R. R. K. TRIVEDI, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER of Writ Petition No. 8442 of 1993 has preferred this special appeal under Chapter viii. Rule 5 of the Rules of order dated 19. 7. 1995, passed by learned single Judge under which the writ petition challenging his dismissal from the post of Principal of R. B. M. Inter College, tilhar, district Shahjahanpur, by resolution dated 15. 12. 1991, passed by the approval of the same by U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission)by order dated 18. 2. 1993, has been dismissed. Appellant/petitioner Dharam Veer Gupta (who shall hereinafter be referred to as petitioner) was selected and appointed as principal of the college on 8. 3. 1973. However, his relations with the employer-smooth from the very beginning and the Committee of Management made first attempt to terminate his services on 26. 2. 1974. However, as no prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools (hereinafter referred to as the d. I. O. S.) under Section 16g of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act was obtained, the order of termination was challenged by petitioner in Original Suit No- 15 of 1974 in which a temporary injunction was granted in his favour. Ultimately, the Committee of Management withdrew the order of termination dated 26. 2. 1974. Then, on 1. 7. 1976 petitioner was suspended. However, the d. I. O. S. disapproved the suspension by his order dated 18. 5. 1977. Thereafter, by a resolution dated 30. 6. 1978, petitioner was dismissed from service which was disapproved by the D. I. O. S. on 25. 7. 1978. The order of the D. I. O. S. was challenged by Committee of Management. respondent No. 3. in Writ Petition No. 6864 of 1978. It appears that the writ petition filed by the committee of Management was dismissed. The D. I. O. S. by order dated 2. 12. 1987 directed the manager to permit the petitioner to work as principal. This order was challenged in High Court in Writ Petition No. 23298 of 1987 which was dismissed on 21. 12. 1987. On 29. 12. 1987 again a fresh resolution was passed by the Committee of Management suspending the petitioner which was disapproved by the D. I. O. S. on 4. 1. 1988, which was challenged in Writ Petition No. 543 of 1988, which was dismissed on 20. 1. 1988. 12. 1987. On 29. 12. 1987 again a fresh resolution was passed by the Committee of Management suspending the petitioner which was disapproved by the D. I. O. S. on 4. 1. 1988, which was challenged in Writ Petition No. 543 of 1988, which was dismissed on 20. 1. 1988. The order of this Court was challenged before Honble supreme Court in special leave petition which was dismissed on 6. 4. 1988. ( 2 ) THE Committee of Management was superseded by State Government by order dated 17. 5. 1988 and authorised controller was appointed who took over charge and control of the management of the College. The order of the State Government was challenged in Writ Petition no. 4491 of 1988 in which an interim order was passed on 11. 8. 1988 staying operation of the order of the State Government. The frustrated Committee of Management then started a fresh attempt to get rid of petitioner and passed a resolution on 10. 8. 1991 suspending petitioner and appointing an inquiry committee comprising of Vishan Chand Gupta, Subhash Chandra. Premi rajan. Ram Saneht and Smt. Vijai Lakshmi. On 12. 8. 1991 a memo of charge was issued by manager against the petitioner and same day one Rajendra Singh, lecturer, was appointed as officiating Principal. The Committee of Management informed the concerned bank about its action that henceforth petitioner will not be entitled to operate bank accounts of the College. On 31. 8. 1991 the D. I. O. S. passed the order that there is no recognized Committee of Management in the College to look after its management and the petitioner will be the principal for the discharge of the affairs of the College and the, petitioner shall be accepted as principal of the College. This order was challenged in this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 25313 of 1991. An interim order was passed on 6. 9. 1991. In the aforesaid background petitioner did not submit any reply to the memo of charge. The inquiry committee proceeded ex parte against the petitioner and submitted its report dated 16. 11. 1991 to the Committee of Management. The Committee of Management by resolution dated 15. 12. 1991 accepted the report of the inquiry committee and resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service which was accorded approval by the Commission on 18. 2. The inquiry committee proceeded ex parte against the petitioner and submitted its report dated 16. 11. 1991 to the Committee of Management. The Committee of Management by resolution dated 15. 12. 1991 accepted the report of the inquiry committee and resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service which was accorded approval by the Commission on 18. 2. 1993, which was challenged in Writ Petition No. 8442 of 1993 in which interim order was granted on 17. 3. 1993. The writ petition, however, was dismissed by learned single Judge on 19. 7. 1995, aggrieved by which this appeal has been filed. ( 3 ) THERE were several rounds of litigation between the petitioner and the Committee of management. In the reply submitted by the petitioner before the Commission, the details of the various writ petitions, original suits and appeals, decided and pending, have been given. This background of fierce litigation between the parties is relevant for correctly appreciating the nature of the charges and how they have been dealt with by the inquiry Committee, the committee Management and finally by the Commission. ( 4 ) REGULATION 4 of U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Procedure for Approval of punishment) Regulations. 1985, provides that before submitting cases to the Commission for its approval under Section 21, the management shall complete all proceedings as per procedure prescribed in the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, or the Rules, if any, and Regulations made thereunder or orders issued by the Education Department or Board of High School and intermediate Education, U. P. , from time to time in regard to any action mentioned in Section 21. Thus, though approval of the proposal of the Committee of Management for dismissal requires prior approval under Section 21 of U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission and selection Board Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the procedure continued to be same which was provided under Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Chapter III of the regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act. 1921, provides for provisions for punishment, inquiry and suspension. Regulations 32 and 36 are relevant for the present case which are being reproduced below : "32. (1) An employee may be dismissed from service on. , grounds. such as gross indiscipline, duty, gross misconduct or constitutes a criminal offence, dishonesty, corruption, misappropriation of funds, sex perversity or moral turpitude. 1921, provides for provisions for punishment, inquiry and suspension. Regulations 32 and 36 are relevant for the present case which are being reproduced below : "32. (1) An employee may be dismissed from service on. , grounds. such as gross indiscipline, duty, gross misconduct or constitutes a criminal offence, dishonesty, corruption, misappropriation of funds, sex perversity or moral turpitude. (2) An employee may be grounds mentioned above as also on the ground of inefficiency in administration or institutional work or unauthorised tuition or employment. (3) An employee may be reduced in rank or subjected to diminition in emoluments on grounds, such as default in administration, unsatisfactory work or conduct, lack of interest in curriculum activities or discharge of examination duties or doubtful integrity. Reduction may be to a lower post or time scale or to a lower stage in the time scale. " ( 5 ) FROM perusal of Regulation 32, it is clear that extreme penalty of dismissal from service can be awarded only when the charge was for gross insubordination, deliberate or serious neglect to duty, gross misconduct or commission of an act which constitutes a criminal offence, dishonesty, corruption, misappropriation of funds, etc. ( 6 ) REGULATION 36 reads as under: "36. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the employee charged and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged employee of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required within three weeks of the receipt of the charge-sheet to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desired to be heard in person. If he or the inquiring authority so desires, an oral inquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted. On that inquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the inquiring authority considers shall be entitled to cross-examine witnesses, to give evidence in person, and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the inquiring authority conducting the inquiry, may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. sufficient record of evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. sufficient record of evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The inquiring authority conducting the inquiry may also, separately from these proceedings, make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the employee. (2) Clause (1) shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded, or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. (3) All or any of the provisions of clause (1) may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, be waived where there is difficulty in observing exactly the requirements thereof and those requirements can, in the opinion of the inquiring authority, be waived without injustice to the person charged. " ( 7 ) AT this place, it will also be such inquiry and what is required from the employer to be done, before, a punishment of dismissal, in other words deprivation of livelihood, is inflicted. Honble supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer and others. AIR 1985 SC 1101, expressed the legal position in this regard in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Judgment in the following words : "5. We have extracted the charges framed against the appellant. We have also pointed out in clear terms the report of the Enquiry Officer. It is well-settled that a disciplinary enquiry has to be a quasi-judicial enquiry held according to the principles of natural justice and the Enquiry officer has a duty to act judicially. The Enquiry Officer did not apply his mind to the evidence. Save witnesses, he did not discuss the evidence. He merely recorded his ipse dixit that the charges are proved. He did not assign a single reason why the evidence produced by the appellant did not appeal to him or was considered not creditworthy. He did not permit a peep into his mind as to why the evidence produced by the management appealed to him in preference to the evidence produced by the appellant. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the Enquiry Officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well-settled to be supported by a precedent. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd, v. Union of India. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the Enquiry Officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well-settled to be supported by a precedent. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd, v. Union of India. (1966) 1 scr 466 : AIR 1966 SC 671 , this Court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. Similarly in Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1971) 1 SCR 201 : AIR 1970 SC 1302 , this Court reiterated that satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that appealed to the authority. It should all the more be so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. In this case the enquiry report is an order-sheet which merely produces the stage through which the enquiry passed. It clearly disclosed a total non-application of mind and it is this report on which the General Manager acted in terminating the service of the appellant. There could not have application of mind and it is such an enquiry which has found favour with the labour court and the High Court. " "6, Where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likelihood to cast a stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. The Court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order-sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no enquiry in this case worth the name and the order of termination based on such unsustainable. " ( 8 ) FROM a perusal of Regulation 36 quoted above, it is clear that there is a specific requirement with regard to the proceedings in question that they shall contain sufficient record of the evidence and statement of findings and the grounds thereof. " ( 8 ) FROM a perusal of Regulation 36 quoted above, it is clear that there is a specific requirement with regard to the proceedings in question that they shall contain sufficient record of the evidence and statement of findings and the grounds thereof. In other words, the rules of natural justice are applicable to the proceedings. The Constitution Bench of Honble Supreme Court after examining various cases. In case of S. N. Mukherfi v. Union of India. AIR 1990 SC 1984 held in para 38 as under : "the object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action. " As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon on the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory frame work whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. . . . . " ( 9 ) SHRI Ashok Khare, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, challenged that the enquiry report as well as the approval accorded by the Commission did not satisfy the requirement or principles of natural justice as required in Regulation 36. They failed to record reasons how the petitioner could be guilty of gross misconduct, gross insubordination, etc. for inflicting the extreme penalty also submitted that the decision of vitiated on account of bias as the members of the enquiry committee also participated in taking final decision against the petitioner. ( 10 ) SHRI S. S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, submitted that the petitioner in spite of the notice failed to appear before the Enquiry Authority and the Committee of management. The charges levelled against him remained uncontroverted. hence elaborate reasons were not required to be recorded. He submitted that as clause (2) of Regulation 36 was applicable, it excluded the application of clause (1) of Regulation 36. The charges levelled against him remained uncontroverted. hence elaborate reasons were not required to be recorded. He submitted that as clause (2) of Regulation 36 was applicable, it excluded the application of clause (1) of Regulation 36. Learned counsel also submitted that before the matter went to the Committee of Management filed writ petition in this court seeking a writ of submit papers to the Commission but in this writ petition, no defect in the proceedings were pointed out by the petitioner and as such he is estopped from pointing out any defect in proceedings and the decision in the writ petition. Committee of Management v. Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Service Commission, (1992) 2 UPLBEC 1261. ( 11 ) IT has also been submitted that Section 21 of the Act is analogous to Section 35 of U. P. Universities Act and as the Commission has examined all the charges after hearing both the parties and has found that the charges are established, the defects in the proceedings at earlier stages become wholly irrelevant and cannot help the petitioner in any way. ( 12 ) LASTLY, it has been submitted that this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the constitution, should not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Commission. Reliance has been placed in case of State Bank of India v. Samrendra Kishore and others. 1994 (4) SCC 537. ( 13 ) IN rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the power of approval conferred by Section 21 is only supervisory in nature to check arbitrariness. If the report of the enquiry Authority was vague and did not contain sufficient reasons, the defect could not be cured in the proceedings before the Commission. It has been further submitted that the findings of the Commission also are vague and illegal and do not satisfy the requirements of Regulations 32 and 36. Reliance has been placed in the case of imperial Tobacco Company v. its Workmen and of hers. AIR 1962 SC 1348 and Committee of Management Vishweshwar Saran Vaidik Inter college v. U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission and others, 1995 (3) SCC 244. ( 14 ) WE have thoroughly considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. We are fully conscious of the scope of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India. ( 14 ) WE have thoroughly considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. We are fully conscious of the scope of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India. This Court cannot interfere with the appreciation of evidence and the findings recorded and also on the quantum of punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority, unless it suffers from gross arbitrariness and is not commensurate with the charges levelled. Keeping in view the above legal position, our endeavour shall be to examine the process of decision making which has been challenged to be in violation of Regulations 32 and 36 quoted above. ( 15 ) THERE were total 62 charges levelled against the petitioner, out of which charges Nos. 10, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23, 28, 29, 30 and 31 have not been found proved by Commission against the petitioner. Rest of the 51 charges have been found established. charges to demonstrate how they have been dealt with by the participated in the proceedings before against the petitioner was that in spite of the service of registered letters dated 11. 8. 1988. petitioner did not place any work of the Committee of Management before the Manager and this way he committed gross neglect of duty. The reply of the petitioner to this charge was that in pursuance of the order of the State government, the authorised controller had already taken the charge and had started functioning. After receiving the letters of the management, he sought guidance from the District Inspector of schools but he did not reply and in the circumstances, he could not give any reply to the letters of the Committee of Management. The Commission has concluded on the basis of oral enquiry that delinquent principal addressed the Committee of Management as "so called" Committee of management in his letters while after the order of the High Court dated 11. 8. 1988, they were legal Committee of Management and this way the petitioner is guilty of not obeying the order of the High Court and the Committee of Management. There is no discussion about the contents of the letter written to the principal as to what work was substance, the only thing which appears objectionable from the findings is that the petitioner addressed the Committee of Management as "so-called-Committee of Management. There is no discussion about the contents of the letter written to the principal as to what work was substance, the only thing which appears objectionable from the findings is that the petitioner addressed the Committee of Management as "so-called-Committee of Management. ( 16 ) IN our opinion, there is no finding that petitioner committed any neglect of duty. It shall not be out of place to mention here that the Committee of Management had already been superseded by the State Government and it was functioning under the strength of the interim order. The d. I. O. S. also by his order dated 31. 8. 1991 had declared that there was no elected Committee of recognize the petitioner as Principal of the College. This order was also challenged in the writ petition and the interim order was obtained. In the Commission ought to have judged the conduct of the petitioner in the light of the pending litigation. The writ petitions had not been decided and probably they remained pending when the proceedings were pending before the Commission. If the petitioner referred them as "so-called" Committee of Management, it cannot be termed as a misconduct or neglect of duty or in any case a gross misconduct. ( 17 ) THE second charge against the petitioner was that the Manager sent letters dated 28. 10. 1988 and 17. 9. 1988 and 18. 9. 1988 to the petitioner but he refused to accept the same and thus he was guilty of neglect of duty and misconduct. The reply of the petitioner was that he never refused to accept any letter. The Manager instead of adopting usual procedure of sending letters through peon, sent them by registered post and in collusion with the postman, got them returned with the endorsement of refusal. He said that to prove this fact, the concerned clerk and the postman should have been examined. The Commission has concluded that letters dated 28. 10. 1988 and 17. 11. 1988 were sent to the petitioner by registered post. The original receipt and the registered cover with the endorsement of refusal have been seen. It has been concluded that the defence of the petitioner that it could have been sent through the college peon and it was sent by registered post only to create evidence, cannot be believed. 11. 1988 were sent to the petitioner by registered post. The original receipt and the registered cover with the endorsement of refusal have been seen. It has been concluded that the defence of the petitioner that it could have been sent through the college peon and it was sent by registered post only to create evidence, cannot be believed. Petitioner was not accepting Shri Lal Prabhat chand as Manager, hence the letters were rightly sent by registered post. So far as the defence of examining the clerk and postman is concerned, it has been said that such plea should have been raised by the petitioner before the Enquiry Authority and the Committee of Management, hence the charge is proved and he is guilty. ( 18 ) IN our opinion, even by accepting the said finding as such, no serious neglect to duty or gross misconduct is proved against the petitioner for which he could be dismissed from service. ( 19 ) THE third charge is that petitioner deposited 80% of the fee realised from the students In account No. 371 which was with regard to U. P. Board marks-sheets. This deposit was contrary to the provisions contained in Sections 5 (2) and (3) of Payment of Salaries Act, 1977 and regulation 3 (2) of the Regulations contained in Chapter III of the Intermediate Education Act. The defence of the petitioner was that the Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda, Shahjahanpur, vide his tetter dated 24. 11. 1988, communicated that the operation of the salary account has been stopped and the Bank refused to deposit 80% amount in the said account. The D. I. O. S. was informed about this by letters dated 14. 12. 1988 and 23. 1. 1989 and a direction was sought from the D. I. O. S. about deposit of the amount as to in which account the amount should be deposited. When no guidance was received, the amount was deposited in account No. 371 which could be operated by the Principal and the D. I. O. S. was informed about this fact by letter dated 11. 9. 1989. It was also submitted by him that the responsibility of the amount was of the D. I. O. S. and the amount could be deposited only under his direction. The salary account was under single hand operation, hence it was not thought necessary to enquire from the Manager. 9. 1989. It was also submitted by him that the responsibility of the amount was of the D. I. O. S. and the amount could be deposited only under his direction. The salary account was under single hand operation, hence it was not thought necessary to enquire from the Manager. It was also submitted that on deposit of the amount in Khata No. 371, some interest was earned which was also deposited in the account of the college. The Commission, however, has recorded a finding that from perusal of the record, it is clear that the principal in arbitrary way deposited the amount in khata No. 371 without obtaining authority. He should have obtained permission from the manager, hence he is guilty of insubordination and breach of Sections 5 (2) and 5 (3) of the payment of Salaries Act. In the finding, there is no discussion about the letters written by the petitioner addressed to the D. I. O. S. seeking permission. As in respect of the deposit of 80% amount of the fee collected from the students, only the Inspector could give general or specific order, the Commission has not considered the tetter of the Regional Manager of the Bank closing the salary account. In our opinion, such finding cannot be accepted as finding recorded in accordance with law, i. e. . Regulation 36, and as required by Hon"ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra ). ( 20 ) IN respect of charges Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 also the Commission has recorded finding in the same manner. The defence of the petitioner was that as the payment of small amount was involved, the suppliers were not ready to accept crossed cheque, hence they were given bearer cheque. He also stated that the entries in the relevant books was the responsibility of the concerned clerk and he cannot be held responsible for the neglect of duty. However, without discussing the charges in detail, they have been accepted to be proved. ( 21 ) CHARGE No. 8 was that the old answer books were sold for an amount of Rs. 1,237 but in the account only Rs. 237 were deposited. An amount of Rs. 1,000 was not deposited. The charge was that it was misused by the petitioner. The defence was that the charge is wholly concocted. He stated that the amount of Rs. 1,237 but in the account only Rs. 237 were deposited. An amount of Rs. 1,000 was not deposited. The charge was that it was misused by the petitioner. The defence was that the charge is wholly concocted. He stated that the amount of Rs. 237 was received on sale of the concluded that from the evidence and report, it is proved that old answer books were sold for Rs. 1. 237 and misuse of Rs. 1,000 is proved. There is no discussion of evidence. There is been proved. It is merely ipsi dixtt of the Commission. ( 22 ) CHARGE No. 9 was with regard to misappropriation of the amount of Rs. 37,500 which was received as grant from the State Government for purchasing instruments relating to subject science. Initially this amount was deposited in account of Reading Room, but subsequently it was transferred in the Post Office. The defence of the petitioner was that he had constituted a committee for purchasing the instruments which may be ascertained from the record of the college and he is not possessed of the said amount. He also stated that he does not remember how much amount was spent but he is certain that the amount which was saved was returned to the Government. The Commission has concluded that from the evidence and the enquiry report, charge is proved. There is no discussion of any kind about the evidence. ( 23 ) THERE are 51 charges which the Commission has found to be proved. We have examined closely almost every charge and position of all the charges is more or less the same as stated above. The charges have been found proved without discussing the nature of evidence and without saying anything why the defence of the petitioner could not be accepted. It is true that petitioner did not participate in the disciplinary enquiry at the stage it was pending before the enquiry Committee and the Committee of Management. But once the Commission had taken on itself to examine all the charges threadbare and de novo. the Commission was under obligation to record findings in terms of Regulation 36 and as required by Honble Supreme Court in reasonings in the findings is clear violation of the principles of natural justice. Before learned single judge. But once the Commission had taken on itself to examine all the charges threadbare and de novo. the Commission was under obligation to record findings in terms of Regulation 36 and as required by Honble Supreme Court in reasonings in the findings is clear violation of the principles of natural justice. Before learned single judge. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that in enquiry report and in the management, findings have not been recorded as required under Regulations 35 to 37. The learned single Judge repelled the contention in the following words : ". . . . . The argument that the enquiry report is not a reasoned one and the petitioner has been held guilty merely because of his non-participation in the enquiry is not correct. In any case the whole thing has been examined by the Commission at considerable length its own conclusions about the charges being proved or not proved. The findings of guilty recorded by charges is a finding of fact based on appraisal of material on record and I do not find any error in the decision making process so as to warrant interference with the findings of fact recorded by the commission. . . . . " ( 24 ) WITH great respect, we feel that the learned single Judge repelled the contention of the petitioner without examining the findings recorded by the Commission as to whether they satisfied the requirement of law. In our opinion, even the Commission did not discuss the nature of evidence and record reasons for accepting the same and that how the charges had been proved. It was a minimum requirement under Regulation 36. The Commission has found that 51 charges have been proved. We have mentioned above some of the charges. We do not think it necessary to over-burden this judgment by discussing all the 51 charges. ( 25 ) IN our considered opinion, the conclusions recorded by the Commission cannot be approved and they suffer from manifest illegality. ( 26 ) AS the petitioner is entitled to succeed in this appeal on the first submission, we do not think it necessary to consider the allegation of bias against the Committee of Management while passing the resolution of dismissal against the petitioner. ( 26 ) AS the petitioner is entitled to succeed in this appeal on the first submission, we do not think it necessary to consider the allegation of bias against the Committee of Management while passing the resolution of dismissal against the petitioner. ( 27 ) THE next important question is what relief can and should be granted to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case. There is no doubt that relationship between the petitioner and the Committee of Management was not smooth from the very beginning and they were involved in dozens of cases, some of which are still pending in this Court. If petitioner is reinstated in the College, there is every possibility that the litigation will continue further and it may not be in the interest of the academic atmosphere of the College. At the same time, it is also necessary to protect the interest of the petitioner who has been illegally dismissed from service by the Committee of Management, and was deprived of functioning as Principal for long time. ( 28 ) IN the affidavit filed in support of the application for interim order, filed in Special Appeal, petitioner has stated his age as 54 years. The appeal was filed in 1995. Thus, the petitioner by now may have attained the age of 58 years and he may have only about two years to serve in office. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the ends of justice will be served if the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner is set aside and he is directed to be paid 50% of salary for the period he has not been allowed to work and from the date of this order till he attains the age of 60 years, i. e. . the date of superannuation, he may be paid his full salary admissible in law. But we also leave it open to the Committee of management and the D. I. O. S. to take work from the petitioner as Principal either in the College or he may be transferred to any other College in accordance with the provisions of the Act and rules applicable. ( 29 ) FOR the reasons stated above. the following reliefs are granted in the appeal : " (a) This appeal is allowed. The Judge dated 19. 7. ( 29 ) FOR the reasons stated above. the following reliefs are granted in the appeal : " (a) This appeal is allowed. The Judge dated 19. 7. 1995, impugned in this appeal, is set aside. (b) Writ petition No. 8442 of 1993 is allowed and the resolution of the Committee of management dated 15. 12. 1991 and approval granted by the Commission on 18. 2. 1993 are quashed. (c) The petitioner shall be entitled and shall be paid 50% of his salary, for which he could have been entitled during the period he was not allowed to work on the post of principal after deducting the suspension allowance, if any, said to him. From the date of this order, he shall be deemed the post and shall be entitled for the full salary and all other allowances admissible to him in law as principal of the College. (d) The D. I. O. S. is directed to examine the possibility and feasibility as to whether the petitioner may discharge his duties as principal in the College without creating any kind of disturbance to the academic atmosphere. (e) If such a possibility is ruled out, the D. I. O. S. shall consider the possibility. if petitioner can be transferredunder the provisions of the Act to some other College for the remaining period of his service. " ( 30 ) THERE will be no order as to costs. .