Judgment : 1. The defendant in O.S.No.745 of 1982 on the file of the XV Assistant City Civil Court, Madras, is the appellant in the second appeal. 2. The respondent herein filed the suit, for directing the appellant to deliver vacant possession of premises No.68, Armenian Street, Madras 1, more fully described in the schedule to the plaint on the following averments: The property was endowed for religious and charitable purposes known to Muslim law and exempted under G.O.Ms.No.2000, from the purview and operation of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973. It was let out to the appellant on a monthly rent of Rs.1,000, the tenancy reckoned as per English calendar month under a registered deed dated 2. 1962 for a period of ten years and subsequently on the expiry of the lease, the period of lease was extended for a further period of five years. By notice dated 29. 1981, the tenancy of the appellant was determined according to law. It was acknowledged on 30.9.1981, and a reply sent therefor offering to pay an enhanced rent, to which a suitable rejoinder was sent reiterating the demand for possession of the premises. To the rejoinder, the appellant caused a further reply dated 1. 1982 to be sent disputing the respondents right to evict the appellant on the footing that the premises in question was exempted from the purview and operation of the Act 18 of 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973. Since on the expiry of the tenancy the defendant had failed to deliver possession, the suit for possession came to be filed. The suit was valued for purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction for the relief of possession under Sec.43(a) of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. In the plaint the respondent is stated to be a religious and charitable Trust registered under the Societies Registration Act, represented by its Secretary Mareeth Abdullah Basha. .3. Theappellant resisted the suit contending inter alia as follows: .The tenancy was for a period of five years, expressed as commencing from 1. 1977 and therefore, it could not be reckoned according to the English calendar month, but the rent was being paid according to the English calendar month. .3. Theappellant resisted the suit contending inter alia as follows: .The tenancy was for a period of five years, expressed as commencing from 1. 1977 and therefore, it could not be reckoned according to the English calendar month, but the rent was being paid according to the English calendar month. The notice of termination with the expiry of the calendar month was not in accordance with law and therefore there had been no proper termination of tenancy. The appellant continued to be in occupation as a tenant by holding over. Again, the respondent was not a religious and charitable Trust within the meaning of G.O.Ms.No.2000 and in any event the said G.O. was not applicable to the respondent. The G.O. itself was bad in law being violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. The tenancy was protected by the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. The civil court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree for delivery of vacant possession of the premises. The expiry of the period of lease was not a ground mentioned in Sec.10 of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 for evicting a tenant. There was no cause of action against the appellant. .4. There was an additional written statement filed by the appellant to the following effect: .“The lessor of the appellant in respect of the suit property was Mareeth Hajee Mohammed Ismail Saheb as the Muthavalli and Nazim of and for and on behalf of the Wakfnama and the respondent was only the person authorised by the said trust to receive the rents from the appellant. It was only an agent of the trust to collect the rent. The respondent, being not the lessor but only an agent of the lessor, was not entitled to sue much less for the reliefs as prayed for in the suit. There was no relationship of lessor/lessee between the parties. The suit was liable to be dismissed”. 5. Onthe above pleadings, the trial court framed the necessary issues and additional issues: Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession. 2. To what relief. Additional issue: Whether the defendant was a lessee/tenant. On the side of the respondent one Kaliya Basha was examined and Exs.A-1 to A-13 were marked. 6. On the side of the appellant no witness was examined nor was any document marked. .7. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession. 2. To what relief. Additional issue: Whether the defendant was a lessee/tenant. On the side of the respondent one Kaliya Basha was examined and Exs.A-1 to A-13 were marked. 6. On the side of the appellant no witness was examined nor was any document marked. .7. The trial court adverted to the various documents filed on behalf of the respondent and found that the respondent was a Trust coming within the purview of G.O.Ms.No.2000 and therefore, exempted from the application of the provisions of the Rent Control Act and that the suit was therefore maintainable. On the materials, the trial court further found that the suit property belonged to the respondent/Trust, that the appellant had been paying the rent to the respondent/Trust and it was not open to the appellant to contend that the respondent was only an agent and it could not maintain the suit. 8. As regards the deficiency in the notice issued, the trial court found that it was valid that it complied with the requirements of law and the contract between the parties. So holding, by judgment and decree dated 22. 1987, the trial court granted the prayer of the respondent. 9. The appellant filed appeal A.S.No.27 of 1988 before the VI Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, who by his judgment and decree dated 4. 1988 confirmed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the present second appeal has been filed. .10. At the time of admission, the following substantial question of law was framed for decision in the second appeal: .“Whether the respondent is the landlord and would fall within the scope of G.O.Ms.No.2000, dated 18. 1986.” .11. Mr.G.Subramaniam, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr.M.R.Raghavan, learned counsel for the appellant made the following submissions: .The plaintiff/respondent was a registered society and no resolution authorising the respondent to initiate proceedings had been passed. If the respondent was to be treated as a Trust, the other Trustees not having been impleaded the suit was not maintainable. If it was a Society, G.O.Ms.No.2000 would not apply. If it was a Wakf property, the Wakf Act, 1954, required notice to be issued to the Wakf Board and it had not been done and there was also no pleading. If it was a Society, G.O.Ms.No.2000 would not apply. If it was a Wakf property, the Wakf Act, 1954, required notice to be issued to the Wakf Board and it had not been done and there was also no pleading. The judgment of the lower appellate court was a non-speaking judgment, no point for consideration had been framed for decision as required under O.41, Rule 31, C.P.C. The society, came into existence only in the year 1969. There was no document produced transferring the property, subject matter of the proceedings, to the Society. 12. The learned counsel referred to the various provisions of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act and relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions: .(1) Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 70 C.C. 388; (2) Banmali Samal v. State of Orissa [1979] 3 S.C.C. 408. .(3) Idol of Sri Kannika Parameswari Amman v. The Educational Trustees, Co. Ltd. Idol of Sri Kannika Parameswari Amman v. The Educational Trustees, Co. Ltd. Idol of Sri Kannika Parameswari Amman v. The Educational Trustees, Co. Ltd. [1990] 1 MLJ. 293;[1990] 1 L.W. 291 and (4) Society of the Sisters of the Blessed Virgin-Mary, etc. v. Madras-E-Bakiyanathus Salihath, Vellore Society of the Sisters of the Blessed Virgin-Mary, etc. v. Madras-E-Bakiyanathus Salihath, Vellore Society of the Sisters of the Blessed Virgin-Mary, etc. v. Madras-E-Bakiyanathus Salihath, Vellore [1990] 1 MLJ. 70;[1990] 1 L.W. 607. 13. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the decision reported in Ranjan Devasahayam v. Hindustan Bible Institute of India [1996] 1 MLJ. 510:[1996] 1 L.W. 533 overlooking, as it does the decision of the earlier Division Bench in S.Guhan v. Rukmani Devi S.Guhan v. Rukmani Devi S.Guhan v. Rukmani Devi A.I.R. 1988 Mad. 1 cannot be stated to be good law. 14. Meeting the arguments of Mr.G.Subramaniam, learned senior counsel for the appellant, Mr.V.S.Subramanian, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the point raised by the learned senior counsel was not raised in the pleadings, and the same could not be allowed to be raised at the stage of the second appeal. The learned counsel also referred to the notices exchanged between the parties and submitted that the title of the respondent was not disputed by the appellant. The learned counsel also referred to the notices exchanged between the parties and submitted that the title of the respondent was not disputed by the appellant. He also drew the attention of the court to the various clauses in the Trust Deed and also the memorandum of association, Ex.P-4, of the respondent/Education Trust and submitted that it was for the appellant to plead and prove that Merit Hajee Abdullah Basha Saheb, representing the respondent, was not the agent. The learned counsel, in particular, referred to Clause 17 of the Memorandum of Association and submitted that the decision relied on by the learned senior counsel arising under the Companies Act and reported in Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 70 C.C. 388 would not apply to the case on hand as there was a specific clause in the Memorandum of Association providing for institution of suit or other proceedings by the secretary-cum-treasurer, namely, Merit Abdulla Basha Saheb. 15. According to the learned counsel, the other decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel for the appellant would not also apply to the facts of the present case and in particular the learned counsel submitted that the decision of Profulla Chorone Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte [1979] 3 S.C.C. 409would not apply to the case on hand as it was a dispute among the Shebaits and the other decision in S.Guhan v. Rukmani Devi Arundale S.Guhan v. Rukmani Devi Arundale S.Guhan v. Rukmani Devi Arundale A.I.R. 1977 Mad. 1 was also equally inapplicable to the facts of the present case; there was no legal question involved and that no question of law much less substantial question of law arose for decision in the present case. 16. Mr.G.Subramaniam, learned senior counsel, in reply submitted that the dichotomy between the society and the trust must be understood in the proper perspective and even conceding that there was any authorisation given to Merit Abdulla Basha Saheb, such authorisation being contrary to Sec.49 of the Indian Trusts Act it had to be held that the plaintiff was not properly represented. The learned senior counsel reiterated that there was no evidence to show that the property, in respect of which relief, was claimed had bene transferred to the society. 17. The Deed of Trust is Ex.A-1, dated 4. 1945. The learned senior counsel reiterated that there was no evidence to show that the property, in respect of which relief, was claimed had bene transferred to the society. 17. The Deed of Trust is Ex.A-1, dated 4. 1945. This was executed by Merit Hajee Mohammed Ismail creating a Wakf in respect of his properties. Under the document, he constituted, nominated and appointed several persons as Trustees. He was himself one of the Trustees. He had started two institutions, namely- 1. Islamia Middle School, Peranambut, and 2. Arabic School for girls known as Madarase Nishvan and this was attached to Item No.1. 18. He also expressed a desire that the Trustees should start an Arabic college in Peranambut for teaching Holy Quran and other religious subjects pertaining to other higher religious studies known as “Dhiniyath” to the people, who came to study there. The founder also gave a direction that for the purpose of improving education in the locality, a Working Committee should be formed and the name of that Committee should be Merit Education Society, Peranambut [Italics supplied]. He also reserved rights in himself to constitute the first Working Committee besides the aforesaid ten trustees. There should be six other members in the said Working Committee of Merit Education Society. This Committee of 16 members should look after and supervise the imparting of education in the aforesaid schools and institutions and they should be responsible for imparting of education properly. .19. Thereafter, the Trust was formed in 1969 and was registered under the Societies Registration ActXXI of 1860. The certificate of registration is Ex.A-2 in the suit. The certificate of registration under Sec.12-A(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is Ex.A-3. The Trust, among other things, has its aims and objects to promote secular and religious (Deeniyath) Education among the people in accordance with the stipulations laid down in the “Deed Trust”. There is a reference in the Trust Deed, Ex.A-1, that Janab Merit Abdulla Basha Saheb had been made Secretary-cum-Treasurer and Trustee. As directed in the Deed Trust, Ex.A-1, six people were nominated as members. An Executive Secretary was also appointed. There is a reference in the Trust Deed, Ex.A-1, that Janab Merit Abdulla Basha Saheb had been made Secretary-cum-Treasurer and Trustee. As directed in the Deed Trust, Ex.A-1, six people were nominated as members. An Executive Secretary was also appointed. The Deed provides that in addition to the generality of the powers of the Working Committee in the matter of direction, control and management of the Trust and its affairs, except its funds and properties, the Working Committee should, in particular, have the following powers to advise and assist the Trustees. Clause A says- .“To improve the quality of instruction by providing necessary facilities in the three institutions created by the Trust; like adequate furniture, library, laboratory, etc., as stipulated in the Deed Trust.” .20. While dealing with the Powers and Functions of the Trustees, Clause 5 provides as follows: .“All the properties of the Merit Education Trust shall vest in the Trustees as Waqf properties absolutely and for ever and shall be administered by the Trustees in accordance with the stipulations laid down in the Deed Trust.” 21. The secretary-cum-treasurer has been directed to convene the meeting of the trustees and of the Working Committee in consultation with or at the instance of the President and shall be personally incharge of the office of the Trust and its administration. .22. Clause 17 provides as follows: .“The trust shall sue and be sued by the secretary-cum-treasurer. It shall have a common seal. All documents executed by and in favour of the trust shall be executed in the name of the trust, represented by the secretary-cum-treasurer for the time being unless the trustees, at a special meeting convened for the purpose, confer such powers of the representation on any other office-bearer or trustee.” 23. On 112. 1961 there was a lease arrangement entered into between M.Hajee Mohamed Isamil Saheb in his capacity as the Muthawalli and Nazim of for and on behalf of the Wakf name created by the Deed, Trust executed at Madras on 2nd day of April, 1945, and the appellant in respect of the suit property. As per the terms of which the appellant was granted a lease for a period of 15 years renewable for a further period of 5 years. While the lease was in force, the Merit Education Trust came into existence, the relevant terms in respect of which have already been noticed. 24. As per the terms of which the appellant was granted a lease for a period of 15 years renewable for a further period of 5 years. While the lease was in force, the Merit Education Trust came into existence, the relevant terms in respect of which have already been noticed. 24. In my view, the Education Trust is not an independent Trust, it is only an extension, an appendage or an adjunct of the wakf and it cannot be stated to be a Society having an independent existence, in relation to the wakf. It is part of the Wakf, already created under Ex.A-1 in the year 1945. If this view is taken, then much of the force in the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant by the learned Senior Counsel, Mr.G.Subramaniam to the effect that there should be a resolution passed, that there should be a transfer of the property from the Wakf to the Education Trust, that there should be an authorisation to enable the respondent to be represented by the secretary-cum-treasurer, that there had been no proper representation by the plaintiff, will all have to be rejected. .25. Clause 17 in Ex.A-4, Memorandum of the Education Trust provides for the secretary-cum-treasurer to sue and be sued on behalf of the Trust. The decision of the Delhi High Court, in Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [1991]70 C.C. 388 cannot be pressed into service. In that case a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on the Director, who purported to represent the company and sue on behalf of the company. It was held that such power to sue can be conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard. In that case a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on the Director, who purported to represent the company and sue on behalf of the company. It was held that such power to sue can be conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard. In that case, on facts, the learned Judge of the Delhi High Court held that the Director, who filed the suit, had no authority to institute a suit as the plaintiff had not placed on record its memorandum or articles of association nor any resolution passed by the company authorising him to institute the suit, that the said Director did not state that he was in a position to depose to the facts of the case, that no resolution was passed by the company ratifying his institution of the suit and that there was no evidence that he was managing the day-to-day affairs of the company or was in charge of the insurance claim which was the subject-matter of the suit. In that case, before the Delhi High Court, it was contending on behalf of the plaintiff that under O.29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaint could be signed and verified on behalf of the Corporation by the Secretary or by any Director or other Principal Officer of the Corporation, who was able to depose to the facts of the case and that since the Director concerned had been authorised by the company to sign and verify the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff-company, there was no separate resolution necessary authorising him to institute the suit. This contention was rejected on the ground that O.29, Rule 1, C.P.C., provides for subscription and verification of pleadings and states that in suits by or against the corporation, any pleadings may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the Secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the corporation, who is able to depose to the facts of the case. But it had not been proved that the suit had been instituted by any such person with the authority of a Principal Officer of a company. But it had not been proved that the suit had been instituted by any such person with the authority of a Principal Officer of a company. The director did not say that he was in a position to depose to the facts of the case in relation to suits filed on behalf of the limited company did not extend beyond what was laid down in O.29, C.P.C. and that provision, did not entitle the Principal Officer of a company to file a suit on its behalf and for that the authority had to be found either in the articles of association of the company or in the resolution of its Board of Directors. In coming to such conclusion, the learned Judge referred to a number of other decisions and it is not necessary to notice the same. As already pointed out, the Trust Deed in the instant case provides for the secretary-cum-treasurer to sue and be sued and only when somebody else is to do that job, The Trustees have to convene a special meeting for the purpose, confer such powers of representation on any other office bearer or trustee. The representation in the instant case by Hajee Abdulla Basha Saheb, who was the secretary-cum-treasurer and Trustee, was in order and no exception can be taken to the same and the suit cannot be held to be not maintainable on this score. No resolution is required. 26. The next contention raised by the learned senior counsel is that if the suit is by a trust, the other trustees have to be impleaded and in support of this contention, the learned senior counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Profulla Chorone Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte [1979]3 S.C.C. 409. As rightly pointed out by Mr.V.S.Subramanian, learned counsel for the respondent, that was a matter among, the trustees and the Supreme Court upheld the contention that the deity had to be represented by all the shebaits and sons. As all the shebaits had not been made parties, the suit was not properly constituted and was liable to be dismissed on that score. This case has no application to the facts of the present case. As a sequel to the terms of the said Wakf, Education Trust, came into existence and the Trust authorises under Clause 17 - the secretary-cum-treasurer to sue and be sued on behalf of Trust. This case has no application to the facts of the present case. As a sequel to the terms of the said Wakf, Education Trust, came into existence and the Trust authorises under Clause 17 - the secretary-cum-treasurer to sue and be sued on behalf of Trust. The contention by the learned senior counsel that the suit has not been properly constituted in the absence of other Trustees, cannot also be sustained. 27. These two objections have been raised on behalf of the appellant. Once we reject the objections raised by the learned senior counsel, then in view of the plaintiff being a Wakf, G.O.Ms.No.2000 would automatically come into play and the suit would therefore be maintainable. 28. The learned senior counsel also contended that absolutely no material had been produced to show that the property belonged to the society. When having regard to what is stated above, the society was only an appendage, of the original Wakf and no separate transfer of the property was required, even conceding that no document evidencing transfer of the property in favour of the society had been produced and in fact no transfer had itself taken place, the respondent cannot be non-suited on this score. 29. The learned senior counsel relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court, reported in S.Guhan v. Rukmani Devi Arundale S.Guhan v. Rukmani Devi Arundale S.Guhan v. Rukmani Devi Arundale A.I.R. 1988 Mad. 1. In that case a suit was filed for framing of a scheme for proper administration of the Trust and out of six Trustees, only four were impleaded as parties and the plaintiff had also not stated that the suit was being filed on behalf of the Trust. The Division Bench held that the Trust being a necessary party and not having been impleaded, the suit as filed, was liable to be dismissed. I am afraid, this case also does not in anyway help the case of the appellant. It is not necessary to go into details in the said case as the ratio laid down in that case has no application to the facts of the present. 30. The learned senior counsel relied on a judgment reported in Society of the Sisters of the Blessed Virgin-Mary, etc. v. Madras-E-Bakiyanathus Salihath, Vellore Society of the Sisters of the Blessed Virgin-Mary, etc. 30. The learned senior counsel relied on a judgment reported in Society of the Sisters of the Blessed Virgin-Mary, etc. v. Madras-E-Bakiyanathus Salihath, Vellore Society of the Sisters of the Blessed Virgin-Mary, etc. v. Madras-E-Bakiyanathus Salihath, Vellore Society of the Sisters of the Blessed Virgin-Mary, etc. v. Madras-E-Bakiyanathus Salihath, Vellore [1999]1 L.W. 606. In that case, the question relating to representation of a Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act, arose for consideration and having regard to the provisions of Sec.20 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, which required that a person competent to represent a society, is the Committee or any officer authorised in this behalf by its bye-law and the representation in that case was by a person, who had not been so authorised, it was held that the Society was not properly represented. That decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 31. In Ranjan Devasahayam v. Hindustan Bible Institute of India [1996]1 L.W. 533 an objection was raised that the plaintiff in those proceedings was not a Trust, but was only a society and therefore could not claim its exception under G.O.Ms.No.2000. It was held by Hadi, J. that the institution registered as a Society being the owner of the building, and under the Memorandum of Rules and Regulations of the Society, being a Trust, it was held that it was a Trust and could come within the G.O. and claim exception. 32. The learned senior counsel submitted that in vies of the decision of a Division Bench, reported in S.GUhan v. Rukmani Devi Arundale S.GUhan v. Rukmani Devi Arundale S.GUhan v. Rukmani Devi Arundale A.I.R. 1988 Mad. 1 the decision of Hadi, J. cannot be stated to be good law. It is not necessary to decide that point in the present proceedings. 33. In The Idol of Srikannika Parameswari Amman v. The Education Trustees, Co. Ltd. The Idol of Srikannika Parameswari Amman v. The Education Trustees, Co. Ltd. The Idol of Srikannika Parameswari Amman v. The Education Trustees, Co. It is not necessary to decide that point in the present proceedings. 33. In The Idol of Srikannika Parameswari Amman v. The Education Trustees, Co. Ltd. The Idol of Srikannika Parameswari Amman v. The Education Trustees, Co. Ltd. The Idol of Srikannika Parameswari Amman v. The Education Trustees, Co. Ltd. [1999]1 L.W. 291 it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that the Idol of Sri Kannika Parameswari Amman is a public religious and denominational institution belonging to the Arya Vaisya Community and it is a religious public trust entitled to file the suit for recovery of possession of the suit property comprising of a land and building, and for damages and also for use and occupation, claiming the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.2000 as a public religious Trust. 34. The learned Senior counsel submitted that the dichotomy between the society and the trust should be maintained. This has only to be stated to be rejected having regard to the finding that the Wakf and the society are not separate independent entities. 35. The learned senior counsel relied on Sec.149 of the Indian Trusts Act and submitted that the authority granted in the instant case to the secretary-cum-treasurer is contrary to Sec.49 of the Indian Trusts Act. Sec.49 of the Indian Trusts Act runs as follows: “Where a discretionary power conferred on a trustee is not exercised reasonably and in good faith, such power may be controlled by a principal civil court of original jurisdiction.” The Indian Trusts Act has been passed to define the law among the private Trust and Trustees. Sec.1 says that the rules of Mohammedan Law as to Wakf or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by customary or personal law are not affected by the provisions of the Indian Trusts Act. Even conceding that the provisions of Indian Trusts Act are applicable to public trusts, in as much as it was not shown by the appellant that the discretionary power conferred on the Trust in the instant case had not been exercised reasonably and in good faith, this contention is to be rejected as devoid of merits. Even at the beginning of the arguments, the learned senior counsel submitted that he was attacking the decision of the courts below only on technicalities. The technical objections raised by the learned senior counsel are rejected in toto. Even at the beginning of the arguments, the learned senior counsel submitted that he was attacking the decision of the courts below only on technicalities. The technical objections raised by the learned senior counsel are rejected in toto. The learned senior counsel made one other point that the lower appellate court had not framed points for consideration. A reading of the judgment of the lower appellate court clearly shows that it understood the scope of the enquiry. It had considered all the aspects necessary for a decision in the case and had approached the whole question from a proper angle. I had occasion to decide the question as to whether a judgment would be vitiated in the absence of framing of a point for consideration by the appellate court under O.41, Rule 31, C.P.C. I held, that as long as the appellate court knew what it was doing, that it was seized of the controversy or contention between the parties and had decided the matter by adverting to the necessary materials on record, the technical objection with regard to non-framing of point for consideration would not avail. [ See: D.Sahul Hammed v. Swamy Nellaiappar Sri Kanthimathi Ambal Devasthanam, Tirunelveli, through its Executive Officer See: D.Sahul Hammed v. Swamy Nellaiappar Sri Kanthimathi Ambal Devasthanam, Tirunelveli, through its Executive Officer See: D.Sahul Hammed v. Swamy Nellaiappar Sri Kanthimathi Ambal Devasthanam, Tirunelveli, through its Executive Officer [2000]3 C.T.C. 232]. 36. For all the reasons stated above, I answer, the substantial question of law against the appellant and dismiss the second appeal. However, there will be no order as to costs.