Judgment 1. Heard Mr. Surendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Ashok Kumar Chaudhary, learned G.P. 8 for the Respondents and with their consent this application is being disposed of at this stage. 2. The only question to be decided in this case is as to whether the petitioners were entitled to back wages, when the orders of termination were quashed by this Court. 3. The petitioners having crossed the selection barrier etc. were appointed as female health workers and were posted at different places of postings. Their services were earlier terminated on the basis of a teleprinter message from the Government but when that order of termination was challenged, the same was quashed by this Court on the ground that the petitioners were entitled for a notice and hearing. 4. Thereafter notices were issued and after compliance of the requirements of natural justice services were again terminated. One of those orders in annexure-3 to this writ application. The petitioners again moved this Court and second time their writ application was allowed and second order of termination was quashed. Copy of the High Court order dated 3.10.94 is annexure-5 to this writ application. Pursuant to the said order of the High Court, the petitioners were reinstated by the order of the Civil Surgeon cum Chief Medical Officer on various dates. Those orders of reinstatement are annexure-6 series. 5. The grievance of the petitioners is that though they were reinstated in view of the order of the High Court but even thereafter their salary for the period for which they were not allowed to work on the basis of the illegal order of termination has not been paid. 6. There is no denial of the fact that under similar circumstances one Reeva Rai along with others moved this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 7121/95 for the same relief. This Court by order dated 21.12.95 allowed the said writ application and directed the Respondents-authorities to pay the arrears of salary, to which said Reeva Rai and others were entitled for the period during which they were kept out of employment by the authorities on the basis of said illegal order of termination. It is also an admitted fact that against the order of the learned Single Judge, the State preferred L.P.A. but without any result. Even the State Government moved the Apex Court but also failed there. 7. Mr. It is also an admitted fact that against the order of the learned Single Judge, the State preferred L.P.A. but without any result. Even the State Government moved the Apex Court but also failed there. 7. Mr. Singh, submits that only thereafter the Civil Surgeon Cum Chief Medical Officer, Bhojpur, Arrah has issued an order on 18.3.98, directing the payment of arrear of salary only to those employees who have not knocked the door of this Court. 8. Mr. Chaudhary, on the other hand, without disputing the facts and circumstances of the case contended that the petitioners claim should be treated as barred by limitation because they have approached this Court at a much later stage. According to him, under these circumstances a learned Single Judge in the case of Nilam Kumari and ors. V/s. The State of Bihar and ors. (C.W.J.C. No. 3596 of 1994) by his order dated 15.3.95 refused to direct the payment of arrear of salary as they approached this Court after a long delay and no plausible explanation was furnished. This order is annexure-A to the counter affidavit. 9. Distinguishing the order of this Court as contained in Annexure-7 learned counsel contends that the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India etc. Appellant V.K. V/s. Jankiraman etc. Respondents; AIR 1991 SC 2010 has not been properly applied in the facts and circumstances and, as such, the said order of the learned Single Judge cannot be applicable to all such cases. In my view, the argument of Mr. Chaudhary has no force. 10. Firstly, as stated above, the order of the learned Single Judge dated 21.2.95 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 7121/95 has reached its finality when the L.P.A. court as well as the Supreme Court has refused. to interfere with the same. Secondly, from the order of the Civil Surgeon Cum Chief Medicaf Officer dated 18.3.98, which has been referred to above, it is abundantly clear that until and unless the employees, whose services were terminated illegally and the order was quashed by this Court again, did not move this Court for payment of arrear of salary, the Respondents were not paying the same. The petitioners as it appears were under the impression that as because the orders of termination in their cases were quashed by this Court, they will be paid the arrears but to their utter surprise they found that by order dated 18.3.98 the Respondents have taken the stand otherwise. 11. Under these circumstances, when the petitioners have moved this Court by filing this writ application on 16.9.98 by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the petitioners have come to this Court after inordinate delay. In my view, this writ application must be allowed as the case of the petitioners is fully covered by the earlier order of this Court as contained in annexure-7. 12. In the result, this writ application is allowed. The Respondents authorities are directed to pay the arrear of salary to which the petitioners were entitled to for the period during which they were kept out of employment by illegal order of termination. Such arrear of salary must be paid to the petitioners within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 13. This writ application is disposed of with the aforesaid observation and direction. However, there will be no order as to costs.