Judgment :- Subramani, the defendant in O.S.No.391 of 1982 on the file of Principal District Munsif, Tirupattur, North Arcot District, is the appellant herein. Anji, the elder brother of the appellant is the plaintiff and the respondent herein. 2. Therespondent filed a suit against the appellant herein for declaration of title to the suit properties and for permanent injunction stating that the suit properties were purchased in his name under the sale deed dated 33. 1968 for Rs.500 and he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same since then. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant, the appellant herein, stating that the suit properties were owned and possessed only by the joint family and the respondent/plaintiff never had any independent source of income to purchase the suit properties. 4. The trial court dismissed the suit accepting the case of the defendant, the appellant herein. However, in the appeal filed by the plaintiff, the lower appellate court reversed the dismissal of the suit and decreed the same in favour of the plaintiff, the respondent herein. Hence, this second appeal by the defendant before this Court. .5. At the time of admission of the second appeal, this Court formulated the following substantial question of law: .“Whether the lower appellate Court has not properly construed the evidence and overlooked the material evidence in holding that he purchased of the suit property by the plaintiff under Ex.A-1, the sale deed dated 33. 1968, was not on behalf of the joint familye” 6. On the basis of this substantial question of law, the arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. However, these submissions were resisted by the counsel for the respondent. 7. After hearing the counsel for the parties and on perusal of the records, I am of the view that the judgment and decree passed by the trial court dismissing the suit have been set aside by the lower appellate court without any valid reason. As a matter of fact, the lower appellate court did not consider the material evidence adduced by the defendant, the appellant herein, which would clearly prove that the suit properties were only joint family properties and as such, the plaintiff would not be entitled to the reliefs of declaration of title and permanent injunction. 8. It is not in dispute that the suit properties were originally joint family properties. 8. It is not in dispute that the suit properties were originally joint family properties. It is also not debated that the suit properties were sold by the plaintiff, his mother and the defendant, who was minor then, on 15. 1959 to one Velu Chettiar. 9. The case of the plaintiff is that he purchased the suit properties from the heirs of the said Velu Chettiar on 33. 1968 under Ex.A-1 in his name and as such, the moment the suit properties, which were originally joint family properties, were sold to the said Velu Chettiar, the said properties ceased to be the joint family properties and that since those properties were properties were purchased later in 1968 in the name of the plaintiff out of his own income, the defendant has no right over the said properties. 10. This theory put forward by the plaintiff cannot be accepted, in view of the materials available on record to show that the properties were in continuous possession of the plaintiff as a Karta of the family and even though the suit properties were sold under Ex.B-1 to Velu Chettiar, there is an agreement for reconveyance executed by the said Velu Chettiar in favour of the plaintiff, plaintiffs mother and the defendant. 11. The entire case projected by the plaintiff was based upon Ex.A-1. It is the evidence of P.W.1, the plaintiff that in 1959 the properties were sold for a sale consideration of Rs.800 and on that date itself, the properties were handed over to the said Velu Chettiar. He would also deny in cross-examination that there was any reconveyance deed. But, as pointed out by the trial court, the recitals in Ex.A-1 itself would indicate that the sale deed dated 33. 1968 executed by the heirs of Velu Chettiar in favour of the plaintiff only in pursuance of the earlier agreement for reconveyance deed executed between Velu Chettiar on one side and the plaintiff, plaintiffs mother and the defendant (minor) on the other side. .12. Under those circumstances, it is too artificial to state that the plaintiff had purchased the suit properties from the heirs of Velu Chettiar in his name individually. .12. Under those circumstances, it is too artificial to state that the plaintiff had purchased the suit properties from the heirs of Velu Chettiar in his name individually. It is also to be noted here that the sale deed was executed by the plaintiff and others in 1959 for the sale consideration of Rs.800, but in 1968 the plaintiff purchased the very same properties from the legal heirs of the said Velu Chettiar for Rs.500. This aspect also would make it clear that the plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands. 13. Yet another feature, which could be noticed, is this. In Ex.A-1, as stated earlier, there is reference about reconveyance deed. It is stated in this as if that sale deed was executed by the plaintiff and his legal heirs in 1959 in favour of Velu Chettiar. This also is not factually correct. This is clear from the wordings contained in the sale deed executed in the year 1959. 14. The plaintiff did not choose to file the sale deed executed on 15. 1959. On the other hand, the defendant has filed it and marked the same as Ex.B-1. The evidence of D.Ws.2 and 3, the local villagers, also would clearly show that though the sale deed was executed in 1959 in favour of Velu Chettiar, the suit properties were in continuous possession of the plaintiff, plaintiffs mother and defendant. 15. In fact, P.W.1, the plaintiff himself would admit that he only arranged the marriage of his younger brother, the defendant in 1966. The marriage invitation also has been marked as Ex.B-2. In the marriage invitation, the plaintiffs name is mentioned. 116. So, these things would make it clear that the sale deed executed in favour of Velu Chettiar was only a name sake document and as such, the suit properties were in possession and enjoyment of the joint family. 117. When there are clear materials to show that the suit properties which were sold to Velu Chettiar by the joint family members and the agreement for reconveyance deed was executed by Velu Chettiar in favour of the joint family members, it can be safely concluded that the properties were reconveyed in the name of the plaintiff only as a Karta of the joint family. 118. 118. As clearly pointed out by the trial Court, there is no material placed before the Court by the plaintiff to show that were was any partition between the members of the family. Moreover, the plaintiff did not prove that the suit properties were purchased out of his independent source of income. 119. It is true that the defendant, the appellant herein also was not able to produce any money order coupons to show that he used to send money from Army to the plaintiff by which the properties were reconveyed in favour of the joint family. But, this aspect cannot be of any use for the plaintiff, as it is for the plaintiff to prove that the properties are his self-acquired properties and consequently, he would be entitled for declaration of title and permanent injunction. .20. At the risk of repetition, I would state that the plaintiff being an elder brother, in order to deprive the right of the younger brother over the joint family properties, has approached the civil court with a false plea. Therefore, I find that the reasonings given by the lower appellate court for decreeing the suit mainly on the basis of the weakness of the defence, are quite perverse and the same are liable to be set aside. 121. While coming to the above conclusion, I am conscious of the fact that this Court when exercising its jurisdiction under Sec.100, C.P.C. would not interfere of fact, by substituting its own assessment of the evidence. But, the Apex Court in various decisions would hold that there is no justification to construe Sec.100 in a very narrow and restricted sense. 122. The recent trend as per the rulings of the Supreme Court has been in favour of keeping an open eye as against the glaring misreading, misquoting or failure to consider crucial evidence. When both the courts below had recorded diverse findings and where the material evidence and the relevant circumstances had not been adverted to by the appellate court, this Court is justified in interfering with the finding of fact. 123. The abvoe principles have been laid down in the following decisions: .(1) Sonawatia v. Sri Ram A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 466. (2) Radha Nath v. Haripada A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1049. .(3) Madan Lal v. Gopi A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1754. (4) Surain Singh v. Mehenga (1996)1 C.T.C. 360. 123. The abvoe principles have been laid down in the following decisions: .(1) Sonawatia v. Sri Ram A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 466. (2) Radha Nath v. Haripada A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1049. .(3) Madan Lal v. Gopi A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1754. (4) Surain Singh v. Mehenga (1996)1 C.T.C. 360. (5) Kochukakkada Aboobacker v. Atiah Kasim Kochukakkada Aboobacker v. Atiah Kasim Kochukakkada Aboobacker v. Atiah Kasim (1996)7 S.C.C. 389 . (6) D.S.Thimmappa v. Siddaramakka D.S.Thimmappa v. Siddaramakka D.S.Thimmappa v. Siddaramakka (1996)8 S.C.C. 365 . (7) Sitaramacharya v. Gururajacharya (1997)2 S.C.C. 548 . (8) Muthu Gounder v. Poosari alias Palaniappan (1997)1 C.T.C. 477. (9) Rahamathulla Shuthari alias Peer Hazarath v. The Muslim Jamath of Eachampatti etc. and others Rahamathulla Shuthari alias Peer Hazarath v. The Muslim Jamath of Eachampatti etc. and others Rahamathulla Shuthari alias Peer Hazarath v. The Muslim Jamath of Eachampatti etc. and others (1998)1 L.W. 413 . (10) Rajammal v. Ramaswami and three others Rajammal v. Ramaswami and three others Rajammal v. Ramaswami and three others (1998) 1 C.T.C. 98 : (1998)2 MLJ. 307 . (11) Rajiah Nadar v. Manonmani Ammal (1999)1 C.T.C. 245. 24. Therefore, on a consideration of the above settled proposition of law as regards the scope of interference of the findings of facts and having regard to the error committed by the lower appellate Court in failing to consider the circumstances mentioned above, I am of the view that the findings of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained. 25. In the result, the second appeal is allowed with costs by setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and by restoring the judgment and decree of the trial court.