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1999 DIGILAW 985 (RAJ)

Radha v. Board of Revenue

1999-08-06

J.C.VERMA

body1999
JUDGMENT 1. - Admitted facts in the writ petition are that one Nand Lal was the Muafidar of the agricultural land situated in village Gothiyana Tehsil Kishangarh. Muafies were resumed in Samwat 2015 (year 1958) by way of notification issued by the State Government under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. The dispute relates to the old khasra Nos. 66, 68, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 97, 98 and 104 measuring 63 Bigha 8 Biswa (now New khasra Nos. 6 & 7). Said Shri Nand Lal died in the year 1962 after the resumption of muafi land. It is also the common case of the parties that Bhanwar Lai and Madan Lal (now non-petitioner Nos. 4 and 5), the sons of deceased Muafidar filed a suit for declaration and possession against Mangla and Ghinsa in the court of Assistant Collector, Kishangarh in the year 1972 with the averments that the above said disputed land was given on 'theka' (on yearly lease) to the said Mangla and Ghinsa, the predecessors of the present petitioners by Nand Lal in Samvat year 2015 for one year for grazing cattle at the rate of Rs. 80/- per year. A claim was made that the predecessors of the petitioners, i.e. defendants in the suit had not paid 'theka' amount to the plaintiffs for the Samvat year 2026, 2027 and 2028 (corresponding years 1969, 1970 and 1971 of Chiristan era). A further prayer has been made that the defendant in the suit had got the mutation sanctioned in their favour. The compensation was also claimed .15 times of the annual rent for the subsequent year from 1961 onwards. 2. The petitioners i.e. the defendants denied the averments in the suit taking up the plea that the land in question was never a khudkasht or khatedari of said Jagirdar Nand Lal. The compensation was also claimed .15 times of the annual rent for the subsequent year from 1961 onwards. 2. The petitioners i.e. the defendants denied the averments in the suit taking up the plea that the land in question was never a khudkasht or khatedari of said Jagirdar Nand Lal. A further plea was taken that said Mangla and Ghinsa were the inducted tenants from Muafidar and in any case after resumption of the Muafi they have become the khatedars; and another plea was taken that said Nand Lal had voluntarily recognised the long standing possession of the defendant petitioners before the Panchayat and had also given a consent for opening the mutation in favour of the predecessors of the present petitioners and consequently the Panchayat had opened the mutation in favour of said two persons Mangla and Ghinsa in August, 1961 as per mutation which was exhibited as Annexure-D in the trial court and attached as Annexure-B in the writ petition. 3. The trial court had framed certain issues. The evidence was led, documents were filed, the Assistant Collector, Kishangarh decreed the suit in favour of the petitioners on 4.6.1974 vide Annexure-D, however, the same was reversed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur vide his judgment dated 28.8.1976 and the decree passed by the Assistant Collector, Kishangarh was set aside. It was held by the Revenue Appellate Authority that admittedly the land in question remains in possession of Mangla and Ghinsa at the time much prior to the resumption of Muafi land. It was further held that the land was not in khudkasht of Nand Lal and the defendants have become the khatedar of the land. Copy of the judgment of Revenue Appellate Authority is attached as Annexure-E. The plaintiffs in the suit had challenged the order Annexure-E before the Board of Revenue and the Board of Revenue had accepted the second appeal on 30.12.1983 by reversing the judgment of Revenue Appellate Authority vide its order Annexure-H. Now, the petitioners have come up in the writ petition for quashing the order of the Board of Revenue and for restoring the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority. 4. Reply has been filed by the private respondents. It is stated that Mangla and Ghinsa were never admitted as tenants or sub-tenants but these two persons were only given 120 Bighas for grazing the cattle on an yearly the of Rs. 4. Reply has been filed by the private respondents. It is stated that Mangla and Ghinsa were never admitted as tenants or sub-tenants but these two persons were only given 120 Bighas for grazing the cattle on an yearly the of Rs. 80/- for the first time in Samvat year 2015. The possession of the said persons has been denied, however, it is admitted that Nand Lal on resumption of Muafi received part of compensation and the remaining part was received by the answering non-petitioners in the writ petition. It has been denied that Mangla and Ghinsa had ever become khatedar tenants of the land. It was submitted that the mutation was got attested in collusion with the Sarpanch. It is further submitted that the father of the answering respondent had never sold this land for Rs. 800/- as alleged in the written statement filed in the suit. It is the further case of the answering respondent in the writ petition that Nand Lal had been recorded as khudkasht and, therefore, he automatically became khatedar tenant in view of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act read with Section 11 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for the reason that khudkasht land is saved from the voices of Jagir Act in favour of Jagirdar and, therefore, the petitioners had no right on the land in question. 5. The Board of Revenue has set aside the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority on the ground that after expiry of one year of 'theka' granted in Samvat year 2016, the predecessors of the present petitioners had not returned back the land despite having been made such a request and, therefore, they had become trespassers on the land itself. Board of Revenue had also doubted the entry of mutation in the names of the defendants in the suit on the ground that the said sale-deed Ex.D-1 was written on a simple paper and, therefore, could not be treated as a document conferring any right for entering in the mutations. The Appellate Authority in Annexure-B had primarily accepted the appeal on the evidence of the plaintiff Madan Lal PW-1 who is said to have stated that the land in question had been resumed prior to Samvat year 2015 and the compensation in regard to the said land had also been accepted by the plaintiffs. The Appellate Authority in Annexure-B had primarily accepted the appeal on the evidence of the plaintiff Madan Lal PW-1 who is said to have stated that the land in question had been resumed prior to Samvat year 2015 and the compensation in regard to the said land had also been accepted by the plaintiffs. It was also observed that the plaintiff had failed to produce the revenue record as to when the plaintiffs had become khatedars after resuming the land. It was also found that the present writ petitioners were in possession of the land at the time of resumption and the filing of the suit itself shows that they continued to be in possession right upto filing of the suit i.e. for more than 14 years at the time of filing of the suit. Khudkasht had been defined as part of the land which is cultivated personally by an estate holder including the land recorded as khudkasht, sir or havala in the settlement records. It was held by the Revenue Appellate Authority that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the land to be khudkasht, onus of which was on the plaintiffs themselves. For the reasons that the compensation had been accepted by the Jagirdar, the land was not a khudkasht of the Jagirdar and the defendants being in possession of the land were entitled to retain the land. It has been repeatedly held in (1) 1967 RRD 72 and (2) 1967 RRD 119 that the khudkasht means two things i.e. it should be cultivated personally and also so be recorded as such as well. If the land had been given on 'theka' for the purpose of grazing, it is proved that the land in any case was not being cultivated personally by the Jagirdar, otherwise the land would not have been given by him for grazing which is an admitted fact. It is also admitted fact that even though the land in question was given for grazing for one year, it was in possession of the petitioners right upto 1972 and was ordered to be evicted by the Assistant Collector. U/s.22 of the Jagir Act, from the date of resumption of jagir land, all the rights, title and interest of the Jagirdar and every other person claiming through him in the Jagir Act vest in the State free from all encumberances. U/s.22 of the Jagir Act, from the date of resumption of jagir land, all the rights, title and interest of the Jagirdar and every other person claiming through him in the Jagir Act vest in the State free from all encumberances. Section 23 is exception to Section 22 but the question if arises is to be decided by the Jagir Commissioner. 6. Section 26 provides for compensation to the every Jagirdar whose Jagir lands are resumed under section 21. The compensation is to be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in the second schedule. In my opinion, if it was admitted fact of the plaintiffs that they have received compensation of the land resumed including the land in question; it is not understandable how any of the predecessors of the Jagirdar could claim back the land in question after about 14 years by filing a suit against the present petitioners. The result would in such circumstances be that the Jagirdar whose land has been resumed would keep the price/compensation of the land and also the land itself. This aspect of the case has been fully discussed by the lower appellate authority but has escaped the attention of the Board of Revenue. 7. In my opinion, the judgment of the Board of Revenue in accepting the appeal of the non-petitioner respondent was not correct as no suit even otherwise lay after 14 years for recovery of the land of resumed jagir for which even the Jagirdar was paid the compensation which was an admitted fact. Viewing from another side as well even though not taken up by any of the party, but Section 63(4) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act extinguishes the right of the tenants if such tenant is deprived of possession and his right of possession by the period of limitation. 8. For the reasons mentioned above, I hold that no suit was maintainable and set aside the order of the Board of Revenue (Annexure-H) and restore the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority (Annexure-E). The writ petition is allowed with no order as to costs.Petition Allowed. *******