Judgment : The petitioner-Corporation is a partnership doing business in conducting chits and finance. The non-banking financial institutions like the petitioner used to accept the deposits from the public. According to the petitioner, the finance business in Tamil Nadu is in vogue from time immemorial. Chapter III B and C of the Reserve Bank of India Act as amended in Ordinance No.2 of 1997 deals with receiving deposits by non-banking financial institutions. The impugned amendment under Act 23 of 1997 has been enacted by amending certain provisions. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition. 2. Themain grievance of the petitioner in this case is that by way of the impugned amendment, the petitioner is prohibited from getting deposits from the public. To appreciate the grievance of the petitioner, it is necessary to appreciate the relevant provisions of the said Act. 3. Chapter III-B of the said Act was introduced for enabling the Reserve Bank of India to obtain returns and informations from non-banking financial institutions accepting deposits from the members of the general public with a view to regulate the business of acceptance of deposits by non-banking financial institutions in the public interest. Sec.45-1 deals with definitions of the terms mentioned in the said Chapter. Sec.45-1 deals with definitions of the terms mentioned in the said Chapter. 45-I(bb) defines ‘deposit’ which reads as follows: “(bb) - ‘deposit’ includes and shall be deemed always to have included any receipt of money by way of deposit or loan or in any other form, but does not includes: .(i) amounts raised by way of share capital; .(ii) amounts contributed as capital by partners of firm; (iii) amounts received from a scheduled bank or a co-operative bank or any other banking company as defined in clause(c) of Sec.6 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949; .(iv) any amount received from- .(a) the Development Bank, .(b) a State Financial Corporation, .(c) any financial institution specified in or under Sec.6-A of the Industrial Development Bank of India Act, 1964, or .(d) any other institution that may be specified by the Bank in this behalf; .(v) amount received in the ordinary course of business by way of- .(a) security deposit, .(b) dealership deposit, .(c) earnest money, or .(d) advance against orders for goods, properties or services; .(vi) any amount received from an individual or a firm or an association of individuals not being a body corporate, registered under any enactment relating to money lending which is for the time being in force in any State; and (vii) any amount received by way of subscriptions in respect of a chit. Explanation I: ‘chit’ has the meaning assigned to it in clause (b) of Sec.2 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982, Explanation 11: Any credit given by a seller to a buyer on the sale of any property (Whether movable or immovable) shall not be deemed to be deposited for the purpose of this clause)”. The non-banking institutions also are defined under Sec.45-I(e) of the Act. Sec.45S provided that no individual or firm or un-incorporated association of individuals shall, at any time have deposits from more than the number of depositors mentioned therein. 4. Under Ordinance 2 of 1997 certain provisions have been amended. The non-banking institutions also are defined under Sec.45-I(e) of the Act. Sec.45S provided that no individual or firm or un-incorporated association of individuals shall, at any time have deposits from more than the number of depositors mentioned therein. 4. Under Ordinance 2 of 1997 certain provisions have been amended. After clause (e) of 45-1 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, a fresh clause (f) has been inserted which defines-non-banking financial company” and consequential amendments have been made in the said Ordinance by introducing a new Section which has been substituted in Sec.45-S of the Principal Act, which reads as follows: “45-S. Deposits not to be accepted in certain cases: (1) Subject to the provisions of Chapter III-B, no person, other than a body cooperate, shall accept any deposit; Provided that an individual may accept deposit from:(a) his relative; and (b) any other individual only for his personal use but not for lending or business purpose. (2) Where any person other than a body corporate holds any deposit on the 1st day April, 1997 which is not in accordance with Sub-sec.(l), such deposit shall be repaid by the person immediately after such deposit becomes due for repayment or within two years from the date of such commencement, whichever is earlier. (3.) On and from the date of 1st day of April, 1997, no person other than a body corporate shall issue or cause to be issued any advertisement in any form for soliciting deposit. Explanation: For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be a relative of another if, and only if: .(i) they are members of a Hindu undivided family; or .(ii) they are husband and wife; or (iii) the one is related to the other in the manner indicated in the List of relatives below: List of relatives: 1. father, 2 mother (including step-mother). 3. son (including step-son) 4. sons wife, 5. daughter (including stepdaughter), 6. fathers father, 7. fathers mother, 8. mothers mother, 9. mothers father, 10. sons son, 11. sons sons wife, 12. sons daughter, 13. sons daughters husband, 14. daughters husband, 15. daughters son, 16. daughters sons wife, 17. daughters daughter, 18. daughters daughters husband, 19. brother (including step-brother), 20. brothers wife, 21. sister (including-step-sister) 22. sisters husband”. 5. Subsequently, under the impugned Act 23 of 1997. mothers mother, 9. mothers father, 10. sons son, 11. sons sons wife, 12. sons daughter, 13. sons daughters husband, 14. daughters husband, 15. daughters son, 16. daughters sons wife, 17. daughters daughter, 18. daughters daughters husband, 19. brother (including step-brother), 20. brothers wife, 21. sister (including-step-sister) 22. sisters husband”. 5. Subsequently, under the impugned Act 23 of 1997. a mew section has been substituted for Sec.45-S which reads as follows: “45-S. Deposits not to be accepted in certain cases: (1) No person, being an individual or a firm or an unincorporated association of individuals shall, accept any deposit: .(i) if his or its business wholly of partly includes any of the activities specified in clause (c)of Sec.45-I,or .(ii) if his or its principal business is that of receiving of deposits under any scheme or arrangement or in any other manner, or lending in any manner; .Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall apply to the receipt of money by an individual by way of loan from any of his relatives or to the receipt of money by a firm by way of loan from the relative or relatives of any of the partners. .(2) Where any person referred to in Sub-sec.(1) holds any deposit on the 1st day of April, 1997 which is not in accordance with Sub-sec.(l), such deposit shall be repaid by that person immediately after such deposit becomes due for repayment or within three years from the date of such commencement, whichever is earlier: .Provided that if the Bank is satisfied on an application made by any person to the Bank that such person is unable to repay a part of the deposits for reason beyond his control or such repayment shall cause extreme hardship to him, it may, by an order in writing, extend such period by a period not exceeding one year subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order. .(3) On and from the 1st day of April, 1997, no person referred to in Sub-sec.(l) shall issue or cause to be issued any advertisement in any form for soliciting deposit. .(3) On and from the 1st day of April, 1997, no person referred to in Sub-sec.(l) shall issue or cause to be issued any advertisement in any form for soliciting deposit. .Explanation: For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be a relative of another if, and only if: .(i) they are members of a Hindu undivided family; or .(ii) they are husband and wife; or (iii) the one is related to the other in the manner indicated in the List of relatives below: List of relatives: 1. Father, 2 mother (including step-mother). 3. son (including step-son) 4. sons wife, 5. daughter (including stepdaughter), 6. fathers father, 7. fathers mother, 8. mothers mother, 9. mothers father, 10. sons son, 11. sons sons wife, 12. sons daughter, 13. sons daughters husband, 14. daughters husband, 15. daughters son, 16. daughters sons wife, 17. daughters daughter, 18. daughters daughters husband, 19. brother (including step-brother), 20. brothers wife, 21. sister (including-step-sister) 22. Sisters husband”. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had submitted that under the guise of restrictions, the petitioner is prohibited from getting deposits from the public and thereby the Reserve Bank of India is trying to interfere with the petitioners business in getting deposits or loans for business purpose. He has also submitted that the entire business is regulated by Chit Fund Act, 1982, and the impugned restriction is redundant. He has also submitted that because of the said prohibition the petitioner is not able to carry on the business and so it offends Art.l9(l)(g) of the Constitution, apart from Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. While referring to Art. 14, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that no such prohibition has been imposed, against the companies, and so the petitioner alone has been singled out and so it cannot be said that it is a reasonable classification. I am not in a position to accept the same. 7. On a reading of the above said provisions, it is clear that it is only with a view to safeguard the interest of the depositors the said enactment has been made by amending the provisions and also to control and regulate the deposits which include every kind of borrowings. 8. While dealing with the similar issue, the Division Bench of this Court in Mayavaram Financial Corpn. 8. While dealing with the similar issue, the Division Bench of this Court in Mayavaram Financial Corpn. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India (1971)41 C.C. 890 , has held that the notification issued (in that case) was necessitated because of the necessity for the Reserve Bank of India to have effective control over the deposits received by non-banking financial institutions, and non-banking institutions were receiving deposits from the public and utilising the same to advance money to others. It has also observed that the amount received by chit fund companies by way of deposit from the public is lent out to third parties at higher rate of interest and that consequentially the impugned directions were valid. 9. Onan occasion when the provisions of the Miscellaneous Non Banking Companies (Reserve Bank) Directions (1973) were challenged, Padmanabhan, J., as he then was, in the decision in A.S.P. Aiyar v. Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta A.S.P. Aiyar v. Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta A.S.P. Aiyar v. Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta , A.I.R. 1983 Mad. 330 has upheld the said provisions and also the directions issued thereunder, while rejecting the contention of the learned counsel on the basis of the violation of Art.l9(l)(g) of the Constitution of India, the learned Judge has held as follows: “There is no substance in the contention that the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution is in any manner affected. So far as the Chit Fund company is concerned the directions do not in any manner affect the business of the company as it only restricts the power of the company to borrow from certain quarters and in a particular manner. I am unable to understand how the petitioners’ fundamental right can be affected when the Directions only place restriction on the power of the chit fund company to borrow. I therefore, reject the argument based on Art.19 of the Constitution of India.” 10. Another Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Subramaniam v. Reserve Bank of India , (1985)57 C.C. 755 while dealing with the appeal filed against the decision in A.S.P.Aiyar v. Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta A.S.P.Aiyar v. Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta A.S.P.Aiyar v. Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta , A.I.R. 1983 Mad. Another Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Subramaniam v. Reserve Bank of India , (1985)57 C.C. 755 while dealing with the appeal filed against the decision in A.S.P.Aiyar v. Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta A.S.P.Aiyar v. Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta A.S.P.Aiyar v. Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta , A.I.R. 1983 Mad. 330 has held as follows: “In the light of these statutory provisions, the contentions urged by Mr.Radhakrishnan, the learned counsel for the appellant, have to be considered. Firstly, Mr.Radhakrishnan contends that in view of the the fact that the 1977 Directions defined a ‘deposit’ as having the same meaning assigned to it under Sec.45-I(bb) of the Act, the Reserve Bank would have no jurisdiction to restrict the receipt of deposit by a non-banking institutions in any manner. According to him, the definition of a ‘deposit’ in the 1977 Directions would render the 1973 Directions invalid and bad in law and the restrictions placed by the 1973 Directions would violate the right of the appellant under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The validity of Secs.45-J to 45-L of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, and the Reserve Bank Directions of 1966 were challenged as being ultra vires, the powers conferred on the Reserve Bank of India before the bench of this Court in Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India , (1971)41 C.C. 890 (Mad.) and the Division Bench has upheld the validity of the said Directions and held that the directions were warranted because of the necessity for the Reserve Bank of India to have control over the deposits received by non-banking financial institutions which have risen to nearly Rs.209.1, crores in March, 1965, and the fact that the non-banking institutions were receiving deposits from the public and utilising the same to advance money to others at higher rates of interest requires to be regulated in public interest. Mr.Radhakrishnan the learned counsel for the appellant, seeks to distinguish that case on the ground that the restrictions introduced in the 1973 Directions on the shareholders’ right to borrow from any person and to lend it to the company was not in the 1966 Directions and, therefore, the court was not called upon to decide the validity of the directions in the light of the departure made by the 1973 directions. According to the learned counsel, there is no public interest involved in bringing in such restrictions on the shareholders’ right to borrow and lend. The learned counsel refers to an instance of a shareholder mortgaging his property and borrowing money and then coming forward to deposit the same with the company in which he is a shareholder with a view to give relief to the company from any financial stress and the restrictions on such borrowing and lending cannot be in public interest. But so long as the object of the directions is to bring in a measure of control over the deposits received by company from members of the public, the restriction imposed on the shareholders right to borrow and lend it to the company will also come within the object sought to he achieved by issuing the directions. It may be that but for the above restrictions on the right of the shareholders, the company may get over the relevant restrictive provisions of the directions. It is only to plug such a loopwhole the restriction has also been brought in on the shareholders’ right should be taken to be ancillary or incidental to the main provisions which are intended to serve public interest. The 1973 Directions are designed to introduce some measure of control over non-banking companies inviting and accepting deposits to the ultimate interest of the depositors and by compelling limited liquidity in resources, the society at large was sought to be protected from the ever haunting spectre of sickness in industry often conveniently resorted to by the private sector companies. We are, therefore, of the view that the principle laid down in Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India (1971)41 C.C. 890 (Mad.) will squarely apply here and, therefore, the 1973 Directions should be held to be constitutionally valid and enforceable”. 11. 11. Even with respect to the argument on the basis of Art.14 of the Constitution, the said Division Bench has further held as follows: “Coming to the third contention that the classification of the deposits on the basis of the source is discriminatory and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution, we do not see how that classification will amount to a hostile discrimination which would attract Art. 14. It is true that in the year 1974, a. 45-1 (bb) was introduced in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, and that definition, as has been extracted above, defines ‘deposit’ as including any money received by a non banking company by way of deposit or loan without making a difference between a loan or a deposit taken from a shareholder and the deposit and loan taken from a non-shareholder. The mere fact that the Reserve Bank of India defined the expression ‘deposit’ in a slightly different manner will not make the earlier provision in the 1973 Directions invalid. According to the learned counsel, the 1973 Directions should be read in the light of the definition of ‘deposit’ in Sec.45-I(bb) in which case the distinction made in the 1973 Directions between the deposit from a shareholder and a deposit from a non-shareholder would have to go after 1974. But, however, we are not in a position to agree with the contention of the* learned counsel. Even assuming that the 1973 Directions should be read subject to the definition of deposit’ in Sec.45-I(b) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, still we do not see how it prevents the Reserve Bank from bringing in a restriction on the deposits made by a shareholder to the company. As already stated, there is a possibility of the shareholder being used as a media by the company for getting over the regulations or restrictions proposed to be imposed on the deposits received by the company from the members of the public and to get over such a situation, the Reserve Bank can bring in ancillary or incidental provision to regulate the deposits of shareholders as well. The shareholders deposit will not come within the ambit of the regulations provided he has not received deposits from the members of the public and utilised the same for making the deposit in the company. We are of the view that this objection also is not tenable.“ 12. The shareholders deposit will not come within the ambit of the regulations provided he has not received deposits from the members of the public and utilised the same for making the deposit in the company. We are of the view that this objection also is not tenable.“ 12. The impugned provision, as stated above, has been made only to safeguard the interest of the public and the same is having reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved. In the decision in Jalan Trading Co. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha Jalan Trading Co. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha Jalan Trading Co. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha , A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 691 the Apex Court has held as follows: “If the classification is not patently arbitrary, the court will not rule it discriminatory merely because it involves hardship or inequality of burden. With a view to secure particular objects a scheme may be selected by the legislature, wisdom whereof may be open to debate, it may even be demonstrated that the scheme is not the best in the circumstances and the choice of the Legislature may be shown to be erroneous, but unless the enactment fails to satisfy the dual test of intelligible classifications and rationality of the relation with the object of the law, it will not be subject to judicial interference under Art. 14. Invalidity of legislation is not established by merely finding faults with the scheme adopted by the Legislature to achieve the purpose it has in view. Equal treatment of unequal objects, transactions or persons is not liable to be struck down as discriminatory unless there is simultaneously absence of a rational relation to the object intended to be achieved by the law. Plea of invalidity of Sec. 10 on the ground that it infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution must, therefore, fail.” 13. Raising finance by way of deposits became attractive because, no security need be given and no approval from any authorities was needed. The Reserve Bank of India also noticed the mushooring of companies, some of which had the object of cheating the unwary public by offering unworkable rates of interest and incentives. Raising finance by way of deposits became attractive because, no security need be given and no approval from any authorities was needed. The Reserve Bank of India also noticed the mushooring of companies, some of which had the object of cheating the unwary public by offering unworkable rates of interest and incentives. The Reserve Bank of India in the role of the Central Bank of the country, entrusted with the task of controlling and regulating the credit of the country, could not sit idle when the corporate sector and the unincorporated bodies were going on raising finance through public deposits in an unbridled manner. In the decision in Peerless General F & ICo., Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India Peerless General F & ICo., Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India Peerless General F & ICo., Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India , A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1033 the Apex Court has recognised the role of Reserve Bank, which reads as follows: “The combined reading of the above provisions unmistakably goes to show that the Reserve Bank of India, if considered necessary in the public interest so to do, can specify the conditions subject to which any prospectus of advertisement for soliciting, deposits of money from public may be issued. It can also give directions to non-banking institution in respect of deposits, including rates of interest payable on such deposits and purpose for which the deposits may be received. This later power flows from Sub-sec.(3) of the Sec.45-K of the Act. The Bank under these provisions can give directions in respect of any matters relating to or connected with receipt of deposits. In our view, a very wide power is given to the Reserve Bank of India to issue direction in respect of any matters relating to or connected with the receipt of deposits..” Again the Apex Court observes as follows: “Before examining the scope and effect of impugned paragraphs 6 and 12 of the Directions of 1987, it is also important to note that the Reserve Bank of India which is bankers bank is a creature of statute. It has large contingent of expert advice relating to matters directing the economy of entire country and nobody can doubt the bona fide of the Reserve Bank of India in issuing impugned directions of 1987. It has large contingent of expert advice relating to matters directing the economy of entire country and nobody can doubt the bona fide of the Reserve Bank of India in issuing impugned directions of 1987. The Reserve Bank of India plays important role in the economy and financial affairs of India and one of its important functions is to regulate the banking system of the country. It is the duty of the Reserve Bank of India to safeguard the economy and financial stability of the country”. Finally the Apex Court gives a caution to the courts in the following words: “Courts are not to interfere with the economic policy which is the function of the experts. It is not the function of the court to sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to expert body. In such matters’ even experts can seriously and doubtelessly differ. The courts cannot be expected to decide them without even aid of experts..” 14. Further, the Apex Court in the decision in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Private Limited Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Private Limited Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Private Limited , A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1023 has held as follows: “I share my brothers concern about the mushroom growth of financial companies all over the country. Such companies have proliferated. The victims of the schemes, that are attractively put forward in public media, are mostly middle class and lower middle class people. Instances are legion where such needy people have been reduced penniless because of the fraud played by such financial vultures. It is necessary for the Authorities to evolve fool-proof schemes to see that fraud is not allowed to be played upon persons who are not conversant with the practice of such financial enterprises who pose themselves as benefactors of people..” 15. It is necessary for the Authorities to evolve fool-proof schemes to see that fraud is not allowed to be played upon persons who are not conversant with the practice of such financial enterprises who pose themselves as benefactors of people..” 15. Even with respect to the prejudice caused to the petitioner as submitted, in view of the amendment, the discussion made in the decision in Narendra Kumar v. Union of India A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 430, could be the answer, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “In applying the test of reasonableness, the court has to consider the question in the background of the facts and circumstances under which the order was made, taking into account the nature of the evil that was sought to be remedied by such law, the ratio of the harm caused to the individual citizens by the proposed remedy, to the beneficial effect reasonably expected to result to the general public. It will also be necessary to consider in that connection whether the restraint caused by the law is more than was necessary in the interests of the general public.” 16. Inthe present case, 1 have not doubt in my mind that the impugned amendments have been made after a careful study of the present trends in the economy of the country and solely with a view to protect the interest of the public. So I do not find any merits in the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in challenging the said provisions. 17. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the companies which are dealing with similar business have been permitted to receive deposits and so the petitioner cannot be discriminated. On that basis the learned counsel has further submitted that the provisions impugned offend Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel also has submitted that with respect to companies certain protections and regulations have been made for the purpose of receiving deposits. The said restrictions and protections could be made applicable to the petitioner and thereby the petitioner can be permitted to receive deposits, and there is no necessity to make the amendment restricting the petitioner from receiving deposits. I am not in a position to accept the said submission. Even from the submission made by the learned counsel, the companies form one class in view of the above said fact. I am not in a position to accept the said submission. Even from the submission made by the learned counsel, the companies form one class in view of the above said fact. So the petitioner cannot compare itself with the said class of companies. Until such restrictions are being made with reference to the institutions other than the company, the petitioner cannot equate itself with the said class of companies or corporate bodies. So the said submission of the learned counsel cannot be sustained. Even with respect to the argument on the basis of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, the amendment does not in any manner affect the business of the petitioner as it only restricts the power to get deposits as defined under the said Act. It cannot be said that the impugned amendment is prohibiting the petitioner from carrying on its business. The fundamental right for trading activities as guaranteed under Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution has not been infringed by the impugned amendment. The fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19 of the Constitution are not absolute but subject to reasonable restrictions to be imposed against the enjoyment of such rights. Such reasonable restriction seeks to strike a balance between the freedom guaranteed by any of the clauses under Art. 19(1) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) under Art. 19. While dealing with the scope of right guaranteed under Art. 19(1) of the Constitution, the Apex Court in the decision in Krishnan Kakkanth v. Government of Kerala (1997)9 S.C.C. 495 , has held as follows: “The reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of the interests of general public and not from the standpoint of the persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed or upon abstract consideration. A restriction cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, it operates hardly and even if the persons affected be petty traders Mohd. Hanif v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731. A restriction cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, it operates hardly and even if the persons affected be petty traders Mohd. Hanif v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731. In determining the infringement of the right guaranteed under Art. 19(1), the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, enter into judicial verdict Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P. (1981)2 S.C.C. 600 : A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 873, D.K.Trivedi and Sons, and Harakchand Ratanchand Bhanthia v. Union of India (1969)2 S.C.C. 166 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1453. Under clause (1)(g) of Art. 19, every citizen has a freedom and right to choose his own employment or take up any trade or calling subject only to the limits as may be imposed by the State in the interests of public welfare and the other grounds mentioned in clause (6) of Art. 19 But it may be emphasised that the Constitution does not recognise franchise or rights to business which are dependent on grants by the State or business affected by public interest Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. , (1955)1 S.C.R. 707 : A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728. It may be indicated that where a right is conferred on a particular individual or group of individuals to the exclusion of others, the reasonableness of restrictions has to be determined with reference to the circumstances relating to the trade or business in question. It may be indicated that where a right is conferred on a particular individual or group of individuals to the exclusion of others, the reasonableness of restrictions has to be determined with reference to the circumstances relating to the trade or business in question. Canalisation of a particular business in favour of specified individual has been held reasonable by this Court where vital interests of the community are concerned or when the business affects the economy of the country Parbhani Transport Ltd. v. Union of India , (1974)1 S. C. C. 468 and Lal Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council Lal Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council Lal Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council (1967)1 S.C.R. 1012 : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 829 It is true that even for imposing reasonable restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1), the restriction is to be imposed under a valid law, be it a statutory law or a statutory regulation, and not by any execution instruction of the Government , A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1295: (1963)2 Crl.L.J. 329”. 18. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merits in this writ petition. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Consequently, W.M.P. No.22417 of 1999 is also dismissed.