Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 20.1.90 (Annexure 3) discharging petitioner from service. (2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner had applied for the post of Constable in Armed Police in pursuance of an advertisement and he was appointed on a probation for a period of two years vide order dated 9.9.89. While petitioner was undergoing the training in Rajasthan Police Training College, his character was verified and it came to the knowledge of the appointing authority that he had been involved in two criminal cases. Petitioner, when confronted by the authorities for suppressing the material fact, disclosed that a compromise had been arrived at between the parties and, therefore, it could not be held that he was involved in the criminal cases. The Competent Authority considered the plea taken by petitioner and passed the impugned order. Hence this writ petition. (3). Petitioner himself has filed a copy of the judgment and order dated 21.11.90 (Annexure 6) showing that he had been involved in criminal case No. 135/ 1989 under Sec.147 352 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and he had been put on trial. Petitioner was given the benefit under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short, ``the Act,1958) and he was released on furnishing a personal bond for Rs. 2000/-. (4). Column 17 of the Application Form made it mandatory for the applicant to furnish the information whether the candidate had ever been involved in any criminal case and if `yes:- (i) whether candidate had been prosecuted in Court; (ii) whether he had ever been arrested in connection with the criminal case; and (iii) whether he had been sentenced in the criminal case ? (5). Petitioner had given reply in negative to all the three querries. The case of Mr. Vinod Purohit is that as the offences had been compounded before the trial court and the trial court had given him the benefit of the Act, 1958, and none of the said offences involved moral turpitude, petitioner cannot be found non-suited on that ground. (6). It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets the appointment by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent Authority, such appointment cannot be sustained. (Vide S.P. Changulvaraiha Naidu vs. Jagannathn and others (1). (6). It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets the appointment by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent Authority, such appointment cannot be sustained. (Vide S.P. Changulvaraiha Naidu vs. Jagannathn and others (1). In Lazarus Estate Ltd. vs. Besalay (2), it has categorically been held that anything obtained by misrepresentation of fraud, cannot be allowed to be sustained. (7). In Andhra State Financial Corporation vs. Gar Re: Rolling Mills (3) and State of Maharastra and others vs. Prabhu, (4), the Honble Apex Court has observed that a writ Court,while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the Courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. ``Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the crafy evasions and sub-letties invented to evade law. (8). The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the impugned orders could not have been passed without giving petitioner an opportunity of hearing,is, also, preposterous for the reason that in such case where an order is obtained by misrepresentation or fraud, the principles of natural justice are not attracted to rectify the mistake which the Authority had com- mitted because of the fraud played by the applicant. In U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee vs. B.Shital Nandwani (5), the students had got admission in M.B.B.S. Course by making misrepresentation. The Honble Supreme Court rejected the plea of applicability of the Rules of Natural Justice observing that under the circumstances in which such benefit had been taken by the candidates concerned, do not justify attraction of the Rules of Natural Justice by providing them an opportunity of hearing. Even in a case where an applicant may not be responsible for playing fraud, his appointment can, also, be cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing to him in case the Authority comes to the conclusion that the appointment had been made by playing fraud by the Members of the Selection Committee thou- gh the candidate had not played any part/ mischief in the said selection. In Krishna Yadav vs. State of Haryana (6), the Honble Apex Court observed that when the entire selection was strinking `conceived in fraud and delivered in deceit,individuals innocence has no place as fraud enravels everything. (9). In Krishna Yadav vs. State of Haryana (6), the Honble Apex Court observed that when the entire selection was strinking `conceived in fraud and delivered in deceit,individuals innocence has no place as fraud enravels everything. (9). The ratio laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining the petitions on their behalf. In Union of India vs. M. Bhaskaran (7), the Apex Court has observed as under:- ``If by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same can- not be permitted to be countenanced by a Court of Law as the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer. (10). While deciding the aforesaid case, the Honble Supreme Court has placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in District Collector and Chairman, U.S.W. School Society vs. M.Thirupura Sandri Devi (8), wherein it has been held that employment obtained by misrepresentation cannot be permitted to be continued. (11). In Ratan Lal vs. Union of India and others (9), this Court has considered this aspect and has placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mangi Lal and others vs. State of Rajasthan & others (10); and of the Single Bench in Temple of Thakurji, Village Kansar vs. State of Rajasthan and others (11) and came to the conclusion that employment obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, if cancelled by the employer, should not be interfered by the Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction. (12). A Division Bench of this Court while entertaining Bhagirath vs. State of Rajasthan and others (12), had passed the following order:- ``We have gone through the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner. We are in complete agreement with the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge and the view taken by him. When the petitioner has suppressed the fact that he was convicted for the offences punishable under Sec. 323,325,341 IPC etc. then obviously he should not have been appointed on the post of Police Constable. He was supposed to disclose the fact that he was convicted and he was found guilty and given benefit of probation. When the petitioner has suppressed the fact that he was convicted for the offences punishable under Sec. 323,325,341 IPC etc. then obviously he should not have been appointed on the post of Police Constable. He was supposed to disclose the fact that he was convicted and he was found guilty and given benefit of probation. In this view of the matter, we do not find any substance in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed. (13). It has also been submitted that if the applicant was not involved in an of- fence involving moral turpitude, he cannot be found ineligible on account of his involvement in the criminal case. Reliance has also been placed on judgments of this Court (Jaipur Bench) in Babu Lal vs. State o Rajasthan and another (13), and a Division Bench of this Court (Jaipur Bench) in State of Rajasthan vs. Khalid Ahmed (14), wherein it has been held that suppression of material information should be deliberate and he should have been involved in a criminal case involving moral turpitude. (14). In fact, there are various aspects of moral turpitude. Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Services Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred as ``the Rules, 1989) reads as under:- ``13.Character:- The character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to qualify him for employment in the Service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the Principal Academic Officer of the University or College or School in which he was last educated and two such certificates, written not more than six months prior to the date of application, from two responsible persons not connected with his School or College or University and not related to him. Notes-(1) A conviction by a Court of Law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement which has its object to overthrow by violent means a Government as established by law, the mere conviction need not be regarded as a disqualification. (15). Thus, it is clear that if a person has been subjected to criminal trial for the offence not involving moral turpitude or association with crime of violence, would not become ineligible for service/employment. (16). (15). Thus, it is clear that if a person has been subjected to criminal trial for the offence not involving moral turpitude or association with crime of violence, would not become ineligible for service/employment. (16). The term `moral turpitude has not been defined anywhere and, therefore, a certain amount of vagueness is attached to it. Notions about morals and mo- rality differ in certain respects from country to country and they have also been varying from time to time. This term is, therefore, capable of being given different meaning in different countries or at different times in different contexts. Yet, inspite of its capability of being given diverse meanings, the term `moral turpitude has generally been taken to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty modesty, good character and morals, or contrary to what a man owes to a fellow-man or to society in general. There are a number of cases in which this term has been interpreted by eminent Judges in the context of different facts and circumstances. On the basis of those cases, the meaning of term `turpitude and `moral turpitude has been given in Black`s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, as follows:- ``Turpitude- In its ordinary sense, inherent baseness or vileness of principle or action; shameful wickedness; depravity. In its legal sense, everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. State vs. Anderson, 117 Kan. 117, 230 P.315; Hughes vs. State Board of Medical Examiners, 162 Ga. 246; 134 S.E. 42, 46. An action showing gross depravity. Traders & General Ins. Co. vs. Russell, Te & Civ. App, 99; S.W. 2-d 1079, 1084. ``Moral Turpitude- A term of frequent occurrence in statutes, especially those providing that a witness conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude may be shown as tending to impeach his credibility. In general, it means neither more nor less than ``turpitude, i.e. anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (17). App, 99; S.W. 2-d 1079, 1084. ``Moral Turpitude- A term of frequent occurrence in statutes, especially those providing that a witness conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude may be shown as tending to impeach his credibility. In general, it means neither more nor less than ``turpitude, i.e. anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (17). A Division Bench of this Court in Lachuram vs. Inderlal (15), has considered this aspect and took note of various India and foreign judgments and also quoted Bartos vs. United States District Court, for District of Nebraska (16), wherein the Court held as under:- ``An act of baseness vileness, or depravity, in the private and social duties, which a man owes to his fellow-men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man and ``conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. The Court further observed as under:- ``It would appear from the above that the meanings given to the terms `turpitude and moral turpitude indicate almost the same type of failing in a man`s character or moral make-up. In our view, no absolute standard or no hard and fast rule can be laid down for deciding whether a particular act should be considered as one involv- ing moral turpitude, because it would mostly depend on the facts and circumstances in which the act or omission is committed whether it involves moral turpitude or not. (18). The Court placed reliance on the judgment of Allahabad High Court in Buddha Pitai vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Mawhabad, Lucknow (17), wherein the Allahabad High Court held as under :- ``Now, coming to the second question, learned counsel has urged that in deciding the question whether an offence involves moral turpitude, the Court should confine its consideration only to the nature of the offence and it should not be swayed in its opinion by the facts and circumstances in which it was committed. ``Whether an offence involves moral turpitude, will depend on its nature and the circumstances in which it is committed. ``Whether an offence involves moral turpitude, will depend on its nature and the circumstances in which it is committed. An offence of a certain class may generally be considered to involve moral turpitude but it may not be so if committed in particular circumstan- ces, for example, an offence of murder may ordinarily involve moral turpitude but if it is committed in a spirit of patriotism or with a laudable object, it may not shock the public conscience and instead of of being decried by the public the offender may considered a hero.......Again an offence of theft will generally be considered mean, vile and anti-social and thief would be simply scorned at. However, if a starving and emaciated person steals food is caught, prosecuted and convicted, people will take a charitable and sympathetic view of the offenders conduct and his offence may not be considered as involving moral turpitude. Thus, the case of every offence will have to be judged in the light to the circumstances in which it is committed. It is not the gravity of the offence or the quantum of punishment imposed on a person which will determine such question. (19). Similarly, in Mangali vs. Chharkkital (18), it was observed as follows: ``From consideration of the dictionary meaning of the words `moral and `turpitude as well as the real ratio decidendi of the cases, the principle which emerges appear to be that the question whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not, will necessarily depe- nd on the circumstances in which the offence is committed. (20). In Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana (19) wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:- ```Moral turpitude is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity. (21). The aforesaid judgment in Pawan Kumar case (supra) has been considered by the Honble Supreme Court again in Allahabad Bank and another vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola (20), and placed reliance on Baleshwar Singh vs. District Magistrate and Collector (21) wherein it has been held as under:- ``The expression `moral turpitude is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man (22). There is a Circular No. 56 (1) PF/Const./95/1687 dated 29.4.95 issued by the respondents, wherein Rule 13 of the said Rules has been explained in view of the special fact that the work of the police is vital to the society as it is connected with the protection of life and property of the citizens. ``Action of the police often impingned on the liberty of the people. It is hence necessary that the persons with up-right and sterling character are recruited to the Force. Therein the ``moral turpitude has been explained as under:- ``Any act which indicates malafide mental conduct such as theft or criminal misconduct towards the woman or forgery or wilful suppression of information (particularly adverse information) about the candidate etc. would be covered under ``moral turpitude. Cases involving atrocities on Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes and wo- man (dowry cases) would, also fall under this category. (23). Further, the term ``violence has been explained in the said Memorandum dated 29.4.95, as under:- ```Violence-Crime of violence include assault (Sec. 323,35,326 etc. IPC) rioting (Section 147,148 etc. IPC) and more serious offences like Sec. 307, 302 IPC etc. Hence a candidate/applicant involved in any such case is not eligible for Police Service. (24). In the instant case, as the respondents have provided guidelines to determine what constitutes `moral turpitude and it has specifically been mentioned that wilful suppression of information (particularly adverse information) ab- out the candidate would involve moral turpitude. Hence a candidate/applicant involved in any such case is not eligible for Police Service. (24). In the instant case, as the respondents have provided guidelines to determine what constitutes `moral turpitude and it has specifically been mentioned that wilful suppression of information (particularly adverse information) ab- out the candidate would involve moral turpitude. There is nothing on record to find out whether petitioner has wilfully suppressed it or not, particularly in view of the fact that petitioner failed to explained as under what circumstances he had filled-up that column answering it in negative. There had been no pleading to that extent and it is settled proposition of law that the petitioner has to plead and prove its case by substantiating material fact by adducing evidence etc. (Vide Bharat Singh vs. State of Haryana and others (22); Larson & Tubro vs. State of Gujarat & others (23); National Building Construction Corporation vs. S. Raghunathan & Ors. (24); and Ram Narain Arora vs. Asha Rani & Ors. (25). So it cannot be said that petitioner has not suppressed material information while filling up the form. (25). In Delhi Administration through its Chief Secretary and others vs. Sushil Kumar (26) the Honble Supreme Court examined the similar case where the appointment was refused on the post of Police Constable and the Court observed as under:- ``It is seen that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though he was found physically fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected, on account of his antecedent record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as Constable to the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Tribunal, therefore, was wholly unjustified in giving the direction fo reconsideration of his case. Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offence, the same has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate. Appointing authority, therefore, has rightly focussed this aspect and found it not desirable to appoint him to the service. (26). An identical case Om Prakash Soni vs. State of Rajasthan and others (27) has been dismissed by this Court giving the same reasons. (27). Moreover, petitioner has approached this Court at a belated stage and the petition is liable to be rejected on that count also. (28). The bone of contention of the learned counsel for petitioner has been that once the trial Court has accorded the petitioner the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ``the Act) the effect of the conviction stands washed away and the impugned order is liable to be set-aside, is preposterous and, thus, cannot be accepted. (29). The issue of benefit of probation under the Act in a criminal case, was considered by the Honble Supreme Court in Aitha Chandra Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (28) and the Court made the following observations:- ``As the appellant has been released on probation, this may not affect his service career in view of Sec.12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. (30). The said judgment in Aitha Chandra Rao (supra) was not followed by the Honble Supreme Court in Hari Chand vs. Director of School Education (29) observ- ing that due to the peculiar circumstances of the case, the benefit of the provisions of 1958 Act had been given to him and as in that case there had been no discussion on the words ``disqualification, if any attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law had not been considered, the said judgment cannot be treated as a binding precedent. The Apex Court interpreted the provisions of Sec. 12 of the Act, 1958 and held as under:- ``In our view, Sec.12 of the Probation of Offenders Act would apply only in respect of a disqualification that goes with a conviction under law which provides for the offence and its punishment. The Apex Court interpreted the provisions of Sec. 12 of the Act, 1958 and held as under:- ``In our view, Sec.12 of the Probation of Offenders Act would apply only in respect of a disqualification that goes with a conviction under law which provides for the offence and its punishment. That is the plain meaning of the words ``disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law therein. Where the law that provides for an offence and its punishment also stipulates a disqualification, a person convicted of the offence but released on probation does not by reason of Sec.12, suffers the disqualification. It cannot be held that by reason of Sec. 12, a conviction for an offence should not be taken into account for the purposes of dismissal of the person convicted from government service. (31). Moreover, in Ratan Lal vs. Union of India and others (30) this Court has placed reliance upon Hari Chand (supra) and has taken the view that the benefit given of the Act of 1958 merely takes away the effect of sentence and not of conviction, though the case of Radha (supra) was not cited and brought to the notice of the Court. (32). In Trikha Ram vs. V.K. Seth and another (31), the Honble Apex Court has held that if a person stands convicted and is given the benefit of the provisions of the Act of 1958, his services can be terminated only on the ground that he stood convicted. But by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 12 of the Act, 1958, his removal cannot be a `disqualification for the purposes provided in other Statutes. The same view has been reiterated in Union of India vs. Bakshi Ram (32); Karam Singh v State of Punjab and another (33); Director of Collegiate Education vs. S. Nagoor Meera (34); and Additional Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hyderabad vs. P.R.K. Mohan (35). (33). Similarly in Shanker Das vs.Union of India and another (36), the Honble Apex Court has held that the order of dismissal from service, consequent upon a conviction, is not a disqualification within the meaning of Sec.12 of the Act, 1958. (33). Similarly in Shanker Das vs.Union of India and another (36), the Honble Apex Court has held that the order of dismissal from service, consequent upon a conviction, is not a disqualification within the meaning of Sec.12 of the Act, 1958. There are Statutes which provide that the persons, who are convicted for certain offences, shall incur certain disqualification; for example, Chapter III of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 entitles `disqualification for Membership of Parliament and State Legislatures, and Chapter IV entitles ``disqualification for voting, contains the provisions which disqualify persons convicted of certain charges from being the Members of Legislatures or from voting at election to the Legislature. That is the sense in which the word `disqualification is used in Sec.12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the reasoning of the High Court that Sec.12 of the Act takes away the effect of conviction for the purpose of service also. (34). In Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and another vs. T.R. Challappan (37), the Honble Supreme Court observed that the conviction of an accused, or the finding of the Court that he is the guilty, does not stand washed away because that is the sine-qua non for the order of release on probation. The order of release on probation is merely in substitution of the sentence to be imposed by the Court. Thus, the factum of guilt on the criminal charge is not swept away merely by passing the order under the Probation of Offenders Act. (35). Even if the trial Court or Appellate Court gives benefit of the Act, 1958 to the accused, it has no competence to observe that criminal prosecution/conviction shall not adversely effect the service of the accused. This Court in Smt. Radha vs. Khajan Singh (38) while considering the appeal against the order of the trial Court in a case under the provisions of Sec. 376, 406 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, made the following observations:- ``The release of accused Khajan Singh on probation will not be a dis- qualification attaching to the conviction with regard to the service and other consequential benefits which may otherwise accrue or otherwise admissible to him under the rules under Sec. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. In view of the above, the law laid down by this Court in Smt. Radha (supra) is not in consonance with the Law laid down by the Apex Court and cannot be treated as a binding precedent. (36). In State of U.P. vs.Ranjit Singh (39) the Honble Apex Court has held that the High Court, while deciding a criminal case and giving the benefit of the Act, 1958, or similar enactment , has no competence to issue any direction that the accused shall not suffer any civil consequences. The Court has held as under:- ``We also fail to understand, how the High Court, while deciding a criminal case, can direct that the accused must be deemed to have been in continuous service without break, and therefore, he should be paid his full pay and dearness allowance during the period of his suspension. This direction and observation is wholly without jurisdiction......... (37). In view of the above, the law laid down by this Court in Smt. Radha (supra) is not in consonance with the law laid down by the Apex Court and cannot be treated as good law. (38). Thus, in view of the above, none of the contentions canvassed on behalf of the petitioner are tenable in the eyes of law. Petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. _ End of the Volume 1999(3)