Research › Browse › Judgment

Delhi High Court · body

1999 DIGILAW 981 (DEL)

INDU RAI v. I. S. BAJAJ

1999-11-16

VIKRAMAJIT SEN

body1999
Vikramajit Sen ( 1 ) THIS application under Order XXXIX, Rules I and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the plaintiff seeking restraint orders against the defendant "from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff without a prior permission of the Court and restraining the defendant from raising any further constrution during the pendency of the suit and restraining the defendant from selling/alienating the front terrace to any anti-social element/third party or parting with possession of the property in question during the pendency of the suit. " ( 2 ) THE facts that emerge from a reading of the plaint are that the plaintiff is the onwer of the second floor of E-78, IInd Floor, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi-110 048 since 13. 12. 1988. It has been variously stated that the plaintiff is in possession of "the roof of the second floor/front terrace over the second floor. " The plaint further narrates that the second floor is not approved and alternatively that although only 1000 sq. ft. has been approved, 2266 sq. ft. has actually been constructed and sold to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was enjoying the peaceful possesion of the front terrace over the second floor till 5. 7. 1999 when the defendant "put a lock in the stairs to obstruct the entry of the plaintiff in the ceiling and started demolishing the walls. " Alongwith in the plaint, a copy of Sale Deed dated 13. 12. 1988 executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff as also the Sale Deed executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff s son have been filed. These Deeds contain the following Clause 13 which are obviously germane to the point in issue: "that the Vendee shall also be entitled to use the front terrace for a period of three years, over the second floor but shall not make any structural additions. These Deeds contain the following Clause 13 which are obviously germane to the point in issue: "that the Vendee shall also be entitled to use the front terrace for a period of three years, over the second floor but shall not make any structural additions. As and when law permits the Vendor shall be authorised and entitled to raise construction on the terrace and even for subsequent floors subjct to the condition that no structural additions or alterations shal be carried out either by the Vendor or his agents in the front terrace within a period of three years from the date of the execution of the Sale Deed and the Vendee shall be under obligation to give full co-operation to Vendor/contractor duly authroised by the Vendor for raising the construction over the terrace and also shall not raise any objections thereof. The Vendee shall also not ask for any compensation thnereof. " ( 3 ) IT is in these circumstances that the prayers made in the application have been pressed by the plaintiff. In its reply the defendant stated, inter alia, that the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest in the terrace floor; that they were entitled to use the terrace for a period of three years which has already expired; that an agreement to sell has been entered into between the defendant and Shri Manvir Singh on 28. 5. 1999 for the third floor, possession of which has been handed over; that the present law permits the construction of third floor; that the servant quarters should be constructed on the top floor and, therefore, once the construction of the third floor is complete servant quarters will be shifted thereon. In these circumstances it has been urged by the defendant that there is no ground, in law and/or in equity, for the grant of the ad interim injunction prayed for. ( 4 ) IN Hem Chand Jain v. Anil Kumar and Am. , 1992 Rajdhani Law Reporter 224, a learned Single Judge of this Court had held that "where the possession of such a person has been peaceful, long, anterior or accomplished and he has been in settled possession of the property, with no right to remain in possession or has acquired ownership by adverse possession, he cannot be ousted or dispossessed by the owner of the property except by the recourse to law. " This passage is relied upon by the plaintiff in support of his prayers contained in his application. In the present case, however, the licence for use of the terrace was for a limited period of three years only, which period has expired. The Clause extracted above clearly envisages that in case of the sale and/or construction on the third floor the plaintiffs would render every assistance . The facts of the present case are, therefore, clearly distinguishable. In an another decision of this Court entitled Parmanand Jha v. Sanatan Dharam Sabha and Am. , 68 (1997) DLT 383, a learned Single Judge had considered a number of judgments rendered on this point. It was then held that a licensee whose licence had been terminated could not be treated as being in settled position of the suit property. ( 5 ) IN D. T. T. D. C. v. D. R. Mehra and Sons, 62 (1996) DLT 234 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court had held that where a licence has expired, the applicant cannot be granted the helping hand of the Court for temporary injunction. The learned Division Bench had considered a decision of the Apex Court in Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation, 1995 (3) SCC 33 . ( 6 ) APPLYING the ratios of these decisions to the present case I am of the view that the plaintiff does not have any legal right over the terrace on the third floor. The equities are also not in his favour for the reason that the Sale Deed specifically postulates that in the event of construction being carried out on the third floor, the plaintiffs are expected to render all assistance . The argument that only 1000 sq. ft. had been allowed and in fact 2266 sq. ft. had been constructed and sold by the defendant to the plaintiff need be mentioned only for its rejection. The parties are clearly in pan delicto. Having purchased illegal construction the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to seek the equitable relief of restraining construction thereon, and thereby render advantage to one of the parties to the detriment of the other. The application is accordingly dismissed but keeping in perspective the existence of illegal construction the site I do not propose to impose any costs.