JUDGMENT: The accused are the appellants. 2. According to the prosecution, on 18.12.1991, at about 10.30 a.m., a police party consisting of 18 members including P.Ws.1, 2 and 4, when they were patrolling in the place called Malayalakudisai, near Valliparai, found cultivation of ganja plants in an area of about 3 acres of land, at the instance of the accused, under the instructions of P.W.4, P.W.2 was asked to take necessary further action, that when the police party surrounded the area, both the accused escaped from the spot, that since no independent witnesses were available, P.W.1 and one other head constable, by name Mani, were requested to act as witnesses, that thereafter, the Ganja plants were seized from that area which weighted about 3000 kilos and that thereafter after retaining one plant under M.O.1, the remaining plants were destroyed on the instructions of P.W.4. It is the case of the prosecution that subsequently, A-1 was arrested at 3 p.m., on 8.2.1993 by P.W.4 near Valparai Bus stop, that A-2 was arrested on 8.3.1993 at about 8 am near Kanavilakku Bus stop and that a charge sheet was filed against them on 8.3.1993. It is the further case of the prosecution that P.W.2 who was asked to carry out the operation, prepared the First Information Report, and that P.W.4 conducted the investigation. According to P.W.2, the Police Party went to the place of occurrence only based on an information, that before accosting the accused, the details were not available with the Police Party, that only at the instance of the informant, the accused could be identified by the police party and that for the purpose of identification only, an independent person was taken along with them. 3. In the course of the examination, P.W.2 stated that in Ex.P-2, it is mentioned that only while carrying out general patrolling, the offence was noticed. He also stated that, if it was based on information, that would have found a place in Ex.P-2. As against the said evidence of P.W.2, P.W.4 would state that along with the police party, certain witnesses also accompanied them, that while the Police party attempted to catch hold of the accused, they escaped from the scene of occurrence, that the inspection was not based on any specific information. He also admitted that the offence was detected in the course of conducting a general patrolling. He also admitted that the offence was detected in the course of conducting a general patrolling. P.W.4 has also categorically stated that the accused were not identified by any independent witness at the time of their arrest. 4. Based on the evidence placed before Court, the accused were found guilty of offence under Sec.8-B and were punished under Sec.20(a)(1), to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for three years, apart from imposition of a fine of Rs.30,000 and in default, to undergo a simple imprisonment for one more year. As against the said conviction and sentence of the Court below, the accused have come forward with this appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants raised three contentions namely, that by virtue of the provisions contained in Secs.41, 42 read with 53 of the NDPS Act, any officer who conduct a search, seizure and investigation should have been properly empowered. According to the learned counsel, under G.O.Ms.No.1437, dated 24.9.1987, only the officers at the level of Deputy Superintendent of Police were competent to carry out the exercise as contemplated under Secs.41, 42 and 43 of the Act, that the subsequent G.O.Ms.No.163, dated 1.8.92, empowered the Sub Inspector of Police and Inspector of Police also to carry out such functions, which came at a much later point of time, when compared to the offence said to have been committed, in the case on hand, and therefore, when the whole operation including that of the investigation was carried out by incompetent persons, the entire proceedings got vitiated. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon Gopal Gani Ram and others v. Superintendent of Customs and Central Excise, CIV, Trichy, 1999 M.L.J. (Crl.) 387, Mani v. State, through, S.I., Tuticorin, V.O.C. District, 1998 L.W. (Crl.) 85 and Sivakumar alias Kumar alias Sugumar, In re., 1989 L.W. (Crl.) 65, (Arunachalam, J.) in support of his abovesaid submission. The said legal position remains uncontroverted. Admittedly, the inspection, search, seizure as well as the further investigation, is stated to have been carried out by P.Ws.2 and 4, between 24.9.1987 and 1.8.1992, the period when P.Ws.2 and 4 were not competent to carry out the functions contemplated under Secs.41, 42 and 43 of the Act. The entire exercise carried out by them was in contravention of the provisions of the NDPS Act. In such circumstances, the whole prosecution gets vitiated. The entire exercise carried out by them was in contravention of the provisions of the NDPS Act. In such circumstances, the whole prosecution gets vitiated. The prosecution launched on the basis of the inspection and investigation carried out by such incompetent persons is wholly vitiated. 6. Further more, in the case on hand, P.W.2 has asserted in more than one place that the whole inspection was carried out on the basis of a specific information gathered by the police party. Though P.W.4 would say that the inspection was carried out in the course of their patrolling, categoric assertion was made by P.W.2 in more than one place, that the whole inspection was conducted on the day of occurrence only on the basis of an information gathered by the police party. If that be the basis for carrying out the inspection, the compliance of Sec.42(1) and (2) gets attracted. If the inspection, viz., search and seizure were carried out on the basis of information, as held by the Honourable Supreme Court, in the judgments reported in Koluttumottil Razak v. State of Kerala, (2000)4 S.C.C. 465 , paragraph 6 and Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2000)2 S.C.C. 513 , paragraphs 14 to 17, the non-compliance of Sec.42(1)(2) being mandatory would vitiate the whole prosecution. As against the categoric admission of P.W.2 in more than one place that the whole episode was carried out based on information, there is no reason to disbelieve the said version, by the mere ipsi dixit statement of P.W.4 that it was not so. When according to P.W.2, the whole inspection on 18.12.1991 was carried out on the basis of the information gathered by the police party, the failure to reduce the said information in writing and the consequent forwarding of the same to the immediate superior, vitiates the prosecution. Therefore, the said submission of the learned counsel also merits acceptance. 7. By virtue of the above said non-compliance of the mandatory provision, the other submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that there was a missing link in connecting the accused with the occurrence, also merits acceptance. According to P.W.2, the accused were arrested on 8.2.1993 and 8.3.1993, near Valparai Bus Stop and Kanavilakku Bus Stop, respectively. It is not stated that at the time of the arrest, he had any assistance from any one, to identify the accused. According to P.W.2, the accused were arrested on 8.2.1993 and 8.3.1993, near Valparai Bus Stop and Kanavilakku Bus Stop, respectively. It is not stated that at the time of the arrest, he had any assistance from any one, to identify the accused. As per the evidence on record, the accused vanished when the police party arrived at the scene of occurrence. Admittedly, the inspection and search was carried out based on an information by an identifiable person. In such circumstances, the version of P.W.4 that the accused were arrested nearly after 14 months and 15 months after the date of occurrence, without the assistance of any other independent witness to identify the accused creates serious doubt about the version of P.W.4. Thus, in the absence of any independent witness corroborating the version about the identity of the accused, there is a missing link about the identity of the accused with that of the crime. On that ground as well, there is every scope for interference with the conviction of the appellants by the trial Court. For all the above stated reasons, I am obliged to interfere with the conviction and sentence inflicted by the lower Court against the appellants, in its judgment dated 4.2.1994, made in C.C.No.86 of 1993 and the same is set aside. 8. The accused are stated to be on bail by virtue of the orders passed in Crl.M.P.No.5779 of 1994. The bail bonds shall stand cancelled in view of the conviction and sentence being set aside in this appeal.