1997 and in accordance with the directions of the Court, the 2nd respondent passed an order on 24th November, 1997 to the effect that serious illegality has been found in the matter of transfer and on the basis of the order of this Court, the transfer of Primary School had been held to be illegal. It was also directed that grant-in-aid should not be released in favour of the petitioner society vide Annexure P-13, which was delivered on 15th Jan. 1998 through covering letter Annex. P-14. The order in question in Annex. P-13, which has been sought to be quashed. It was also directed that grant-in-aid should not be released in favour of the petitioner society vide Annexure P-13, which was delivered on 15th Jan. 1998 through covering letter Annex. P-14. The order in question in Annex. P-13, which has been sought to be quashed. Respondent No.2 filed a return claiming that the order Annex. P-13 was perfectly valid and according to the law. There was the statutory remedy of appeal provided under section 10 of the M.P. Societies Registration Act, 1973 before the State Government and as such the petition is not maintainable. It has however, been pleaded that the object of the Society was not to run the Higher Secondary School but it was to run Primary to Higher Education School and Colleges. Under the law, prior permission is required for transferring the school's property by the society concerned from respondent No.2 Registrar under section 21 of the M.P. Societies Registration Act, 1973 and under Rule 23 of the byelaws. The Society transferred the school against it. Respondent No. 1 did not appear inspite of service of notice and Issue of an S.P.C. The petition has been heard finally at the initial stage. A preliminary objection has been raised by respondent No.2 that there is an alternative remedy available to the petitioner inasmuch as an appeal can be filed against the impugned order Annex. P-13 before the State Govt. under section 40 of the M.P. Societies Registration Act and as such, the petitioner should have taken recourse to the remedy available under the law and wrongly filed this writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand contended that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar and this Court can certainly interfere if there are grounds for interfering. I have considered the contentions raised before me by the learned counsel for the parties. As pointed above, a preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent-State that an alternative remedy is available, hence no interference is called for in this petition. It has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is a provision of appeal from every original order under the Act or the rules to the authorities mentioned in section 77 of the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar. The general law is that where an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is available to a litigant, he should pursue that remedy and may not invoke special jurisdiction of this Court. No doubt, it is a rule of practice and not of jurisdiction. In exceptional circumstances, the High Court may grant relief under Article 226, even if an alternative remedy is available. Extra ordinary jurisdiction need not be invoked in all cases. It is true that it is not an absolute bar but if an aggrieved person has right to file an appeal or revision application under the relevant statute, the High Court may refuse to entertain a petition under Article 226. This principle also applies to cases where review or reference is, available. Of course, there are certain exceptions to the general rule. In those cases where the question relates to the jurisdiction of the authority passing the impugned order is involved this Court can certainly interfere and an alternative remedy cannot be said to be a bar. Similarly, where there is patent infringement of fundamental right, it is the duty of this Court to protect the fundamental rights. The alternative remedy cannot be said to be a bar. Here in the present case, nothing has been shown by the learned counsel for the petitioner which may go to show that the general rule may not be adhered to. There is a specific statute of remedy available to the petitioner and hence, the petitioner must approach the proper forum in accordance with the provisions contained in the statute. I, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that when an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner, no interference is called for in this petition. It will be open to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order before the proper forum under the provisions of the statute. With this observations, this petition is dismissed. Costs shall remain easy.