Honble SHETHNA, J.–Learned counsel Shri Sudesh Gupta appearing for Mr. N.K. Goyal for the petitioner submitted that this petition is squarely covered by the decision of this Court (Honble Bhagwati Prasad, J.) dated 3.5.1999 delivered in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 477 of 98 (1). He submitted that in the same line this petition may also be allowed and decree drawn by the Board of Revenue setting aside the decree of trial Court be set aside and the trial court be directed to try the suit afresh. (2). However, learned counsel Shri Jain appearing for the respondent vehemently submitted that it was an ex-parte order and without hearing the State, straightway the order was passed by the Honble Bhagwati Prasad, J. and on merits also this case also it has no application. According to Mr. Jain for the respondents, in this case there was a voluminous evidence showing that the land was Govt. land. (3). Before dealing with the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, I would like to reproduce the entire order passed by my learned Brother, Honble Bhagwati Prasad, J. on 3.5.99 in Writ Petition No. 477 of 98 (supra), which reads as under:- ``HONBLE SHRI BHAGWATI PRASAD, J. Mr. N.K. Goyal, for the petitioner. In this writ petition, order of the Board of Revenue in reference is under challenge, the Board of Revenue while accepting the reference has set aside the decree on the ground that State was not given chance to put up its case. In this background, at best a retrial could be ordered. As and when the Board of Revenue sets aside a decree on such ground, then it becomes imperative that parties are required to be relegated back to their position where they can put up their case. It would have been better if the Board of Revenue itself remanded the matter back to the trial court and would have permitted the parties to lead evidence and do the needful. In this case, the same has not been done. It is deemed proper that the parties should be directed to appear before the trial court and pursue the suit from the level which is required to be pursued. The parties will appear before the trial court i.e. Asstt . Colonisation Commissioner, Kolayat on 1.7.1999. In this case, the same has not been done. It is deemed proper that the parties should be directed to appear before the trial court and pursue the suit from the level which is required to be pursued. The parties will appear before the trial court i.e. Asstt . Colonisation Commissioner, Kolayat on 1.7.1999. The decree drawn by the Board of Revenue setting aside the decree of the trial court is maintained but it is further directed that the trial court will try the suit afresh. With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of as indicated above. (4). From the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue (Annex.3) it is clear that it had accepted the reference on the ground that there was not an iota of evidence like the khasra-girdawari, Jamabandi, parcha, rent receipts, pass-book etc. in favour of the petitioner, nor any report was sought from concerned Patwari, Girdawars or Tehsildar. The Board of Revenue also observed that the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner merely relying upon the statement of two witnesses, which were also not clear, still the khatedari rights were conferred in favour of the petitioner. (5). in favour of the petitioner, nor any report was sought from concerned Patwari, Girdawars or Tehsildar. The Board of Revenue also observed that the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner merely relying upon the statement of two witnesses, which were also not clear, still the khatedari rights were conferred in favour of the petitioner. (5). The Board of Revenue has also reproduced the decree passed by Assistant Colonisation Commissioner in a suit filed by the petitioner in para no.6 of its order, which I would like to reproduce which reads as under:- ^^16-2-87 i=koyh vkt dSEi jkookyk ij isk gqbZA odhy oknh vuqifLFkrA voyksdu fd;kA oknh us mDr izdj.k jktLFkku dkrdkjh vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 88] 188] 92] 15,, ,oa Hkw jktLo vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 125] 136 ds rgr izLrqr dj fuosnu fd;k gS fd fookfnr Hkwfe ij mudk iqrSuh dCtk gSA vr% mDr fookfnr Hkwfe xzke jkookyk rknknh 34 ch?kk 5 fcLok dk xSj [kkrsnkjh fVusUV ?kksf"kr fd;k tkosA geus i=koyh dk voyksdu fd;k oknh }kjk izLrqr lk{; ds voyksdu ls fookfnr Hkwfe ij oknh dk iqrSuh dCtk gksuk tkfgj ugha gksrk gS rFkk izfroknh }kjk izLrqr tokc esa Hkh okn i= ds lHkh rF;ksa dks vLohdkj fd;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa okn [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA uEcj ls de dh tkosaA fu.kZ; lquk;k x;kA g-@& ^^16-2-87 iqup% bruk fy[kus ds ckn oknmh Lo;a mi- gqvk rFkk mUgksus fookfnr Hkwfe dks viuh iqrSuh gksuk Li"V fd;k & vkt mifLFkr xzke okfl;ksa us Hkh Li"V fd;k fd oknxzLr Hkwfe oknh dh gh iqrSuh Hkwfe gS & geus Hkh ekSdk ns[k & vr% iwoZ ikfjr vknsk ij iqufoZpkj fd;k tk, & okn fMØh fd;k tkrk gS & fu.kZ; i`Fkd ls vafdr fd;k x;kA g-@& (6). From the above order passed by the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner on 16.2.1987 it becomes very clear that the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner himself dismissed the suit in absence of petitioner-plaintiff after considering the evidence on record. He also considered the reply filed by the defendant and accordingly he dismissed the suit. (7). It appears that after the pronouncement of the order of dismissing the suit, the petitioner appeared alongwith his witnesses before the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner, therefore, the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner recorded his statement and also the statements of the witnesses without naming them. He also considered the reply filed by the defendant and accordingly he dismissed the suit. (7). It appears that after the pronouncement of the order of dismissing the suit, the petitioner appeared alongwith his witnesses before the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner, therefore, the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner recorded his statement and also the statements of the witnesses without naming them. Accordingly, from the evidence of the plaintiff and the witnesses of the village produced by the plaintiff before the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner, he was satisfied that the disputed land in question was ancestral land, therefore, he reconsidered his earlier judgment and decreed the suit in favour of the petitioner. (8). The way in which the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner decreed the suit left us with much to desire. Having dismissed the suit, the Assistant Colonisa- tion Commissioner ought not to have reviewed his own order straightway without issuing notice to other side. That part the way in which the suit was decreed speaks volume about the conduct of the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner. He has not even named the witnesses who were present before him and deposed in favour of the petitioner -- plaintiff. As against that there was voluminous documentary evide- nce against the petitioner-plaintiff which is clear from the impugned order at Annex.2 It appears from the impugned order passed by the Collector at Annex.2 that earlier application for allotment made by the petitioner was rejected by the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation on 28.1.1983 and the possession of the land vested with the Stave Govt. In spite of that the petitioner continued to commit tres- pass on that land, therefore, even penalty was imposed against the petitioner by Tehsildar and once again the possession of the land was taken from him. It is also found that there was no residential house on the land in question. In spite of these material available on the record, the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation decreed the suit of the petitioner-plaintiff in a most unusual manner. (9). Under the circumstances, when the Board of Revenue on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case accepted the reference made by the Collector under Sec.232 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act then it cannot be said that the Board of Revenue had committed any error of law or facts which requires interference by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (10). (10). For the reasons stated above, the judgment and order passed by my learned Brother Honble Bhagwati Prasad, J. on 3.5.99 in writ petition No 477 of 98 (supra) has no application and no such order can be passed by this Court directing the trial court to decide the suit afresh. (11). In view of the above discussion, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.