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2000 DIGILAW 1013 (RAJ)

Sat Bharai, Sriganganagar v. State of Rajasthan

2000-08-10

RAJESH BALIA

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Honble BALIA, J.–Heard learned counsel for the parties. (2). This petition is directed against the order passed by the Board of Revenue dt. 23.2.95 (Annex.3) rejecting the revision filed by the petitioner. (3). This petition has arisen following circumstances when Ramu Ram belonging to Scheduled Caste had sold his land to the present petitioner by a registered sale deed dt. 26.6.71. The respondent-State initiated proceedings against the petitioner u/S. 175 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act inter alia on the ground that above sale was in clear violation of Sec. 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which prohibits transfer of land of a member of the Scheduled Caste to a person who is not a member of the Scheduled Caste. During the pendency of these proceedings a receiver was appointed by the Assistant Collector by his order dt. 4.6.74 to manage the property about pending proceedings before him. Assistant Collector vide his order dt. 2nd Sept. 1975 declared that sale of the land in question was in violation of Sec. 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is illegal and void and directed that land should revert to the Govt.. The Tehsildar was directed to take possession of the land in compliance of the order. (4). The appeal preferred before the Revenue Appellate Authority by the present petitioner was also dismissed on 19.5.77. (5). Aggrieved with the aforesaid order the present petitioner preferred a Revision No. TA/178/82/Ganganagar before the Board of Revenue. The Board by its order dt. 14.2.83 allowed the revision on the ground that vendor Ramu Ram whose rights were being considered had not been impleaded as party and remanded the case back to the Assistant Collector for trial afresh after impleading Ramu Ram. During the pendency of these proceedings before the Assistant Collector on remand an application was made by the State on 29.05.1991 praying that since receiver was appointed in 4.6.74 but he has not auctioned the property thereafter, therefore he should be directed to take possession of the land and conduct the auction of the land in question. It was stated that since order dt. 4.6.74 appointing receiver pending the proceedings had not been challenged, the order still subsists. This application was allowed by the SDO Hanumangarh on 4.6.91. The order dt. 4.6.91 was challenged before the Board of Revenue by way of revision which has been dismissed by order dt. 23.2.95. It was stated that since order dt. 4.6.74 appointing receiver pending the proceedings had not been challenged, the order still subsists. This application was allowed by the SDO Hanumangarh on 4.6.91. The order dt. 4.6.91 was challenged before the Board of Revenue by way of revision which has been dismissed by order dt. 23.2.95. In these circumstances the present petition has been filed by the said transferee of the land. (6). It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the proceedings initiated at the instance of the State Govt. during which a receiver was appointed by the Assistant Collector came to an end on 2nd Sept. 1975 when the Assistant Collector declared the sale in her favour to be invalid and also directed that land be reverted to the Government. The order by which the Tehsildar was directed to take possession of the land in compliance of the order appointing him receiver came to an end. In absence of any interim order on passing of the order dt. 2.9.75 land had to be handed over to State Govt. in its own right and possession of the Tehsildar could not have continued as a receiver. However it appears that thereafter the possession has not been handed over to the State Govt. as it appears from the application itself that it requires an order to take possession from the receiver. (7). In these circumstances it has been contended by the learned counsel that since the appointment of receiver made on 4.6.74 had come to an end on the culmination of proceedings before the Assistant Collector on 2.9.75. Thereafter when the order passed by the Assistant Collector itself has been set aside, the petitioner was entitled to restitution of the land which under the order of the Assistant Collector were to revert to State Govt. and unless there is another order by which restitution is stayed and a receiver is appointed, he continues to be in possession of land in his own right which cannot be disturbed on the anvil of order dt. 4.6.74. (8). Learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Jain urged that as the proceedings had not been quashsed but the matter has only been remanded the order passed during the trial before the Assistant Collector automatically revives and it must be deemed that the order appointing receiver also stood revived. 4.6.74. (8). Learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Jain urged that as the proceedings had not been quashsed but the matter has only been remanded the order passed during the trial before the Assistant Collector automatically revives and it must be deemed that the order appointing receiver also stood revived. The application made by the State Govt. was only for the purpose of seeking direction to the receiver for discharging his obligations. (9). I have given my careful considerations to the rival contentions. The duration for which a receiver is appointed in a given case has not been provided specifically under any provision. However the question is not res integra and it stands settled by a decision of the Supreme Court in Hiralal Patni vs. Loonkaran Sethiya & Others (1) wherein the Court stated the law about the duration of appointment as receiver, in the following words: ``The law may briefly be stated thus if a receiver is appointed in a suit until judgment, the appointment is brought to an end by the judgment in the act on. If a receiver is appointed in a suit, without his tenure being expressly defined, he will continue to be receiver till he is discharged. But after the final disposal of the suit as between the parties to the litigation, the receivers functions are terminated, he would still be answerable to the Court as its officer has ample power to continue the receiver even after the final decree. (10). It may be noticed that Supreme Court was examining a case where receiver has been appointed during the period when the suit for partition was pending. In that case a question has arisen whether the receiver would continue even after the final decree has been passed in the suit so as to act under the directions of the court. The Court found that receivers appointment had not come to an end until he is discharged by the Court, he could still be directed to discharge his functions as appointment was not limited until the judgment was pronounced. (11). Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed on record the order passed by the Assistant Collector on 4.6.74 appointing the receiver during the pendency of these proceedings. The order unmistakebly directs that receiver is appointed until further orders. (11). Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed on record the order passed by the Assistant Collector on 4.6.74 appointing the receiver during the pendency of these proceedings. The order unmistakebly directs that receiver is appointed until further orders. His appointment was not confined until pronouncements of the order of the Assistant Collector in the proceedings before it. Therefore applying the aforesaid principle it must held that appointment of receiver continued until he was discharged from his office by a subsequent order or suit between the parties stood finally determined. After which he could not act as receiver, though he may be responsible and answerable to the Court for that count for his actions. Viewed in that light the revision arising out of these proceedings was in continuation of the suit and passing an order by the trial court by itself does not attain finality, if challenged and the order are passed by the superior Courts exercising such powers. In the present case the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Revenue Appellate Authority against the order dt. 2.9.75 was continuation of the same proceedings which were pending before the Assistant Collector and being unsuccessful his revision before the Board of Revenue would also be treated as continuation of the same proceedings. As the Board of Revenue did not decide the controversy finally, but remanded the case back to the original authority for making fresh orders after impleading Ramu Ram as a party. The lis continued to exist. The operation of appointment of receiver which was to be effective until further orders continue to operate throughout until discharged. The fact that during the subsequent stages of the proceedings the land remained in possession of the petitioner would not affect this position. (12). It may further be viewed from another perspective. It is not in dispute between the parties that order dt. 4.9.74 continued to operate until 2.9.75 that is to say the receiver came in possession of the property under the order dt. 4.6.74 on passing of the order dt 2.9.75 the possession of the Tehsildar as a receiver became possession of the State under its own right which continued to be so until order passed by the Board of Revenue dt. 14.2.83 setting aside the two orders and remanding the case back to the original authority. 4.6.74 on passing of the order dt 2.9.75 the possession of the Tehsildar as a receiver became possession of the State under its own right which continued to be so until order passed by the Board of Revenue dt. 14.2.83 setting aside the two orders and remanding the case back to the original authority. In that event at best the petitioner would have been entitled to claim restitution. Before restoring the possession, question would still be for the trial Court to consider whether the possession may be delivered to him or possession should be handed over to the receiver which has not been discharged by the Court. (13). Thus viewed from any angle the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority affirming the order of the SDO does not suffer from any apparent error which may require interference by this Court. (14). In this connection reference is made to a decision of this Court in Kanchan Bai vs. Ketsidas & Ors. (2). In that case it has been held that on the setting aside of he order of rejection of the plaint and its remand by the appellate Court, the temporary injunction issued by the trial Court does not automatically stand revived. The interlocutory orders viz. striking out defence which are meant to aid and supplement the ultimate decision arrived at in the main suit or appeal would be ancillary order and such order would stand revived automatically on the restoration of the suit. Therefore keeping in view that principle, the Court held that temporary injunction granted by the trial court come to an end when the proceedings before the trial Court end and temporary injunction does not survive. That principle in my opinion cannot be imported while considering the question of appointment and duration of office of receive. This question invariably linked with the order of appointment. (15). Accordingly this petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim order is also vacated.