JUDGMENT R.B. Dixit, J. 1. This Second Appeal has been placed before this Bench for decision in view of the reference made by order dated 6-5-1997 by a learned Single Judge of this Court under Rule 9(1) of the Rules and Orders of the High Court. 2. While admitting the appeal vide the order dated 23-4-1993, the Learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Shri R.C. Lahoti, J, as he then was had formulated the following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether the plaintiff should have been held to have been in possession of the suit property? (ii) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to protect his possession even against true owners in spite of his having no title to the property? 3. We have heard the Learned Counsel of both the parties and have carefully perused the record. 4. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this appeal lay in a narrow compass: The appellant-plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration that he was the Bhmiswami in possession of the land in dispute wherein the defendants 1 and 2 had no right and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in his possession and further not to get it recorded in his favour in the Court of Civil Judge Second Class, Ganj Basoda. The plaintiff claimed himself to be in possession as sub-tenant of agricultural land bearing S. No. 89 of village Ahar. Defendant-respondent No. 1 Mann Singh was recorded as Bhumiswami in Khasra and Khatoni of the disputed land. It is alleged that Maan Singh transferred this land to defendant-respondent No. 2 Dashrath Singh by a registered sale-deed dated 29-11-1977. Under the garb of this transfer, defendant-contesting respondent No. 2 Dashrath Singh wanted to take forceful possession from the plaintiff which necessitated filing of the suit by the appellant-plaintiff. 5. Although the defendant-respondent No. 1 Maan Singh admitted plaintiff-appellant as sub-tenant (Up-Krishak) of the land, but the reply of defendant-respondent No. 2 was that he is the transferee true owner of the disputed land on the strength of his sale-deed duly executed by defendant No. 1. The State Government also disputed title of the plaintiff on the ground that he had not instituted any proceedings under section 190 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code for conferment of Bhumiswami Rights. 6. The State Government also disputed title of the plaintiff on the ground that he had not instituted any proceedings under section 190 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code for conferment of Bhumiswami Rights. 6. The learned trial Court, after recording evidence of both the parties, came to the conclusion that though the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land and his possession had also been recorded in some of the Khasra entries, however, he had failed to establish his title as a sub-tenant. Since the Plaintiff failed to prove his title to the land, his suit was dismissed accordingly. The appellant thereafter filed 1st appeal before the Additional Judge to District Judge, Vidisha at Ganjbasoda and the Appellate Court also endorsed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 7. It was argued on behalf of the appellant before the learned Single Judge of this Court that appellant being settled in possession can claim injunction against true owner. Reliance was placed on Puran Singh and others. v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1674 and Krishna Ram Mahale vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, reported in AIR 1989 SC 2097 . The Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 Dashrath Singh opposed this contention and in support of his submission, placed reliance on a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Premji Ratansey Shah and others. vs. Union of India and others. (1994) 5 SCC 547 , and various other cases. 8. It has been observed by the learned Single Judge in his order dated 23-4-1993 while admitting the appeal that no case is made out for hearing on question 'B' suggested in the memo of appeal. It is a finding of fact concurrently recorded by the Court below that the plaintiff was not a subtenant of the suit land and his claim regarding accrual of tenurial right in the land in dispute was not acceptable. The submission challenging this finding was rejected earlier and the learned Single Judge having refused to frame any substantial question of law as urged in ground 'B', it will have to be taken that that the concurrent finding on the question of title of the plaintiff returned against him has attained finality. The submission challenging this finding was rejected earlier and the learned Single Judge having refused to frame any substantial question of law as urged in ground 'B', it will have to be taken that that the concurrent finding on the question of title of the plaintiff returned against him has attained finality. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 Dashrath has made a statement before us that after passing of the decree by the lower Court, a separate suit for possession against plaintiff-appellant had also been filed. 9. In view of the statement regarding filing of a suit for possession made by the Learned Counsel of respondent No. 2, the Learned Counsel of the appellant-plaintiff during the hearing of this appeal before us has also stated that now the plaintiff does not claim a decree of permanent injunction and his claim in that regard be taken to be confined to a decree for an injunction protecting his possession so that he may not be evicted otherwise than in accordance with law. 10. The submissions made by both the counsel stated hereinabove have narrowed down the scope of the controversy in this appeal which now stands limited only to the point of law, that is "Whether any injunction can be issued for the limited purpose of protecting the possession of the plaintiff as against true owner of the land?" so as to ensure that he is not dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law. 11. In case of Puran Singh (supra), it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the nature of possession which may entitle a trespasser to exercise the right of private defence of property and person should contain the following attributes: "(i) the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period; (ii) the possession must be to the knowledge either express or implied of the owner or without any attempt at concealment and which contains an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser would however be a matter to be decided on facts and circumstances of each case; (iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced in by the true owner; and (iv) one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession, in which case the trespasser will have a right of private defence and the true owner will have no right of private defence." The word 'settled possession' had been used in Munshi Ram and others. vs. Delhi Administration reported in AIR 1968 SC 702 wherein it was observed that no one including the true owners has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case, unless he is evicted in due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by the true owner. 12. In the case of Krishna Ram Mahale (supra), decree for recovery of possession was passed notwithstanding the fact that the period of licence had expired long back during pendency of legal proceedings. It was held that since the licensee was unlawfully dispossessed, it could not be said that the licence had expired long back and the plaintiff not being entitled to renewal of licence could only ask for damages for unlawful possession. It was further observed that it is a well settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse of law. 13. It was further observed that it is a well settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse of law. 13. In the case of Premji Ratansey Shah (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court made it clear that issuance of an order of injunction is absolutely a discretionary and equitable relief. In a given set of facts, injunction may be given to protect the possession of the owner or person in lawful possession. It is not mandatory that for mere asking such relief should be given. Injunction is a personal right under section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 the plaintiff must have personal interest in the matter. The interest of right not shown to be in existence, cannot be protected by injunction. It is equally settled law that injunction would not be issued against the true owner. Therefore, the Courts below have rightly rejected the relief of declaration and injunction in favour of the petitioners who had no interest in the property. Even assuming that they had any possession, their possession was wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession, as against the owner. 14. A trespasser was defined in the case of Panna Lai Bhagirath Marwadi vs. Bhaiyalal bindraban Pardesh Teli, AIR 1937 Nag 281, as a person who enters into peaceful possession of land claiming it as his own although he might not have any title to the land, can sue another person who has forcibly ousted him of possession and who has no better title to the land, because the first person, although he might not have any legal title, had at least possessory title and had commenced to prescribe of a legal title. Peaceful entry is the very essence of possessory title. This proposition does not conflict with the rules that (1) a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant's; and (2) that a defendant in possession can set up a jus tertii. The first rule says nothing about the nature of the title which must be shown. This proposition does not conflict with the rules that (1) a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant's; and (2) that a defendant in possession can set up a jus tertii. The first rule says nothing about the nature of the title which must be shown. As between the trespasser who enters peaceably and another who wrongfully dispossesses him, the title of the former is superior on two grounds, first because it is prior to point of time and next because it is a peaceful title as opposed to a forcible one in the sense that it involves a wrongful dispossession of the previous occupier. 15. In the case of Ram Shiromani vs. Ram Pratap reported in 1998 (1) MPWN 180 by the learned Single Judge of this Court, plaintiff was found in possession on basis of Khasra entries and receipts of land revenue, as in the present case, it was held that the order of temporary injunction was rightly passed in his favour. In the case of Ram Kishan vs. Rampal reported in 1992 (1) MPWN 164 the plaintiff was found in settled and peaceful possession for 3-4 years. He was held to be entitled to permanent preventive injunction against forcible dispossession by the defendant. It was reiterated in the case of Kala Bai and Ors. vs. Bhoj Raj reported in 1992 (1) MPJR SN 7 that the law respects possession when a person is found in settled and peaceful possession of property then his possession should be protected. Even an owner cannot be allowed to take recourse to extra judicial methods for dispossessing the person in settled and peaceful possession though without title. The position may be different with the encroachment committed is of flimsy character or when a trespasser is sought to be prevented by the real owner whilst the former was in process of committing trespass. The possession of the plaintiff should have been protected unless and until the defendant/respondent took steps for evicting appellant by due process of law. 16. In the case of Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. A. Viswam reported in (1996) 8 SCC 259 , the award made and compensation paid to all the parties except in respect of disputed land which was set apart for public park. 16. In the case of Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. A. Viswam reported in (1996) 8 SCC 259 , the award made and compensation paid to all the parties except in respect of disputed land which was set apart for public park. Respondent claiming to be in possession of the disputed land and seeking perpetual injunction against the Housing Board, delivery of possession of the land was admitted. In these circumstances, therefore, it was held that injunction cannot be issued against the true owner, namely, the Housing Board in whom the land ultimately stood vested. However, in our opinion the present case is distinguishable on facts and the principle as laid down in the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 17. In its decision in the case of Pratprai N. Kothari vs. John Braganza reported in (1999) 4 SCC 403 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a person who had been in long and continuous possession can protect the same by seeking an injunction against any person in the world other than the true owner. It was further settled that even the owner of the property can get back his possession only by resorting to the due process of law. 18. A perusal of the different citations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, referred to hereinabove, clearly indicates that there is no conflict of decision insofar as the legal position of a person is settled possession of the land, is concerned. Even if his possession is found without title, it can be protected as against a true owner for a limited purpose, till he is evicted by due course of law. 19. Coming to the facts of the present case, it can be noticed that plaintiff/appellant was found in peaceful possession of the suit land and his possession was also found recorded in some of the khasra entries. This position was also admitted by original owner defendant/respondent Maan Singh. In our opinion, therefore, appellant can be held to be in settled possession of suit land. This position was also admitted by original owner defendant/respondent Maan Singh. In our opinion, therefore, appellant can be held to be in settled possession of suit land. Our conclusions are: (a) The finding returned by the Court below on the question relating to the defendant No. 2 being in possession of the land in dispute is based on an appraisal of evidence on the record and does not appear to be vitiated in law; (b) The Ist substantial question of law as framed is, therefore, decided in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff/appellant; and (c) So far as the 2nd substantial question of law as framed is concerned, we are clearly of the opinion that since the plaintiff was in settled possession, his possession had to be protected, even against a rightful owner, until and unless he is evicted by any lawful order or by due process of law. 20. In the result, this appeal succeeds in part. The decree passed by the trial Court is modified to the extent that the suit of the plaintiff shall stand decreed only for a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant from dispossessing the plaintiff from the land in dispute otherwise than in accordance with law. For the rest of the relief, the suit shall stand dismissed. 21. However, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed