JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J.—The above-noted two revision petitions are being disposed of together since they involve common questions and have arisen out of the same proceedings, under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The facts giving rise to the above-noted two revision petitions, briefly, may be thus stated. Respondent, in Criminal Revision Petition No.3 of 1999, is the wife, while respondent in Criminal Revision Petition No. 4 of 1999 is the minor daughter of the petitioner. On a joint petition having been made by the two respondents under Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Theog, on 25.8.1993, awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300/- and Rs. 200/-, respectively, in favour of the wife and daughter of the petitioner with effect from the date of the petition, that is, 27.10.1992. 3. Since the petitioner failed to pay the maintenance amount to the two respondents in terms of the orders dated 25.8.1993, the two respondents approached the learned Magistrate under Section 125 (3), Code of Criminal Procedure to enforce the order of maintenance dated 25.8.1993. Two separate applications were made in this behalf on 14.5.1998. 4. In response to the notice issued to him, the petitioner put in appearance before the learned Magistrate on 3.7.1998. He was asked to file the reply to the applications made by the respondents on 5.8.1998. Since no reply was filed, the two applications were adjourned to 8.10.1998 to enable the petitioner to file the reply. On this adjourned date, neither the petitioner appeared nor any reply was filed on his behalf. The learned Magistrate, therefore, passed an order in the following terms:— "Respondent is not present. Hence, he proceeded against ex-parte. It appears that recovery cannot be effected except by way of warrant of arrest. Hence, NBW be issued against the respondent for 31.10.1998.” 5. It appears that no warrants of arrest were issued in pursuance of the order dated 8.10.1998 (quoted above). Therefore, on 31.10.1998, the learned Magistrate directed the issuance of non-bailable warrants against the petitioner returnable for 11.12.1998. On having been arrested, in pursuance of the warrants issued against him, the petitioner was produced before the learned Magistrate on 7.12.1998, when the following order was passed:— "Respondent has been produced in police custody in pursuance of the fresh NBW issued by the Court. On having been arrested, in pursuance of the warrants issued against him, the petitioner was produced before the learned Magistrate on 7.12.1998, when the following order was passed:— "Respondent has been produced in police custody in pursuance of the fresh NBW issued by the Court. The respondent has failed to pay even a single penny towards the payment of the arrears of maintenance. The respondent has not paid the maintenance to his minor daughter since 27.10.1992. It shows his conduct. Therefore, in order to enforce the order of maintenance it is required to send the respondent into civil imprisonment. Hence warrants of civil imprisonment for one month be prepared. However, the respondent is also directed to be produced in the court on 11.12.1998 on the fixed date." On 11.12.1998, the learned Magistrate, after observing that the payment has not been made, adjourned the case to 5.1.1999. The petitioner was produced before the learned Magistrate on 5.1.1999 in custody, when the following order was passed:— "Since the respondent has not paid the maintenance amount, he is sent in civil imprisonment till 1.2.1999. Warrant be prepared accordingly. Case file be put up on 1.2.1999. Copy of the order be provided to the respondent without any costs." The above proceedings have been reproduced from case No. 19A/4 of 1998. (Priyanka v. Padam Sharma) instituted by the daughter of the petitioner for enforcement of the order of maintenance dated 25.8.1993. To the similar effect are the orders which were passed by the learned Magistrate in case No. 19/4 of 1998 (Vidya v. Padam Sharma) instituted by the wife of the petitioner for the enforcement of the above referred order of maintenance. 7. The petitioner has thus approached this Court by way of the present two revision petitions assailing the order dated 5.1.1999 of the learned Magistrate sentencing him to civil prison for a second term for failure to pay the amount of maintenance for which he was earlier sentenced to civil prison vide order dated 7.12.1988. 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 9. 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 9. Section 125(3), Code of Civil Procedure, 1973, which deals with the enforcement of an order of maintenance, reads:— "If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each months allowance remaining unpaid after execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made." 10. A learned single Judge of this Court in Agya Ram v. Smt Pushpa Devi and another (1978 Sim. L.C. 3), had the occasion to deal with the scope and ambit of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, which provisions are similar to the provisions contained in Section 125(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (quoted above). It was held that if the main provisions of sub-section (3) are scrutinised, it will be found that if it is noticed that the person against whom the maintenance order is made fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, then the following course is open to the Magistrate:— (i) He may issue a warrant for levying the amount due, in the manner which is provided in the Code for levying fines; (ii) He may sentence such person to imprisonment if after the execution of the warrant as above, any part of the maintenance remains unpaid. 11. It was further held that an order of imprisonment can be passed only with regard to the realisation of the amount of maintenance remaining unpaid after the warrant is executed in the manner provided for levying fines under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, corresponding to Section 421, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Therefore, when sub-section (3) of Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, contemplates the issue of warrant for levying the arrears of maintenance in the manner provided for levying fines, it means that the warrant should in the first instance be for attachment and sale of movable or immovable or both properties of the defaulter. Therefore, when sub-section (3) of Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, contemplates the issue of warrant for levying the arrears of maintenance in the manner provided for levying fines, it means that the warrant should in the first instance be for attachment and sale of movable or immovable or both properties of the defaulter. It is only after this warrant is executed that it could be known what amount of maintenance remains unpaid and it is only for this unpaid amount of maintenance that the defaulter could be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Sub-section (3) of Section 125, quoted above, opens with the words u if any person so ordered, fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order". That necessarily follows that the powers under this sub-section could be exercised only when it is proved that the person so ordered has failed without sufficient cause to comply with the order. 12. Sub-section (3) of Section 125, quoted above, opens with the words u if any person so ordered, fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order". That necessarily follows that the powers under this sub-section could be exercised only when it is proved that the person so ordered has failed without sufficient cause to comply with the order. 12. Section 51, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which deals with the powers of the Court to enforce execution of a decree, provides:— "Powers of Court to enforce execution.—Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, on the application of the decree-holder, order execution of the decree— (a) by delivery of any property specifically decreed; (b) by attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of any property; (c) by arrest and detention in prison for such period not exceeding the period specified in Section 58, where arrest and detention is permissible under that section; (d) by appointing a receiver; or (e) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require: Provided that, where the decree is for the payment of money, execution by detention in prison shall not be ordered unless, after giving the judgment-debtor an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be committed to prison, the Court, for reasons recorded in writing, is satisfied— (a) that the judgment-debtor, with the object or effect of obstructing or delaying the execution of the decree,— (i) is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or (ii) has, after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed, dishonestly transferred, concealed, or removed any part of his property, or committed any other act of bad faith in relation to his property, or (b) that the judgment-debtor has, or has had since the date of the decree, the means to pay the amount of the decree or some substantial part thereof and refuses or neglects or has refused or neglected to pay the same, or (c) that the decree is for a sum for which the judgment-debtor was bound in a fiduciary capacity to account. Explanation.—In the calculation of the means of the judgment-debtor for the purposes of clause (b), there shall be left out of account any property which, by or under any law or custom having the force of law for the time being in force, is exempt from attachment in execution of the decree." 13. The Honble Supreme Court in Jolly George Varghese and another v. The Bank of Cochin (AIR 1980 SC 470), had the occasion to deal with the power of the Court to order arrest and detention of a judgment-debtor in civil prison under Section 51 read with Order 21, Rule 37, Code of Civil Procedure. It was held:— "......The simple default to discharge is not enough. There must be some element of bad faith beyond mere indifference to pay, some deliberate or recusant disposition in the part or, alternatively, current means to pay the decree or a substantial part of it. The provision emphasis the need to establish not mere omission to pay but an attitude of refusal on demand verging on dishonest disowning of the obligation under the decree. Here considerations of the debtors other pressing needs and straitened circumstances will play prominently...." It was further observed:— “.....It is too obvious to need elaboration that to cast a person in prison because of his poverty and consequent inability to meet his contractual liability is appalling. To be poor, in this land of Daridra Narayana (land of poverty) is no crime and to recover debts by the procedure of putting one in prison is too flagrantly violative of Article 2 1 unless there is proof of the minimal fairness of his wilful failure to pay inspite of his sufficient means and absence of more terribly pressing claims on his means such as medical bills to treat cancer or other grave illness..”. 14. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dnyaneshwar Baburoa Gorel v. Sau. Kamal Dnyaneshwar Gorel and others (1992 Cri. L.J. 835), while dealing with Section 125 (3), Code of Criminal Procedure, has held that the ratio laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Jolly George Vargheses case (supra) would equally apply in the proceedings under sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Kamal Dnyaneshwar Gorel and others (1992 Cri. L.J. 835), while dealing with Section 125 (3), Code of Criminal Procedure, has held that the ratio laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Jolly George Vargheses case (supra) would equally apply in the proceedings under sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was further held that under subsection (3) of Section 125, the expression "without sufficient cause to comply with the order" conveys that even while proceeding to direct recovery under Section 125 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or for sending a defaulter to prison, the trial Magistrate must give opportunity to show cause why he should not be sentenced. It is only when the defaulter fails to show sufficient cause, the Magistrate may direct recovery by sentencing him to imprisonment. In the event, the husband proves that he has no means to pay even at the time of passing the order, under sub-section (3) of Section 125, the Magistrate will not be justified in exercising his powers directing the detention of the defaulter. 15. The learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Om Parkash v. Vidya Devi (1992 Cri. L.J. 658), has held that an order of arrest cannot be passed for recovery of maintenance amount under Section 125(3) without first resorting to coercive measures provided under Section 421, Code of Criminal Procedure. 16. Following the above ratio, the impugned order of the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained. At no stage, the learned Magistrate had followed the procedure prescribed under Section 421, Code of Criminal Procedure. Nor the learned Magistrate had afforded any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner before directing his arrest and detention. 17. There is yet another significant aspect of the case. The learned Magistrate having sentenced the petitioner to civil prison for one month for his failure to pay the arrears of maintenance vide order dated 7.12.1998, had again sentenced the petitioner on 5.1.1999 for a second term of imprisonment till 1.2.1999 for the same arrears of maintenance. Under the law, a defaulter may be sentenced to one months imprisonment in respect of the arrears of maintenance of each month or a broken period, but he cannot be sentenced to imprisonment a second time for default in respect of the same identical arrears. Under the law, a defaulter may be sentenced to one months imprisonment in respect of the arrears of maintenance of each month or a broken period, but he cannot be sentenced to imprisonment a second time for default in respect of the same identical arrears. (See: Maung Kyi Pe v. Ma Htu In, AIR 1932 Rangoon 93; Maung Tun Zan v. Ma Myaing, AIR 1941 Rangoon 247). 18. Resultantly, both the revision petitions are allowed, the impugned order(s) dated 7.12.1998 and 5.1.1999 of the learned Magistrate sentencing the petitioner to imprisonment for default of payment of arrears of maintenance are set aside. The learned Magistrate shall proceed with the matter in accordance with law and in the light of observations made above. 19. The parties through their Counsel are directed to appear before the learned Magistrate on 22.6.1999. Records be returned forthwith so as to reach well before the date fixed. Revision petition allowed.