J. C. MISHRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 25. 11. 93 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ Additional City Magistrate VII. Kanpur declaring vacancy at 117/34, sarvodaya Nagar. Kanpur, on the ground floor. ( 2 ) IT is not disputed that opposite party No. 2 Smt. Sumitra Jain was landlady of the accommodation No, 117/34, Sarvodaya Nagar. Kanpur and she had let it out to Kanpur Zlla sahkarl Avas Sangh Limited with effect from 16. 2. 81 for a period of three years. The tenancy comprised ground floor of the premises including the garage and one room above the garage. The tenant stipulated that it shall not sub-let any portion occupied as tenant at any circumstance except that the accommodation shall be used for allied affiliated offices of the Co-operative housing Societies of Kanpur district. The term of tenancy was to expire on 1. 2. 84. ( 3 ) IT is not disputed that the Jan Sevak Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited, Kanpur, was one of the affiliates of Kanpur Zlla Sahkari Avas Sangh Limited and was permitted to occupy the garage, room on the ground floor for its office. It is also not disputed that Mazdoor Housing Cooperative society Limited, Kanpur, was permitted to occupy the room above the garage and both these affiliates used to pay Rs. 125 each to Kanpur Zila Sahkari Avas Sangh Limited, who paid the entire agreed rent to the land lady. ( 4 ) IT is not disputed that the Kanpur Zila Sahkari Avas Sangh Limited, vacated the tenanted premises and the entire premises which were in the tenancy of Kanpur Zila Sahkari Avas Sangh limited, was let out to the petitioner the Cotton Corporation India Limited. It is further admitted that both Jan Sevak Shakari Avas Samiti Limited and Mazdoor Housing Cooperative Society limited, continued to pay rent amounting to Rs. 125 each to the new tenant Cotton Corporation india Limited and the petitioner Cotton Corporation paid the entire agreed rent to the landlady. ( 5 ) THE controversy between the parties is limited. It is further admitted that both Jan Sevak Shakari Avas Samiti Limited and Mazdoor Housing Cooperative Society limited, continued to pay rent amounting to Rs. 125 each to the new tenant Cotton Corporation india Limited and the petitioner Cotton Corporation paid the entire agreed rent to the landlady. ( 5 ) THE controversy between the parties is limited. The petitioners case is that while taking the entire, premises on rent, it was assured by the landlady that both Jan Sevak Sahkari Avas Samiti limited and Mazdoor Housing Cooperative Society Limited, would vacate the garage respectively and room above the garage after some time and in the meantime, they would continue to pay the rent to the Cotton Corporation India Limited as they were previously paying to the Kanpur Zila Sahkari Avas Sangh Limited. It is averred that it was agreed that as and when the landlady would succeed in getting the garage and the room above it vacated, the Cotton corporation of India would occupy both the garage and the room above it. It is averred that the petitioner had taken the entire premises on rent (n view of the aforesaid assurances given by the landlady. ( 6 ) THEN the petitioners case is that room above the garage was vacated by the Mazdoor Sahkari avas Samiti Limited and that the petitioners Corporation had put its lock on the said room but the landlady forcibly occupied the said room after breaking open the lock of the Cotton corporation of India Limited. Thus, the petitioners "case is that Jan Sevak Sahakari Avas Sangh limited, was occupying the garage with implied permission of the landlady and no consent was given by the petitioners Corporation to Jan Sevak Sahkari Avas Sangh Limited to continue to occupy the garage. ( 7 ) THEN, the petitioners case is that the landlady filed suit for eviction of the petitioner. She falsely accused the petitioners Corporation of subletting the garage to Jan Sevak Sahkari Awas sangh Limited and sent a notice to the petitioner to vacate the premises. She thereafter filed Suit no. 140 of 1086 against the petitioners Corporation and another for eviction on the ground of the alleged sub-letting. The matter is sub-judice. ( 8 ) WHILE the civil suit was pending, one Deen Dayal Balmiki filed an application for allotment of premises No. 117/34, Sarvodaya. Nagar on the ground that it was vacant. She thereafter filed Suit no. 140 of 1086 against the petitioners Corporation and another for eviction on the ground of the alleged sub-letting. The matter is sub-judice. ( 8 ) WHILE the civil suit was pending, one Deen Dayal Balmiki filed an application for allotment of premises No. 117/34, Sarvodaya. Nagar on the ground that it was vacant. A report was called from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who submitted a report on 1. 2. 92. It was stated in the report that the Cotton Corporation of India had let out the garage to Jan Sevak Sahkari Avas samiti Limited, on a monthly rent of Rs. 125 with effect from 1. 8. 81 and on this ground the landlady had filed a suit for eviction. It was further stated that the Jan Sevak Sahkari Avas Samiti limited had its office in the garage since last four years. ( 9 ) THE Rent Control and Eviction Inspector in his report incorporated the defence set up by the landlady petitioners Corporation and Jan Sevak Sahkari Avas Samiti and suggested that the matter may be considered after hearing the parties. ( 10 ) ON submission of the report, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer gave opportunity to the parties to submit objection. He after considering the respective cases of the parties and the affidavit and documents produced held that the petitioner had sub-let the garage to Jan Sevak sahkari Avas Samiti Limited and, therefore, in view of subletting, the entire premises in question was deemed to be vacant. He, therefore notified the vacancy. Felt aggrieved the tenant corporation of India has filed this petition. ( 11 ) THE respondent No. 2 Smt. Sumitra Jain filed counter affidavit. The petitioner filed rejoinder-affidavit. They also annexed documents. ( 12 ) HEARD Smt. Poonam Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners Corporation and Sri V. P. Varshney, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Jan Sevak Sahkari Avas Samiti limited, was occupying the premises since 1981 and its occupation was permitted by the landlord while letting out the premises to the petitioner. The landlady had assured that she would get the garage vacated and permit the petitioner to occupy the garage as well. She contended that the finding recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is perverse and deserves to be quashed. The landlady had assured that she would get the garage vacated and permit the petitioner to occupy the garage as well. She contended that the finding recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is perverse and deserves to be quashed. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for the contesting respondent contended that the garage was sub-let by the petitioner who used to realise rent from the very beginning and, therefore, the accommodation was rightly held to be vacant. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Act) is not applicable to the premises since it was in occupation of the petitioner who is Central government Undertaking and the building occupied by the tenant is exempted by the Act. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in om Kumar v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, 1980 ARC 144, wherein it was held that a building taken on lease by a "public sector corporation" is "public building" and exempted from the operation of the Act. Section 2 of the Act enumerates the buildings which are exempted from operation of the Act. It provides that nothing in this Act shall apply to a public building. "public building" means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State) ; and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation. "public sector corporation" means any corporation owned or controlled by the Government and includes any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act. 1956, in which not less than fifty percent of the paid up share capital is held by the Government. " ( 17 ) THE question is whether the petitioner Cotton Corporation of India is a "public sector" within the meaning of the Act. ( 18 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner referred to paragraph 1 of the petition that the Cotton corporation of India Limited is a Government of India undertaking and its registered office is at air India Building. Nariman Point, Bombay and the branch office is at 117/34 Sarodaya Nagar, kanpur. ( 18 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner referred to paragraph 1 of the petition that the Cotton corporation of India Limited is a Government of India undertaking and its registered office is at air India Building. Nariman Point, Bombay and the branch office is at 117/34 Sarodaya Nagar, kanpur. The respondents in paragraph 15 of the counter-affidavit stated that this averment needs no reply. This Indicates that the averment contained in paragraph 1 of the petition is admitted. In paragraph 17 of the petition, it has been stated that the accommodation in question has been given to Central Government undertaking and in the circumstances the Act will not apply to the petitioner. The respondents In paragraph 27 of the counter-affidavit denied this averment as misconceived. This plea has again been reiterated in ground No. IV in paragraph 20 of the petition. ( 19 ) THE petitioner is an undertaking of Central Government but premises in suit is not a "public building" within the meaning of clause (o) of Section 3. Only the building which belongs to or taken on lease on behalf of the Central Government public building and not by its undertaking are exempted. Besides the Central and State Governments, the building belonging to or taken on lease by any public sector corporation is also "public building". The question is whether the petitioner is a public sector corporation. "public sector corporation" as, defined in clause (p)means any corporation owned or controlled by the Government, and Includes any company as defined In Section 3 of the Companies Act. 1956, In which not less than fifty percent of the paid up share capital is held by the Government. ( 20 ) THERE is no material on record to show that not less than 50% of the paid up share capital of the petitioner is held by the Government. In absence of this evidence, the petitioner cannot be held to be a "public sector corporation". ( 21 ) ASSUMING that the petitioner is a public sector corporation as defined in Section 3 (p) of the act, though it could not be shown that not less than 50% of the paid up share capital of the petitioner is held by the" Government, we proceed to examine whether the building rented by it is exempted from the operation of the Act. The buildings which are exempted from the operation of the Act are enumerated In Section 2 of the Act which provides that nothing in this Act shall apply to the following, namely-- (a) any building of which the Government or local authority or a public sector corporation or a Cantonment Board is the landlord. ( 22 ) WE are not concerned with other clauses of Section 2 as they have no applicability to the facts before us. In view of Section 2 (1) (a) only those buildings are exempted from operation of the Act of which the public sector corporation is the landlord. It means that those buildings are not exempted from the operation of the Act of which the public sector corporation is the tenant. ( 23 ) THE pronouncement in Om Kumar v. District Judge and another, 1980 ARC 144 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not apply to the present case as it was based on interpretation of the provisions as they stood on the date of the institution of the said suit. Sections 2 and 3 have undergone repeated changes. Firstly it was amended by Act No. 28 of 1976. The relevant portion of the Section 2 as It stood before the amendments read as follows : "exemption from operation of the Act: section 1, nothing in this Act shall apply to.-- (a) any building belonging to or vested in the government of India or the government of any State or any local authority. " ( 24 ) BY Section 2 of the Amending Act Ho. 28 of 1976 for clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 2 the following clause was substituted : "any public building. " ( 25 ) THIS provision was again amended by Act No. 17 of 1985 which came retrospectively in operation with effect from 18. 5. 83. The existing clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 was amended as any building of which Government or the local authority or a public sector corporation or a Cantonment Board Is the landlord. ( 26 ) THUS, after 1983 only those buildings are exempted from the operation of the Act of which the Government or local authority or a public sector corporation or a cantonment board is the landlord. Prior to 1983, the public buildings were exempted from the operation of the Act. ( 26 ) THUS, after 1983 only those buildings are exempted from the operation of the Act of which the Government or local authority or a public sector corporation or a cantonment board is the landlord. Prior to 1983, the public buildings were exempted from the operation of the Act. Public building was defined In clause (o) of Section 3 which runs as follows : (o) "public building" means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or State Government (Including the government of any other State) : and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation. " ( 27 ) THUS, before 1983 the buildings which were taken on lease by the Central Government or public sector corporation were exempted from the operation of the Act. Since the clause (a) of sub-section 2 of the Act has undergone change after 1983 and any public building was substituted, the buildings taken on lease by the State public sector corporation are no more exempted from the operation of the Act. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant is based on interpretation of Section 2 as it existed on the relevant date. ( 28 ) IN State of U. P, and others v. District Judge Jhansi and others, 1997 (1) ARC 126. It was held that public building as defined in Section 3 (o) is exempted only when Its landlord is State government or local authority or public sector corporation or Cantonment Board, and this exemption is not available if these authorities are tenants. This decision is based on interpretation of Section 2 of the Act as it exists after the Amending Act, 1985. I find that the building in question is not exempted from the operation of the Act. ( 29 ) IT has been contended that Section 12 of the Act has no application to the non- residential buildings. This decision is based on interpretation of Section 2 of the Act as it exists after the Amending Act, 1985. I find that the building in question is not exempted from the operation of the Act. ( 29 ) IT has been contended that Section 12 of the Act has no application to the non- residential buildings. Reference has been made to sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act which provides that in case of non-residential building where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner as the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. The learned counsel contended that since this provision is applicable to non-residential buildings only, the Rent control and Eviction Officer committed error in declaring the premises in suit as vacant. ( 30 ) THE argument advanced by the learned counsel is not correct. Deemed vacancy of buildings has been referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. This provision is applicable both to residential buildings as also non-residential buildings. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has deemed the building in question as vacant as the petitioner tenant had allowed it to be occupied by a person who is not member of his family. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 has limited scope and a presumption has been raised regarding vacancy of a non-residential building if the tenant had admitted any person who was not a member of his family or partner. In my view, both residential and non-residential building could be deemed to be vacant and notified as such if the conditions mentioned in subsection (1) is satisfied, The argument advanced is without any merits. ( 31 ) THE learned counsel then contended that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer committed error in recording a finding that petitioner had admitted/permitted the Jan Sewak Sahkari Avas samiti, as the tenant of the garage. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has assigned three reasons for declaring the vacancy, firstly it was observed that the Manager of the Cotton corporation and Director of Jan Sevak Sahkari Avas Sangh were real brothers, secondly, it was held that Jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti, was paying rent to Cotton Corporation of India which along with its own rent paid it to the landlady. Thirdly, it was held that the Cotton Corporation of India could not produce any document to prove that Jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti was permitted to occupy the garage with the consent of the landlady. It was also observed that even If there was any consent, it was against the provisions of the Act and, therefore, the Cotton Corporation of india was not entitled to take rent from Jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti. ( 32 ) IT appears that the learned Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not understand the real controversy between the parties. The respondent has filed copy of letter signed by the petitioner corporation to the landlady Smt. Sumitra Jain Incorporating the terms of the tenancy. Later the petitioner tenant confirmed that it had agreed to occupy the front portion in the ground floor of the premises No. 117/34, Sarvodaya Nagar, Kanpur plus one room above the garage on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,400 on the terms and conditions given in the said letter. Clause (8)provides that the tenancy is for a fixed term but the tenant could vacate the premises in question at its option after giving one months prior notice and in default to pay one month rent in lieu of the notice period. ( 33 ) IN the same clause, It was stated that she shall give possession of the premises positively in the first week of July. 1981 and It was further stated that it shall occupy the premises positively in the first of July. 1981. ( 34 ) IT is an admitted fact that the Jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti Limited was in occupation of the garage since three years before as affiliate of the previous tenant. Kanpur Zila Sahkari Awas sangh Limited. It is also not disputed that the Jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti Limited, continued in possession and is still in occupation of the garage. The petitioners case is that although the entire premises Including the garage was given in the tenancy of the petitioner but there was understanding between it and the landlady that the landlady would get the Jan Sewak Sahkari awas Samiti Limited, evicted from the garage and thereafter the garage would be given in possession of the petitioner and till then the Jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti will continue to pay Rs. 125 per month to the petitioner as they were paying to the previous tenant. 125 per month to the petitioner as they were paying to the previous tenant. The case of the landlady on the other hand, was that since the Manager of the petitioner and the Director of the jan Sewak Sahkarl Samiti Limited, were real brothers, the petitioner permitted the Samiti to occupy the premises. Thus, the controversy lies a very narrow compass and cannot be resolved by determining whether the Jan Sewak Sahkarl Samiti Limited, was sub-tenant of the petitioner or not. It ts not the case of either party that the garage was ever in possession of the petitioner and at any subsequent stage, it was sub-let to the Jan Sewak Sahkarl Samiti Limited. The continuance of the possession of Jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti Limited, was also known to the landlady from the very inception. It cannot be said that the petitioner had inducted the Sahkarl samiti Limited, therefore, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer should have confined his enquiry to the relevant question whether it was the petitioner or the landlady who had permitted continuance of Jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti Limited, in occupation of the garage. From the agreement. It appears that the garage was also Included in the tenancy of the petitioner. The real question that arises for consideration was whether it was duty of the landlady to have evicted the jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti Limited, or this duty was Imposed by the landlady on the petitioner. In my view, the question whether subsequently landlady has given written permission or not was not relevant and significant. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer should have considered the terms of the agreement and the conduct of the parties in determining the real controversy. The vacancy could be deemed to be vacant only if it was found that the petitioner had allowed the garage to be occupied by Jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti Limited and not otherwise. In case the landlady had acquiesced in possession of Jan Sewak Sahkari Samiti Limited and there was understanding between the parties that the garage would be given in possession of the petitioner as and when if falls vacant, then the provisions of Section 12 of the Act may not be attracted and landlady could not get any advantage of acquiescence. ( 35 ) THE petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed. ( 35 ) THE petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed. The case is remanded with the direction to decide the case afresh in accordance with law.