ORDER S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. M/s M.B. Gharpuray Engineers and Builders, the contractor, the appellant in M.A. No. 142/1983, had entered into a contract with the State of Madhya Pradesh through the Executive Engineer, P.W. D. (R&B), Bhind Division, the appellant in M.A. No. 155/1983 to construct a bridge on the river Sindh at Mehdaghat, on Bhind-Bhander Road. During the progress of the work some disputes had arisen between the contracting parties which had been referred to the arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract. The two arbitrators could not come to a unanimous conclusion on several issues relating to the disputes which resulted a reference to the Umpire. The Umpire gave his award on 14-10-1981. An application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act of 1940 was presented in the Court of District Judge, Bhind, on 9-11-1981 by Anant Mahadeo Kanhre who had been directed and authorised by the Umpire to file the original award and connected papers in the Court on his behalf. Thereafter on 5-1-1982, the State of Madhya Pradesh through the Executive Engineer, P.W. D. (B&R), Division No. 2, Bhind had filed an application under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, against the award of the Umpire praying that the said award may be set aside. An other application which purported to be under sections 17 and 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, was filed on 11-2-1982 by M/s M.B. Gharpuray Engineers and Builders praying that a decree in terms of the award may be passed and further seeking a decree for interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the decretal amount from the date of the decree upto the date of payment. 2. Both of the above applications were heard and disposed of by a common order passed by the learned District Judge, Bhind, held that except for the amount of Rs. 68,500/- , the award was liable to be confirmed and the award was set aside for that amount only. The learned District Judge further directed for the payment of interest to the objector/contractor on the principal amount from the date of the decree till the amount was paid or deposited in the Court at the rate of 6% per annum. 3. The learned District Judge further directed for the payment of interest to the objector/contractor on the principal amount from the date of the decree till the amount was paid or deposited in the Court at the rate of 6% per annum. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the State of Madhya Pradesh through the Executive Engineer, P.W. D. (B&R), Division Bhind has come up in appeal under section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 by means of Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 155 of 1983 praying for the setting aside of the award. 4. The contractor, M/s M.B. Gharpuray, Engineers and Builders has also come up in appeal under section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, by means of Miscellaneous Appeal No. 142 of 1983, praying for the setting aside of the impugned judgment and order whereunder the award had been modified reducing the amount awarded to the extent of Rs. 68,500/- and further praying for a decree in terms of the award confirming the same along with the interest as awarded by the umpire. It may be noticed that the umpire had awarded interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of his award till the date of the decree or the date of payment whichever was earlier. The learned District Judge under the impugned order had granted a decree for the payment of the interest to the contractor/objector on the principal amount of disputed items, A, C, D and E at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of decree till the said amount was paid or deposited in the Court. 5. The appellant in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 142/83 in ground No. (L) has urged that the rate of interest for the period from the date of decree till payment should have been 9% per annum specially when the umpire himself had found the award of interest at that rate to be reasonable so far as the period elapsing between the date of the award and the date of the decree was concerned. 6. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties in both the appeals, and have carefully perused the record. 7. 6. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties in both the appeals, and have carefully perused the record. 7. Before proceeding further, it may be noticed that the conditions of contract in question as contained in condition No. 17 was to the following effect: "Provided always that in case any question, dispute or difference shall arise between the E.E. and the Contractor(s) as to what additions, if any ought in fairness to be made to the amount of the contract by reason of the work being delayed through no fault of the Contractor(s) or by reason or on account of any directions, or requisitions of the E.E. involving increased cost to the Contractor(s) beyond the cost properly attending the carrying out the contract according to the true intent and meaning of the signed drawing and specification, or as to the works having been duly completed or as to the construction of these presents or as to any other matter or thing arising under or out of this contract, except as to matters left during the progress of the work to the sole decision or requisition of the E.E. under clause Nos. 1, 4, 8 and 9 or in case the Contractor(s) shall be dissatisfied with any certificate of the E.E. under clause 6 or under the provision in clause 13 or in case he shall withhold or not give any certificate to which he/they may be entitled, or as to the right of the Contractor(s) to receive any compensation or as to the amount of such compensation payable to him/them under clause 18 then such question, dispute or difference or such certificate or the value or matter which should be certified, as the case may be, is to be from time to time submitted to the arbitrator of a tribunal composed, of one arbitrator nominated by the Contractor(s) and one arbitrator nominated by the S.E. In the event of a disagreement between the arbitrators on any matter or matters, such matter or matters shall be referred to an Umpire to be nominated by the Chief Engineer and the award of such arbitrators or the Umpire is to be final and where necessary to be equivalent to a certificate of the E.E. and the Contractor(s) is/are to be paid accordingly." 8. The parties had also entered into an agreement with special conditions of contract under a separate document. The parties had also entered into an agreement with special conditions of contract under a separate document. The special condition No. 1 stipulated that the bridge will be constructed by M/s M.B. Gharpuray Engineers & Builders for a lump sum payment of Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees fifty lakhs only) generally according to the Contractor's outline drawing dated 7-10-1972 (tender drawing) and the offer of the contractor was based on the terms and conditions contained in the documents enclosed with the agreement, the details whereof were given in that condition. Under those conditions, the contractor had offered a rebate of Rs. 50,000/- for accepting his tender before 17-7-1973. 9. In special condition No. 4.7 which related to the escalation clause, it was stipulated that the contractor had agreed to withdraw the escalation clause for an extra lump sum payment of Rs. 50,000/- and had foregone the extra amount demanded by him and sanctioned by the Government for withdrawal of escalation clause. The contractor had agreed to withdraw the escalation clause for an extra lump sum amount of Rs. 50,000/- only in view of that had been stipulated in paragraph 1 referred to hereinabove. 10. In condition No. 4.11 of the special conditions, apart from other things, it had also been agreed that the contractor will be entitled to bonus for early completion of the work at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per day of early completion with an outer limit of Rs. 50,000/- only. 11. The Learned Counsel for the appellant in M.A. No. 155/83 has strenuously urged that the contractor was not entitled to any payment on account of escalation in view of the fact that the escalation clause itself was omitted from the contract. The further submission in this regard is that even if there was some delay for no fault of the contractor in the completion of the bridge in the absence of any escalation clause, the contractor was not entitled to any amount due to loss whatsoever on account of any rise in the prices as claimed. 12. The Learned Counsel for the respondent has however urged that clause 17 of the conditions of the contract clearly stipulated the entitlement of the contractor for an additional amount which ought in fairness be found payable by reason of the work being delayed through the no fault of the contractor. 12. The Learned Counsel for the respondent has however urged that clause 17 of the conditions of the contract clearly stipulated the entitlement of the contractor for an additional amount which ought in fairness be found payable by reason of the work being delayed through the no fault of the contractor. Further, it has been urged that the specifications and the special conditions of the contract made it clear that the entire amount demanded by the contractor and sanctioned by the Government for withdrawal of the escalation clause was quantified to Rs. 50,000/- and the contractor had offered a rebate for accepting his tender before 17-7-1973. 13. In the aforesaid special conditions of the contract it was also clarified in condition No. 4.7 that the contractor had agreed to withdraw the escalation clause for an extra lump sum payment of Rs. 50,000/- only in view of the aforesaid fact. 14. The special condition No. 4.11(b) also provided for the award of bonus for early completion at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per day of early completion with an outer limit of Rs. 50,000/- . All this clearly indicated it is urged, that in view of the non-fulfilment of the conditions on the part of the appellant to ensure to the time schedule of payment etc., the concession given by the contractor for not taking the advantage of the escalation ceased to be operative on account of the own conduct of the appellant. 15. It may be noticed that according to the terms and conditions of the contract, the work had to start on 15-12-1973 and was to be completed by 14-4-1976. The construction of the bridge, however, could be completed on or about 8-9-1981. The work consisted of ten spans of 154 feet each and two spans of 50 feet each. Spans were to rest on eleven R.C.C. piers to be supported on well foundations and two R.C.C. abutments to be supported on open foundations. The contractor was to build piers on wells which were to be completed by the appellant in M.A. No. 155/83. 16. The said appellant had failed in completing the well foundations within the stipulated time and these foundations remained incomplete even upto 14-4-1976 by which date the whole contract was to be fulfilled. The contractor was to build piers on wells which were to be completed by the appellant in M.A. No. 155/83. 16. The said appellant had failed in completing the well foundations within the stipulated time and these foundations remained incomplete even upto 14-4-1976 by which date the whole contract was to be fulfilled. The appellant in M.A. No. 155/1983, who had to build the well foundations, failed to do so within the time, with the result that the contract, the appellant in M.A. No. 142/1983, could not perform his part of the work over the well foundations. The delay in completion of the contract and the loss of bonus etc., and the other damages had resulted; according to the contractor on account of the failure of the appellants in M.A. No. 155/1983 to perform their part whereafter alone, the contractor could proceed and complete the work. The delay in the completion of the work by the aforesaid appellant had put the contractor to direct and indirect losses for no fault of his. The umpire had awarded an amount of Rs. 1,68,500/- to the contractor for the claim for compensation and loss suffered subsequent to 16-6-1977. 17. The learned District Judge, taking into consideration the own case of the contractor and his admissions contained in his letter dated 28-4-1977, had come to the conclusion in the impugned judgment that the contractor could not be held entitled to any amount over and above Rs. 1,00,000/- as damages and had reduced the award from Rs. 1,68,500/- to Rs. 1,00,000/- only. 18. It may be noticed that in his aforesaid letter dated 28-4-1977, the contractor had in unequivocal terms confined his claim for compensation for loss for the period after 16-6-1977 to an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- only. 19. The learned District Judge being of the view that the categorical and clear cut admission of the contractor himself was more than sufficient to reduce the award of Rs. 1,68,500/- to Rs. 1,00,000/- and it amounted to an error apparent on the face of the award passed by the umpire. It was also noticed that the award of the umpire on item No. "e" was to the effect that "claim for compensation of loss due to rise in prices for period after 16th June, 1977... Rs. 1,00,000/- I award Rs. 1,68,500/- only to the claimants." 20. It was also noticed that the award of the umpire on item No. "e" was to the effect that "claim for compensation of loss due to rise in prices for period after 16th June, 1977... Rs. 1,00,000/- I award Rs. 1,68,500/- only to the claimants." 20. From the aforesaid, the learned District Judge inferred that the umpire had traversed beyond the reference so far as the award of Rs. 68,500/- was concerned as it was clearly without jurisdiction. It was also found that the amount of Rs. 68,500/- was severable from the rest and there could be no impediment in reducing that amount. 21. As pointed out by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. vs. Eastern Engineering Enterprises and another, reported in AIR 1999 SCW 3644 , it is settled law that the Arbitrator is the creature of the contract between the parties and hence if he ignores the specific terms of the contract, it would be a question of jurisdictional error which could be corrected by the Court and for that limited purpose agreement is required to be considered. For deciding whether the Arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction, reference to the terms of the contract is a must. 22. In the present case, the arbitration clause is also very widely worded. Therefore, reference of the dispute to the Arbitrator cannot be termed as without jurisdiction. Still, the question would be whether the Arbitrator had the authority or jurisdiction to grant damages or compensation in teeth of stipulation in regard to the withdrawal of the escalation clause for an extra lump-sum payment of Rs. 50,000/- only and that too subject to the conditions as indicated in paragraph 1 of the special conditions of contract. The stipulation contained in condition No. 17 of the contract clearly envisaged within its ambit the award of additional amount which in fairness was found justified in addition to the amount of contract by reasons of the work delayed through no fault of the contractor. The conditions of the contract and the special conditions of the contract had to be read together. 23. The conditions of the contract and the special conditions of the contract had to be read together. 23. The submission of the Learned Counsel for the appellant that the Arbitrator had no authority or jurisdiction to grant damages or compensation in teeth of stipulation providing that no escalation would be granted is totally misconceived not only because the withdrawal of the escalation clause in the present case was conditional but also in view of the fact that the contractor's entitlement for an additional amount for the reason of the work being delayed through none of his fault was clearly provided and envisaged under condition No. 17 of the contract. 24. An award may be remitted or set aside or modified on account of any error apparent on the face of the award. Such result may also follow in case it is established that the Arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Court can look into the arbitration clause but in the former it cannot unless the agreement was incorporated or recited in the award. This position in law stands amply clarified by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth vs. Chintamanrao Balaji, reported in AIR 1965 SC 214 . 25. In the present case, what we find is that the award in respect of the claim for compensation of loss suffered during the period after 16th June, 1977, which was covered within the dispute referred for arbitration, was considered by not only the Arbitrator but the Umpire also. In this case, the two Arbitrators had not given unanimous award. In view of the difference, the matter had been referred to the Umpire. 26. One of the Arbitrators Shri M.P. Apte had held that the contractor was entitled to compensation, for which an amount of Rs. 2,30,000/- had been awarded. The other Arbitrator however on this count gave an award of Rs. 50,000/- only. The Umpire however had awarded an amount of Rs. 1,68,500/, which was reduced by the learned District Judge to an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- . 27. The Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. (supra) had clearly pointed out that it was not open to the Court to speculate where no reasons are given by the Arbitrator as to what impelled the Arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. 1,00,000/- . 27. The Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. (supra) had clearly pointed out that it was not open to the Court to speculate where no reasons are given by the Arbitrator as to what impelled the Arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. It was further not open to the Court to admit to probe the mental process by which the Arbitrator had reached his conclusion where it is not disclosed by the terms of the award. 28. The Apex Court had further pointed out that where the Arbitrator had committed a mere error of fact or law in reaching his conclusion on the disputed question submitted for his adjudication, the Court cannot interfere. It was pointed out that in case of non-speaking award, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited and the award can be set aside if the Arbitrator acts beyond his jurisdiction and for this purpose in order to find out whether the Arbitrator has travelled beyond his jurisdiction, it would be necessary to consider the agreement between the parties containing the arbitration clause. The Apex Court had amply clarified the position in law that the Arbitrator acting beyond his jurisdiction is a different ground from the error apparent on the face of the award. It was also indicated that in order to determine whether Arbitrator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction, it has to be seen as to whether the claimant could raise a particular claim before the Arbitrator and if there is a specific term in the contract or the law which does not permit or give the Arbitrator the power to decide the dispute raised by the claimant or there is a specific bar in the contract to the raising of the particular claim, then the award passed by the Arbitrator in respect thereof would be in excess of jurisdiction. 29. An award made by the Arbitrator disregarding the terms of the reference or the arbitration agreement or the terms of the contract would be taken to suffer from a jurisdictional error which is required ultimately to be decided by the Court. 29. An award made by the Arbitrator disregarding the terms of the reference or the arbitration agreement or the terms of the contract would be taken to suffer from a jurisdictional error which is required ultimately to be decided by the Court. The Arbitrator could not award an amount which stood ruled out or prohibited by the terms of the agreement as in view of any such specific bar stipulated by the parties in the agreement, any claim in that regard could not be raised and even if raised and referred to arbitration because of wider arbitration clause, such claim amount could not be awarded as agreement is binding between the parties and the Arbitrator has to adjudicate as per the agreement. 30. In the present case, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances as brought on record and the conditions of the contract and the agreement between the parties, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned award so far as the amount of damages in question is concerned cannot be held to be vitiated as urged by the Learned Counsel for the appellant in view of any such bar or prohibition which may render the award of Rs. 1,00,000/- as upheld by the learned District Judge to be without jurisdiction. It may further be noticed in this connection that the aforesaid amount in essence is not on account of any escalation but denotes the damages/loss suffered by the contractor, the award of additional amount for which, was clearly stipulated in the specific condition contained in paragraph 17 of the contract. 31. The contention to the effect that the contractor was not entitled to any damages whatsoever in the absence of any escalation clause is totally misconceived and baseless. In fact, in the circumstances, taking into consideration not only the provision made in clause 17 of the contract but also the provision made in the special conditions of the contract, to which a reference has already been made hereinabove, the concession of the contractor for not availing the benefit of escalation clause had to be treated to be ceased to be operative. 32. However, since the contractor himself had quantified the damages to a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- only, it was not open to the Arbitrator or the Umpire to go beyond that to award any sum over and above the said quantified figure. 32. However, since the contractor himself had quantified the damages to a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- only, it was not open to the Arbitrator or the Umpire to go beyond that to award any sum over and above the said quantified figure. The learned District Judge cannot therefore be taken to have erred in reducing the amount from Rs. 1,68,500/- to Rs. 1,00,000/- only. 33. We have carefully perused the record as well the impugned judgment passed by the learned District Judge and are of the considered opinion that the contentions referred to hereinabove are not liable to be accepted and no justifiable ground can be said to have been made out for any interference as sought for in M.A. No. 155/83. 34. Learned Counsel for the appellant in Misc. Appeal No. 142/83 has strenuously urged that the learned District Judge under the impugned order has erred in law in awarding an interest at the rate of 6% per annum only from the date of decree till the amount is paid or deposited in the Court, even though the Arbitrator had found it proper and appropriate to award the interest at the rate of 9% per annum. 35. The award however indicates that the interest at the rate of 9% per annum had been awarded for the period elapsing between the date of the award and the date of the decree or the date of payment whichever was earlier. 36. The appellant in this appeal has confined his claim for the enhancement of the rate of interest from the date of decree to the date of deposit or realisation to 9% per annum only. It has been urged that while fixing the rate of interest the learned District Judge had omitted to take into account the proviso to section 34(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, which is to the following effect: "Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six percent per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions." The aforesaid proviso had been inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 and had come into effect from 1-7-1977. 37. 37. So far as the rate of interest is concerned, it cannot be lost sight of that what is just and fair in the circumstances of each case cannot be laid down with any precision. The interest is paid to indemnify a person and it should normally be an equivalent or substitute of equal values. Payment of interest however has to be just. 38. In the present case, the Arbitrator had found the payment of interest at the rate of 9% per annum to be just for the period elapsing between the date of the award and the date of the decree or date of payment whichever was earlier on all the amounts awarded in disputes "a to f" as mentioned in the award dated 14-10-1981. The learned District Judge had directed under the impugned order for the payment of the interest to the contractor on the principal amount of disputed items No. "a, c, d and e" amount to Rs. 3,44,350/- from the date of decree till the amount is paid or deposited in the Court at the rate of Rs. 6% per annum. 39. In the aforesaid connection, it may be noticed that the Hon. Supreme Court in its decision in the case of State of Orissa vs. B.N. Agarwala, reported in AIR 1997 SC 925 , after taking notice of its earlier decisions in regard to the competency of the Arbitrator to award interest for pre-arbitration period, period relating to the pendency of the arbitration proceedings and the post arbitration period upto the date of realisation or upto the date of passing the decree, had held that the Arbitrator was competent to award interest for all the above three periods after the advent of the Interest Act, 1978. In paragraph 38 of its decision, the Apex Court had clarified that under section 29 of the Arbitration Act the Court even though the Arbitrator had awarded interest from the date of the award till the date of payment, disallow interest from the date of decree or determine a different rate at which the interest is to be paid or confirm the grant of interest as awarded in the award. 40. In the aforesaid view of the matter, it is obvious that the Court is competent to either modify the interest awarded by the Arbitrator or confirm the interest part. 41. 40. In the aforesaid view of the matter, it is obvious that the Court is competent to either modify the interest awarded by the Arbitrator or confirm the interest part. 41. The provisions contained in section 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 clearly stipulate that where and insofar as award is for the payment of the money the Court may in the decree order interest, from the date of the decree at such rate as the Court deems reasonable, to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree. 42. It may be noticed that in the present case the terms of agreement did not prohibit the claim of interest. 43. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, in the aforesaid view of the matter, while awarding the interest, specially taking into consideration that the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction and the proviso to section 34(1) of the Civil Procedure Code stood clearly attracted, we are of the considered opinion that the learned District Judge had erred in awarding an interest at the rate of 6% per annum only. Considering the circumstances, it deserves to be increased from 6% to 9% per annum. 44. No other point has been urged or pressed in either of the appeals. 45. In view of our conclusions indicated hereinabove, the Misc. Appeal No. 155/1983 deserves to be and is hereby dismissed but the Misc. Appeal No. 142/1983 succeeds in part providing that the figure of 6% per annum as the rate of interest as indicated by the learned District Judge in paragraph 60 of the impugned judgment/order shall stand substituted by the figure of 9% per annum and the decree shall be modified accordingly. In other respects, however, the impugned order and decree shall stand affirmed. 46. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed