Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This revision petition has been preferred against the order dated 24.1.1996 passed by the Sub- Judge IV, Siwan, in Misc. case no. 1 of 1997 by which the application made by the petitioners for setting aside the compromise decree on the ground of fraud being practised has been rejected. 2. The admitted position remains that Title Suit no. 274 of 1994 was filed by the opposite parties and it was contended that there was amicable partition between the share holders but no documents being annexed regarding amicable settlement which necessitated for filing of the partition suit. After the partition suit was filed both the parties entered into a compromise and such compromise petition was filed signed jointly by both the parties and their counsel and the said compromise petition was considered about its lawfulness by the learned court below and then by accepting the same passed decree on the suit and the compromise petition was made part of the decree. 3. The grievance of the petitioner is that the plot which they received by virtue of earlier exchange deed and wherein their residence was there had been wrongly and fraudulently included in the share of the opposite parties in the compromise petition and as such the compromise petition and the decree thereof should be set aside on the ground of fraud being practised. Opposite parties appeared, filed rejoinder and challenged the contention of fraud and it contended that both the parties had amicably arrived at the compromise and in presence of both the parties the allotment of shares were made and then the same was incorporated in the compromise petition being signed by the parties and their counsel has been filed to the court and the same was accepted and decree was passed on compromise. On contention of both the parties six witnesses each have been examined in support of their respective contentions and after construing of evidence and materials on record learned court below by the impugned order came to the finding that no case could be made out of fraud in challenging the compromise petition and hence the same has been rejected. On contention of both the parties six witnesses each have been examined in support of their respective contentions and after construing of evidence and materials on record learned court below by the impugned order came to the finding that no case could be made out of fraud in challenging the compromise petition and hence the same has been rejected. Before the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure in the year 1976 there was wide scope of challenging the compromise petition in a separate suit but now provisions have been included within the Order 23 to the effect that challenge of the compromise decree should be in the court where the compromise petition has been filed and the decree has been passed. Separate suit has been barred. The challenge of the compromise decree could be made on the ground of lawfulness and on practising of fraud. In the present case, on the ground of fraud the compromise decree has been challenged but except some bare statements being made here and there and in the petition itself the petitioners have not alleged as to how fraud was practised on whom and in what way. No ingredients have been supplied as to what kind of fraud had been practised on the petitioners while compromise had been arrived at. It was only submitted that as the residential plot belonging to petitioners has been alloted to the opposite parties, the same reveals that fraud being practised on the petitioner. On the other hand, it has come on record that the petitioners do not reside in that residential piot rather they reside in another district. Thus it cannot be said that the house belonging to the petitioner has been fraudulently incorporated in the allotment of the opposite parties. It is settled principle of law that when a party alleges fraud he should give details of fraud while making such allegations giving opportunity to the either side to controvert the same. The kind of fraud must also be stated specifically with its ingredients in the pleadings itself giving opportunity to the other side to know as to what kind of fraud has been alleged then the said fraud should be proved by the party alleging. In the present case it appears that because of vague statements being made by the petitioner no ingredients of fraud have been pleaded. In the present case it appears that because of vague statements being made by the petitioner no ingredients of fraud have been pleaded. So the fraud alleged remains only a vague allegation. Moreover, there is no allegation that there was any inequal distribution of shares between the allottees. For some reasons or other the residential plot which is not in the occupation of the petitioners might have been given to the other. 4. Before this Court learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the ordersheet of the suit showing that compromise-decree was recorded in absence of the petitioners or his counsel. The compromise petition had been pressed to be made a decree from the side of the counsel for the opposite parties alone. Such sort of ordersheet has got no meaning or gives no prejudicial favour in favour of the petitioners when existence of the compromise has not been denied. On going through the impugned order and on hearing the submissions of both sides and also going through the materials on record, I find that no jurisdictional error or impropriety have been committed by the learned court below in rejecting the prayer made by the petitioners under Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure rather in the circumstances of the case learned court below is justified in rejecting the prayer for setting aside the compromise decree. There is no force in this revision petition and the same is rejected. But in the circumstances no order as to costs.