ORDER: Landlord in R.C.O.P.3498 of 1986 on the file of Rent Controller/XVI Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras is the revision petitioner herein. 2. Application filed by landlord was one for eviction on the ground that the building requires immediate demolition and re-construction under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 3. Material averments in the eviction petition could be summarised thus: One Mallikeswara Chetty was the owner of the scheduled premises and he sold the same to landlord. Even before purchase, respondent herein was occupying the entire premises as tenant of Mallikeswara Chetty and after purchase, rent was apportioned between Mallikeswara Chetty and landlord. Tenant also agreed to pay the same at the rate of Rs.200 per month and balance Rs.141 to be paid to the previous owner. Building was let out for residential purpose. 4. It is the case of petitioner that the building is a tiled one built with brick and lime mortar and the age of the building is 75 years, and hence the condition of the building has become flimsy and weak. Landlord is also the owner of the adjacent property lying on the eastern side of the building, bearing door No.341. After purchase of the said building, petitioner had demolished the entire weak structure and put up three storeyed building to have the show room under the name and style ‘M/s.Aruna & Co’. Landlord is a partner in that business and carrying on the business. 5. It is the case of landlord that he has purchased the scheduled premises with a view to demolish the present weak structure and to put up new structure so as to enclose the same with the newly built up area. It is also his case that landlord is not able to accommodate the entire business of M/s.Aruna & Co in the present building. Demolition and reconstruction of scheduled building is also necessary to augment the income and for better investment and use of the property and to expand the business. 6. Petitioner also averred that he also made arrangements to get sanction from the local authorities and it is also stated that he got sufficient means to put up new construction. Various demands were made to tenant to vacate the building and finally a notice was issued on 19.9.1986 terminating the tenancy and asking tenant to vacate the premises. 6. Petitioner also averred that he also made arrangements to get sanction from the local authorities and it is also stated that he got sufficient means to put up new construction. Various demands were made to tenant to vacate the building and finally a notice was issued on 19.9.1986 terminating the tenancy and asking tenant to vacate the premises. In the reply sent by respondent, he refused to vacate the building which necessitated filing of eviction petition. Landlord has also given an undertaking that he will commence the demolition work within a month from the date of taking possession of the building and complete the reconstruction work within three months. 7. In the first counter-statement filed by respondent, he denied the claim of landlord for eviction of the building on the ground that the building requires immediate demolition and reconstruction. According to tenant, building is strong enough and there is no necessity for demolition. The allegation that the building is more than 75 years old is not correct. Vendor of landlord already filed rent control petition in R.C.O.P.No.4900 of 1982 for fixing fair rent wherein the age of the building was also one of the matter considered. At that time it was concluded that the building is only 50 years old and on this date it will not be more than 60 years. It is also contended that the present application is filed only in collusion with Mallikeswara Chetty. Various attempts made by Mallikeswara Chetty to evict tenant have failed and now he has asked the present petitioner to file separate application after selling portion of the property. 8. In the additional counter statement filed by tenant it is contended that the entire tenancy premises have not been purchased by landlord and only a portion has been sold to him. Since entire premises has not been sold, tenancy cannot be split up. But for the sake of convenience, rent payable to original landlord was apportioned and tenant also agreed to pay a sum of Rs.200 to petitioner herein and balance to the previous landlord. Eviction of portion of the demised premises is not maintainable. It is also contended that the tenancy being one and indivisible, the mere fact that there was division of rent for the convenience of petitioner and his vendor does not detract indivisibility of tenancy. Eviction of portion of the demised premises is not maintainable. It is also contended that the tenancy being one and indivisible, the mere fact that there was division of rent for the convenience of petitioner and his vendor does not detract indivisibility of tenancy. It is also contended that demolition of portion of building is also not possible and if portion of building is demolished entire structure cannot be used. Apart from the same, Mallikeswara Chetty is also a necessary party to this proceedings. 9. On the above pleadings, Rent Controller took oral and documentary evidence and as per order dated 10.1.1991 dismissed the eviction petition. Rent Controller held that the building is in good condition and it does not require reconstruction. It is also found on the basis of Engineer’s report that demolition of portion is not possible. The contention of landlord that the building is weak and not in good condition was also found against. It is further found that the age of the building is not 75 years and in the earlier proceedings for fixation of fair rent, age of the building has been found much less. 10. The matter was taken in appeal in R.C.A.No.203 of 1992 on the file of VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, who is the Rent Control Appellate Authority. Appellate Authority also did not find any reason to come to a different conclusion. The appeal was dismissed. 11. The concurrent findings of authorities below are assailed in this revision petition under Sec.25 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 12. I heard the counsel on both sides. Learned counsel for landlord submitted that the concurrent findings are liable to be interfered with since the authorities below have not taken into consideration the relevant piece of evidence and also the law declared by this Court under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act. 13. Even though there is an averment in the eviction petition that landlord requires the scheduled building for expansion of his business after reconstruction, the said ground is not seen pursued since scheduled premises is a residential premises. Landlord cannot claim eviction on the ground of bona fide own occupation of a residential building for the purpose of non-residential purpose. Probably, that was the reason why landlord wanted eviction on the ground that building requires demolition and reconstruction under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act. 14. Landlord cannot claim eviction on the ground of bona fide own occupation of a residential building for the purpose of non-residential purpose. Probably, that was the reason why landlord wanted eviction on the ground that building requires demolition and reconstruction under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act. 14. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that from the Commissioner’s report itself it could be seen that the building is not in good condition. There are cracks on the wall and the interpretation given by Rent Controller as well as appellate authority giving importance to the physical condition of the building is not correct. Counsel also relied on the decisions reported in S.Thangaswamy v. R.Vinayakamurthy, (1996)2 M.L.J. 322 : (1996)2 C.T.C. 105 , S.Kannan v. P.Manoharan, (1996)2 C.T.C. 733 and also M/s.M.M.Jaffar and Company v. M/s.Coimbatore Bearing Stores, (1999)1 C.T.C. 620 . I will consider the effect of these decisions after taking into consideration the arguments of learned counsel for respondent, when he challenges the very maintainability of this eviction petition. 15. According to tenant, the entire building was let out to him for a rent of Rs.330 and petitioner herein has purchased only portion of the building and the remaining portion still belongs to Mallikeswara Chetty. Since it is a single tenancy, landlord is not entitled to split up the tenancy and tenancy continues as indivisible. Tenancy therefore cannot be terminated nor eviction could be had of portion of the tenanted premises. How far the said contention could be accepted is a matter to be considered in this case. 16. Since it is a single tenancy, landlord is not entitled to split up the tenancy and tenancy continues as indivisible. Tenancy therefore cannot be terminated nor eviction could be had of portion of the tenanted premises. How far the said contention could be accepted is a matter to be considered in this case. 16. Sec.109 of Transfer of Property Act provides rights of lessor’s transferee, which reads thus: “If the lessor transfers the property leased, or any party thereof, or any part of his interest therein, the transferee in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer, cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease, unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him: Provided that the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the transfer, and that if the lessee, not having reason to believe that such transfer has been made, pays rent to the lessor,the lessee shall not be liable to pay such rent over again to the transferee. The lessor, the transferee and the lessee may determine what proportion of the premium or rent reserved by the lease is payable in respect of the part so transferred, and, in case they disagree, such determination may be made by any Court having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the possession of the property leased”. 17. Similar question came for consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Mohar Singh v. Devi Charan, (1988)3 S.C.C. 63 , wherein their Lordships approved the Full Bench decision of this Court in Kannyan v. Alikutti, 37 M.L.J. 47: A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 838 (F.B.). The scope of Sec.109 of Transfer of Property Act was fully discussed in that case. In paragraphs 7 to 10 of the judgment their Lordships have held thus: “7. It is a trite proposition that a landlord cannot split the unity and integrity of the tenancy and recover possession of a part of the demised premises from the tenant. The scope of Sec.109 of Transfer of Property Act was fully discussed in that case. In paragraphs 7 to 10 of the judgment their Lordships have held thus: “7. It is a trite proposition that a landlord cannot split the unity and integrity of the tenancy and recover possession of a part of the demised premises from the tenant. But Sec.109 of the Transfer of Property Act provides a statutory exception to this rule and enables an assignee of a part of the reversion to exercise all the rights of the landlord in respect of the portion respecting which the reversion is so assigned subject, of course, to the other covenant running with the land. This is the true effect of the words’shall possess all the rights... of the lessor as to the property or part transferred...” occurring in Sec.109 of the T.P.Act. There is no need for a consensual attornment. The attornment is brought about by operation of law. The limitation on the right of the landlord against splitting up of the integrity of the tenancy, inhering in the inhibitions of his own contract, does not visit the assignee of the part of the reversion. There is no need for the consent of the tenant for the severance of the reversion and the assignment of the part so severed. This proposition is too well-settled to require any further elucidation or reiteration. Suffice it to refer to the succinct statement of the law by Wallis, C.J. in Kannyan v. AliKutti, (supra): A lessor cannot give a tenant notice to quit a part of the holding only and then sue to eject him from such part only, as pointed out quite recently by the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy, 35 M.L.J. 707. Consequently, if the suit is brought by the original lessor the answer to the question referred to us must be in the negative because such a suit does not lie at all. Other considerations, however, arise, where, as in the present case, the original lessor has parted in whole or in part with the reversion in part of the demised premises. Under the general law such an assignment effects a severance, and entitles the assignee on the expiry of the term to eject the tenant from the land covered by the assignment. 8. Under the general law such an assignment effects a severance, and entitles the assignee on the expiry of the term to eject the tenant from the land covered by the assignment. 8. Shri Uma Dutta, learner counsel for the respondent-tenant, however, relied on the pronouncement of this Court in Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 186, to support his contention that severance and assignment of a part of the reversion would not affect the integrity of the lease. We are afraid, reliance on this case is somewhat misplaced. This was a converse case where this Court considered the effect of splitting up of the interest of the lessees, inter se. In that context, Mahajan, J. said: “An inter se partition of the mokarrari interest amongst the mokarraridars as alleged by the plaintiffs could not affect their liability qua the lessor for the payment of the whole rent, as several tenants of the tenancy in law constitute but a single tenant, and qua the landlord they constitute one person, each constituent part of which possesses certain common rights in the whole and is liable to discharge common obligations in its entirety.... There is a privity of the estate between the tenant and the landlord in the whole of the leasehold and he is liable for the covenants running with the land. In law, therefore, an inter se partition of the mokarrari interest could not affect the integrity of the lease... ” This is an altogether different proposition. 9. The next contention of Shri Uma Datta is that, at all events, what flows from a ‘transfer’ under Sec.5 read with Sec.109 of T.P.Act cannot be predicated of a partition as partition is no ‘transfer’. It is true that a partition is not actually a transfer of property but would only signify the surrender of a portion of a joint right in exchange for a similar right from the other co-sharer or co-sharers. However, some decisions of the High Courts tend to the view that even a case of partition is covered by Sec.109 and that, in any event, even if the Section does not in terms apply the principle of the Section is applicable as embodying a rule of justice, equity and good conscience. We need not go into this question in this case. We need not go into this question in this case. Suffice it to say that the same High Court itself, from whose decision this present appeal arises, in Ram Chandra Singh v. Ram Saran, A.I.R. 1978 All. 173, has taken the view that Sec.109 of T.P.Act is attracted to the case of partition also. That was a decision which the learned judge in the present case should have considered himself bound by, unless there was a pronouncement of a larger Bench to the contrary or unless the learned judge himself differed from the earlier view in which event the matter had to go before a Division Bench. 10. The correctness of the decision in Ram Chandra Singh case, was not assailed before us, and, therefore, we do not feel called upon to pronounce on it. We should, we think apply the same rule to this case. Several other High Courts have also taken this view, though, however, some decisions have been content to rest the conclusion on the general principle underlying Sec.109, T.P.Act, as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience“. 18. In Sk.Sattar Sk.Mohd. v. Gundappa Amabadas, (1996)6 S.C.C. 373 , also same question came for consideration. After extracting Sec.109 of Transfer of Property Act, in paragraphs 17 to 19, their Lordships have held thus: ”17. This Section is based on the maxim, qui in jus dominiumve alterius succedit jure ejus uti debet, that is to say, rights and liabilities attached to the property (arising out of possession and control of that property) pass with the property. 18. A bare reading of the first part of the Section indicates that if the property is either transferred as a whole or any part thereof alone is transferred, the transferee comes to possess all the rights of the lessor. 19. The Proviso appended to the first part of the Section contemplates that before a tenant can be made liable to pay rent to the transferee, he must have knowledge of the transfer either through lessor or by his transferee by a notice. Requirement of knowledge of transfer in this Section as also in Secs.37 and 50 is based on the general principle of law set out by Willes, J. in De Nicholls v. Saunders, that if a person fulfils his obligations without notice of the rights of a third party, his obligation is treated as discharged. Requirement of knowledge of transfer in this Section as also in Secs.37 and 50 is based on the general principle of law set out by Willes, J. in De Nicholls v. Saunders, that if a person fulfils his obligations without notice of the rights of a third party, his obligation is treated as discharged. Requirement of knowledge and the communication of notice regarding transfer of the part or the whole of the property in occupation of a tenant is a condition precedent for creating a liability in the tenant to pay rent to the transferee or the assignee of the demised premises, but it does not have the effect of postponing the assignment or transfer of property till the receipt of the notice. The title passes to the assignee immediately on the execution of the deed of transfer or assignment“. In para.37 of the judgment it is further held thus: ”37. In view of the above discussion, it is obvious that the law with regard to the splitting of tenancy is not what the High Court has set out in the impugned judgment. As pointed out earlier,a co-sharer cannot initiate action for eviction of the tenant from the portion of the tenanted accommodation nor can he sue for his part of the rent. The tenancy cannot be split up either in estate or in rent or any other obligation by unilateral act of one of the co-owners. If, however, all the co-owners or the co-lessors agree among themselves and split by partition the demised property by metes and bounds and come to have definite, positive and identifiable shares in that property, they become separate individual owners of each severed portion and can deal with that portion as also the tenant thereof as individual owner/lessor. The right of joint lessors contemplated by Sec.109 comes to be possessed by each of them separately and independently. There is no right in the tenant to prevent the joint owners or co-lessors from partitioning the tenanted accommodation among themselves. The right of joint lessors contemplated by Sec.109 comes to be possessed by each of them separately and independently. There is no right in the tenant to prevent the joint owners or co-lessors from partitioning the tenanted accommodation among themselves. Whether the premises which is in occupation of a tenant, shall be retained jointly by all the lessors or they would partition it among themselves, is the exclusive right of the lessor to which no objection can be taken by the tenant, particularly where the tenant knew from the very beginning that the property was jointly owned by several persons and that, even if he was being dealt with by only one of them on behalf of the whole body of the lessors, he cannot object to the transfer of any portion of the property in favour of a third person by one of the owners or to the partition of the property. It will, however, be open to the tenant to show that the partition was not bona fide and was a sham transaction to overcome the rigours of Rent Control laws which protected eviction of the tenants except on specified grounds set out in the relevant statute". [Italics supplied] An argument was also taken before Honourable Supreme Court that assigning of part of the property would not affect the integrity of the lease. The same was also found against in paras.38 and 39 of the judgment, which read thus: "38. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon a decision of this Court in Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 186 and contended that the severance or assignment of a part of the reversion would not affect the integrity of the lessee. This case is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In that case, there were several lessees who had divided the tenancy rights among themselves and had thus split up the lease. It was in this connection that it was laid down that an inter se partition of the lessee rights amongst the co-lessees would not affect their liability qua the lessor for the payment of the whole rent as they continue, in status, as a single tenant. It was further observed that in law an inter se partition of the leasehold interest would not affect the integrity of the lease. 39. It was further observed that in law an inter se partition of the leasehold interest would not affect the integrity of the lease. 39. The decision in Badri Narain Jha case, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 186 was considered by this Court in Mohar singh v. Devi Charan, (1988)3 S.C.C. 63 . and was not followed on the ground that it related to partition of the leasehold rights among the co-lessees". 19. Karnataka High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in India Hobby Centre (P) Ltd. v. Jabbar Ahmed, (1998)3 Karn.L.J. 563. In that case also one of the question that was raised was whether purchaser of portion of property from original lessor is entitled to file eviction petition in respect of portion which he purchased. In that case tenant also apportioned the rent between purchaser and original owner. In that case, it is held thus: "....Therefore, it is clear by the fact that the petitioner-tenant had agreed to pay Rs.380 as rent per month to the said Jabber Ahmed, clearly shows that subsequent to the purchase of the petition schedule premises by the said Jabber Ahmed, there has been severance of one tenancy in respect of the three shops under the original landlord the aforesaid Ananthakrishna; and in its place, two fresh tenancies were created-one in respect of the petition schedule premises by agreeing to pay Rs.380 as rent per month to one said Jabber Ahmed and another in respect of the said two shop premises purchased by the aforesaid Sardar Pasha by agreeing to pay rent of Rs.480 per month. Thus, the property transferred being distinct and well defined and rent payable also having been apportioned as payable to the property transferred, the tenancy stood split upon transfer and the petition filed for eviction of the petitioner-tenant, in my view, is maintainable in law. The view I have taken above is also supported by a decision of this Court in the case of Haji Abdul Ghanisaheb v. Rajan Sharma, (1980)1 Karn.L.J. 79 (S.N.). The view I have taken above is also supported by a decision of this Court in the case of Haji Abdul Ghanisaheb v. Rajan Sharma, (1980)1 Karn.L.J. 79 (S.N.). This Court, after quoting Secs.37 and 109 of the Transfer of Property Act observed thus: "...On a combined reading of these two Sections, what emerges out is: when in consequence of transfer of the property leased is divided and held by different transferees in different shares, the benefit of any obligation relating to the property as a whole, also passes from transferor to several transferees of the property leased, with corresponding duty to be performed in favour of each of such several transferees in proportion to their share in the property, provided the duty can be so severed without substantially increasing the burden of obligation. If the duty cannot be so severed or the severance would substantially increase the burden of obligation, the duty shall be performed for the benefit of each of the transferees as determined by them jointly. This also holds good where only part of the property leased is transferred by the lessor and the property so transferred is either divided or is ascertainable for being hold separately from the part not transferred. In either of these cases, all that is necessary is that the tenant must have sufficient notice of the transfer to convert his single obligation into several obligations to pay the rent to several transferees who by virtue of the provisions of Sec.109 step into the shoes of the lessor become possessed of rights of the original lessor as to the property or part of the property transferred and the lessee, if he so elects, is subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part of the property transferred, except that the transferee will not be entitled to the arrears of rent due before transfer and the lessee shall not be liable to pay the rent over again to the transferees. In what proportion the rent will be payable in respect of part of the premises or different portions of the premises transferred may be determined by the lessor, transferee(s) and lessee. In case of disagreement between them as provided under Sec.109, the same will be determined by the Court having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for possession of the property leased. In case of disagreement between them as provided under Sec.109, the same will be determined by the Court having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for possession of the property leased. However, as long as there is no apportionment of the rent made, the obligation remains single and the transferee, or transferees (where different portions of the property is sold to different persons), who becomes the lessor in place of original lessor, will not be allowed to split the tenancy for claiming or recovering the rent or a part of the property leased. The rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee are determinable by the terms of the contract or local usages and those specified in Sec.108 of the Transfer of Property Act. Since by virtue of clauses (c) of Sec.108, transferees from the original lessor shall be deemed to contract with the lessee that if the lessee pays the rent reserved by the lease and performs the contract binding on him, he may hold the property during the time limited by the lease without interruption. In other words, the tenant shall continue in undisturbed possession of the property leased until determination of the lease. In sum and substance, where the property leased is transferred, there is severance of tenancy; but, in spite of severance of tenancy, the lessee is entitled to continue in possession of the property without interruption by paying the rent as originally reserved proportionate to the property transferred. However where the property leased is transferred in different shares to different transferees, without specifying as to which part of the property leased is transferred to which of the transferees, and although it may be possible to say what share they have in the property so transferred having regard to the contributions made by the transferees for the transfer, and the transferees, by virtue of the provisions of Sec.36 of the T.P.Act, may be entitled to claim and receive the rent in proportion to their share, they cannot however determine the lease or recover possession of the property leased proportionate to their share, because until and unless there is a division of the property leased in proportion to their share, the transferees cannot say that they are the lessors in respect of any particular part of the property. In order to effect severance of tenancy on transfer, there must necessarily be a division of the property. In order to effect severance of tenancy on transfer, there must necessarily be a division of the property. Once there is division of the property, either while transferring the property leased or after transfer, among the transferees of the property leased in proportion to their share, then there is severance of tenancy. That being so, the transferee of the property leased will be entitled to recover possession of the part of the property leased in proportion to his share so determined. Although as stated earlier, under general law, even after transfer of the property leased, the tenant is entitled to continue in undisturbed possession of the property leased to him by paying the premium of the rent reserved until determination of the lease, but in case of statutory tenants continuing in possession of the property leased, because of the protection from eviction given to them under the Rent Control Act, the determination of the lease being not necessary, the transferee of the part of the property transferred may recover possession without determination of the lease". 11. It appears, it is not necessary to refer to various decisions cited and relied upon by Mr.Narayana Rao since the question of law as now raised by him was subject of consideration in the decision of Sree Nataraja Flour Mills v. Venkatarathnaiah, of this Court and after referring to various decisions including the one relied upon by Mr.Narayana Rao, it has been held that on transfer of a part of the property leased, there is severance of tenancy. The transferee of the property leased, or where it is transferred to different persons, all the transferees, step into the shoes of the lessor. There being thus severance of tenancy, on a transfer of a part of the property leased and the transferee becoming the lessor and the lessee becoming the lessee of the transferee of the part of the property so transferred, they will be subject to all the rights and the liabilities of the lessor and the lessee as specified under Sec.108 of the Transfer of property Act". The principle laid down in the aforesaid decision fully applies to the facts of the present case. The principle laid down in the aforesaid decision fully applies to the facts of the present case. Merely because for the convenience of the tenant, the said Jabber Ahmed and Sardar Pasha did not insist on the petitioner-tenant to put a bifurcating wall in between the two premises, it would not in any way affect the respective rights of the said Jabber Ahmed and Sardar Pasha in respect of the two portions purchased by them in respect of which two tenancies were created. The learned Judge, while considering the question as to whether the frame of the eviction petition filed against the petitioner-tenant was bad, i.e., Point No.1, in paragraphs 6 to 11 of the order, has elaborately considered the objections raised on behalf of the petitioner-tenant on this question and held against the petitioner-tenant. I do not find by infirmity in the findings rendered by the learned Judge". [Italics supplied] 20. In view of the decisions cited above, I do not think that the contention of learned counsel for tenant could be accepted. In this case, portion sold to landlord has been defined and actual measurement is also given. That is stated in the additional written statement filed by the tenant himself. Thereafter, he himself apportioned the rent and landlord was given Rs.200 and balance to the previous owner. In those circumstances, it is futile to contend that previous landlord is also necessary party to the proceedings and further to contend that the tenancy cannot be split up by filing this application. By transfer, assignee is getting all the rights of transferor in respect of item transferred. He becomes lessor of the portion and under Sec.109 of the Transfer of Property Act, he is entitled to exercise that right. If Mallikeswara Chetty alone continues as owner, he will not be in a position to get eviction of a portion, but when he has transferred a portion, there are two landlords and tenant has also by his conduct agreed for splitting of the tenancy by apportioning the rent. In fact, it is a new tenancy so far as landlord is concerned. Under these circumstances, eviction petition is maintainable, and landlord also entitled to get eviction if he proves the ingredients of Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act and his bona fides. 21. Only other question to be considered is whether landlord is entitled to get eviction under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act. 22. Under these circumstances, eviction petition is maintainable, and landlord also entitled to get eviction if he proves the ingredients of Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act and his bona fides. 21. Only other question to be considered is whether landlord is entitled to get eviction under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act. 22. The concurrent finding is that landlord is not entitled to get eviction of tenant. Main reason for holding against landlord was that the condition of the building is good. Commis-sioner’s report was placed before me by learned counsel for respondent. In the report, the Commissioner has stated thus: "Next, I visited the portion in occupation of the respondent. The said portion is a old model constructed building. The said portion is a tiled one built with brick and lime mortor. But the condition of the building is not flimsy and weak. This building does not require immediate demolition and reconstruction, since the building is in proper condition". Thereafter, he gives the measurements of the building which is sought to be evicted and thereafter Commissioner further says that: "There is a long crack in the ground floor of the respondent’s portion. The respondent made representation that the crack was made by the petitioner for the construction of wall to separate the whole house into two parts; subsequently the petitioner have abanded the idea of construction of the wall and closed the crack with cement plastering". Authorities below have held that if the condition of the building do not require any reconstruction, an application under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act is not maintainable. 23. I do not think that the said approach of the authorities below is correct. It is true that the physical condition of the building is also one piece of evidence which is relevant factor to be considered to show the bona fides of landlord for demolition and reconstruction. But, the physical condition alone is not the criteria. Landlord has got definite case in para.8 of the petition that demolition and reconstruction is necessary for augmenting income and for better investment and use of property. 24. Entire law has been considered in the decision reported in Vijay Singh v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, (1996)6 S.C.C. 475 , which arose under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Landlord has got definite case in para.8 of the petition that demolition and reconstruction is necessary for augmenting income and for better investment and use of property. 24. Entire law has been considered in the decision reported in Vijay Singh v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, (1996)6 S.C.C. 475 , which arose under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In paras.10 and 11 of the judgment, their Lordships considered this question and held that to prove the bona fides illustrative factors mentioned are not exhaustive and the physical condition of the building is also taken into consideration with other factors and then the conclusion will have to be arrived by the Rent Controller. Paragraphs 10 and 11 read thus: "10. On reading Sec.14(1)(b) along with Sec.16 it can be said that for eviction of a tenant on the ground of demolition of the building for erecting a new building, the building need not be dilapidated of dangerous for human habitation. If that was the requirement there is no occasion to put a condition to demolish within a specified time, and to erect a new building on the same site. Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.16 contemplates that permission has been granted by the Rent Controller under Sec.14(1)(b) for demolition of the building, but if such demolition is not carried out in terms of the order and undertaking, then the Rent Controller can order the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the building on the original terms and conditions. If the building is dangerous and dilapidated requiring immediate demolition for safety, then there is no question of Rent Controller directing the landlord to put the tenant in possession of such building on the original terms and conditions, on account of the failure of the landlord to commence the demolition within the period prescribed. Similarly, there was no occasion to link the demolition of such building with erection of new building and then to give the landlord freedom from the restrictive provisions of the Act for a period of five years from the date on which the construction of such new building is completed and notified to the local authorities concerned. In this background, it has to be held that neither of the extreme position taken by the respondent or the appellants can be accepted. In this background, it has to be held that neither of the extreme position taken by the respondent or the appellants can be accepted. Permission under Sec.14(1)(b) cannot be granted by the Rent Controller on mere asking of the landlord, that he proposes to immediately demolish the building in question to erect a new building. At the same time it is difficult to accept the stand of the appellants that the building must be dilapidated and dangerous, unfit for human habitation. For granting permission under Sec.14(1)(b) the Rent Controller is expected to consider all relevant materials for recording a finding whether the requirement of the landlord for demolition of the building and erection of a new building on the same site is bona fide or not. For recording a finding that requirement for demolition was bona fide, the Rent Controller has to take into account: (1) Bona fide intention of the landlord far from the sole object only to get rid of the tenants; (2) the age and condition of the building; (3) the financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building according to the statutory requirements of the Act. These are some of the illustrative factors which have to be taken into consideration before an order is passed under Sec.14(1)(b). No Court can fix any limit in respect of the age and condition of the building. That factor has to be taken into consideration along with other factors and then a conclusion one way or the other has to be arrived at by the Rent Controller. 11. It appears from the facts of the present appeals that the building in question was an old one and was situated in a very busy locality of the town where a number of buildings in and around the building in question had been demolished and shopping complex had been constructed with modern amenities. The respondent also wanted to demolish the entire building in order to construct a new shopping complex for which necessary permission from the municipal authorities had already been obtained. It had also been claimed on behalf of the respondent that she had sufficient financial resources for construction of the new building. The respondent also wanted to demolish the entire building in order to construct a new shopping complex for which necessary permission from the municipal authorities had already been obtained. It had also been claimed on behalf of the respondent that she had sufficient financial resources for construction of the new building. An undertaking had also been given on behalf of the respondent that the work of demolition of the building would commence within one month and would be completed before the expiry of three months from the date the said respondent recovered possession of the building. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, the Controller had passed an order in terms of Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act directing the appellants who were tenants in the building in question to deliver possession of the building to the respondent. According to us, all relevant factors have been taken into consideration and there is no scope for any interference by this Court“. [Italics supplied] 25. In the decision reported in A.Lakshmanan v. Kanniammal alias Pattammal, (1995)2 M.L.J. 178 , Justice AR.Lakshmanan (as he then was), held thus: ”...It is settled law that a concrete and immediate proposal or scheme to demolish an existing building and reconstruct it into a bigger, more productive and higher income yielding one, cannot by any means be said to be mala fide.This view was taken in many judgments by this Court and other High Courts. The case of the landlady should be scrutinised to find out whether she bona fide intends to demolish the building or whether the said provision is invoked by her merely with a view to evict the tenants with oblique motive. In this context, the plans or schemes of the landlady, her resources, her getting sanction from the municipal authorities for the reconstruction, etc., would have a bearing to establish the bona fide requirement of the landlady. 9. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the landlady, Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act is not rendered inapplicable merely because the building is not old or dilapidated but is in a good condition. 9. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the landlady, Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act is not rendered inapplicable merely because the building is not old or dilapidated but is in a good condition. In other words, if the intention of the landlady for demolition and reconstruction is proved to be genuine and not spurious, of specious, the landlady would be entitled to obtain an order for eviction under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act, whether or not the condition of the building is such as to require immediate demolition, the age and dilapidated condition of the building not being sine qua non for such eviction. As held by our High Court in the decision reported in Arumugham v. D.R.Srinivasan, (1982)2 M.L.J. 298 , if the landlady wanted to pull down a relatively recent construction and put up a multi-storeyed building according to modern requirements, the law does not prevent her provided it was bona fide. The decision of the Supreme Court will come into play only when the landlady relies on the age condition of the building for the purpose of Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act. 10. Likewise, it is well established in this case that the means of the landlady to carry out the work of demolition and reconstruction is a relevant factors to be taken note of by this Court and considered while testing her bona fides. As observed in the decision reported in Rukmani Ammal v. Izudden, (1983)1 M.L.J. 186: A.I.R. 1983 Mad. 303: 96 L.W. 145, this Court does not necessarily mean that the landlady should jingle the coins before the Controller to establish this factor. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the applications have been filed merely with a view to evict the tenants. The contention of Mr.E.Padmanabhan, that the entire eviction proceedings is nothing but a device to evict the tenants and in view of the conduct of the landlady, no order of eviction could be passed on the facts of this case is not based on any acceptable material. Therefore, I reject the same. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in M/s.P.Orr. Therefore, I reject the same. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in M/s.P.Orr. & Sons (P) Ltd. V.M/s.Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd., (1990)2 L.W. 547, in order to satisfy the test under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act, the condition of the building need not have deteriorated to the extent of the building being in danger of crumbling down but the condition must be such as to indicate a bona fide requirement for the timely, qunuine and direct purpose of demolition and reconstruction“. [Italics supplied] 26. The Commissioner has only said that the condition of the building is not flimsy and weak and it does not require immediate demolition and reconstruction. Nowhere in the report he was said about the physical strength of the building nor he has said that the condition of the building is good. It may not be that much dangerous that it may fall down at any time nor it is in ruinous condition. But that is not the legal position to be considered under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act. Various other factors will have to be considered under Sec.14(1)(b) to arrive at a conclusion whether the condition of the building is good or bad. There is a crack on the main wall in the ground floor portion and the said crack is seen throughout in the wall is also clear from the Commissioner’s report. Though tenant has given explanation that the crack was due to the acts of landlord, I do not think that argument was accepted by the authorities below nor do I find any evidence to substantiate the same. According to tenant, landlord wanted to put up dividing wall between the portion purchased by purchaser with that of the vendor. If he wanted to divide the property, what is the necessity of making crack on the wall is not explained and how can a crack develop if an intervening wall is constructed. From the available evidence it is clear that one of the main walls in the ground floor is not in good condition. 27. Justice AR.Lakshmanan, (as he then was) also had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in S.Thangaswamy v. R.Vinayakamurthy, (1996)2 M.L.J. 322 : (1996)2 C.T.C. 105 . In paragraphs 9 to 10 of the Judgment, learned Judge held thus: ”9. I am unable to countenance any one of the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant. 27. Justice AR.Lakshmanan, (as he then was) also had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in S.Thangaswamy v. R.Vinayakamurthy, (1996)2 M.L.J. 322 : (1996)2 C.T.C. 105 . In paragraphs 9 to 10 of the Judgment, learned Judge held thus: ”9. I am unable to countenance any one of the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant. Even though the petitioner was a party respondent before the Rent Controller, he has not disputed or denied the age of the building. According to the counter filed by the tenant, he has only stated that though the building is old, but not in a bad shape or condition. Except this, he has not stated anything about the nature or condition of the building. Nothing prevented the tenant from requesting the Court to appoint a Commissioner in order to show that the building does not require immediate purpose of demolition and re-construction. In this case, the petitioner has specifically stated in his counter that the petitioner’s father was a tenant for the past 50 years and after his death, the petitioner has been paying the rent to the landlord. However, the petitioner has been paying the rent to the landlord only by mistake that he has title to the property. I am unable to appreciate the stand taken by the tenant in denying the title of the present landlord. Having paid the rent and having recognised him as the landlord, it is not open to the petitioner herein to deny the title of the landlord, which in my opinion is nothing but wilful. 10. In my opinion, non-examination of a Commissioner or an Engineer, is not fatal to the case of the respondent herein. Likewise, the motive for demolition and reconstruction is wholly irrelevant in a petition for eviction under Sec.14(1)(b). As rightly contended by learned counsel for the landlord, Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act is not rendered inapplicable merely because building is not dilapidated, but is in good condition. In other words, if the intention of the landlord is proved to be genuine, and not spurious or specious, the landlord would be entitled to obtain an order for eviction under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act, whether or not the condition of the building is such as to require immediate demolition, the age and dilapidated condition of the building not being sine qua non for such eviction. It is well established in this case that the means of the landlord to carry out the work of demolition and reconstruction is a relevant factor to be taken note of by this Court and considered while testing his bona fides. In my opinion, in order to satisfy the test under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act, the condition of the building need not have deteriorated to the extent of the building being in danger of crumbling down but the condition must be such as to indicate a bona fide requirement for the timely, genuine and direct purposes of demolition and reconstruction. The tenant, in my opinion, has miserably failed to establish that there is no bona fide on the part of the landlord in seeking eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction and on the question of denial of their title. As already observed, the denial by the tenant is not bona fide. Having paid the rent and having recognised the respondent herein as the landlord, it is not open to the petitioner herein to deny his title. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that the denial of title is mala fide. There are no merits in the revision petition. Therefore, the civil revision petition fails and it is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs". 28. One of the reason which was found against landlord was that he has not taken plan and licence for putting up construction. Eviction petition was filed in the year 1986 and it is now more that 13 years since the same was filed. Under Tamil nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, production of plan and licence is not made condition precedent for making an application for eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction. Even where statute provide for production of plan and licence, it has been interpreted in such a way that plan and licence need not be produced along with petition. It could be produced at a later stage. Under Kerala Buildings Rent Control Act, one of the condition to get eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction is production of plan and licence. The same was considered by learned Judge of Kerala High Court, which I had occasion to consider in the decision reported in S.Kannan v. P.Manoharan, (1996)2 C.T.C. 733 . Under Kerala Buildings Rent Control Act, one of the condition to get eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction is production of plan and licence. The same was considered by learned Judge of Kerala High Court, which I had occasion to consider in the decision reported in S.Kannan v. P.Manoharan, (1996)2 C.T.C. 733 . I have also followed the decisions of this Court, wherein it is held that the production of plan and licence is not condition precedent for invoking the provisions of Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act, In paragraphs 18 and 19, I have considered this question in detail, which read thus: “18. ...When a condition is imposed in the Statute for production of plan and licence as a pre-condition for eviction, and the same has been interpreted by Court that the production at the later stage will be sufficient, in statutes where there is no such condition, according to me, the production at the late stage cannot be considered as an after thought or eviction petition was filed without any bona fides. ..... If we ask the landlord to have plan and licence every time renewed, as held in S.Balasubramanian v. Gulab Jan, 94 L.W. 102, it will be a futile exercise depending upon the result of the litigation and unnecessary expenses will have to be incurred. After licence is obtained, even the licence rules may change. So, the earlier plan becomes ineffectual. By the time eviction is ordered, the plan already filed may become ineffectual due to change of life of the property, or change of rules of construction. Even at that time fresh licence will have to be taken up. Under the circumstances, to insist the landlord that he must produce the plan and licence along with the petition cannot be correct. The Court will have to see whether the landlord has come to Court with clean hands with a good intention that he wants to demolish and reconstruct the building. For the said purpose, it will be sufficient if the plan and licence are filed either at the time of evidence or at the time of execution. The Rent Controller can insist that before the tenant is dispossessed, the landlord should produce a plan and licence. 19. For the said purpose, it will be sufficient if the plan and licence are filed either at the time of evidence or at the time of execution. The Rent Controller can insist that before the tenant is dispossessed, the landlord should produce a plan and licence. 19. In a Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court reported in Jose v. Thomas, (1992)1 K.L.T. 158 , their Lordships held thus: “In almost all cases wherein the tenants contest the claim for eviction, the period originally granted by the local authority for construction of building would expire before final disposal of the parties. It is a well known canon of interpretation that the Court should adopt an interpretation which would give effect to the purpose of the Act and avoid an interpretation which would defeat its object. When the Rent Control Court or Revisional Authority is satisfied that the landlord has a plan and licence to reconstruct the building, his petition is not to be dismissed on a finding that the period of licence expired during the pendency of proceedings under the Act. The Act does not contemplate rejection of the petition on the ground that the period of licence granted by the Municipality expired during the pendency of the proceedings. In order to safeguard and protect the interest of the tenant in such cases, the Court may incorporate a direction in the order of eviction that actual delivery of possession will be given only when landlord satisfies the execution Court that the licence has been renewed or a new licence has been granted by the local authority concerned”. Therefore, the finding of the Appellate Authority that the landlord obtained the licence few days before the hearing of the petition before the Rent Controller is an after thought, and cannot be accepted. In this connection, it must also be noted that an appeal was filed before the Appellate Authority, the landlord filed along with the appeal a renewed plan and licence which he obtained. The same was discarded and refused to be accepted by the Appellate Authority. I do not find any justification in rejecting the application. It only shows that continued bona fides of the landlord that he earnestly intended to demolish the building and reconstruct the same”. 29. My learned brother Justice K.Govindarajan has also taken the same view in the decision reported in M/s.M.M.Jaffar & Co. I do not find any justification in rejecting the application. It only shows that continued bona fides of the landlord that he earnestly intended to demolish the building and reconstruct the same”. 29. My learned brother Justice K.Govindarajan has also taken the same view in the decision reported in M/s.M.M.Jaffar & Co. v. M/s. Coimbatore Bearing Stores, (1999)1 C.T.C. 620 . 30. I have already said that eviction petition was filed in the year 1986. If landlord is asked to file plan and licence, he will have to renew the same every year and by this time, the very purpose of getting plan and licence will become infructuous. The original plan and licence cannot be used for constructing a building at present. The building rules might have been changed now. So, taking into consideration these facts, it cannot be said that non-production of plan and licence will disentitle landlord from getting eviction. 31. Regarding financial capacity of the landlord both the authorities below have held that landlord got capacity to raise funds and put up new construction. There is no allegation by tenant that there is oblique motive on the part of landlord to file this eviction petition. 32. The only other ground that is put forward by learned counsel for tenant is that if demolition of part of building is allowed regarding the remaining portion will affect the stability of the building. I do not think that the said argument will have any legal basis. Nowadays, Engineering technologies have improved to the vast extent and necessary directions also could be given at the time when possession is sought to be delivered over to landlord. That also will not prove lack of good faith as contended by learned counsel for respondent. 33. Learned counsel for respondent also submitted that it is concurrent finding and this Court should not interfere under Sec.25 of the Act. Legal submission made by learned counsel is correct. But I do not think that the said principle could be applied when the authorities below have not considered the law as interpreted by Honourable Supreme Court as well as by this Court. Rent Controller as well as appellate authority have given importance only to the physical condition of the building and also non-production of the licence to hold that landlord is not entitled to get eviction for demolition and reconstruction. Rent Controller as well as appellate authority have given importance only to the physical condition of the building and also non-production of the licence to hold that landlord is not entitled to get eviction for demolition and reconstruction. If only they have considered the legal position as interpreted by the Honourable Supreme Court and this Court, the decision would have been different. In that view of the matter, I have to hold that the decision of authorities below are not in accordance with law and interference under Sec.25 of the Act can be had in this case. 34. In the result, the revision petition is allowed and there will be an order of eviction as prayed for. I hold that petitioner is entitled to get eviction under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 35. Before taking possession of the property, landlord will have to produce plan and licence before the executing Court and executing Court will satisfy itself and only on satisfaction of production of copy of plan and licence, order of delivery will be issued. Before petitioner undertakes to demolish the building, he must take necessary precautions to see that the remaining portion of the building do not collapse or its condition is in any way damaged. Executing Court also will give necessary directions to the landlord before ordering delivery and landlord also must undertake that he will satisfy those conditions and only thereafter, he will demolish the building. 36. The revision petition is allowed as above. No costs.