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2000 DIGILAW 102 (GAU)

Rajendra Chandra Deb v. State of Tripura

2000-03-10

D.BISWAS

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This petition is directed against the judgment dated 13.3.90 passed by the learned Member, Tripura Sales Tax Tribunal Agartala, West Tripura, in Revision Case No. 70/REV/78 whereby the Tribunal set aside the order dated 15.11.1978 passed by the learned Survey and Settlement Officer, West Tripura in Appeal Case Nos 5 and 6 of 1978 and the order dated 24.4.1978 in Eviction Case No. 149 of 1977 and directed eviction of the present petitioner from the disputed land on the ground of non-payment of rent for the years 1381,1382 and 1383 BS. 2. I have heard Mr. P. Deb Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. KN Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel along with Dr. HK Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. At the very outset Mr. Deb Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Tripura Sales Tax Tribunal, in passing an order of eviction in a revision petition filed under section 95 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960. His contention is that there is provision in section 93 of the Act for second appeal against the judgment of the first appellate Court and the respondents could not have filed a petition under section 95 of the Act by way of revision without availing the provision of appeal. In support of his contention the learned counsel has also placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in (1989) 1 GLR 364 (1989 (1) GLJ 219). But after a careful consideration of the provisions embodied in sections 93 and 95 of the Act of 1960 and the interpretation thereof by this Court in the aforesaid judgment, I am of the view that an aggrieved party stay in his option maintain a petition for revision against an order passed by the first revenue appellate .authority without availing the provisions of second appeal. The ratio laid down in the said judgment is also an indication to this effect. 4. In brief, it may be stated here that the parties engaged in protracted litigation in different forums eventually before the Assistant Settlement Officer where the respondents sought eviction of the present petitioner for non-payment of rent Under section 18 (1) (d) of the Act of 1960. 4. In brief, it may be stated here that the parties engaged in protracted litigation in different forums eventually before the Assistant Settlement Officer where the respondents sought eviction of the present petitioner for non-payment of rent Under section 18 (1) (d) of the Act of 1960. The learned Assistant Settlement Officer dismissed the said petition and the respondents preferred First Appeal No. 9 of 1978 under the provisions of section 93 (1) (d) of the said Act. The said first appeal was also dismissed by the learned first appellate authority. Thereafter, the respondents preferred a revision petition invoking powers of the Tripura Sales Tax Tribunal under section 95 of the Act. The Tribunal after hearing the parties passed the impugned judgment and ordered eviction of the present writ petitioner which is now in challenge before this Court. 5. It would appear from the impugned judgment that the Tribunal primarily relied upon the finding recorded by this Court in SA No.35 of 1978 with regard to a settlement entered into by the parties regarding the rate of rent payable. The High Court in the said judgment in unambiguous term accorded approval to the legality and validity of the agreement (solejiama) made by the parties. Despite that, the learned Assistant Settlement Officer as well as the learned first appellate authority decided otherwise while rejecting the prayer of the respondents for eviction of the writ petitioner for non-payment of rent. It is this mistake which appears to have been corrected by the Tripura Sales Tax Tribunal in the impugned d judgment and, on such correction, the Tribunal passed the order for eviction of the writ petitioner for default in payment of rent for the years 1381 to 1383 BS. It is submitted by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the respondents that the petitioner has not paid any amount to liquidate the rent not only for the period in dispute but also for the period subsequent thereto till date. 6. On the face of it the impugned judgment does not appear to be contrary to any provision of law. Rather the provisions relating to eviction of an underraiyat as is available in section 180 (I) (d) of the Act shows that non-payment of rent has been codified as a ground for eviction of an under-raiyat. But the law. 6. On the face of it the impugned judgment does not appear to be contrary to any provision of law. Rather the provisions relating to eviction of an underraiyat as is available in section 180 (I) (d) of the Act shows that non-payment of rent has been codified as a ground for eviction of an under-raiyat. But the law. does not appear to be a rigid one in the sense that the competent authority has been given a discretion to grant time not exceeding six months for payment of the rent / due before eviction is carried out. This Act of 1960 appears to be in pursuance of the policy adopted by the Govt of India as well as all the State Govts to bring in a drastic agrarian reform protecting the interests of the agricultural tenants. The provisions embodied therein, therefore, will have to be interpreted liberally. In the instant case we are dealing with the case of an under-raiyat (bargader) whose only means of livelihood is agricultural produce from a small piece of land measuring 9 kanis 1 ganda and 2 kara. The provisions of law being not too rigid and the financial condition of the writ petitioner being very precarious it has to be interpreted liberally. I would, therefore, like to modify the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal to the effect that the order of eviction may be carried out on expiry of six months from today if the writ petitioner fails to pay the entire arrears of rent payable from the year 1381 BS till date as per fate agreed upon by the solenama. 7. With this modification, this writ petition stands disposed of. 8. It is needless to point out here before parting with the record that although this petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court in the interest of justice may exercise powers vested upon it under any other provisions of law, and in my opinion, the order recorded above will be competent within the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 9. No order as to costs.