Judgment Ravi S.Dhavan, J. 1. This writ petition has its genesis in certain incidents that took place in the months of January and February 1984. At that time the petitioner, now retired from service, was working as Senior Scientific Assistant in the Central Mining Research Institute, Dhanbad. He then also happened to be the General Secretary of C.M.R.S.E.A, an Association of the employees of the Research Institute. He seems to have assumed that his position in the Association made him free of the obligations of service discipline. He plainly disregarded and crossed the well-defined line de-limiting legitimate trade union activities and forms of protest recognized as legally valid from intimidator agitation subversive of discipline and acts of gross insubordination. 2. The petitioners acts of misconduct during the period in question are duly catalogued in the charge-sheet that was given to him. The charge-sheet, a copy of which is at Annexure 1 was given to the petitioner on April 21, 1984. He gave his reply to the charges on May 2, 1984. It was an extraordinary reply. It could hardly be called show cause to a charge-sheet and it was verily a counter-charge-sheet from the delinquent to the disciplinary authority. It ran into ten closely typed sheets and had sub-headings such as corruption in C.R.M.S., favouritism, nepotism, and casteism in C.R.M.S. etc. Under these headings, the petitioner made sweeping allegations against the disciplinary authority. Some specimens from the petitioners show cause are re-produced below: (ii) Corruption in respect of purchase and stores are clearly evident to every one. The purchase proposals of Dr. S.C. Srivastava for the past three years and the objections raised with respect to them by responsible officers concerned have been intentionally over ruled/overlooked by you. Mysteriously, none of these particular purchase files have been dealt through the Administrative Officer, CMRS. The proof of our statement shall be provided at the appropriate time. (iii) Corruption in appointment and promotions are not only known to one and all but is supported by the irregularity followed in the case of L.D.C. appointment. The case of victimisation of Sri R.K. Sinha by depriving him of his genuine promotion is also cited and may be supported by his letter to you earlier. Other serious irregularities followed by you shall be focused upon at the appropriate time and forum. The case of victimisation of Sri R.K. Sinha by depriving him of his genuine promotion is also cited and may be supported by his letter to you earlier. Other serious irregularities followed by you shall be focused upon at the appropriate time and forum. (iv) Other corruption cases involving misuses of official transport, employment of I.S.O. security personnel and demobilise school of C.M.R.S. are the major topics of ail C.M.R.S. employees the facts duly supported by evidence are available with us and we cannot place these on record for the simple reason that preventive method may be taken to destroy all such evidence. Such charge shall be handed over to the C.B.I, or to any such machinery as the DGSIR/Vice-President C.S.I. R./President, C.S.I.R. may direct us to. (v) A scientist of your caste has been allowed to continue holding the Post of Secretary of the C.M.R.S. De-Nobili School illegally and unconstitutionally. 3. We are clearly of the view that the petitioners show cause, with its intemperate language and irresponsible contents, formed in itself the basis for another fresh disciplinary proceeding against him. The disciplinary authority, however, did not expand the proceedings against the petitioner and confined it to the charges earlier given to him. 4. A Board of Inquiry, consisting of a Chairman and two members was constituted to examine the charges against the petitioner and two other employees facing similar charges. The Chairman of the Board of Inquiry in his report found and held that the charges against the petitioner were not established. The other two members of the Board of Inquiry, however, submitted a separate note which was as follows: (1) We are of the opinion that it should be viewed in the context of whether the CMRS Employees Association is recognized by CSIR or not, and the actions of the officials concerned as office-bearers of CMRS Employees Association are proper or not. (2) We are also of the opinion that any type of addressing the staff members and raising slogans in the office premises and canteen as happened on 23.1.1984 was not proper. Such incidents are not good for peaceful working environment of the institute. Therefore, we feel any such incidents in the office premises and canteen should be stopped in future. 5. The disciplinary authority proceeded on the basis that the petitioner was exornerated of the charges by the Board of Inquiry. Such incidents are not good for peaceful working environment of the institute. Therefore, we feel any such incidents in the office premises and canteen should be stopped in future. 5. The disciplinary authority proceeded on the basis that the petitioner was exornerated of the charges by the Board of Inquiry. He, however, disagreed with the findings of the Board of Inquiry and in a long written-note gave detailed reasons for his disagreement with the findings arrived at by the Board of Inquiry. He further found and held in that note that on the basis of the materials brought on record the charges against the petitioner were fully established. 6. The petitioner was then given a second show-cause notice, dated September 22, 1987 asking him to explain why he might not be dismissed from service. It is significant to note that along with the second show-cause notices the petitioner was also supplied with copies of the inquiry report of the Chairman of the Board of Inquiry, the separate note of the other two members of the Board and the detailed note of the disciplinary authority giving reasons for his disagreement with the inquiry report and the grounds for finding the petitioner guilty of the charges. 7. The petitioner gave his reply to the second show-cause notice on September 26,1987 and thereafter, the disciplinary authority on a consideration of the entire materials on record passed the order, dated August 3, 1988 awarding him the penalty of reduction in rank; the order directed the petitioner to be placed for a period of five years on the lower post of Junior Scientific Assistant, next below the post of Senior Scientific Assistant held by the petitioner at the time with further directions regarding fixation of his pay in the lower post. 8. In the departmental appeal, the penalty awarded to the petitioner to was considerably reduced by order dated May 22, 1989 and he was let off with the minor penalty of withholding two annual increments for a period of two years without cumulative effect. The appellate order was a common order passed in the case of the petitioner and the other two delinquent employees who were proceeded against along with the petitioner on similar charges and it proposed the same penalty for the other two employees. 9. The appellate order was a common order passed in the case of the petitioner and the other two delinquent employees who were proceeded against along with the petitioner on similar charges and it proposed the same penalty for the other two employees. 9. All the three delinquents, including the petitioner, sought to challenge their punishment orders before the Central Administrative Tribunal. By the time O.A. No. 2036 of 1989 filed by the petitioner was taken up, the Tribunal had already disposed of the applications (O.A. Nos. 2041 and 2021 of 1989) filed at the instance of the other two employees by order dated January 13,1993. By that order, the Tribunal had set aside the order passed in the departmental appeals holding that it was passed without due application of mind and had remitted the matter to the appellate authority for fresh too the Tribunal proposed to adopt the same course. However, on behalf of the petitioner, it was sought to be argued that the order passed by the disciplinary authority was itself bad because the disciplinary authority had erred in taking a different view than the Board of Inquiry and further because the disciplinary authority had differed from the findings of the Board of Inquiry without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The Tribunal in its decision, dated May 9, 1994 rejected the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner concerning the order passed by the disciplinary authority but following its order passed in the case of the other two employees set aside the appellate order and remitted the matter to the appellate authority with a direction to rehear the appeal and to dispose it of on merits with a further direction that till the decision in the appeal was rendered, the order passed by the disciplinary authority would remain in abeyance. 10. On rehearing the appeal, the appellate authority by its order, dated November 1,1994 once again gave the petitioner the minor penalty of withholding of two increments in his time scale of pay for a period of two years without cumulative effect. 11. 10. On rehearing the appeal, the appellate authority by its order, dated November 1,1994 once again gave the petitioner the minor penalty of withholding of two increments in his time scale of pay for a period of two years without cumulative effect. 11. Following the order passed by the appellate authority, an office memorandum, was issued by the Director on November 29, 1994 by which the earlier conditional promotion granted to the petitioner was recalled on the ground that the promotion was given during the pendency of a departmental proceeding which had ended in an order of punishment against the petitioner. As a consequence, the date of the petitioners promotion to section. A grade was shifted from 25.10.1987 to 26.10.1990. 12. The petitioner once again challenged the order of his punishment passed by the appellate authority in O.A. No. 113 of 1995 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna. This time, the Tribunal, by judgment and order, dated May 15, 2000 dismissed the O.A. and upheld the fresh order of punishment passed by the appellate authority. 13. Mr. Pushkar Narain Shahi, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the appellate authority gave the petitioner the penalty of withholding of two annual increments, following that order the petitioners date of promotion to section. A grade was shifted from 26.10.1987 to 26.10.1990 and, thus, in effect and substance the Director once again inflicted the punishment of reduction in rank on the petitioner. We are not impressed by the submission. The promotion was earlier given to the petitioner with effect from 26.10.1987 when he was facing a disciplinary proceeding. It was, therefore, subject to the condition that the proceeding should end in his exoneration from the charges. This did not happen and the petitioner, having been found guilty of the charges, receive penalty. Therefore, in terms of bye-law 71 (B) of C.S.I. R. Bye-Laws the promotion was to be recalled and made effective from a date when the effect of the punishment was over. The authorities have, therefore, simply followed the provision of a bye-law and we do not find any infirmity in the office memorandum, dated 29.11.1994. 14. Mr. Therefore, in terms of bye-law 71 (B) of C.S.I. R. Bye-Laws the promotion was to be recalled and made effective from a date when the effect of the punishment was over. The authorities have, therefore, simply followed the provision of a bye-law and we do not find any infirmity in the office memorandum, dated 29.11.1994. 14. Mr. Shahi then submitted that the disciplinary authority was obliged to give a show-cause notice to the petitioner before taking a view different from the findings of the Board of Inquiry and the action of the disciplinary authority in taking a different view without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner was bad and illegal and that had vitiated the entire disciplinary proceeding. In support of his submission, Mr. Shahi relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Yoginath D. Bagde V/s. State of Maharastra and Anr. -- . We find the submission unacceptable for more reasons than one. From a perusal of the Tribunals judgment, it appears that this point was also canvassed there and the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court was also brought to the notice of the Tribunal. The Tribunal rightly pointed out that the decision in Bagdes case was under the Maharastra Civil Services (D & A) Rules, 1979, Rule 9 of which required that in case of disagreement with the findings of inquiring officer the disciplinary authority should give a notice to the delinquent. No such requirement was there under the provisions of the Civil Services (Classification. Control and Appeal) Rules under which the petitioner was proceeded against. Secondly, this point was specifically agitated by the petitioner in the first round of litigation which was rejected by the Tribunal by its decision, dated May 9, 1994 in O.A. No. 2036 of 1989. That decision of the Tribunal had attained finality and it was, therefore, no longer open to the petitioner to reagitate this point. 15. Apart from all this, the penalty finally awarded to the petitioner was withholding of two annual increments without cumulative effect. This penalty is stated in Clause (ii) of Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification. Control and Appeal) Rules. And in terms of Rule 55-A of the Rules, this penalty could be imposed even without going through any departmental enquiry and simply on a consideration of the show-cause filed by the delinquent (samples from the show-cause have already been extracted above). Control and Appeal) Rules. And in terms of Rule 55-A of the Rules, this penalty could be imposed even without going through any departmental enquiry and simply on a consideration of the show-cause filed by the delinquent (samples from the show-cause have already been extracted above). Thus, any criticism of the departmental inquiry and the action of the disciplinary authority in disagreeing with the findings of the Board of Inquiry becomes totally irrelevant in this case. 16. For all these reasons, we find no merit in this writ petition and we are satisfied that this case does not warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. This writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.