JUDGMENT A.K. Mishra, J. 1. This appeal filed by the unsuccessful plaintiffs is for specific performance of an agreement to sell which has been disallowed by the learned trial Court with respect to an agricultural land comprising of khasra No. 213/2 in area 1.619 hectares and khasra No. 213/1 in area 0.809 hectares. Total area being 2.428 hectares situated at village Khamkheda, tehsil Deori, district Sagar. 2. It was alleged that an agreement to sell was entered into with the original plaintiff Rajaram for a sum of Rs. 1,30,500/-. The agreement was entered into by late Hari Shankar, defendant No. 2 and earnest money of Rs. 25,000/- was paid to him. The sale-deed was to be executed on or before Fagun Sudi Puno Year 1990. It was agreed that by executing the sale-deed and receiving the consideration of balance of Rs. 1,05,500/- before the Sub-Registrar, the registration of the document would be completed and the possession will also be handed over. The plaintiffs' father Raja Ram was ready and willing to pay remaining amount due under the agreement to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to get the sale-deed executed, but all of a sudden, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on 19-10-1989 served an incorrect notice falsely alleging that on 21-9-1989, earnest money Rs. 25,000/- was returned along with interest of Rs. 580/- but the agreement has not been returned in the pretext that it was with the son of plaintiff in a different village, but in spite of several demands, it has not been returned back. The earnest money Rs. 25,000/- and interest Rs. 580/- was not returned to the plaintiff. Notice of the defendants was replied to and it was mentioned that he was ready to purchase it on Fagun Sudi Puno, 1990 and was also ready to pay the remaining consideration and if the defendants wanted to get the sale-deed executed, earlier, 15 days notice be given so that the plaintiff was able to arrange and pay the money and get the sale-deed executed. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 sent reply to the notice on 12-1-1990 and refused to execute the sale-deed and again repeated the allegations made in the previous notice. Hence, the plaintiff filed a suit on 6-2-1990 for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 19-6-1989 on a condition of plaintiffs paying Rs. 1,05,500/-. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 sent reply to the notice on 12-1-1990 and refused to execute the sale-deed and again repeated the allegations made in the previous notice. Hence, the plaintiff filed a suit on 6-2-1990 for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 19-6-1989 on a condition of plaintiffs paying Rs. 1,05,500/-. In the alternative it was also prayed that if the said decree is not granted, then Rs. 25,000/- be refunded together with interest at the rate of 2% per month since 19-6-1989. 3. The defendant No. 1 in the written statement denied the plaint allegations and contended that defendant No. 2 Hari Shankar Guru was already dead. He was not general power of attorney holder of defendant No. 1. Defendant No. I further contended that the agreement was entered into by Hari Shankar Guru for a sum of Rs. 1,30,500/-. The sale-deed was to be executed by Amawasshya 2046 (year 1990), but the plaintiffs' father was not having the arrangement of money, hence another agreement was substituted on 19-5-1989 for the period upto Fagun Sudi Puno 1990. No agreement was executed on 19-6-1989. According to the agreement, defendant No. 1 was minor and defendant No. 2 could not enter into agreement without permission of the District Court, hence, the agreement was not binding on defendant No. 1. 4. It was further contended by defendant that Raja Ram was not willing to purchase the property. He expressed his unwillingness to purchase the property. Hence, on 21-9-1989 in front of the witness, earnest money of Rs. 25,000/- was refunded along with interest of Rs. 580/-. Thus, the total amount of Rs. 25,580/- was refunded but Raja Ram did not return the original agreement on the pretext that it was with his son in a different village and it will be returned as soon as it was obtained by Raja Ram from his son. When the agreement was not returned back and no receipt of the refund of the earnest money was given, the police report was lodged by defendant No. 2, Hari Shankar at police-station Gorchamar on 6-10-1989 and subsequently, on 19-10-1989 a registered A.D. notice was served on him. The notice dated 19-10-1989 was based on the correct facts but plaintiffs reply was false. Thereafter, on 12-1-1990 again, a notice was sent. No cause of action has arisen to the plaintiffs. The notice dated 19-10-1989 was based on the correct facts but plaintiffs reply was false. Thereafter, on 12-1-1990 again, a notice was sent. No cause of action has arisen to the plaintiffs. In the special pleas it was contended that on the date of the so-called agreement, defendant No. 1 was minor and without permission of the Court, no agreement could be entered into by defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 2 was not general power of attorney holder of defendant No. 1. 5. The trial Court has dismissed the suit and it has been found that earnest money of Rs. 25,000/- along with interest of Rs. 580/- was refunded. The trial Court also found that the agreement was executed on 19-5-1989. In the date of agreement, there is alteration from 19-5-1989 to 19-6-1989. 6. In the appeal, it has been contended on behalf of the appellants by Shri Sanjay Agrawal, Advocate, that the finding recorded with respect to refund of consideration is perverse and could not be arrived at in a reasonable manner. The plaintiffs' father had averred readiness and willingness to purchase the property. As such, the suit for specific performance has to be decreed. In the alternative, it is contended that the refund of earnest money along with interest may be ordered as prayed in the plaint. 7. The counsel for respondent submitted that the earnest money was refunded by the defendant's father Hari Shankar along with interest, but the agreement was not returned back, hence police report was lodged on 6-10-1989. Thereafter a registered A.D. notice was sent on 19-10-1989 and again a notice was sent on 12-1-1990 by Hari Shankar. It has also been contended that the plaintiff had received back the earnest money along with interest and he failed to perform his part of contract. He had no arrangement of the funds, hence, the earnest money was received back. The plaintiff was not entitled for specific performance, which has been rightly refused by the learned trial Court. 8. The first point which arises for consideration is whether the agreement itself has been repudiated by the plaintiff after receiving back the earnest money. In order to prove that the earnest money was refunded to the original plaintiff Raja Ram, the defendant has laid the evidence of herself as DW-1, Harish Chandra, DW-2, Madhav Prasad, DW-3, Birbal, DW-4-and the defendant's mother Shanti Bai DW-5. In order to prove that the earnest money was refunded to the original plaintiff Raja Ram, the defendant has laid the evidence of herself as DW-1, Harish Chandra, DW-2, Madhav Prasad, DW-3, Birbal, DW-4-and the defendant's mother Shanti Bai DW-5. The defendant has also laid documentary correspondence evidenced in the shape of registered notice dated 19-10-1989. The trial Court has taken note of the circumstance that the notice which was sent by the defendant has been placed on record as Ex.D/2 and has been filed along with the plaint but its reply has not been placed on record for the reasons best known to the plaintiff Raja Ram. The witnesses examined on behalf of the defendant have clearly stated that the earnest money was refunded along with interest of Rs. 580/- but the agreement was not returned on the ground that it was lying with his son and ultimately it was not returned. That led to the defendants not only lodging of an FIR on 6-10-1989, but subsequently, a notice was served on 19-10-1989 on the basis of the refund of earnest money along with interest on 21-9-1989. 8-A. The defendant has examined Sarpanch of the village Madhav Prasad (DW-3). He is not shown to be interested in any manner with the defendant. Another witness Birbal has been examined as DW-4, he has also supported the plea of the refund of earnest money along with interest and stated that the amount of interest was also calculated by Madhav in the house of Raja Ram. All the witnesses have clearly stated that the money was refunded during the period of Pitrapaksha. That corresponds with the date of 21-9-1989. 9. Not only the defendant has laid the oral evidence with respect to the refund of the earnest money along with interest, but the contemporary conduct evidence of the lodging of the FIR on 6-10-1989 and thereafter serving of a registered notice on 19-10-1989 by Hari Shankar and again notice dated 12-1-1990 clearly indicates that the witnesses examined by the defendant are credible and have been rightly relied upon by the learned trial Court as circumstances lend support to the deposition of the witnesses. Man may lie but the circumstances do not in the cardinal principle of evaluation of evidence. In the instant case, circumstances on record do constitute corresponding conduct evidence of repayment of earnest money along with interest. Man may lie but the circumstances do not in the cardinal principle of evaluation of evidence. In the instant case, circumstances on record do constitute corresponding conduct evidence of repayment of earnest money along with interest. The reply to the notice dated 19-10-1989 stated to be sent by the plaintiff on or about 29-11-1989 has also not been placed on record which would have thrown light as to stand taken in the reply of the notice. Similarly, another notice was sent by the defendant on 12-1-1990. The reply to this notice has also not been placed on record by the plaintiffs, though reply is stated to have been sent. It was the defendant who pleaded and has deposed about lodging of the FIR on 6-10-1989. In spite of receipt of the earnest money along with interest, agreement was not returned, hence registered notice was immediately served thereafter on 19-10-1989 within 15 days. Thus, the allegation of the defendant of refund finds support with the serving of the notice as well as lodging of the FIR. Pinki (D.W.1) has deposed that her father Hari Shankar had withdrawn the money of Rs. 11,000/- on 19-9-1989 from his bank account for the purpose of making refund. Photocopy of bank account has been placed on record and Pinki has deposed with regard to it. She has deposed in para 9 that her father had lodged a report against Raja Ram. Her father had withdrawn Rs. 11,000/- from Account No. 501189 of the State Bank of India, Deori Branch for refund of earnest money. No cross-examination has been made on this material aspect. The matter of cross-examination is the matter of substance not merely a matter of procedure. It was the duty of the plaintiff to cross-examine the defendant. It has been laid down in Maroti Bansi Teli vs. Radhabai, 1944 NLJ 492 : AIR 1945 Nag. 60 at page 64 as under:-- The usual practice at the Bar is to accept matters which are not challenged either in the pleadings or in cross-examination as fully established once a person enters the box and swears to it. If the rule were otherwise parties would be obliged to encumber the record with a mass of material which in the result might prove wholly unnecessary. If the rule were otherwise parties would be obliged to encumber the record with a mass of material which in the result might prove wholly unnecessary. The practice therefore is when it is intended to challenge a point which is not specifically challenged in the pleadings to cross-examine to it formally the first time. It is raised in a witness's deposition. The other side is then placed upon its guard and is given notice that it must establish the point as fully as it can. When that is not done it means that the point is not challenged and can be accepted. In Kowar Lal Amritlal vs. Rekh Lal Kodurum, 1950 NLJ 197 : AIR 1950 Nag. 83 it has been laid down that -- If the other side wants to challenge that statement, it is their duty quite apart from raising it in the pleadings to cross-examine the witness along these lines. Where that is not done, the party proving attestation is entitled to assume that the mode of attestation was not being attacked and therefore that it was enough for his witness merely formally to prove attestation. In A.E.G. Carapit vs. A.Y. Derderian, AIR 1961 Cal. 359 , the Court observed as under:-- Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross- examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. This is not merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that it is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. This much a counsel is bound to do when cross-examining that he must put to each of his opponent's witnesses in turn, so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which that witness had any share. 10. Harish Chandra has been examined as DW-2. He deposed that plaintiff Raja Ram and defendant Hari Shankar Guru belong to the same family and Hari Shankar was nephew of Raja Ram. He is not shown to be interested in any manner or having ill-will against the plaintiff. 10. Harish Chandra has been examined as DW-2. He deposed that plaintiff Raja Ram and defendant Hari Shankar Guru belong to the same family and Hari Shankar was nephew of Raja Ram. He is not shown to be interested in any manner or having ill-will against the plaintiff. 11. Madhav Prasad (DW-3) has deposed that Raja Ram was his brother and Hari Shankar happens to be his uncle. On 21-9-1989, money had been returned along with interest by Hari Shankar to Raja Ram. 12. Birbal (DW-4) is an independent witness. He has stated that the money was returned in his presence along with interest supported by Shanti Bai (DW-5). We have perused the statements and the view which has been taken by the trial Court, the statements of these witnesses are unimpeachable and we affirm the findings of the trial Court with respect to the refund part of the earnest. 13. In view of this finding that the earnest money was refunded to the plaintiff Raja Ram, it has to be held that the agreement was repudiated by Raja Ram himself by receiving refund of the earnest money along with the interest. 14. As to the plea about ready and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the essential terms of the contract. The continuous readiness and willingness at all stages from the date of the agreement till the date of hearing of the suit need to be proved. The substance of the matter and surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the plaintiff must be taken into consideration in adjudging the readiness and willingness to perform the plaintiffs part of the contract. This is reiterated in the case of Jugaraj Singh and another vs. Labh Singh and others, AIR 1995 SC 945 . Reference to Privy Council in Ardeshir H. Mama vs. Flora Sassoon, AIR 1928 PC 208 has been made in which it has been laid down that ''in a suit for specific performance the averment of readiness and willingness on plaintiffs part upto the date of the decree is necessary." The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff can be gathered not only from his averment in plaint, but also by his conduct of sending a registered notice to execute the sale-deed. In the instant case, the plaintiff has not placed on record any of the notice in the shape of reply, which he is stated to have sent to the defendant. 15. It is also pertinent to note here that to judge whether the plaintiff is ready to perform his part of the contract, the Court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. The said requirement has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N.P. Thirugnanam vs. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, AIR 1996 SC 116 . 16. In another case of Abdul Khader Rowther vs. R.K. Sara Bai, AIR SC 682, it has been laid down by following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1969) 2 SCC 539 (Para 11) to the effect that 'the plaint does not contain the requisite pleadings necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance. This equitable remedy recognised by the Specific Relief Act cannot be had on the basis of such pleadings and evidence.' Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 runs as under:-- 16. Personal bars to relief. -- Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of person -- (a) ............. (b) ............. (c) Who fails to aver and proved that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Hence it is mandatory for the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. In other words, if the plaint does not contain this averment, it can well be said that the plaint does not disclose the cause of action. Such averments are in accordance with Forms 47 and 48 of Civil Procedure Code. In other words, if the plaint does not contain this averment, it can well be said that the plaint does not disclose the cause of action. Such averments are in accordance with Forms 47 and 48 of Civil Procedure Code. In the suit for specific performance, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract. In the instant case, the pleading which has been made in the plaint in Para 2 is as under: In the Paragraph No. 3 of the plaint, the plaintiff has further averred to the effect that "defendants 1 and 2 served a notice on 19-10-1989 averments of which were not correct. The said notice was replied by the plaintiff through counsel and it was informed in the reply to the said notice that the plaintiff was ready to purchase on Fagun Sudi Puno year 1990 the property on payment of remaining consideration and in case the defendants want to execute the sale-deed earlier, 15 days' time should be given to the plaintiff so that the, plaintiff should pay the remaining amount to get the sale-deed executed." It is clear from the pleading that the plaintiff was not immediately ready to perform his part of the contract but asked for 15 days notice. The plaintiff has further nowhere pleaded or proved that he was ready to bear the requisite expenses for the purchase of the stamps and also to bear the registration charges. In paragraph 2 of the plaint, it is stated that he was ready to pay balance of the contract price only and nothing beyond that. Section 29(c) of the Indian Stamp Act runs as under:-- 29. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the expenses of providing the proper stamp shall be borne ... ... ... ... (c) in the case of a conveyance (including a reconveyance of mortgaged property) by the grantee, in the case of a lease or agreement to lease by the lessee or intended lessee; It is apparent from Section 29(c) of the Stamp Act that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the expenses of providing the proper stamp shall be borne by the purchaser. Section 55(1)(d) of the Transfer of Property Act provides as under:-- 55. Section 55(1)(d) of the Transfer of Property Act provides as under:-- 55. In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the buyer and the seller of immovable property respectively are subject to the liabilities, and have the rights, mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property sold: (1) the seller is bound -- XXX XXX XXX XXX (d) on payment or tender of the amount due in respect of the price, to execute a proper conveyance of the property when the buyer tenders it to him for execution at a proper time and place. It is clear from the above cited Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act-that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, it is the duty of the buyer to bear the expenses for the purchase of the proper stamps for the conveyance and to tender the proper conveyance of the property to execute at a proper time and place. These are the statutory obligations of the buyer and, therefore, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, they inhere in every contract. In the case of Smt. Dhanbai vs. Pherozshah, ILR (1971) 21 Raj. 1099, it has been held that in the absence of the contract to the contrary, it is imperative for the plaintiff to bear the expenses of the stamps and tender the conveyance for execution to the defendant-purchaser and his willingness to do this is essential ingredient of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The relevant observations are as under:-- Now it has to be remembered that as no contract to the contrary was pleaded in the plaint, it was the duty of the buyer, under section 55(1)(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, to tender a proper conveyance of the property to the seller for execution at a proper time and place. So also it was his duty under section 29(c) of the Stamp Act to bear the expenses for the purchase of the proper stamp for the conveyance. These statutory obligations of the buyer inhere in every such contract, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. So also it was his duty under section 29(c) of the Stamp Act to bear the expenses for the purchase of the proper stamp for the conveyance. These statutory obligations of the buyer inhere in every such contract, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. As it is admitted that there was no agreement to the contrary, it was the plaintiffs duty to make a general averment of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, or to plead specifically that he was, inter alia, ready to tender the conveyance and pay the expenses for the purchase of the stamp. Reference in this connection may be made to Ma Hnit vs. Maung Popu, AIR 1919 PC 124 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that it is the duty of the purchaser to tender a conveyance, and he would then, and not before such a tender was either made or waived, have the right to the deed of transfer. Then it has been held in Dau Alakhram vs. Mt. Kulwantin Bai, 1950 NLJ 456 : AIR 1950 Nag 238 that the expenses for the deed of sale have to be incurred by the purchaser and it was thus for the plaintiff to express his readiness and willingness to pay the money for the stamp paper and to call upon the other side to execute the sale-deed. The other decisions on the point are Saral Kumar Chatter fee vs. Madhusudan Auddy, AIR 1964 Cat. 556 and Mst. Suraj Bai vs. Nawab Mohammad Mukarram Alt Khan, ILR (1969) 19 Raj. 508. The averments referred to by Mr. Gupta in the plaint are therefore quite inadequate. xxx xxx xxx There is therefore no force in the argument of Mr. Gupta and it was necessary for the plaintiff to make an averment of his readiness and willingness to perform "all acts" and it was not open to him to leave out, or to refuse to comply, with the requirement regarding the tender of the conveyance or the purchase of "the stamp xxx xxx xxx It will thus appear that the plaintiff has not made an averment in the plaint regarding his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The plaint does not therefore disclose a cause of action for the suit and there is justification for the argument that it should be dismissed for that reason. This decision has been cited with approval by the Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 13 of 1973 in the case of Firm Gangaram Ram day al and others vs. Firm Patiram Nahaneram decided on 30-11-1981. In the said case, in the similar set of pleadings, it was held that the plaintiff was unable to prove his plea about his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. Hence, the suit for specific performance was dismissed for want of pleading. The requisite readiness to bear registration charges and to bear the expenses of stamp duty. The only averment made was to bear the remaining part of the consideration. By virtue of denial of the written contract, the plaintiff cannot escape its liability to aver in the plaint his readiness and willingness and to prove the provisions of section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 17. In the instant case, in the agreement (Ex.P/1), there is no agreement to the contrary for the buyer to bear the expenses for the purchase of proper stamps for the conveyance and to tender the proper conveyance. Thus, it was necessary for the plaintiff to have pleaded readiness and willingness, but there is no general averment of readiness and willingness, in plaint in paragraph 2, moreover, the readiness and willingness has to be continued till the passing of the decree, which is also lacking. The averment in the plaint, paragraph 3 goes to indicate that when notice dated 19-10-1989 was served upon the plaintiff, then he was not ready to get the sale-deed executed, he wanted to get sale-deed executed only on Fagun Sudi Puno year 1990 and in case defendants wanted to execute the sale-deed earlier; he prayed 15 days time for arrangement of the funds. By the said conduct, it could not be said that the plaintiff was ready to perform the part of the contract even at the time when the notice was served on him on 19-10-1989 by the defendants. This very averment goes to show that the plaintiff was not continuously at all times ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, his conduct was dilly and dallying. This very averment goes to show that the plaintiff was not continuously at all times ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, his conduct was dilly and dallying. There is no evidence led with respect to part that plaintiff was ready to bear the expenses of stamp duty as well as to bear the charges of registration. Even if the pleading is taken constituting the general averment of readiness and willingness, the evidence of its proof, in the instant case is clearly lacking. He has also failed to produce notice stated to be served on the defendants in the shape of reply to the defendants' notice. The notice would. have thrown some light to the plaintiffs' readiness and willingness. In the instant case, Satyanarayan (P.W.1) has simply deposed, there was an agreement to sell in the sum of Rs. 1,30,500/-. He has not stated readiness and willingness to bear the stamp duty and registration charges. Vasheer Mohammad (P.W.2) an attesting witness of the said agreement (Ex.P/1). Nathuram ( P.W.3) was also an attesting witness of the agreement (Ex.P/1). The only statement with respect to readiness was that of Satyanarayan (P.W.1) which falls much short of the requirement to proye the readiness and willingness. 18. However, the other infirmity in the case equally disentitles the plaintiff to obtain specific performance, the disputed land is admittedly owned by defendant No. 1 Pinki. It is pleaded in the plaint that defendant No. 2 was his general power of attorney holder. This fact has been denied in the written statement by defendant No. 1. The plaintiff himself in his own deposition Satyanarayan ( P.W.1) in paragraph 10 has simply stated that Hari Shankar was general power of Attorney holder but he has not filed any document in the case. Thus, in the absence of any document on record, it cannot be said that Hari Shankar was general power of attorney holder of defendant No. 1 and as per the case set-up, natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or benefit of the minor's estate, but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. Sub-section (2) of section 8 runs as under:-- (2) The natural guardian shall not without the previous permission of the Court; (a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise any part of the immovable property of the minor or (b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority, Sub-section (3) of section 8 provides that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. In the instant case, no permission was obtained from the Court. Thus, the said agreement of specific performance violates mandate of section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. It is not the case of the plaintiff that it was the joint property or joint family property. Since it was the property belonging to Pinki, defendant No. 1, it was necessary to obtain the permission in view of section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Pinki has repudiated the agreement and has challenged the entitlement of the plaintiff for specific performance of agreement to sell in question. Thus, in view of the clear provisions of section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, plaintiffs are not entitled for decree of specific performance of the agreement to sale. We are also not at all satisfied from the evidence and own statement of the plaintiff that Hari Shankar was the general power of attorney holder of defendant Pinki and moreover in the capacity of natural guardian, he could not alienate the property of the minor without permission of the Court under section 8 of the Act. It has been contended by the plaintiffs/appellants counsel that defendant Pinki was herself major at the time when agreement was executed by her father Hari Shankar. That does not advance the case of the plaintiffs any further as in the case of a major child, father will have no right to execute an agreement and to bind major children until and unless the property is shown to be joint or father is shown to be Karta. That is not the case pleaded or proved by the plaintiffs. 19. That is not the case pleaded or proved by the plaintiffs. 19. That, for relief or specific performance, the plaintiff is not entitled in view of the finding that earnest money was refunded. The plaintiff is not entitled for any specific performance of an agreement which has been repudiated by himself. He has failed to aver and prove the readiness and willingness as required under section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and further, it is not proved that Hari Shankar was general power of attorney holder of defendant No. 1 Pinki and as she is shown to be minor at the time of execution of the agreement, permission of the Court under section 8 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act ought to have been obtained, which has not been done. The circumstance makes that the plaintiff is not entitled for discretionary relief of specific performance of contract of sale and that has been rightly refused by the learned trial Court. 20. We find no substance in the appeal. The same is dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs as incurred in the present appeal.