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1999 DIGILAW 959 (MAD)

G. Raghavachari v. A. Swaminathan

1999-09-14

S.S.SUBRAMANI

body1999
Judgment :- Tenant in H.R.C. No. 2964 of 1989 on the file of XV Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras is the revision petitioner herein. 2. Landlord is the respondent herein who filed application under Section 10(3) (c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. It is stated that landlord is the owner of the house and premises No. 9 Pammi Sivaramulu Chetty Street, Madras. Petitioner herein is the tenant of the northern portion of the said premises consisting of eastern half of verandah, one room, a half portion of hall and kitchen and also the northern side verandah with bathroom on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- 3. It is stated that tenant began to occupy the premises for a temporary period of 3 to 6 months in 1985 when he was in dire need and was fighting a litigation with the landlady of house at that time, in ground and premises No. 3 Pammi Sivaramulu Chetty Street, Madras with one Venkata Seshamma. It was tenant who filed litigation against the said Venkata Seshamma for restoring electricity and water supply and tenant obtained an executable order. It is also said that tenant was close friend of landlord from childhood and on sympathy, the landlord accepted his request and let out a portion of the property on monthly rent of Rs. 300/-. 4. It is said that the family of landlord consisted of himself, his wife, his unmarried son, unmarried daughter besides his son-in-laws sister. The northern portion of the house in the tenants occupation consisted of a small Verandah and the eastern side one room, half koodam, a kitchen, a bath room. Landlord has got three other married daughters and they have been frequently coming to Madras and have been staying in the parental house for months together with their children. One or the other daughter of landlord has been obliged to come to petitioners house for confinement and in this context also one or the other daughter of landlord has been staying with landlord for long periods. In view of the number of members in the family and in view of the wholly insufficient accommodation of petitioner/landlord, he demanded tenant for surrendering vacant possession. In view of the number of members in the family and in view of the wholly insufficient accommodation of petitioner/landlord, he demanded tenant for surrendering vacant possession. The portion of landlord being wholly insufficient, the portion is also completely dark with no ventilation or passage or free air and light due to the fact that immediate southern side neighbour Dr. Rajaram has constructed a big building on the southern side of landlords house. It is stated in the petition that the portion occupied by tenant is in dire need of landlords occupation as additional accommodation. Regarding relative hardship it is said that tenant will not be put to any hardship since he has already obtained an executable order and building is just opposite to the scheduled building. 5. In the counter statement filed by tenant the requirement of landlord for additional accommodation was disputed. It is also said that the claim is without bona fide and he will be put to great hardship if eviction is ordered. 6. Rent Controller after taking evidence, as per Order dated 16.12.1994 dismissed the application. 7. The matter was taken in appeal by landlord in R.C.A. 382 of 1995 on the file of VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras. Appellate Authority as per Judgment dated 10.12.1998 set aside the order of Rent Controller and allowed the appeal. In appeal. Additional evidence was also taken at the instance of landlord. Appellate authority held that the space occupied by landlord is wholly insufficient and the claim of landlord is bona fide . With regard to comparative hardship, it is held that tenant will not be put to any hardship when he himself obtained order to restore amenities with regard to building in the opposite right of the scheduled premises. It also held that tenant has no case that he cannot find out any building in the town where he can shift his residence. Eviction was allowed. It is against the said Judgment, tenant has preferred this revision. 8. Since caveat was entered by respondent, I heard the revision at the admission stage itself. 9. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted only one point for consideration in this revision. Eviction was allowed. It is against the said Judgment, tenant has preferred this revision. 8. Since caveat was entered by respondent, I heard the revision at the admission stage itself. 9. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted only one point for consideration in this revision. Counsel submitted that after disposal of appeal by appellate authority, Landlord has sold that portion of the property occupied by him as per Sale Deed dated 7.6.1999 and in view of the same the claim for additional accommodation cannot be entertained. The registration copy of the sale deed is also filed along with application to receive the same in CMP. No. 13094 of 1999. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that when a claim is made for own occupation whether for additional accommodation or for own use, the bona fides must be proved till the entire proceeding is over. Counsel submitted that when landlord has already sold the property which is in his possession that shows that there cannot be any bona fides in their claim. At any rate, only when landlord continues to be owner and in possession of that portion of property in their occupation, they can claim eviction for additional accommodation. Argument is that claim for additional accommodation cannot be had so far as statutory requirements are not satisfied and consequently bona fides of the claim is also not proved. An argument was also made by learned counsel for petitioner that though sale deed is dated 7.6.1999, long before the order of appellate authority entire consideration seems to have been received as-early as on 28.11.1998 and landlord was only waiting for final orders of appellate authority to register the deed. 10. Detailed counter affidavit has been filed by landlord and used before this Court that he has no objection in taking note of the subsequent events and submitted that the relief also could be moulded by this Court and permit landlord to get possession, not for the ground as claimed for additional accommodation but for the claim as own occupation. In the counter affidavit, the circumstances under which landlord had to execute the sale deed for the portion he occupied is narrated and contended that even now his need for occupation of tenants premises is continuing and subsequent event has nothing to do to suspect the bona fides in his claim. 11. I heard the counsel on both sides. 12. In the counter affidavit, the circumstances under which landlord had to execute the sale deed for the portion he occupied is narrated and contended that even now his need for occupation of tenants premises is continuing and subsequent event has nothing to do to suspect the bona fides in his claim. 11. I heard the counsel on both sides. 12. The only question that requires consideration is whether in view of the sale deed executed by landlord in regard to that portion of the building which they were occupying, is he not entitled to get possession of the tenanted premises under Section 10(3) (c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 13. Landlord claims possession under Section 10(3) (c) of the Act, which reads thus, “Section 10(3)(c) — A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.” It is not disputed by landlord that as on date, he cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 10(3) (c) of the Act in view of the subsequent sale deed. But Landlord claims that in view of the subsequent event, he is entitled to get possession under Section 10(3) (a) (i) of the Act, which reads thus, “10(3)(a)(i) — in case it is residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of (any member of his family) and if he or (any member of his family) is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned.” 14. On going by the wordings of the statute, 1 find that one thing is common in both the sub-sections, i.e., ‘bona fide own occupation of the landlord’. In the case of additional occupation, landlord is residing in a portion of the building and he requires the portion occupied by tenant also as additional accommodation. Under Section 10(3) (a) (i), landlord wanted to transplant himself and occupy that portion of the building occupied by the tenant. In the case of additional occupation, landlord is residing in a portion of the building and he requires the portion occupied by tenant also as additional accommodation. Under Section 10(3) (a) (i), landlord wanted to transplant himself and occupy that portion of the building occupied by the tenant. In both the cases, the claim is dependent on the proof of landlord about his bona fides to occupy the portion. In fact, both these sections are two species of a similar claim i.e., ‘bona fide own occupation. 15. It is on this basis 1 have to consider how for the sale deed executed by landlord on 7.6.1999 of that portion of the building occupied by him will disentitle his claim to occupy under Section 10(3) (a) (i) of the Act. 16. Before further going into the facts of the case, both the counsel agreed that court is entitled to take into consideration the subsequent events and mould the relief. Reliance is also placed on the decision reported in 1975 (1) S.C.C. 770 ( Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders ). In paragraph 4 of the Judgment, their Lordships held thus, “It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify Or r ender inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is not violated, with a view to promote substantial justice subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. The above decision was followed in the decision reported in 1981 (3) S.C.C. 103 = AIR 1981 SC 1711 {Hamsat Rai v. Raghunathi Prasad ). In that case, their Lordships held thus, “Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred, the appeal being a continuation of suit, the landlords need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the Court including the appellate Court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage.” 18. In what way the court will take note of these subsequent events, came for consideration in the decision reported in 1992 Supp (2) S.C.C. 623 ( Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram ). In that case landlord filed an affidavit about the subsequent events, which enabled him to take possession. High Court permitted landlord to plead subsequent events in revision. Counsel for tenant failed to appear in the revisional hearing and prayed for recalling the order on the ground that no opportunity was given to him, but the same was declined by High Court. Before Honourable Supreme Court, learned counsel for tenant submitted that the order of High Court is liable to be interfered with and the contention placed is stated in para 7 of the Judgment. Answering the same, in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Judgment, their Lordships held this, “8. The submissions of the learned counsel are only partly correct. Before Honourable Supreme Court, learned counsel for tenant submitted that the order of High Court is liable to be interfered with and the contention placed is stated in para 7 of the Judgment. Answering the same, in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Judgment, their Lordships held this, “8. The submissions of the learned counsel are only partly correct. While it is true that a distinction must be made between pleading and proof, the further submissions that these must necessarily be in two successive sequential stages need not always be so and particularly when dealing with pleas of subsequent events in appeals and revisions. If the allegations of facts made in support of such a plea are denied, then alone the question of their proof in an appropriate way arises. If those allegations of facts are admitted, there is no need to prove what is admitted or must be deemed to be admitted. There can be admissions by non traverse. The High Court proceeded to accept the allegations as proved presumably in view of the fact that appellants learned counsel did not even appear, let alone challenge the allegations. But there might also be cases in which, having regard to the nature of the circumstances, the court may insist upon proof independently of such admission by non-traverse. 9. When subsequent events are pleaded in the course of an appeal or proceedings of revision, the court may having regard to the nature of the allegations of fact on which the plea is based, permit evidence to be adduced by means of affidavits as envisaged in Rule 1 of Order XIX CPC. The court may also treat any affidavit field in support of the pleadings itself as one under the said provisions and call upon the opposite side to traverse it. The Court, if it finds that having regard to the nature of the al legations, it is necessary to record oral evidence tested by oral cross examination, may have recourse to that procedure. It may record the evidence itself or remit the matter for an enquiry and evidence. All these depend upon the factual and situational differences characterising a particular case and the nature of the plea raised. There can be no hard and fast rule governing the matter. The procedure is not to be burdened with technicalities.” (emphasis supplied) 19. It may record the evidence itself or remit the matter for an enquiry and evidence. All these depend upon the factual and situational differences characterising a particular case and the nature of the plea raised. There can be no hard and fast rule governing the matter. The procedure is not to be burdened with technicalities.” (emphasis supplied) 19. Counsel for landlord also brought to my notice the decision reported in 1997(9) S.C.C. 654 = 1997-2-L.W. 64 ( P. Sriramo-murthy v. Vasantha Raman ) to contend that Honourable Supreme Court has ordered eviction even on the ground which has not been pleaded and only taking note of subsequent events. Counsel relied on relevant portion of para 3 of the Judgment, which read thus, “When the respondents husband retired from service, they decided to permanently come back and settle down in Madras. Thus it is obvious that they needed their house for personal occupation. It is true that the need for personal occupation was not pleaded. It is settled law that for moulding the relief, subsequent events can be taken note of. Under those circumstances, the relief of eviction could be granted on the ground of personal occupation.” 20. Tenant by filing the document contend that the very basis of the claim now ceased to exist, whereas landlord wanted to make use of the very same document to plead that the relief will have to be moulded and his claim for occupation of tenants portion still continues. 21. Landlord has admitted that after disposal of Rent Control appeal, he has disposed of that portion of the building to third party. The purchasers are very close relations. The circumstances which led landlord to sell the property is narrated in the counter affidavit. The facts stated therein are not denied by tenant. Even though tenant alleged that the sale had already taken place by receiving consideration even before Rent Control application was disposed of, landlord explained those circumstances as well. When the facts stated in the counter affidavit that led to the sale are not disputed, 1 feel on the basis of the affidavits alone a decision could be arrived in this case as was held in 1992 Supp (2) S.C.C. 623 cited supra). 1 repeat, the only case of the tenant was, in view of the sale, the basis of the claim is taken away. 1 repeat, the only case of the tenant was, in view of the sale, the basis of the claim is taken away. On the other hand, landlord has stated reasons for executing sale deed, while admitting that he has executed sale deed. It is those facts explained in the counter affidavit which have not been denied by the tenant. 22. In the counter affidavit it is stated that the scheduled building which is in the occupation of the revision petitioner was let out by him alone though owned by himself and three brothers. It is stated that there are dissensions in the family especially among the female members and property is also capable of being partitioned. All of a sudden the marriage of petitioners brothers daughter one Sirisha has to be settled. Younger brother is a retired High Court staff and he was in need of funds to meet the huge marriage expenses. Landlord was also looking for alliance of his last daughter, who was then doing Ph-D in University of Madras in Telugu. At that time, the three co-brothers Venugopal, Srinivasan and Dhanasekaran came forward to purchase two properties belonging to family and paid a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs on 28.11.1998. Since Landlord and his brothers were in need of the same to meet the marriage expenses of their daughter, Rs. 5 lakhs was received on 28.11.1998. Marriage of landlords brothers daughter took place on 7.3.1999 at Madras. Betrothal took place on 6.12.1998 immediately after the advance was taken. Even though three co-brothers agreed to purchase the property, ultimately they found that they could not purchase the same since they were also not in possession of entire sale consideration. Landlord and his brothers also could not return the sale consideration since major portion has already been spent for brothers daughters marriage. In this state of affairs they sold that portion of the property occupied by landlord on 7.6.1999 in the name of wife of Venugopal and Dhanasekaran. It is stated that that portion was sold since it was dark and dingy. The date of receipt of consideration is stated as 28.11.1998. Only because they received Rs. 5 lakhs on that date, sale deed has given the true picture and what all happened. It is stated that that portion was sold since it was dark and dingy. The date of receipt of consideration is stated as 28.11.1998. Only because they received Rs. 5 lakhs on that date, sale deed has given the true picture and what all happened. He also has stated that after the sale, landlord is now without any building and he has temporarily to occupy No. 12, Pammy Sivaramalu Chetty Street, Madras, which belongs to his brother. He also stated that after his retirement petitioner is now been appointed for managing of V.V.S. Public Trust and for the said purpose he had to be at Madras only. For the purpose of Trust, he had to frequently travel to the various cities like Tirupathi, Nellore, Vijayawada, Guntur, Rajamundry, Hyderabad, etc. He also said that his requirement to occupy the building still continues and he has no building of his own, and after sale, he has now become dependent on his brother for his temporary accommodation. 23. On going by the counter affidavit it is clear that petitioner was compelled to sell that portion of the building occupied by him due to circumstances beyond his control. His nieces marriage had to be urgently conducted and landlord was also looking good alliance for his daughter. Even in the eviction petition Landlord has said that the portion occupied by him is very dark without any light there and dingy. Landlord wanted to expand the area of his occupation and to occupy the tenanted portion also. In view of the sale, the question of expanding the area of occupation has ceased and landlord has to transplant to the area where tenant is now occupying. Having sold the property, he cannot continue to occupy that portion. Landlord also has no other building of his own and now has become dependent on his brother and has shifted his residence to the nearby place. These are undisputed facts which led to the execution of sale deed and consequent shifting of landlords residence. Now landlord on the basis of these facts alleges that he wants to occupy the premises occupied by tenant. 1 feel the bona fides of landlord is proved in this case. 24. As I said earlier, even in regard to the claim for additional accommodation, it is claim for own occupation. Appellate authority has found that the claim is bona fide. 1 feel the bona fides of landlord is proved in this case. 24. As I said earlier, even in regard to the claim for additional accommodation, it is claim for own occupation. Appellate authority has found that the claim is bona fide. Now, the only circumstance is landlord cannot occupy his own portion which he was occupying. The subsequent sale will not go against the claim of landlord when he alleges that he wanted to occupy tenanted portion for his own occupation. The bona fides of the claim as found by the appellate authority still subsists though under different provision of the Rent Control Act. 25. While allowing eviction, appellate authority found that appellant can occupy the building situated on the opposite side on which he is a tenant. It is not disputed by tenant even at the time of hearing on the revision. The said building is still available for his occupation. Though comparative hardship need not be considered while eviction is ordered under Section 10(3) (a) (i), I am taking note of that fact also to hold that tenant will not be put to any difficulty even if he is asked to vacate the scheduled premises. Possession by tenant of another accommodation either ready for occupation or available for occupation is also relevant circumstance while moulding the relief of either parties. In fact, finding of the appellate authority that another building is available for tenant to occupy was not challenged in this revision. 26. In the result, taking into consideration the subsequent events it is declared that landlord is entitled to get possession of building under Section 10(3) (a) (i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, instead of Section 10(3) (c). 27. The revision petition is dismissed with costs. C.M.P. 13094 of 1999 is allowed as above and C.M.P. 13093 of 1999 is dismissed.