Ponnayee and Others v. Perumayee and Others — 1999 DIGILAW 975 (MAD)

Judgment :- The Judgment was delivered by : These second appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment, as both these appeals would arise out of the common judgments rendered by both the trial Court and lower appellate Court in two suits in which the parties are the same. 2. Ponnayee, the plaintiff in O.S. No. 322 of 1982 on the file of District Munsif, Tiruchengode and the third defendant in O.S. No. 743 of 1982 on the file of District Munsif, Tiruchengode is the appellant herein. 3. One Muthu Gounder filed a suit in O.S. No. 548 of 1979 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Sankari on 17-4-1979 for declaration of title to the suit properties and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the properties. The suit was re-numbered as O.S. No. 743 of 1982. Ponnayee, the third defendant in the said suit filed a separate suit in O.S. No. 942 of 1979 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Sankari on 20-7-1979 for specific performance and this suit was re-numbered as O.S. No. 322 of 1982. 4. The trial Court, as agreed by both the parties through a joint memo filed by their counsel, conducted a joint trial in both these suits and ordered the evidence recorded in O.S. No. 322 of 1982 to be treated as evidence of respective sides in O.S. No. 743 of 1982 also. During the course of joint trial in both the suits, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined on the side of the plaintiff in O.S. No. 322 of 1982 and on the side of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined. Exs.A1 to A3 were marked on the side of the plaintiff Ponnayee and Exs.B1 to B8 were marked on the side of Muthu Gounder, the first defendant. 5. On conclusion of trial, the trial Court held that Muthu Gounder, the plaintiff in O.S. No. 743 of 1982 is entitled to the relief of declaration of title to the suit properties, but would not be entitled to permanent injuries, as he is not in possession of the suit properties. It further held that the plaintiff in O.S. No. 322 of 1982 would be entitled to the relief of specific performance. 6. It further held that the plaintiff in O.S. No. 322 of 1982 would be entitled to the relief of specific performance. 6. Having aggrieved over the rejection of the relief of permanent injunction and decree against him for specific performance, the plaintiff in O.S. No. 743 of 1982 and the defendant in O.S. No. 322 of 1982 filed two separate appeals in A.S. Nos. 61 and 62 of 1985 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Sankari. 7. After hearing the counsel for the parties and on consideration of the records, the lower appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and allowed the appeals filed by the appellants. 8. Even during the pendency of the suits, the said Muthu Gounder died. Therefore, his legal representatives were brought on record as plaintiffs and defendants in respective suits. 9. As against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, these two second appeals have been filed before this Court by the appellant Ponnayee. 10. For the purpose of knowing the facts of the case, let us see the respective pleas put forward before the trial Court by the parties. 11. The case of the plaintiff Muthu Gounder in O.S. No. 743 of 1982 is this : "The suit properties belonged to one Ardhanari Gounder. He along with his major daughter Valli Ammal and minor daughter Ponnayee executed a registered sale deed in favour of Muthu Gounder on 10-8-1967. On the same date, he was put in possession of the properties and he was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the properties in his own right. The said Muthu Gounder on the same day executed a registered deed of reconveyance in favour of Ardhanari Gounder and his two daughters. According to the said document, the sale price for reconveyance shall be paid by Ardhanari Gounder and his children within five years. But, they did not make any attempt to comply with the conditions mentioned in the reconveyance deed. The time got expired on 9-8-1972. On 20-2-1979 there was a disturbance to his possession of the properties by Ardhanari Gounder and his men. When they offered to pay some amount and demanded the execution of the reconveyance deed, Muthu Gounder refused to comply with the said demand stating that the five years' period already got expired. The time got expired on 9-8-1972. On 20-2-1979 there was a disturbance to his possession of the properties by Ardhanari Gounder and his men. When they offered to pay some amount and demanded the execution of the reconveyance deed, Muthu Gounder refused to comply with the said demand stating that the five years' period already got expired. A notice was sent by Ardhanari Gounder to Muthu Gounder and the same was replied through Lawyer. Despite the receipt of the reply on 15-4-1979, Ardhanari Gounder and others came with weapons and attempted to trespass into the properties. This necessitated suit." 12. The case of the defendants 1 to 3 is this :- " Third defendant Ponnayee was a minor on the date of execution of the sale deed. The said Muthu Gounder was not put in possession of the suit properties on the date of alleged sale deed. As per the reconveyance agreement, the said Muthu Gounder agreed for re-sale of the properties to the third defendant for Rs. 5,000/-. After the execution of reconveyance agreement, the second defendant got married. In 1971 there was a panchayat. In the said panchayat, it was decided that the first defendant Ardhanari Gounder shall pay the sale price to the said Muthu Gounder and make arrangements for the execution of the sale deed in favour of the third defendant Ponnayee. The said Muthu Gounder also took part in the said panchayat. The first defendant selected a bridegroom for the third defendant, but the third defendant refused to give her consent to the marriage. Thereafter, the third defendant with the help of her uncle got married to someone. After she attained majority, the third defendant issued a notice on 6-7-1979 to Muthu Gounder asking him to execute the reconveyance deed in her favour, as she was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract." 13. These are the common pleadings mentioned in both the suits by respective parties. 14. The relief sought for by the plaintiff Muthu Gounder in O.S. No. 742 of 1982 is for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit properties. Ponnayee, the plaintiff in O.S. No. 322 of 1982 has sought for specific performance in respect of the suit properties. 15. 14. The relief sought for by the plaintiff Muthu Gounder in O.S. No. 742 of 1982 is for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit properties. Ponnayee, the plaintiff in O.S. No. 322 of 1982 has sought for specific performance in respect of the suit properties. 15. After consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court ultimately found that the contract of reconveyance dated 10-8-1967 is a true one and the claim of the plaintiff Ponnayee in O.S. No. 322 of 1982 is not barred by limitation and as such, she would be entitled to specific performance as prayed for. 16. However, the trial Court in O.S. No. 743 of 1982 held that the plaintiffs in that suit have title over the suit properties by virtue of the sale deed dated 10-8-1967, but dismissed the claim for the grant of permanent injunction on the ground that the plaintiffs therein have failed to establish their actual possession and enjoyment of the properties as well as the cause of action, attempted to trespass by the defendants in the suit properties. 17. In the appeals, the lower appellate Court by allowing the appeals decreed the suit in O.S. No. 743 of 1982 for permanent injunction and dismissed the suit in O.S. No. 322 of 1982 seeking for specific performance on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. Hence, these second appeals. 18. Though these two second appeals have been filed against both the findings relating to the entitlement of permanent injunction and maintainability of the suit under the Limitation Act, this Court at the time of admission, formulated only one substantial question of law in both these appeals and the same is as follows :- "Was not the lower appellate Court in error in holding that Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act are applied to the facts and circumstances of the case?" 19. In view of the above single substantial question of law, the learned Counsel for the appellants in both these appeals would not concentrate much in attacking the finding in respect of the relief of permanent injunction granted by the lower appellate Court. 20. In view of the above single substantial question of law, the learned Counsel for the appellants in both these appeals would not concentrate much in attacking the finding in respect of the relief of permanent injunction granted by the lower appellate Court. 20. Moreover, the lower appellate Court in paragraph 5 of its judgment would discuss the materials such as Ex.B1, the title deed, Ex.B3, the notice issued by the defendant to Muthu Gounder and Exs.B5 to B8, kist receipts and found that the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 743 of 1982 are in possession of the suit properties and consequently, granted the relief of permanent injunction. 21. In view of the factual finding with reference to the possession and enjoyment of the suit properties by the plaintiffs' family, the learned Counsel for the appellant, that is, the third defendant in O.S. No. 743 of 1982 correctly did not choose to challenge the said finding passed against his clients, the defendants in the second appeal. 22. However, he would vehemently contend that the learned first appellate Judge ought not to have held that the suit was not filed within the period of limitation, as it is against the true interpretation of Sections 6 and 7 of the LImitation Act. The gist of his submission could be summarised as follows :- "On 10-8-1967 Ardhanari Gounder and his daughters Valliammal and Ponnayee received Rs. 5,000/- from Muthu Gounder and executed a sale deed in his favour. On the same day, a separate registered agreement for re-sale of the properties to the vendors was executed by the said Muthu Gounder as per Exh.A1 and B2. Muthu Gounder also received Rs. 10/- as part of the sale amount. It was agreed for re-sale of the suit properties by Muthu Gounder within five years on tendering Rs. 4,990/-. At that time, the plaintiff was a minor. Her sister Valliammal got married after the execution of sale deed. There was a dispute in the family. In a panchayat held in 1971, father Ardhanari Gounder agreed to pay the sale amount to Muthu Gounder and to arrange to execute the sale deed in favour of Ponnayee, the appellant herein as her share. Even at that time, she was a minor. There was a dispute in the family. In a panchayat held in 1971, father Ardhanari Gounder agreed to pay the sale amount to Muthu Gounder and to arrange to execute the sale deed in favour of Ponnayee, the appellant herein as her share. Even at that time, she was a minor. Only on attaining majority, she issued Ex.A2 notice dated 6-7-1979 to Muthu Gounder stating that she was ready and willing to pay the balance amount and asking him to execute reconveyance deed. But, it was refused on the ground that the reconveyance agreement expired on 9-8-1972 itself. Since Ponnayee, the appellant herein suffered disability, as she was a minor during the stipulated period mentioned in the contract, she filed the suit to enforce the contract only after she attained majority and her disability has ceased. Section 6 of the Limitation Act confers on persons, who are entitled to property and who are incapacitated from suing out their rights in Court, the right to file suit within a reasonable period after the incapacity has disappeared. The omission by the father and elder sister to file a suit would not be a bar to the suit filed by the plaintiff, the appellant Ponnayee within three years of her ceasing to be a minor, as, in this case, both the father and sister did not take interest in the welfare of the appellant. The reading of Sections 6 and 7 would show that the father and sister, who were not the persons managing joint family, cannot discharge the appellant without her concurrence and therefore, the time will not run as against the appellant and consequently, the suit filed by the appellant herein is maintainable, since she filed the suit within three years as per Section 8 of the Act after the disability had ceased." 23. With regard to the above legal position, the learned counsel cited the following authorities:- (1) Kolandavel Gounder v. Chinnappan, (1965) 78 Mad LW 32 : 1965 AIR(Mad) 541); (2) Minor Krishna Raju v. Ayyappa Chettiar, (1955) 2 Mad LJ 456; (3) Linga Reddy v. Ramachandrappa, 1971 AIR(Mysore) 194; (4) Subbarao v. Pattabhiramayya, 1945 AIR(Mad) 498; (5) Nidhi Padhan v. Bhainra Khadia, 1963 AIR(Orissa) 133; (6) Sushila Devi v. Prem Kumar, 1981 AIR(All) 83; (7) Kunhi Kannan v. Vazhayil Devaki, 1939 AIR(Mad) 907. 24. 24. Arguing contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/the defendant, in support of the finding of the lower appellate Court that the suit was barred by limitation, would make the following submission :- "The materials available on record that the first defendant Ardhanari Gounder executed the sale deed in favour of Muthu Gounder only as a guardian for the appellant. Though in her written statement in the connected suit and the deposition, the plaintiff would say that there was a dispute and consequently, there was a panchayat for setting the dispute among the family members, it was not clearly established that the said Ardhanari Gounder ceased to be the guardian of the appellant herein. Furthermore, the first notice Ex. B-3 dated 29-3-1979 would show that all the defendants were living together and it was stated, therein that he ceased to be Kartha of the family or guardian of the appellant. So, in the absence of any evidence to show that the first defendant Ardhanari Gounder ceased to be Kartha or guardian, it shall be held that the suit must have been filed by the father on behalf of the minor daughter also within time and failure of filing the suit within the said period. Section 7 of the Limitation Act would certainly attract, as the period of time will run not only against the persons concerned, but also as against others, who suffered with the disability. 25. He would also cite some authorities, which are as follows :- (1) Ponnamma v. Padmanabhan, 1969 AIR(Ker) 163 (FB); (2) Sarda Prasad v. Jumna Prasad, Mangalam Pillai v. C. S. Appavoo Udayar, (1976) 89 Mad LW 272 : 1976 AIR(Mad) 360); (4) Kandasami Naicken v. Irusappa Naicken, (1917) 33 Mad LJ 309 : 1918 AIR(Mad) 724); (5) Har Pratap Singh v. Satya Narain Misra, 1980 AIR(All) 52. 26. In the light of the rival contentions, let us now go into the question as to whether the finding rendered by the lower appellate Court holding that the suit was barred by limitation filed by the plaintiff, the appellant herein, on the basis of the substantial question of law formulated by this Court indicated above (sic). 27. It is not disputed that Muthu Gounder, the first defendant purchased the suit properties from Ardhanari Gounder and his two daughters on 10-8-1967 by virtue of the sale deed Ex. B-1. 27. It is not disputed that Muthu Gounder, the first defendant purchased the suit properties from Ardhanari Gounder and his two daughters on 10-8-1967 by virtue of the sale deed Ex. B-1. It is also not disputed that reconveyance deed was executed by him in favour of Ardhanari Gounder and others on the same day under Ex. B-2. The reading of Ex. B-2 would categorically show that Muthu Gounder agreed for the re-sale of the properties in favour of Ardhanari Gounder and two others within five years from the date of the deed after receipt of the balance sale consideration of Rs. 4,990/- and failure to make payment of the balance consideration within the stipulated period of five years would make the agreement deed invalid. The relevant portion is as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted-Ed.) 27. Thus, it is clear that the stipulated period is five years and the date of expiry is 9-8-1972. Admittedly, the suit in O.S. No. 942 of 1979, renumbered as O.S. No. 322 of 1982 was filed by the appellant Ponnayee for specific performance only on 20-7-1979, that is, long after the period of stipulated five years. The reason for the delay, according to the appellant, is that she was a minor and that therefore, she waited till she attains majority and after her disability had ceased, she filed suit within three years, namely, period of limitation, as contemplated under Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act. 27-B. The arguments advanced on this point cannot be accepted for the following two reasons. 28. Section 6 of the Act provides as follows :- "6. Legal disability.- (1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ." 29. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ." 29. Under this section, a person who is entitled to institute a suit may file the suit within the prescribed period and if that person happens to be a minor he could file the said suit after his disability has ceased, that, is after attaining majority and the prescribed period is to be reckoned from the date on which he attained majority. 30. Section 7 would provide thus :- "Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased." 31. The reading of this section also would make it clear that a person could file a suit after the disability had ceased in the cases where one or several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit and where the discharge cannot be given without concurrence of such person who suffered the disability. 32. Section 8 would make it clear that the suit has to be filed within three years from the cessation of the disability. 33. Thus, it is clear that a person after cessation of his disability, that is, after attaining majority could file a suit within three years and the said suit cannot be said to be barred by limitation. 34. At this juncture, it would be useful to refer various decisions rendered by the High Courts and the Apex Court, cited by the counsel for both the parties dealing with Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. Let us see one by one. 35. 34. At this juncture, it would be useful to refer various decisions rendered by the High Courts and the Apex Court, cited by the counsel for both the parties dealing with Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. Let us see one by one. 35. In 1980 AIR(All) 52 (supra), it is held as follows :- "Where the Karta had sold with a condition for reconveyance, the only joint family property, a house, but had continued to reside as a tenant therein and it was he against whom the suit for arrears of rent was filed and the Karta failed to file the suit within limitation for enforcement of clause for reconveyance, all other members of the family, including the minors, would be debarred from filing the suit for reconveyance as the limitation, in such a case, would be deemed to have started running against all the members from the date of sale." 36. In the Apex Court, in case where the Karta of a joint family did not file an application for execution of a decree within limitation, would hold that the minor members of the family were debarred from executing the decree when they attained majority. The observation is as follows (Para 8) :- "Under the Hindu Law the Karta of a Hindu joint family represents all the members of the family and has the power and duty to take action which binds the family in connection with all matters of management of the family property. Clearly, therefore, when in respect of a transaction of property possession has to be received by the several members of the family, it is the Karta's duty and power to take possession on behalf of the entire family, including himself, the members of the family who are sui juris as well as those who are not." 37. In Natarajan v. Karumana Gounder, (1963) 1 Mad LJ 81 : 76 Mad LW 199, where it was found on the facts that the father was no longer the managing member and the next senior adult member was in fact in management, it was held that the failure of such next senior adult member to set aside the alienation within three years of his attaining majority operated as a bar against the other junior members of the family. The entire case law on the subject has been reviewed therein. 38. The entire case law on the subject has been reviewed therein. 38. In Doraiswami Serumadan v. Nondisami Saluvan, 1915 (38) ILR(Mad) 118 : 1915 AIR(Mad) 1201) (FB), it was held that under Sections 7 and 8 and Article 44 of the Limitation Act, (XV of 1877) a suit brought by two brothers of an undivided Hindu family to set aside an alienation by their father more than three years after the elder of the two sons became a major, was barred by limitation not only as regards the elder brother's share but also in respect of the younger brother's, even though the younger brother had attained majority within three years prior to the institution of the suit. 39. In (1965) 78 Mad LW 32 : (1965) 1 Mad LJ 326 : 1965 AIR(Mad) 541) (supra), it is held thus (Para 7 of AIR) :- "The present case is a case, where the youngest of the sons whose minority could be relied upon, has in fact, released his interest in favour of the alienees. The two plaintiffs who have filed the suit became majors more than three years prior to the suit, and on a reading of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act, together, there is no room for doubt that the suit is barred by limitation." 40. In 1969 AIR(Ker) 163 (FB) (supra), it is observed as follows (Para 7) :- " Section 7 is really an appendix to Section 6. A harmonious construction of the two sections would require the view that in both sections the period of limitation is only extended. Section 7 is only an application of the principle in Section 6 to a joint right inhering in a group of persons, some or all of whom are under the disability. It is the existence of a person in the group with a capacity to give a discharge without the concurrence of the others, which makes time run as against all in the group. The disability of the other persons in the group does not prevent the running of time, and it is not the cessation of the disability of one in the group, but the attainment by him of the capacity to give a discharge without the concurrence of the others that makes time run as against all. The disability of the other persons in the group does not prevent the running of time, and it is not the cessation of the disability of one in the group, but the attainment by him of the capacity to give a discharge without the concurrence of the others that makes time run as against all. This would show that even on the literal construction of Section 7, time would run even if one or more persons in the group are under disability. That this is the proper way to look at Section 7 is made clear by Section 8." 41. In 1939 AIR(Mad) 907 (supra), it is held thus :- " Section 7 is a disabling Section. Section 6 confers on persons who are entitled to property or interests in property and who are incapacitated from suing out their rights in Court, the right to file suits within a reasonable period after the incapacity has disappeared. Section 7 so far as it takes away that right must be strictly construed and before dismissing the suit of a minor which is in time within the meaning of Section 6 the Court should be quite certain that the disabling provisions of Section 7 apply to his case." 42. In 1981 AIR(All) 83 (supra), it is observed as follows (para 3) :- " The settled view is that Section 7 operates only if the other persons by whose act the plaintiff is said to be bound was in a position to give a valid discharge on behalf of the plaintiff. In cases like the present the elder brother's omission to file a suit within three years of his ceasing to be a minor would bar a subsequent suit by the younger brother after his own minority only if the elder brother had been a Karta of the family and should be treated as representing the younger brother." 43. In 1963 AIR(Orissa) 133 (supra), it is held as follows (Para 9) :- "There can be no presumption that the elder brother is the manager of the family on attainment of majority. Whether a person is the Karta of the family or not is a pure question of fact." 44. In 1963 AIR(Orissa) 133 (supra), it is held as follows (Para 9) :- "There can be no presumption that the elder brother is the manager of the family on attainment of majority. Whether a person is the Karta of the family or not is a pure question of fact." 44. In 1945 AIR(Mad) 498 (supra), it is observed thus :- " A suit by the younger of two brothers constituting a joint Hindu family filed within three years of his attaining majority would be barred by limitation if the elder brother had failed to sue within three years of his majority, and was a manager of the family. But Section 7 would not operate as a bar to the suit by the younger brother if the elder brother was not the manager of the family during the relevant period." 45. The ratio decided in the above cases is clear which is as follows :- " Section 7 of the Limitation Act clearly governs the case of a person jointly entitled to institute a suit. According to the section, if any one of such persons is under the disability and none of the other persons could give a discharge without the concurrence of the person under disability, the time will run as against any of them, until the disability of the said person has ceased or any one of them becomes capable of giving a discharge. If the position is that any one of such persons is capable of giving a discharge, then time will run against them all." 46. Bearing in mind the above principles, let us now go into the facts of the case on hand. 47. In the present case, the plea of the plaintiff, the appellant herein, is that she was a minor and that after she attained majority, within three years she filed the suit. The first thing to be seen in the present case is whether this plea has been established so as to invoke Sections 6 to 8 of the Limitation Act. 48. As stated earlier, the five years' period was the essence of contract under Ex. B-2, the agreement for re-sale. The date of execution is 10-8-1967 and the date of expiry is 9-8-1972. The case of the plaintiff is that both on the date of execution of these deeds, that is, Exs. 48. As stated earlier, the five years' period was the essence of contract under Ex. B-2, the agreement for re-sale. The date of execution is 10-8-1967 and the date of expiry is 9-8-1972. The case of the plaintiff is that both on the date of execution of these deeds, that is, Exs. B-1 and B-2 and on the date of expiry she was a minor. But, there is no material placed before the Court as to when exactly she became major. 49. Ex. A-2, the notice dated 6-7-1972 which was issued by her through the counsel to the first defendant Muthu Gounder does not show that as to when exactly she became major. Even in the plaint, she did not state as to when she became major. As a matter of fact, the alleged disability was not mentioned at all in the plaint. In the deposition, P.W. 1, the plaintiff did not state as to when she became major. In the cross-examination, she would simply state that she was aged about 7 years at the time of execution of document. 50. The plaintiff referred about the panchayat in which the father of the plaintiff agreed to arrange for the payment of the amount to Muthu Gounder and for re-sale in favour of the plaintiff. According to her, the said panchayat was held in 1971. Curiously, she would state that even at the time of panchayat held in 1971, she was aged about 7 years. The relevant evidence is as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted-Ed.) 51. During cross-examination, a suggestion was put by the counsel on behalf of the defendant that she was aged about 13 years in the year 1968, she would state : (Vernacular matter omitted-Ed.) P.W. 2 Palanisamy, the husband of Valliammal would state that the said panchayat was held in 1971 and the same was convened only at the instance of Ponnayee, the appellant herein. D.W. 1 was examined on behalf of the defendant Kandasamy, son of Muthu Gounder. He would specifically state in the chief examination : (Vernacular matter omitted-Ed.) This evidence has not been disputed in the cross-examination. 52. Thus, there is nothing to indicate that after she became major, she filed the suit in O.S. No. 942 of 1979, re-numbered as O.S. No. 322 of 1982, on 20-7-1979 within three years of her attaining majority. He would specifically state in the chief examination : (Vernacular matter omitted-Ed.) This evidence has not been disputed in the cross-examination. 52. Thus, there is nothing to indicate that after she became major, she filed the suit in O.S. No. 942 of 1979, re-numbered as O.S. No. 322 of 1982, on 20-7-1979 within three years of her attaining majority. In other words, the materials available on record would not show that the case of the plaintiff regarding the period of limitation would cover Sections 6 to 8 of the Limitation Act. 53. It is well settled that the question regarding jurisdiction of the trial Court and the maintainability of the suit would go to the root of the matter and as such, the same has to be established by the plaintiff alone that the suit was maintainable and the same was filed within the period of limitation and consequently, the trial Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In my view, the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove this aspect. Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiff; the appellant herein, is liable to be dismissed on this ground. 54. The second reason is this. It is true that the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court would not consider the aspect of the question as to when exactly she became major. Both the Courts below would deal with the case as if she filed the suit after attaining majority within three years. 55. The trial Court, as stated earlier, merely on the basis of Section 6 would hold that the suit was maintainable. On the other hand, the lower appellate Court would hold that the suit was not maintainable, since other persons, namely, father and sister of the plaintiff should have filed a suit within the time prescribed on behalf of the plaintiff also and as such, the suit filed by the plaintiff, the appellant herein, was barred by limitation. 56. Under those circumstances, this Court would consider the said question, in the light of the findings given by both the Courts below. In other words, even assuming that the appellant within three years after the cessation of disability filed the suit, can it be that Section 7 would help the plaintiff for saving the suit to cover the period of limitation? 57. To answer this question, we have to come back again to Section 7. In other words, even assuming that the appellant within three years after the cessation of disability filed the suit, can it be that Section 7 would help the plaintiff for saving the suit to cover the period of limitation? 57. To answer this question, we have to come back again to Section 7. As per the section, where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit is under any disability and discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, the time will run against them all. Therefore, if the defendant, the father can discharge on behalf of the plaintiff, the appellant herein, even without her concurrence, then the period of limitation will run against all, viz., Ardhanari Gounder, Valliammal and minor daughter, the appellant. But, when the father becomes incapable of giving such discharge, time will not run against the person who suffered disability until the disability has ceased. 58. In order to contend that Section 7 is attracted for the present facts of the case, the learned counsel for the appellant would point out the materials available on record and submit that the father became incapable of giving any discharge, since he was hostile to the appellant due to the misunderstanding between them and consequently, the period of time will not run as against the plaintiff/appellant until the disability has ceased. 59. This submission also, in my opinion, does not merit acceptance, as there is no acceptable material to hold in favour of the appellant. 60. According to the plaint, there was a misunderstanding between the father and daughter, the appellant herein, and the parents chose the bridegroom for the appellant, who in turn did not like to marry him and, therefore, the appellant sought the help of her uncle and got married to one Kuppusamy Gounder. 61. In Exs. B1 and B2, the sale deed and agreement for reconveyance deed, it is clearly mentioned that Ardhanari Gounder was the seller of the suit properties for himself and as a guardian of the appellant, who was then minor. Even according to the deposition of P.Ws. 1 and 2, there was a panchayat in the year 1971, since there was a dispute in regard to the Seervarisai articles for the marriage held for Valliammal. In that panchayat also, the plaintiff's father agreed to give the balance consideration, namely Rs. Even according to the deposition of P.Ws. 1 and 2, there was a panchayat in the year 1971, since there was a dispute in regard to the Seervarisai articles for the marriage held for Valliammal. In that panchayat also, the plaintiff's father agreed to give the balance consideration, namely Rs. 4,990/- to Muthu Gounder and arrange to get back the properties from Muthu Gounder, in order to execute the deed in favour of the plaintiff, the appellant herein. 62. Furthermore, Ex.B3, the lawyer notice was issued by Ardhanari Gounder, sister Valliammal and Ponnayee, the plaintiff (the appellant) on 29-3-1979 asking Muthu Gounder to give back the properties, as all the three would be ready to repay the amount of Rs. 5,000/-. A perusal of the notice would show that all the three persons were living at the same address. In this notice, it is not stated that the father became hostile to the appellant. 63. Strangely, in Ex. A2 sent by the appellant alone through another lawyer on 6-7-1979, the earlier notice dated 29-3-1979 sent by her along with her father and sister was not at all referred to. When the plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1, she would admit in the cross-examination that she along with her father sent the notice dated 29-3-1979 to Muthu Gounder. This admission, in my view, would assume great significance. 64. At this juncture, one other strange feature could be noticed. In the notice dated 29-3-1979 sent by the appellant Ponnayee along with others, it is stated that through usufructuary mortgage deed, the suit properties were entrusted to Muthu Gounder on 10-8-1967 and informed their readiness and willingness to redeem the properties by paying Rs. 5,000/-. But, in the notice dated 6-7-1979 sent on behalf of the appellant, it is referred about the sale deed and resale agreement dated 10-8-1967. This also would make it clear that the plaintiff did not take consistent stand. In fact, she had admitted in Ex.B3 notice dated 29-3-1979 that the father and daughter were living together. 65. Under those circumstances, it is clear that there is no material to show that the father ceased to be a guardian or the Karta of the family. Consequently, the suit cannot be saved by invoking Section 7 of the Limitation Act. 66. 65. Under those circumstances, it is clear that there is no material to show that the father ceased to be a guardian or the Karta of the family. Consequently, the suit cannot be saved by invoking Section 7 of the Limitation Act. 66. In view of what is stated above, the judgment and decree passed by the lower-appellate Court, which do not suffer from any error or infirmity either on facts or law, are liable to be confirmed, as the view of the lower appellate Court that the suit was barred by limitation, is upheld. 67. In the result both the appeals are dismissed with costs throughout. Appeals dismissed.