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1999 DIGILAW 975 (MP)

Radheshyam v. Sardar Preetam Singh

1999-12-02

J.G.CHITRE

body1999
JUDGMENT J.G. Chitre, J. 1. These appeals are hereby decided by a common judgment. 2. The matters are revolving around the same property situated in Mahesh Nagar, Indore bearing No. 5/43 consisting of three rooms and a verandah on ground floor. The landlord Radheshyam brought a suit against respondent Sardar Preetam Singh which was numbered as 96-A/80. Landlord Radheshyam prayed for decree of eviction against respondent in context with provisions of Section 12 (1) (a), 12 (1) (b), 12 (1) (c) and 12 (1) (i) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as Act for convenience). The trial Court dismissed the suit of landlord Radheshyam so far as his claim based on 12 (1) (a), 12 (1) (i) of the Act. Landlord had abandoned his claim for eviction in context with Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act. The trial Court decreed the suit of the landlord Radheshyam in context with provisions of Section 12 (1) (e). Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court the defendant Sardar Preetam Singh filed an appeal in the District Court which was decided by Vth Addl. District Judge, Indore on 23-4-92 by which he set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court that is 6th Civil Judge, Cl. II, Indore as well as dismissed the cross objections which were filed by the landlord in respect of challenge to the findings recorded by the trial Court in context with his claim for eviction in view of Section 12 (1) (a), 12 (1) (e), 12 (1) (i) of the Act. 3. Trial Court dismissed the contention of the landlord in respect of his claim in respect of provisions of Section 12 (1) (a), 12 (1) (e), 12 (1) (i) of the Act by holding that the defendant did not construct the house of his own in the area near Khatiwala Tank, Indore. The 1st Appellate Court confirmed the finding recorded by the trial Court on above mentioned provisions of the Act by concurrent opinion. In addition to that it set aside the finding recorded in favour of the landlord by the trial Court in respect of his bonafide need so far as suit house is concerned. The 1st Appellate Court confirmed the finding recorded by the trial Court on above mentioned provisions of the Act by concurrent opinion. In addition to that it set aside the finding recorded in favour of the landlord by the trial Court in respect of his bonafide need so far as suit house is concerned. The trial Court held that the landlord was residing in rented house and during the pendency of the civil suit filed by the landlord by entering into a compromise, vacated said premise and filed the suit for evicting the defendant Sardar Preetam Singh. The trial Court further held that being the owner of the suit house, the landlord was entitled to get vacant possession of the suit house as he required it for his residence, bonafide. That resulted in granting the decree on that count in favour of the landlord. The 1st Appellate Court set aside the finding recorded by the trial Court on the count of which the suit of the landlord-plaintiff was decreed. 4. In the discussion the 1st Appellate Court concluded that though a house was constructed in the area near Khatiwala Tank by the wife of defendant Sardar Preetam Singh, it can not be tented to be a house constructed and available to the tenant for residence. It held that during the pendency of litigation once a portion of the suit house fell vacant, however, it was given to the tenant on higher rent and, therefore, the need of the landlord can not be treated to be bonafide. He pointed out that the rent of that vacant portion of the house was increased from Rs. 170/- to Rs. 200/-. The 1st Appellate Court held that this increase of the rent and non-occupation by the landlord during the pendency of the litigation was speaking against his bonafides. It held further that the house which was constructed by wife of defendant Sardar Preetam Singh can not be treated to be alternative accommodation available to the tenant. The 1st Appellate Court also held that the tenant was not in default of payment of rent because the rent was deposited per month. 5. The appeal was admitted on following substantial questions of law: "(1) Whether the learned lower Appellate Court has erred in interpreting the contents of plaint Ex. P-21 and whether such interpretation has led to the failure of justice ? 5. The appeal was admitted on following substantial questions of law: "(1) Whether the learned lower Appellate Court has erred in interpreting the contents of plaint Ex. P-21 and whether such interpretation has led to the failure of justice ? (2) Whether in view of the aforesaid fact the learned lower Appellate Court has erred in holding that the bonafide need of the landlord has not been proved ?" 6. Shri G.M. Chaphekar, Sr. counsel, instructed by Shri S.S. Samvatsar submitted that the 1st Appellate Court failed in interpreting Ex. P-2-a and, therefore, landed in error which resulted in denial of justice to the present appellant-landlord. In Ex. P-2 in Paragraph 7 it has been averred by plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 214-A/73 namely Mangilal s/o Babulal, Samirmal son of Babulal and Gambhirmal son of Babulal against defendants Ramkawarbai wife of Kanhaiyalal Somani represented by Legal Representatives Mohanlal and Radheshyam son of Mohanlal that those respondents own a house in a Maheshnagar, Indore and other in Agrasen Nagar, Indore which have been constructed by them newly for their residential purpose. It has been averred in Paragraph 7 that thus, the landlord is having suitable accommodation for his residence, and therefore, those plaintiffs were entitled to get the vacant possession of the suit house in the suit house bearing Municipal Corporation No. 56, Badasarafa, Indore - 2 rooms on first floor and two rooms on 2nd floor etc.. During the pendency of this suit, the present landlord was brought on record as L.R. No. 2 of deceased original defendant. Landlord, the present appellant, contexted the suit and thereafter there was a compromise entered into between the said plaintiff and respondents by which the vacant possession of the suit house was handed over to those plaintiffs. The plaint of that suit has been produced in record which has been marked as Ex. P-2-a. The 1st Appellate Court has placed reliance on this plaint, on Para 7, by connecting it with the admission given by present appellant in the cross-examination. The 1st Appellate Court interpreted the said sentence uttered by the present appellant, the landlord, when he said that the averments made in the said plaint i.e., Ex. P-2-a are corrected. By relying on these things, the 1st Appellate Court concluded that the present appellant admitted that he was owning such alternative accommodation. The 1st Appellate Court interpreted the said sentence uttered by the present appellant, the landlord, when he said that the averments made in the said plaint i.e., Ex. P-2-a are corrected. By relying on these things, the 1st Appellate Court concluded that the present appellant admitted that he was owning such alternative accommodation. By holding that way the 1st Appellate Court concluded that the present appellant is having suitable accommodation for his residential purpose. He connected this conclusion with the evidence on record that the portion of the house which was in possession of a tenant, fell vacant and it was re-let by increasing the rent from Rs. 170/- to Rs. 200/- per month. Thus, the 1st Appellate Court held that in view of all these things the need put forth by the present appellant was not bonafide and, therefore, the trial Court committed the error in decreeing the suit of the appellant on that count. 7. Shri Chaphekar pointed out in his submission that the 1st Appellate Court committed the error in interpreting Ex. P-2-a and the said abrupt statement made by the present appellant in the cross-examination. He submitted further that the way in which the 1st Appellate Court connected the conclusions and drew final conclusions against the appellant is totally illegal and perverse and not consistent with evidence on record. 8. Shri M.L. Agrawal, counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of Amarjitsingh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, reported in 1987 MPRCJ 9 = AIR 1987 SC 741 = (1986) 4 SCC 736 , wherein Supreme Court held that :-- "When landlord filed a suit for eviction on the ground of bonafide residential necessity and landlord did not occupy the part of house which fell vacant during the pendency of this suit but let out the same on higher rent. This subsequent event with regard to reasonable and suitable accommodation should have been taken into account. The law provides habitat for the landlord and does not provide comforts other than habitat." 9. This subsequent event with regard to reasonable and suitable accommodation should have been taken into account. The law provides habitat for the landlord and does not provide comforts other than habitat." 9. By placing reliance on this observation of the Supreme Court, in Amarjitsingh v. Smt. Khatoon 's case (supra) Shri M.L. Agrawal submitted that the present appellant is having two houses available for his residential purpose, thereafter he handed over the vacant possession of the premises which he was occupying as tenant in favour of Mangilal and others, his claim that he required the present suit house for his bonafide residential need, can not be treated to be a bonafide need and the trial Court committed the error in that context which has been corrected by the 1st Appellate Court in setting aside that finding and rejected the cross objections of the present appellant. Shri Chaphekar submitted that 1st Appellate Court also committed the error in rejecting the cross-objections filed by the present appellant on flimsy grounds. He submitted that when the evidence on record was itself proving that the tenant did not pay the rent regularly from year 1980 onwards and did not make a complaint of not handing over the receipts by the landlord to him in notice reply itself proves that the tenant was in default in not paying the rent regularly. He submitted that the trial Court committed the error in appreciating this important aspect of the matter and recording finding against the present appellant which has been erroneously and illegally confirmed by the 1st Appellate Court. Shri Chaphekar further submitted that when the evidence on record was proving that wife of tenant was having a plot near Khatiwala Tank area where some construction was constructed and plan of construction has been sanctioned by municipal council, it was totally erroneous and illegal on the part of the trial Court to come to the conclusion that the tenant was not having suitable accommodation for his residence when in addition to this evidence the evidence of tenant himself was proving that the tenant was also having a residential house in Palsikar Colony of Indore. He submitted further that both the Courts below committed the error of appreciating the evidence and ignoring the evidence of Gopikrishna, the landlord in whose house the appellant was residing on rent when he was required to vacate the house belonging to Mangilal and others. Shri Chaphekar submitted that in the case of Amarjitsingh's case (supra) the landlord had let vacant premises thrice. He submitted that in the present case it has not been proved by the evidence on record that the present appellant let out the house which fell vacant by increasing the rent from Rs. 170/- to Rs. 200/-. 10. I find substance in the submission advanced by Shri Chaphekar on behalf of the appellant. The trial Court committed the error in coming to the conclusion that the rent was paid regularly by the tenant ignoring that tenant did not produce rent receipts showing that he had paid the rent to appellant landlord regularly from year 1980 onwards. The trial Court failed in ignoring that the tenant not only failed in producing the rent receipts in context with the said period but did not make a grievance in the reply to the said notice that though he had paid the rent to the appellant regularly, the appellant did not give him the receipts in that context. It also committed the error in not noticing that a separate notice was also not given by the tenant informing the landlord, the present appellant, that in spite of his regularly paying the rent, the landlord was not giving any receipts to him which was against the ethics as well as law. The same error has been repeated by the 1st Appellate Court. It is pertinent to note that when the relations were strained, a tenant would definitely take care for the purpose of ensuring that he gets the receipts in respect of the payment of rent. He would send a notice in that context immediately and would not wait for the receipt of said notice. The Courts below committed the error of law in ignoring that the tenant-respondent has sent the rent pertaining to this period by money order. When the rent was paid regularly and the receipts were not given to the tenant by landlord, what was the need for the tenant to send the rent for that period by money order ? The Courts below committed the error of law in ignoring that the tenant-respondent has sent the rent pertaining to this period by money order. When the rent was paid regularly and the receipts were not given to the tenant by landlord, what was the need for the tenant to send the rent for that period by money order ? He would have made grievance of that in the reply of the notice and would have taken the recourse of law by making a proper grievance in the Court, but that has not been done. Even that has not been done in the written statement also. The reasons given by the Courts below justifying their conclusions on this count, are totally inconsistent with evidence on record and pertains to domain of gross misappreciation of evidence. Being it so, it can not be permitted to sustain. In fact the 1st Appellate Court should have allowed the cross objections filed by the respondent in this context. But he did not do so and committed gross mistake of rejecting it. The trial Court and 1st Appellate Court ignored that it has come in the evidence that the family of tenant-respondent are residing in Palsikar Colony. In addition to that, the wife of the tenant is having a plot near Khatiwala Tank which is admeasuring 70' x 40' sq. ft. municipal corporation had sanctioned the map for construction of it. It failed in ignoring that there has been some construction also. The two Courts below committed the error in ignoring the evidence on oath given by the appellant that the portion which fell vacant was given to respondent on his request for adjusting him for his need of accommodating the guests at the time of marriage of his sister. This evidence of the appellant has not been shattered at by the respondent. A person would not be guilty of getting increased rent and can not be blamed for that if the rent is increased from Rs. 170/- to Rs. 200/-. What Rs. 330/- mean in this context ? What Rs. 30/-was having value in the year 1980 ? Whether a landlord would relet such a portion after falling vacant only for the purpose of earning Rs. 30/- at the risk of losing it for his house ? The Courts below have not given proper reason in rejecting the claim of the appellant-landlord in this context. What Rs. 30/-was having value in the year 1980 ? Whether a landlord would relet such a portion after falling vacant only for the purpose of earning Rs. 30/- at the risk of losing it for his house ? The Courts below have not given proper reason in rejecting the claim of the appellant-landlord in this context. The two Courts below have not given proper reasons for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the tenant did not have alternative accommodation for his residential purpose. 11. When a landlord needs the premises for his bonafide requirement for residence and when he compromise in the civil suit when his landlord sues him for eviction, that should not be taken against such person in all cases. Such tenant may find it difficult to win in that suit on account of he being the owner of another house from which he evicts the tenant and resides there. That can not be treated to be a conspiracy between Mangilal and others and the present appellant. That can not be taken to be a ground for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the need of landlord for his residence is not bonafide. The need of the landlord has to be seen from his view point also. It is true that it has come in the evidence that the appellant was residing in Shikshak Nagar in rented premises but the Courts below committed the error in not properly understanding that the said house was required to be taken on rent by the present appellant because he was evicted from the house belonging to Mangilal and others on account of that compromise. The suit was pending for evicting the present respondent but when that was so, when he did not get the vacant possession of the suit house from the present respondent, whether he was expected to be stay on roads ? Certainly not. As a need he was required to take the premises on rent in Shikshak Nagar from Gopikrishna. The Courts below should have given proper importance to the effect of evidence of appellant and Gopikrishna so also the admission given by the present respondent in cross-examination. 12. Certainly not. As a need he was required to take the premises on rent in Shikshak Nagar from Gopikrishna. The Courts below should have given proper importance to the effect of evidence of appellant and Gopikrishna so also the admission given by the present respondent in cross-examination. 12. Thus, the trial Court was right in decreeing the suit of the appellant on the ground of his bonafide need for residential accommodation but was wrong in rejecting his claim for possession of the suit house on other grounds mentioned above. The 1st appellate Court was totally in error in law in setting aside the decree which was passed by the trial Court in favour of the present appellant and rejecting the cross-objections filed by the present appellant. The concurrency of two opinions when are against the total impact created by the evidence on record, it does not become an obstacle for correcting it by set aside them by the High Court. When the judgment and decree passed by the 1st Appellate Court is inconsistent with evidence on record and perverse interpretation of the oral evidence or documentary evidence, the High Court should not hesitate in setting aside it in second appeal. 13. Thus, the appeal is hereby allowed. The suit of appellant is hereby stands decreed on all counts except one which has been abandoned by appellant himself so far provisions of Section 12 (1) (b) is concerned. Thus, the appeal stands allowed with costs. Decree be drawn accordingly.