ORDER 1. The appellants/State have preferred this Misc. Appeal under order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of civil Procedure (for short 'the Code') against the order dated 06.08.1999 passed by District Judge, Shajapurin civil Suit No. 17-A/99 by which the District Judge has granted mandatory injunction against the appellants by giving a direction that the possession over the disputed house alongwith articles be restored back to Respondent No.5 within a period of one month and thereafter the appellants State shall not interfere in the possession of the respondent No.5 till the final disposal of the suit. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that on 21.06,1999 Respondents/plaintiffs filed a civil suit for 'declaration and injunction in the Court of District Judge, Shajapur with an application for temporary injunction making a prayer therein for issuance' of temporary injunction against the appellants/defendants restraining them from interfering in the possession of the Respondents/plaintiffs in respect of the suit house. The notices of the application for temporary injunction were issued urgently on the same day i.e, on 21.06.1999. The notices were served on the appellants through the Government pleader on the same day i.e. on 21.06.1999 and the date of hearing was fixed on the next day i.e. 22.06.1999 looking to the urgency in the matter. The case of the Respondents in the suit was that Respondents No. 1 to 4 are the owners of the suit house as the house was inherited to them and a part of that house was given on rent to Respondent No.5. The suit-house is known as "KABUTAR KHAN A". Earlier an Ayurvedic Hospital was being run in the suit house which according to Respondents/plaintiffs was given on rent by Respondents No.1 to 4 to Shankarlal Vaidya and the department was paying rent. Subsequently the said Ayurvedic Hospital was shifted to other building constructed by the Government two years ago and Respondents No.1 to 4 got possession of the suit house from the Vaidya. The construction of this house is about 55 years old and the construction was done by the predecessors of Respondents No. 1 to 4 As such on the date of the filing of the suit, the suit house was in possession of Respondent No.5 as a tenant of respondents No.1 to 4. 3. The construction of this house is about 55 years old and the construction was done by the predecessors of Respondents No. 1 to 4 As such on the date of the filing of the suit, the suit house was in possession of Respondent No.5 as a tenant of respondents No.1 to 4. 3. On 10.06.1999 appellant No. 2 Sub-Divisional Officer (revenue) Shajapur issued a notice to Respondent No. 5 asking him to hand-over the possession of the suit house to the Government as the house belongs to the Government and he is the encroacher and he is using the said Government house for his personal purpose. Therefore, the same should be vacated immediately and he should appear on 21.06.1999 at 11.00 a.m. and to file reply otherwise he shall proceed ex-parte. The case of the Respondent No.5 is that on 21.6.1999 he appeared before the Sub-Divisional Officer and filed his reply of the notice and the case was fixed for hearing on 21.06.1999 which he had noted in the margin of the order-sheet and on the same day i.e. 21.06.99 all the Respondents No. 1 to 5 filed a suit for declaration and injunction before the District Judge, Shajapur and on the same day notices were issued to the appellants/defendants which were served on the Government pleader. 4. That on 21.06.1999 Sub-Divisional Officer passed an order of eviction against Respondent No. 5 and directed the Tahsildar. Shajapur to evict Respondent No.5 and make compliance of his order Immediately a letter was written by the Sub-Divisional-Officer, Shajapur to Tahsildar, Shajapur for taking possession and to submit the compliance report by tomorrow. On the same day i.e. on 21.06.1999 the Revenue Inspector went to village Dupada alongwith patwari and the Police Force. The locks were broken in presence of some persons, articles were removed and a Panchnama was prepared and after taking possession of all the rooms, the house was given in the custody of up-sarpanch Shri Bhagirath Rathore of Gram Panchayat. A Panchnama was also prepared. The Supurdginama was also prepared and the articles, which were removed from the said house, were given to one Smt. Gangahai w/o Laxminarayan Soni. By another Supurdginama. some other articles were given in the Supurdgi of Shri Manaklal. A Panchnama was also prepared. The Supurdginama was also prepared and the articles, which were removed from the said house, were given to one Smt. Gangahai w/o Laxminarayan Soni. By another Supurdginama. some other articles were given in the Supurdgi of Shri Manaklal. Yet another supurdginama was prepared on the same day and the vacant house was given in the Supurdgi of Shri Bhagirath s/o Kaluram, Up-sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Dupada and a compliance report was also submitted by the Tahsildar, Tehsil Moman Barodiya, Shajapur on the same day before the Sub-Divisional-Officer, Shajapur. The aforesaid compliance report was taken on record by the Sub-Divisional-Officer and it was directed on the same day to produce the original copy of Panchnamas and Supurdginamas. 5. Thereafter on 30.06.1999 the appellants filed reply or the injunction application alongwith tile affidavits or Shamhhudayal Shrivastava Himmatsingh, Ashok Kumar and Bhagirath taking the defence that on 21.06.1999 the appellants have already dispossessed the Respondents and have taken possession of the disputed house which is the Government property and therefore, the suit has become infructuous. The Respondents arc not having any title over the property, law they are not in possession and, therefore, they are not entitled for any injunction. On 23.06.1999 the Respondents also filed an application under Section 151 or the Code for issue or mandatory injunction and also for a direction for the restoration or the possession on the ground that the appellants have taken possession over the disputed house from the Respondents after riling or the suit and even after the notices by the Court which were served on the Government Pleader on the same day i.e. on 21.06.1999. Therefore, the possession or law house he restored. This application was supported by an affidavit or Respondent No. 3, Prakashchand and Respondent No.5 Yogendra Kumar Soni. The reply of this application was also filed on behalf of the appellants/State on 30.6.1999. In tile reply it was submitted on behalf for the appellants/State that they have already taken possession. Therefore, This application under Section 151 of the Code for grant of mandatory injunction is not maintainable and more so because Respondents are not having any prima facie case. balance or convenience and the principles of irreparable loss in favour of the respondents. Therefore, application is liable to he rejected. 6. After hearing the panics and considering the pleadings and documents or the parties. balance or convenience and the principles of irreparable loss in favour of the respondents. Therefore, application is liable to he rejected. 6. After hearing the panics and considering the pleadings and documents or the parties. the learned District Judge, Shajapur by order dated 06.08.1999 gave the finding that it is an admitted position on record that on 21.06.1999 Respondents No. 1 to.5 were in possession over the suit house. The order dated 21.06.1999 has also been passed at the back or Respondent No.5. On 21.06.1999 Respondent No.5 had appeared before the Sub-Divisional-officer (Revenue), Shajapur and had riled reply or his notice. Earlier the case was adjourned for 23.06.1999 and that Respondent No. 5 had also signed in the order-sheet and the date or 23.06.1999 was also put but subsequently some over-writing was done, date or 23.06.1999 was changed to 21.06.1999 and thereafter leaving the continuation or the order-sheet blank, a separate order-sheet was written and tile order or eviction was passed. The learned District Judge also came to the dconclusion that the suit was filed on 21.06.1999. notice was issued to the Government pleader and the same was served on him on the same day. The learned District Judge also gave the finding that the action of tile Sub-Divisional-officer is not beyond suspicion. When he came to know that the respondents have filed the suit, he immediately passed the order and took possession of the house on the same day. The file of Case No. 100-B/2l/98-99 from the Court of Sub-Divisional-Officer (Revenue), Shajarur was produced before me The learned District Judge also gave the finding that the Respondents were dispossessed after filing of the suit and after the service or the notice on the Government Pleader. He came to the conclusion that in fact all the papers have been prepared later on with a view to defend the suit and the claim of the Respondents for injunction and after examining the entire documents, he came to the conclusion that the action taken by the Revenue Officers is absolutely illegal and all the principles for granting injunction like prima facie case, balance of convenience and the question of irreparable loss arc in favour of the Respondents and therefore, in view or the facts and in the circumstances of the case they are entitled for mandatory injunction and also for restoration of possession over the suit house. 7. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and considered rival submissions of the parties. 8. The submission of the learned Pand Lawyer Smt. Meena Chaphekar for the appellants/State is that the order dated 06.08.1999 is contrary to law and on facts of the case. mandatory injunction cannot be granted in favour of the Respondents because no notice of filing of the suit was given to the appellants. The relief of mandatory injunction is of equitable and discretionary and the Respondents arc the trespasser over the Government property and no injunction can be issued in favour of the trespasser and such possession cannot he protected under the law. The Sub-Divisional-Officer was perfectly justified in passing file order of eviction under Section 24R of the M.P. land Revenue Code. Therefore, the appeal is liable to he allowed and the impugned under appeal is liable to be set-aside. It is also the submission or the learned counsel for the appellants that the mandatory injunction cannot he granted on an interim application as the suit was not amended by the Respondents and they have not sought any reilef of possession or the house. 9. Shri B.L. Pavecha, learned senior counsel appeared for the Respondents and in reply submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned District Judge regarding restoration of possession of the Respondents as well as the order for injunction restraining the appellants for interfering in the possession of the Respondents till the final disposal of the suit is perfectly legal and justified in law. 10. Further submission of Shri Pavecha is that the Sub-Divisional-Officer had no authority under the law to issue any such notice and to pass an eviction order. The Respondents are the owners or the house in dispute. they were also in possession up to 21.6.1999, Respondent No. 5 is the tenant of Respondents No. 1 to 4 the suit house is their ancestral property and is not the Government property. On the contrary house was given on rent for running an Ayurvedic Hospital for which the Vaidya was also paying rent. Copies or the rent accounts are also filed. The Medical officer of Ayurvedic Hospital. Dupada. District Shajapur has admitted in his various letters that the house owner is Hhanwarlal Seth of Dupada. In the Government record it is shown to he on rent from Bhanwarlal Seth of Dupada. Copies or the rent accounts are also filed. The Medical officer of Ayurvedic Hospital. Dupada. District Shajapur has admitted in his various letters that the house owner is Hhanwarlal Seth of Dupada. In the Government record it is shown to he on rent from Bhanwarlal Seth of Dupada. The further submission or Shri Pavecha is that on 21.6.1999 Respondents were in possession but by an illegal notice and all illegal order of eviction the Sub-Divisional-Officer (Revenue) dispossessed tile Respondents in a day and that too even after filing of the civil suit and service of notices in the Government pleader on the very day the order of eviction was passed. 11. His further submission is that the Sub- Divisional-Officer has no authority under any law to dispossess the Respondents without following the due process of law. His further submission is that the action taken by the Revenue Authorities and particularly by the Sub-Divisional-Officer (Revenue), Shajapur is absolutely illegal and without any authority of law. The notice dated 10.6.1999 was issued on 17.6.1999 from the office and was served on 18.6.1999 on Respondent No.5. On 21.6.1999 Respondent No.5 appeared 'before the Sub-Divisional-Officer and the case was fixed for hearing on 23.6..1999 and signatures of Respondent No. 5 were obtained on the order-sheet but subsequently the order of eviction was passed and over writing was done on the order-sheet below the signatures of Respondent No.5. The entire proceedings seem to be fabricated as on the same day order was passed in absence of Respondent No.5, subsequently his signatures were not taken, the regular order-sheet was left blank and order was passed on another order sheet, no signatures were taken. On the same day order was issued to Tahsildar, Shajapur All Panchnamas and Supurdginamas were prepared, possession was taken and compliance report was also taken on the same day whereas the village Dupada is situated at the distance of 20 to 25 Kms. from Shajapur. The possession was taken over the house after breaking the locks of the house. Therefore, the findings on the question of fact recorded by the learned District Judge are perfectly justified and based on the documentary evidence. The further contention of the learned counsel for the Respondents is that service of notice is valid on the Government pleader under order XXVII Rule 4 of the Code and mandatory injunction can be granted on an interlocutory application. The further contention of the learned counsel for the Respondents is that service of notice is valid on the Government pleader under order XXVII Rule 4 of the Code and mandatory injunction can be granted on an interlocutory application. The order of restoration of possession is perfectly legal and justified. There is prima-facie, case, balance of convenience and the question of irreparable loss in favour of the Respondents. The State has already admitted that the Respondents were in possession on 21.6.1999 when the suit was filed. Therefore, the Respondents cannot he dispossessed illegally and in such circumstances mandatory injunction can he granted. the injunction which has been granted in favour of the respondents is perfectly legal and justified. There is clear cut finding by the learned District Judge in favour of the Respondents. There was no necessity for incorporating the amendment in the suit for claiming the relief of possession. Under Section 151 of the Code the Court is fully competent to correct mischief done by the appellants. Equitable relief can always he granted. The provision under Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code is not applicable on the house and under this section Sub-Divisional-Officer has no power to initiate the action. Even under Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code it is mandatory to hold an enquiry and in case of dispute about title, Revenue Courts have no jurisdiction. In this case the possession of the Respondents is neither unauthorised nor they are trespasser, but they are owners and by taking the law in their hands the officers of the State Government cannot negative the rule of law and violate the principles of due process of law. The order of the learned District Judge for restoration of possession and granting injunction in favour of the Respondents is fully justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and the appeal is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed. 12. the first question before this Court is that whether the action of the Sub-Divisional-Officer passing the order of eviction is legal and justified and under what law he is having an authority to pass an order of eviction. 13. 12. the first question before this Court is that whether the action of the Sub-Divisional-Officer passing the order of eviction is legal and justified and under what law he is having an authority to pass an order of eviction. 13. I have considered the submissions or the learned counsel for the appellants that under Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, the Sub-Divisional-Officer is having the powers to issue notice and evict the persons those who are trespasser and in possession unauthorisedly. It was not the case of the appellants/State before the learned District Judge. In the reply also, no where they had mentioned that they have taken this action under Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. Under Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code action can only be taken by Tahsildar. I have seen entire case file maintained by the Sub-Divisional-Officer (Revenue) Shajapur. The first order-sheet of this me shows that on 11.6.1999 be registered a case and ordered to issue notice to Respondent No. 5 on the complaint of Jama of Village Dupada. In the file two notices are on record. One is dated 11.6.1999 and another is 10.6.1999. So when the Case was registered on 11.6.1999. there cannot be any notice dated 10.6.1999. Secondly another notice dated 11.6.1999 was dispatched from his office on 17.6.1999 and was served on Respondent No.5 though there is no date but as per the statement of Resp6ndent No.5. the same was served on him on 18.6.1999. By this notice he was called upon to file reply on 21.6.1999. It is not mentioned in this notice that it is under Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. 14. The appellants/State cannot be permitted to set up a case under Section 248 of the M.P. Land' Revenue Code very first time at this appellate stage. Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue code provides for penalty for unauthorisedly taking the possession of the land which includes unoccupied land. abadi, service land or any other land which has been set apart for any special purpose under Section 237 or upon any land which is the property of the Government. Section 237 of Lie M.P. Land Revenue Code provides use of unoccupied land for exercise of Nistar rights. 15. abadi, service land or any other land which has been set apart for any special purpose under Section 237 or upon any land which is the property of the Government. Section 237 of Lie M.P. Land Revenue Code provides use of unoccupied land for exercise of Nistar rights. 15. In such circumstances it is clear that the provisions of Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code are not applicable on the property in dispute. 16. No doubt a person is in possession can protect his possession and cannot be dispossessed without the authority of him or without the orders passed by the competent Court or authority following the process of law. Reliance is placed on the decision of Supreme Court in case of Krishnaram v. Shohha Venkatrao ( AIR 1989 SC 2097 ) in which it has been held that it is well settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to retain on the property. he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by due course of law'. Further reliance was also placed on another Division Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Lalloo Yashwant Singh v. Rao Jagdishsingh (AIR 196R SC 620 -- page 622. Para 8) wherein it is held that. "in our view, in the context the word trespass here would include forcibly entering and dispossession by the landlord". the Supreme Court in this judgment cited with approval the well known passage from the leading Privy Council case of Mitanapur Jamadary Company Ltd. v. Narain Rao (1921 Indian Appeals 293 at page 299 = AIR 1924 PC 144) wherein it has been observed as under: "In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession, they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court." 17. This proposition was also accepted by a Division Bench of Apex Court in Ram Ratan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1977) 2 SCR 232 : ( AIR 1977 SC 619 ). This proposition was also accepted by a Division Bench of Apex Court in Ram Ratan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1977) 2 SCR 232 : ( AIR 1977 SC 619 ). The Division Bench comprising of three learned Judges held that a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he is in the act or process of trespassing hut this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under the law. 18. The Supreme Court in another case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Maharaja Dharmendraprasad Singh and others ( AIR 1989 SC 997 ) has held as under : "A lessor, with the hest title, has no right to resume possession extra judicially by use of force, from the lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in the lease deed does not authorise extra judicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited, a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the instant case the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary; it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedigree'. Therefore there is no question in the instant case of the Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extra-judicial right of re-entry. Possession can he resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law." 19. Possession can he resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law." 19. The another judgment relied by the respondents is Bishandas v. State of Punjab and others ( AIR 1961 SC 1570 ) wherein it has been held as under: "Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken ill this case by the State and its officers is destructive or The basic principle of the rule of law. The facts and the position in law thus clearly are (1) that the buildings constructed on this piece of Government land did not belong Government, (2) that the petitioners were in possession and occupation or the buildings, and of that by virtue or enactments binding on the Government. the petitioners could he dispossessed, if at all, only in pursuance of a decree of a civil Court obtained in proceedings properly initialed. In these circumstances the action of the Government in taking the law into their hands and dispossession the petitioners by the display of force, exhibits a callous disregard of the normal requirements of the rule or law apart form what might legitimately and reasonably be expected form a government functioning in a society governed by a constitution which guarantees to its citizen against arbitrary invasion by the executive of peaceful possession of property. As pointed out by this Court in Wazir Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh 1955-ISCR 408 : ( AIR 1954 SC 415 ), the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. In Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. State of Biha 1953 SCR I 129 : ( AIR 1953 SC 215 ), this Court said that nothing is more likely to drain the vitality from the rule of law than legislation which singles out a particular individual from his fellow subjects and visits with him a disability which is not imposed upon the others. We have here a highly discriminatory and autocratic act which deprives a person of the possession of property without reference to any law or legal authority. We have here a highly discriminatory and autocratic act which deprives a person of the possession of property without reference to any law or legal authority. Even if the property was trust property it is difficult to see how the Municipal Committee. Barnala, can step in as trustee on an executive determination only. The reasons given for this extra-ordinary action are, to quote what we said in Sahi's case (supra) remarkable for their disturbing implications." Respondents have also cited the well known passage of Lord Atkin in case or Eshugyai v. Govt. of Nigeria (AIR 1931 PC 248) which reads as under: " The executive can only act in pursuance of the powers given to it by law. In accordance with British jurisprudence no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property or British subject except on tile condition that he can support the legality of his action before the Court of justice. The term 'Act of State' as applied to an act of the sovereign power directed against another sovereign power not owing temporary allegiance in pursuance of sovereign rights of waging war or maintaining peace on the high seas or abroad may give rise to no legal remedy, but as applied to acts of the executive directed to subjects within the territorial jurisdiction it has no special meaning. and can give no immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court to inquire into the legality of the act." 20. The learned counsel for the Respondents also cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India and others (AIR 1959 SC 479) in which the reliance has been placed on the passage written by Lord Atkin, as stated above. It was further observed in this case by Bose, J. as under: "In a democracy functioning under the Rule of law it is not enough to do justice or to do the right thing, justice must he seen to be done and a satisfaction and sense of security engendered in the minds of the people at large in place of a vague uneasiness that star chambers are arising in this land. We have received a rich heritage from a very variegated past. But it is a treasure which can only he kept at the cost of ceaseless and watchful guarding. We have received a rich heritage from a very variegated past. But it is a treasure which can only he kept at the cost of ceaseless and watchful guarding. There is no room for complacency, for in the absence of constant vigilance we run the risk of losing it. "It can happen here". 21. In this case the Respondents had already filed a suit and notices were served on the Government Pleader before taking possession over the property by the Tahsildar under the orders of the Sub-Divisional officer (Revenue). The entire action taken and proceedings drawn by the revenue authorities clearly shows their mala fides. Everything was done in a day which cannot be treated as a judicial action on their part. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned District Judge about the mala fide dispossession of the Respondents from the suit property is perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and needs no interference by this Court. 22. The last argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that mandatory injunction cannot he granted without notice to the appellants. The relief of mandatory injunction is equitable and discretionary and the possession of the trespasser cannot be protected, The learned counsel for the appellants/State cited two decisions of this Court reported in 1973 JLJ 914 = 1973 MPLJ 973 (Rama and another v. Mangilal) in which it was held that mandatory injunction should not be granted to restore status-quo on date earlier to suit, and 1990 (1) MPWN 136 Dattatraya Vaishampayan v. Janakarya Vibhag Karamchari Grih Nirman Sahakari Samiti' in which it has been held that possession must be legal and the injunction cannot be granted in favour of trespasser. 23. In reply the learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that mandatory injunction can be granted on interlocutory applications. They are not trespasser. Notices were already served on the Government Pleader. During the pendency of the suit if the plaintiff is dispossessed from the property-in-dispute, the Court' is competent to grant the relief of possession even without amendment in the plaint. The learned Court below has rightly granted mandatory injunction on the ground that on the day of the suit Respondent No.5 was admittedly in possession and he was dispossessed on the same day. The learned Court below has rightly granted mandatory injunction on the ground that on the day of the suit Respondent No.5 was admittedly in possession and he was dispossessed on the same day. The learned Court below also came to the conclusion that it appears that the Respondents were dispossessed subsequently but the proceedings were drawn in the date of 21.6.1999. Admittedly Respondent No.5 was found in possession on the day of the suit. There is a prima facie case in favour of the Respondents and the balance of convenience is also in their favour and on the basis of the decisions in case of Mansingh v. Mst. Parobai [ 1990 (I) MPWN 37 ] and in case of Darshanlal v. Ramshanker [ 1981 (1) MPWN 111 ] in which it was held that the possession of the Respondents may be restored if they are dispossessed after institution of the suit or during pendency of suit the discretion can be exercised. 24. The learned counsel for the Respondents cited the case of Dalpat Kumar and another v. Prahlad Singh and others ( AIR 1993 SC 276 ) for the purposes to show difference between prima facie case and prima facie title. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused by prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. 25. In the case of Shankarlal Rathore v. State of M.P. and others ( 1978 JLJ 51 = 1978 MPLJ 419 ), Honble Justice G.P. Singh, as he then was has held about the prima facie case regarding grant of injunction that the real thing to be seen is only that plaintiff's claim is not frivolous or vexatious, in other words that there is a serious question to be tried. Plaintiff is not required to make out a clear legal title but has to satisfy the Court that he has a fair question to raise as to the legal right claimed by him in the suit. It is not the function of the Court at that stage to resolve the disputed questions of fact or difficult question of law which should be left to be decided at the c0nclusion of the trial. 26. It is not the function of the Court at that stage to resolve the disputed questions of fact or difficult question of law which should be left to be decided at the c0nclusion of the trial. 26. In the case of Nandan, Pictures Ltd. v. Art Pictures and others (AIR 1956 Calcutta 428) it was decided as to when mandatory injunction should be granted. It is only hi very rare cases that a mandatory injunction is granted on an interlocutory applications. Injunction are a form of equitable relief and they have to be adjusted in aid of equity and justice to the facts of each particular case. If a mandatory injunction is granted at all on an interlocutory application, it is granted only to restore the 'status quo' and not granted to establish a new state of things, differing from the state which existed at the date when the suit was instituted. 27. In another case of Darshanlal v. Ramshanker ( 1981 (1) MPWN 111 ) it is held that temporary injunction in the mandatory form can be granted when the defendant dispossessed the plaintiff after institution of suit and possession can be restored. 28. The Court has power and jurisdiction to grant ad-interim mandatory injunction-in appropriate cases. In the facts and circumstances of the case if the defendants disturb the situation after institution of suit or during pendency of suit. Court can direct the defendant to restore the status quo ante. 29. Admittedly, when Respondent No.5 was in possession on the day when the suit was filed and if he is illegally dispossessed, the Court can protect his possession and Court is fully empowered to do the justice and to grant mandatory injunction to restore the possession of the aggrieved party. 30. In this case the learned counsel for the appellants could not justify the action taken by the revenue authorities in dispossessing the Respondents without following the due process of law. Therefore, the order passed by the learned District Judge is fully justified, the same has been passed following all the principles necessary for grant of mandatory injunction and in such circumstances where the party was not provided a chance to protect his possession. the Court has every power to restore the possession of the party. 31. In view of the reasons stated above, the appeal has no merit. Consequently the same is accordingly dismissed counsel's fee Rs. the Court has every power to restore the possession of the party. 31. In view of the reasons stated above, the appeal has no merit. Consequently the same is accordingly dismissed counsel's fee Rs. 1,000/-, if certified. Record be returned.