Honble MADAN, J.–(1). This second appeal has been preferred by the appellants-defendants for short ``the appellants against the judgment & decree dated 3.10.1997 passed by ADJ No.4, Jaipur City, Jaipur in C.R. Appeal No. 9/97 which was preferred before the said Appellate Court challenging the judgment & decree dated 6.11.1996 passed in suit for eviction filed by the plaintiff-respondent for short ``the respondent against the appellants by which the trial court decreed the suit for eviction and arrears of rent. (2). The suit for eviction was filed by the respondent against the appellants on three grounds i.e.- (a) default in payment of rent, (b) denial of title and (c) change of user of the suit land for the purpose other than for which the premises were let out. The appe-llants were earlier tenants of Thakur Bharat Singh, the original landlord who had sold out the Plot No. 15, Parivahan Marg, Jaipur. Thakur Bharat Singh sold the part of the plot to the respondent vide registered sale-deed vide Exh. 1 dated 5.10.1981 by which out of 500 Sq. Yards of land, 367 Sq. Yards of land was sold to the respondents for sale consideration of Rs. 13,884 /-. (3). From para 9 of the said sale-deed, it is borne out that Vendor (Thakur Bharat Singh) in pursuance of agreement dated 22.10.1978 transferred the aforesaid land in favour of the Vendee (respondent-Budhmal Bhojak). In this manner, that premises came in sole occupation and ownership of the respondent. (4). The respondent in his plaint submitted before the trial Court stated that the appellants had taken 267 Sq. Yards of open land on monthly rent of Rs. 40/-instead of Rs. 100/-per month as per the case set up by the respondent. The trial Court determined the provisional standard rent under Sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 for short ``the Act of 1950 vide order dated 11.5.1982 @ Rs. 100/-per month in the earlier suit. It was alleged that the appellants had never paid the rent in time to Thakur Bharat Singh in the year 1979-1981. Thakur Bharat Singh determined the tenancy of the appellants by his notice dated 30.5.1979 which became effective from 30.6.1979. 100/-per month in the earlier suit. It was alleged that the appellants had never paid the rent in time to Thakur Bharat Singh in the year 1979-1981. Thakur Bharat Singh determined the tenancy of the appellants by his notice dated 30.5.1979 which became effective from 30.6.1979. The relationship of landlord and tenant was not disputed between the parties since the respondent had through his notice dated 16.11.1981 had informed the appellants of having pur-chased the suit land from its previous owner Thakur Bharat Singh and hence, had attorned their tenancy with effect from the date of its purchase. It was alleged that the appellants were in arrears of rent and as such, are not entitled to the benefit of protection under Sec. 13 of the Act of 1950 since the rent for a period of more than 6 months was outstanding and hence, they were liable to be evicted on the ground of default in payment of rent. It was further stated that initially, the appellants were allowed to place building material on the suit land which was used for the purpose till 1979 but, thereafter, when the appellants had come to know with regard to the execution of the aforesaid agreement of sale in favour of the respondent, they started keeping firewoods and from October, 1981, they also started keeping bricks, cement and bazari over the suit land and in this manner, they started using the land for the purpose other than that for which it was let out and hence, on the ground of change of user they were liable to be evicted under Sec. 13(1) (d) of the Act of 1950. It was also stated in the plaint that the appellants in their reply to the application of the respondent under Sec. 19 of the Act of 1950 in the Court of Assis-tant Collector-cum Magistrate No. 2 Jaipur had denied the ownership and the right of the respondent -landlord by stating that they are not the tenants of the respondent which amounts to denial of title of the landlord and renunciation of their character as tenant which act had not been condoned and hence they are liable to be evicted. (5). (5). The appellants in their written submission while controverting the aforesaid contentions, did not dispute their tenancy earlier under Thakur Bharat Singh and subsequently, under the present respondent-Budhmal Bhojak but, stated that they were not in arrears of rent though, they had admitted the receipt of notice sent to them earlier on 30.5.1979 by the erstwhile owner Thakur Bharat Singh reply to which, was also sent through their advocate on 4.6.1979. It was stated the alleged notice dated 5.9.1987 was not received by them nor they were aware of the sale of the land in question in favour of the respondent since, earlier notice dated 5.10.1981 was not received by them which was received by appellant No. 2 but after receiving the said notice, appellant No.1 was still in doubt with regard to the same. In these circumstances, it was stated that in their reply filed before the Assistant Collector, Thakur Bharat Singh was the owner/landlord and hence, they have not denied the title of the respondent who is the present landlord. They also denied the ground of change of user or business in-consistent with the purpose of letting. (6). On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed 12 issues which have already been referred to in the impugned judgment of the trial Court and hence, need not be reproduced in this order. It is further pertinent to mention that issues No. 1,2,3,7 and 8 relate to the question of default in payment of rent while, issue No. 4 relates to change of user for the purpose in-consistent with the terms of tenancy. Issues No. 5 and 9 relate to denial of title while, Issue No. 6 relates to grant of permanent injunction and Issues No. 10 and 11 are legal issues. The respondent examined himself in evidence as PW-1, Bharat Singh as PW-3 and Dineshwar Singh as PW-4 besides, atleast 15 documents which were executed between the parties. The appellants in their evidence examined Abdul Rehman as DW-1, Noor Mohd. as DW-2 and exhibited one rent receipt Exh.1. (7). The trial Court on the grounds of eviction i.e.(a) default in payment of rent, (b) change of user and (c) denial of title being proved against the appellants, decreed the suit of respondents vide its impugned judgment & decree dated 6.11.1996. as DW-2 and exhibited one rent receipt Exh.1. (7). The trial Court on the grounds of eviction i.e.(a) default in payment of rent, (b) change of user and (c) denial of title being proved against the appellants, decreed the suit of respondents vide its impugned judgment & decree dated 6.11.1996. Being aggrieved of the aforesaid order, the appellants preferred Civil Re-gular Appeal No. 9 of 97 which was transferred and disposed of finally by ADJ No. 4, Jaipur City, Jaipur. The said appellate court held that though default in payment of rent was proved, yet appellants were entitled to the benefit of first default as per Section 13(6) of the Act of 1950. Against the change of user of the land for purpose in consistent with letting of suit premises, it was held that the respondent had not been able to prove this ground and on the basis of which, the respondent is not entitled to decree of eviction. With regard to the ground of denial of title, it was observed by the said appellate court that the suit was rightly decreed by the trial court by deciding Issue No.9 against the appellants and in this manner, the first appellate court confirmed the findings of the learned trial court on the ground of denial of title and this ground also survives for consideration of this Court in this appeal. (8). During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended by assailing the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below on the grounds inter-alia that they have overlooked the facts and circumstan-ces of the case since whatever was stated in reply i.e. Exhibit-10 was with a view to put the respondent who was a transferee from the original landlord to prove his title and since the appellants had admitted themselves to be tenants of Thakur Bharat Singh, the erstwhile landlord, it cannot be said that the statement made in Exh. 10 could be taken as disclaimer entailing forfeiture of tenancy. It has further been averred on behalf of the appellants that their tenancy was contractual as per the case set up by respondent himself and had been determined by the previous landlord-Thakur Bharat Singh vide notice Exh.2 dated 30.5.1979 and land in question was sold to respondent subsequently on 5.10.1981. 10 could be taken as disclaimer entailing forfeiture of tenancy. It has further been averred on behalf of the appellants that their tenancy was contractual as per the case set up by respondent himself and had been determined by the previous landlord-Thakur Bharat Singh vide notice Exh.2 dated 30.5.1979 and land in question was sold to respondent subsequently on 5.10.1981. Hence, in these circumstances, when the tenancy of the appellants had already been terminated, the ques-tion with regard to the forfeiture of their tenancy on account of alleged denial of title would not arise. (9). I have heard learned counsel for the parties, examined their rival claims and contentions as well as the legal position on the subject. Prima-facie, I am of the considered view that concurrent findings recorded by the courts below on the ground of denial of title which resulted in forfeiture of tenancy of the present appellants are not open to challenge in this second appeal. The law is so well settled that in dealing with the second appeals the court should not interfere upsetting the concurrent findings which have been recorded by the courts below on due appreciation of evidence unless and until some exceptional case has been made out calling for such interference. Sec. 100(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 stipulates, as under- ``Second Appeal-100(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court, from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-Sec. (4) 100 CPC stipulates, as under- ``(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. ``Proviso to sub-Sec. (5) of Sec. 100 CPC stipulates, as under- ``Provided that nothing in this sub-sec. shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. (10). Even if, the finding of fact has been erroneously recorded, it is not open to the High Court to interfere with the said finding in second appeal. (10). Even if, the finding of fact has been erroneously recorded, it is not open to the High Court to interfere with the said finding in second appeal. I am fortified in my observation from the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Kishanlal Biharilal Maheshwari vs. Ramarao Hanumant Rao Patil (1) and in the matter of Kar-balai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed (2). Further, the law is well settled that the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction should not interfere with the findings of fact based upon due appreciation of evidence by substituting its own conclusions which would be contrary to the well reasoned findings recorded by the courts below. (11). In the matter of Dr. Ranbir Singh vs. Asharfilal (3), the Apex Court while dealing with the scope of powers of the High Court regarding interference with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below in exercise of its jurisdiction in entertaining the second appeal observed, as under- ``The question of title of the property is not germane for decision of the eviction suit. In a case where a plaintiff institutes a suit for eviction of his tenant based on the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the scope of the suit is very much limited in which a question of title cannot be gone into because the suit of the plaintiff would be dismissed even if he succeeds in proving his title but fails to establish their privity of contract of tenancy. In a suit for eviction based on such relationship the Court has only to decide whether the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff or not, though the question of title if dispute, may incidentally be gone into, in connection with the primary question for determining the main question about the relationship betw-een the litigating parties. In order to decide whether denial of landlords title by the tenant is bona fide the Court may have to go into tenants contention on the issue but the Court is not to decide the question of title finally as the Court has to see whether the tenants denial of title of the landlord is bona fide in the circumstances of the case. ``Admittedly, the defendant denied the title of the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises, which in the facts and circumstances furnished a ground for eviction of the respondent, as such denial of title by the respondent was not bona fide. The trial court and the first appellate court on a close analysis of the evidence also recorded a definite finding that the plaintiffs requirement of the suit premises was genuine and bona fide but the High Court set-aside the same on unreasonable grounds. ``............There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence and substituting its own conclusions for the well-reasoned recorded by the Courts of fact. (12). In the matter of TejBhan Madan vs. II Additional District Judge and Ors. (4), the Apex Court observed, as under- ``Appellant who was in occupation of the premises as a tenant even prior to the sale attorned the tenancy in favour of the purchase G and came to pay the rents to G accordingly. G in turn, sold the property in favour of C. Both the vendor G and the purchaser C issued notices to the appellant to attorn the tenancy in favour of the purchaser, C. But appellant-tenant declined to do so and assailed not only the derivative title of C to the property but also the validity of the sale in favour of G himself. Held that what appellant did, indeed amounted to a de-nial of title and that appellant was precluded from doing so on the general principles of estoppel between landlord and tenant. The principle, in its basic foundations, means no more than that under certain circumstances law considers it unjust to allow a person to approbate and reprobate. It was a clear case which attracted the gro-und of eviction under Sec. 3(1) of Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act 3 of 1947), AIR 1980 All 320 , Affirmed. AIR 1937 PC 251 Rel. on. (13). Likewise, in the matter of Narsingh Das vs. Mst. Amar Kanwar (5), in the matter of Smt. Barkat Bai vs. Bhanwarlal (6) and in the matter of Shri Kishan vs. Dayal Das Chawla (7), the same view was taken by this Court. (14). AIR 1937 PC 251 Rel. on. (13). Likewise, in the matter of Narsingh Das vs. Mst. Amar Kanwar (5), in the matter of Smt. Barkat Bai vs. Bhanwarlal (6) and in the matter of Shri Kishan vs. Dayal Das Chawla (7), the same view was taken by this Court. (14). As a result of the above discussion, I find no force in this appeal and the same is accordingly, dismissed on merits. As a result the Judgment and Decree dated 3.10.1997 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 4 Jaipur City, Jaipur in C.R. Appeal No. 9/97, confirming the judgment & decree dated 6.11.1996 passed by learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 9/96 is affirmed being not open to challenge. (15). There will be no order as to costs.