Judgment :- C.R.P.No.1719 of 1996 is directed against the order dated 3. 1994 made in P.No.140 of 1992 by the Revenue Court, Kumbakonam, thereby dismissing the petition filed by the landlord under Sec.3 (4)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 (Tamil Nadu Act XXV of 1955), petition praying for eviction of the tenant. 2. C.R.P.No.1614 of 1996 is directed against the order dated 12. 1995 made in P.No.23 of 1994 by the Revenue Court, Kumbakonam, thereby ordering that the arrears up to fasli 1399 is barred by limitation, further opining that eviction petition could be filed only for three fasli years of arrears by the landlord. 3. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both the above revisions, would contend that in both the above revisions, the petitioners are the landlords, but parties and the properties and the very subject matter are different; that the respondents in both the revisions are the cultivating tenants; that since the tenant defaulted in payment of arrears of rent, as provided by The Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 (Tamil Nadu Act XXV of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), the landlord in C.R.P.No.1719 of 1996 has initiated eviction proceedings under the said Act; that he failed in the eviction petition, before the lower authority and hence, he filed the above civil revision petition. 4. The learned counsel would further contend that several moratoriums were granted by the legislations and the tenant concerned with the above C.R.P.No.1719 of 1996 has availed the benefits of those moratoriums ordered by the Government. But, when he was directed to pay the arrears, he did not comply with and, therefore, the landlord has filed the eviction petition against him; that in the said eviction petition, order has been passed by the Revenue Officer stating that in view of the earlier proceeding under Act 38 of 1990, the Moratorium Act provides that the current rent and ¼th of the previous arrears, if deposited by the tenant, it is deemed that he has paid the entire arrears and that the tenant availed that benefit of law. 5. 5. Thelearned counsel would further point out that the lower authority has not followed the procedures laid down by law; that no opportunity has been afforded to exhaust the remedies and a blunt order has been passed citing an earlier proceeding; that the earlier proceeding was under the Moratorium Act; that the tenant availed the benefit of law, but he has not complied with the order, which directed him to pay arrears within 10 days. Hence, the landlord filed the subsequent petition for eviction and the same has been dismissed. The lower authority, having admitted that an order has been passed in an earlier petition filed by the landlord and further opining that the said application had been filed prior to the advent of the Act 38 of 1990, and the present petition has been filed subsequent to the said Act which should have been filed under the Act 38 of 1990, dismissed the eviction petition filed by the landlord. It is only aggrieved against the said order passed by the Revenue Court, Kumbakonam, the landlord has come forward to file this revision petition. 6. It is only aggrieved against the said order passed by the Revenue Court, Kumbakonam, the landlord has come forward to file this revision petition. 6. In so far as C.R.P.No.1614 of 1996 is concerned, the learned counsel would contend that in this case, the tenant did not avail the opportunity of the moratorium; that the landlord filed eviction petition claiming arrears for a period of six years; that the Revenue Court said that arrears can be claimed only for three years; that it is not a petition for arrears, but for eviction; that the period of default is not calculated in terms of limitation in so far filing a petition to prove default; that further in all these proceedings there was moratorium; that several Acts from 1976, have come into being granting moratorium from the payment of arrears of lease rent, in other words preventing the landlord from going to the court for orders on ground of arrears of rent; that the statute prevented the landlord from claiming the arrears in exercise of his right, but the period cannot be restricted; that Sec.6 of the Act 38 of 1990 recites as follows: “Bar of proceedings for eviction or recovery of arrears of rent: (1) No application shall be made for the eviction for non-payment of the current rent or any arrears of rent for any fasli year in the said years, and no suit shall be filed for the recovery of such current rent or arrears of rent, .(i) against any cultivating tenant till the 31st day of March, 1991; and .(ii) against the cultivating tenant in favour of whom further time has been granted by the Court or the competent authority under Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.5, until the expiry of such time. (2) Subject to the provisions of Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.5, all applications for the eviction of cultivating tenant for non-payment of current rent or the arrears of rent referred to in Sub-sec.(1) and all suits, proceedings in execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings pending before a court or competent authority for the recovery of any such current rent or arrears of rent, or for such eviction, shall stand stayed, .(a) till the 31st day of March, 1991; and .(b) till the expiry of further time granted by the court or the competent authority under Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.5. .(3) All applications and all suits and proceedings stayed under this section, shall after the expiration of the time limit specified therein be proceeded with against any cultivating tenant who has not paid or deposited under this Act the current rent and the one-fourth of the arrears of rent within the said time limit specified in Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.5, subject to the provisions of any law which may be then in force, from the stage which had been reached when the application, suit or proceeding was stayed.“ 7. The learned counsel would also cite from para 18 of the petition, wherein it is alleged that one Pavadai Padayachi died leaving behind the respondents as his legal heirs and the respondents are in possession and enjoyment of the petition mentioned lands on the same terms and conditions; that in spite of repeated demands, the respondents are in default in payment of rent without sufficient reasons; that for the arrears from 1392 to 1394, a suit in O.S.No.259 of 1996 has been filed on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Kumbakonam, and the same is pending. The default of the respondents as stated above is nothing but wilful; that the respondents have not even paid the said arrears as contemplated by the Act 60 of 1986 and hence, they render themselves liable for eviction. Ultimately, the learned counsel would pray that both the above revision petitions have to be remanded for reconsideration in the context of the position of law. 8. A cursory glance of the orders passed by the authority, below would not only prove to be blunt, but also meaningless in the sense that neither the procedures established by law have been complied with therein regarding the subject matters in hand, nor the authority had given sufficient and reasonable opportunity for parties to be heard in compliance of the principles of natural justice. Nor does the authority below seem to have dealt with the subject matter in the manner required by law. 9. Petition No.140 of 1992 is one filed by the landlord under Sec.3(4)(a) of the Act specifically praying for eviction of the tenant. But the authority below has never dealt with this subject of eviction of the tenant as sought for by the landlord in the said petition at all. 9. Petition No.140 of 1992 is one filed by the landlord under Sec.3(4)(a) of the Act specifically praying for eviction of the tenant. But the authority below has never dealt with this subject of eviction of the tenant as sought for by the landlord in the said petition at all. Having discussed something regarding the arrears of rent pertaining to the landlords in question and having uttered some other which are unconnected to the relief sought for, but citing a previous order passed regarding arrears of rent and remarking that an application should have been filed under Act 38 of 1990 had bluntly dismissed the application. Secondly the petition is one which has been filed under Sec.3(4)(a) of the Act under which the landlord is entitled to initiate eviction proceedings under the said Act and the petitioner being a landlord has rightly filed the application under the said provision of law before the lower authority. But the authority below without following the procedures contemplated therein in order to arrive at the decision whether to evict the tenant or not, has cited an earlier petition pending in P.No.592 of 1992 and remarking that the jurisdiction is seized under Act 38 of 1990 has concluded that no order could be passed in the petition filed by the petitioner, further advising that an application should be filed under Act 38 of 1990 which is totally erroneous and unacceptable. 10. The petition has been closed in spite of the relevant Sec.6 of the Act 38 of 1990 which contemplates that the bar of proceedings for eviction or recovery of arrears of rent from a cultivating tenant only for a specific period i.e., till 31st March, 1991, has been stayed by the said Act and it has nothing to do with a regular application made under Sec.3(4)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, which is supposed to lie till the moratorium period is over and there is no bar to take up the matter after the expiry of the moratorium period and to be dealt with in accordance with law’. Hence, it is totally false on the part of the lower authority to have alleged that only an application under Act 38 of 1990 would lie and not under Sec.3(4)(a) of the Act. 11. Hence, it is totally false on the part of the lower authority to have alleged that only an application under Act 38 of 1990 would lie and not under Sec.3(4)(a) of the Act. 11. Above all, the grievance of the petitioners and the respondents as well pertaining to the orders passed by the authority below is unequivocal that they have not been afforded with adequate and reasonable opportunities to be heard so as to put forth their case well and to exhaust their remedies before the authority in which event much of the confusion caused in the order could have been averted being a fundamental and basic right of the parties for ages together and came to be recognised as one of the high principles of natural justice embodied in the constitution also. The lower authority from the very orders made has shown that he has not bothered about giving such opportunities for parties to make use of and let in evidence, both oral and documentary. There is not even an indication that some opportunity has been afforded to and simply the lower authority has passed his orders on the face value of the pleadings and the other available materials and without hearing the parties and without having anything to appreciate in evidence and hence the approach of the lower authority in so far as not affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity for parties to be heard, the orders passed by him is not only arbitrary, but also perverse in approach. 12. Moreover, the authority below has also granted the relief ordering to pay arrears of lease rent only for three years immediately preceding the filing of the petition remarking thereby that over and above the period of three years, the petitions are barred by limitation and hence he could pass orders only for three years. This stand taken by the lower authority has neither been based on any statutory provisions of law, nor on any other sound legal principle and only as a result of illusion, this limitation has been adopted by the lower authority and at this score also, the lower courts order becomes liable to be set aside. 13. No doubt, the above orders made by the Revenue Court, Kumbakonam, suffers from patent errors and perversity in approach thereby calling interference by this Court and hence the following order has to be necessarily made. 14. 13. No doubt, the above orders made by the Revenue Court, Kumbakonam, suffers from patent errors and perversity in approach thereby calling interference by this Court and hence the following order has to be necessarily made. 14. In result, both the above civil revision petitions are allowed. The order passed in P.No.140 of 1992 dated 3. 1994 and the other order passed in P.No.23 of 1994 dated 12. 1995 by the Revenue Court, Kumbakonam, are set aside and both the above matters which are concerned with the above Civil Revision Petition Nos.1719 and 1614 of 1996 are remanded to the lower authority for passing orders in full compliance of the rules and procedures and with due opportunity for both parties to be heard and the matters are to be decided in accordance with law on merits, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this orders. No costs.