DR. M. K. SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) BY this order I propose to dispose of the aforementioned petitions as they giverise to and involve similar issues which were urged before me. ( 2 ) THE respondent/delhi Cloth Mill is a company which owns 52 acres of land atbara Hindu Rao, Kishan Ganj, Delhi and was running a textile mill at the said place. The mill had in all about 63 acres of land, out of which 52 acres were free-hold landwhereas remaining 11 acres were lease-hold land. A master pain was drawn up andput into operation in 1962 by Delhi Development Authority for the entire Delhi in termsof which the mill was required to be shifted from the aforesaid location which washeld under the Master Plan as a non-conforming area. In the said Master Plan it wasalso stipulated that the land on which the mill was located could be used for flattedfactories and group housing residential schemes. Accordingly, the respondent appliedto Delhi Administration for permission to close its mill and submit a scheme to Delhidevelopment Authority for re-development of the land into group housing and flattedfactories. The aforesaid closure of the mill was sought for under Section 25-D of theindustrial Disputes Act. Delhi Administration However, refused to accord suchpermission which resulted in filling of writ petition in this court which was registeredas C. W. P. I 28/1985. The Full Bench of this court allowed the writ petition and the Lt. Governor of Delhi was directed to determine the application of the company forpermission to close down the Undertaking under section 25-D of the Industrialdesputes Act. The Special Leave Petition filed as against the aforesaid order of thiscourt was also dismissed and thus the respondent closed its textile mill w. e. f. 1. 4. 1989. ( 3 ) DELHI Development Authority however, revoked its resolution dated 1. 2. 1993whereby it had granted permission to the respondent to re-develop the land in termsof their request. The aforesaid action on the part of Delhi Development Authority alsocame to the challenged in a writ petition in this court which was registered andnumbered as writ petition No. 2687/1986 which was also allowed by the Full Bench ofthis court on 2. 5. 1987 upholding the right of the respondent to re-develop the land asper Master Plan. Delhi Development Authority as also the Central Governmentchallenged the said judgment in Special Leave Petition which dismissed on 30. 5. 1987 upholding the right of the respondent to re-develop the land asper Master Plan. Delhi Development Authority as also the Central Governmentchallenged the said judgment in Special Leave Petition which dismissed on 30. 3. 1990directing the Delhi Development Authority to grant conditional approval. By theaforesaid judgment the Supreme Court upheld the right of the respondent to redevelop the land. By its order dated 1. 5. 1991 the Supreme Court approved thescheme of the respondent for re-development of 52 acres of land at Bara Hindu Rao,kishan Gank, Delhi. ( 4 ) THE respondents, thereafter, filed an application under section 19 (1 ) (a) of theslum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the ACC)seeking permission for eviction against the petitioner herein. The said applicationswere taken up for consideration and the competent Authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance ) Act allowed that said application granting permissionunder Section 19 (1) (a) of the Act, 1956. While allowing the said applications thecompetent Authority (Slum Areas) considered the decisions of this court in Punnuram and others Vs. Chiranji Lal and others; reported in AIR 1982 Delhi 431 asalso the orders of the Supreme Court delivered in respect of the aforesaid land andon consideration thereof proceeded to grant permission as sought for by respondent. Various pleas were raised by the petitioner before the Competent Authority, whichafter careful scrutiny were found to be Within any merit. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by the said orders passed by the Competent Authority thepresent petitions have been filed by the petitioners, wherein similar pleas have beentaken by the petitioners and were also urged before me at the time of arguments. ( 6 ) COUNSEL appearing for the petitioners submitted that it was necessary for thecompetent Authority to consider the status of the tenants and their means to get analternative accommodation so that if the tenant is evicted he would not create anotherslum and as the aforesaid factors and aspects have not been dealt with by thecompetent Authority the decisions of such Competent Authority are vitiated. Counselappearing for the petitioner referred to the provisions of Sections 19 and 20 of the Actand relying on the said provisions it was submitted that the Competent Authorityfailed to take into consideration the subsequent acts and the events after passing ofthe order dated 13. 10. Counselappearing for the petitioner referred to the provisions of Sections 19 and 20 of the Actand relying on the said provisions it was submitted that the Competent Authorityfailed to take into consideration the subsequent acts and the events after passing ofthe order dated 13. 10. 1992 by which the title of the respondent in respect of the landcame to be affected in view of passing of the resolution by determining the lease ofthe land lease out to the respondent. He submitted that since the respondent had notitle to the aforesaid land in view of determination of the lease of the land leased out toit no permission could have been granted to the respondent for initiating actionsenvisaged under section 19 of the Act. He also submitted that section 20 of the Actprovides for exercise of the option by the petitioner and therefore, no such permissioncould have been granted by the Competent Authority ignoring the provisions ofsection 20 of the Act. ( 7 ) COUNSEL for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the orders of thecompetent Authority are well reasoned orders and that there is no infirmity in the saidorders. He submitted that after passing of the orders by the Full Bench of this courtwhich were up-held by the Supreme Court the present petitions are not maintainable. He also submitted that the clauses (a) and (b) of Section 19 (4) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 are disjunctive and therefore, even. . . tenant does not have means to acquire alternative accommodation permission hasto be granted. In support of the aforesaid proposition the counsel for the respondentrelied upon the case of Shri Punnu Ram and Others Vs. Shri Chiranji Lal Gupta andothers; reported in JT 1999 (II) SC 87. In the said case the Supreme Court, afterreferring to the provisions of Section 19 and 20 (A) of the Act considered the case ofjyoti Pershad Vs. Administrator of Union Territory of Delhi; reported in 1961 (2) SCR125, held that the aforesaid two clauses are disjunctive. It was held that if the factormentioned in clause (a) is satisfied i. e. If the alternative accommodation within themeans of the tenant is available them there is no reason to held that second factor isrequired to be satisfied before granting permission under sub-section (3 ). It was held that if the factormentioned in clause (a) is satisfied i. e. If the alternative accommodation within themeans of the tenant is available them there is no reason to held that second factor isrequired to be satisfied before granting permission under sub-section (3 ). It wasfurther held that clause (b) provides that before granting such permission thecompetent Authority should be satisfied whether the eviction is in the interest ofimprovement and clearance of the slum areas then permission for eviction can begranted. In such cases also, a tenant would not be put to any hardship it he is evicted. ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court went on to hold that if the aforesaid iwo factors mentioned inclauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 19 are to be taken into account asalternative factors by the competent authority before granting permission to file a suitfor eviction or to grant permission for execution of a decree against a tenant residingin a slum area, the tenant s rights are not in any manner prejudicially affected, for hehas an option under Section 20 (a) of the Act under which he is fully protected. In viewof the provisions of Section 20 of the Act even if the building is required by the ownerfor demolition or re-construction or improvement the provisions of Section 20 provideample safeguard to a tenant, for if the tenant so desires to be replaced in occupationof the building after completion of the work or improvement or re-erection of thebuilding then he is required to file an application before the Competent Authority. IDview of the aforesaid provisions it was held that if the tenant is evicted on the groundof improvement or demolition of the building in the slum area, then the tenant isrequired to be provided accommodation in the improved or re-constructed building. ( 9 ) IN the present case however, the said stage has not arrived and therefore, at thepresent moment and at this stage the said provision of section 20 of the Act could notbe made applicable. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore,that even the provision of Section 20 are violated, is found to be premature at thisstage. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore,that even the provision of Section 20 are violated, is found to be premature at thisstage. The plea that the respondents have no right and title to the land due tocancellation of lease is also without merit as admittedly 53 bighas of land in questionare free hold and therefore, the respondents are absolute owners of the remainingland also. Except for the resolution no other documentary evidence has been placedon record to show that the respondents do not have right over the land. Admittedly,the respondents continue to be in possession of land and therefore, in absence ofevidence it appears that the resolution was not given effect to. ( 10 ) THE two factor mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 19have been held to be alternative factors which are required to be considered by thecompetent Authority before granting permission to file a suit for eviction. In thepresent case the Competent Authority has considered the said factors and onconsideration therefore found that the permission as sought for is to be granted asthe eviction is sought for in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slumarea. The scheme of the re-development submitted by the respondent has beenapproved by the decisions of the Full Bench of this court which have been upheld bythe Supreme Court. It was found that the cases of the petitioners are fully covered bythe Full Bench decision of this court in Punnu Ram and Others Vs. Chiranji Lalgupta; reported in Act 1982 Delhi 431 and upheld by the Supreme Court. Theaforesaid conclusions were arrived at by the Competent Authority on the basis of thefindings that clauses (a) and (b) are alternative factors to be taken note of by thecompetent Authority. The land from which eviction is sought for fails within the nonconforming area and re-development of the said land stood approved by this court asalso by the Supreme Court. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid position the present cases squarely fall within thepurview of Section 19 of the Act. I, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the orderspassed by the Competent Authority. The petitions have no merit and are dismissedaccordingly.