ORDER Dipak Misra, J. 1. Invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') the defendant petitioner has called in question the legal validity of the order dated 29-3-2000 passed by the learned third Additional District Judge, Satna in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 48/99 whereby the learned appellate Judge passed the order of status quo in respect of immovable and movable properties belonging to the petitioner whereas the Court of first instance had passed an order of restraint restraining the petitioner from alienating the immovable property. 2. The facts as have been portrayed are that the non-applicant as plaintiff initiated a civil action being C.S. No. 54-A/99 in the Court of 4th Civil Judge, Class II, Satna for partition and declaration that she is entitled to half share in the joint Hindu family property. Alongwith the suit the non-applicant filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code for seeking an injunction restraining the applicant from selling or alienating the immovable and movable properties. In the said application it was pleaded that the plaintiff is the married wife of the applicant and the marriage had taken place 50 to 55 years back. It was set forth that, the applicant was the Karta of the family and has two houses in his name. It was also pleaded that he also owns two buses and has got certain fixed deposits in the Bank. It was also alleged that the applicant has married for the second time and has driven out the non-applicant from the house on 5-3-99. 3. The applicant entered contest and filed his objection contending, inter alia, that the plaintiff is not his married wife but has been his mistress and at the time of partition of India she had accompanied her. It was further put forth that the property in respect of which injunction is sought is the self acquired property and the non-applicant has no right. It was also highlighted that the plaintiff/non-applicant had left the house of the defendant/petitioner and gone to live with her brother's son and while going she had taken her ornaments, movables and had also encashed the fixed deposits which were made by the defendant in her name. It was also highlighted that the plaintiff/non-applicant had left the house of the defendant/petitioner and gone to live with her brother's son and while going she had taken her ornaments, movables and had also encashed the fixed deposits which were made by the defendant in her name. It was further pleaded that she has opened a shop with the help of her brother's son and doing business. It was also put forth that the plaintiff/non-applicant is not a member of the joint Hindu family and hence, the claim for partition at her instance is not maintainable. 4. That the parties filed number of documents before the Court of first instance. The learned Trial Judge by order dated 24-9-99 restrained the defendant applicant from alienating the immovable properties. However, no injunction was granted in respect of the two buses and other movable proper ties. 5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the defendant/petitioner preferred M.C.A. No. 48/99 and the non-applicant/plaintiff preferred an appeal which was registered as M.C. A. No. 45/99. Both the appeals were heard by the learned Additional District Judge and a common order was passed on 29-3-2000 whereby learned Appellate Judge directed status quo to be maintained with regard to the suit property. The said order is the cause of grievance of the present revisionist. 6. Assailing the aforesaid orders it is contended by Mr. Kohli that the non-applicant being not a coparcener could not have sued for partition and, therefore, no prima facie case is made out which is the basic requirement for grant of injunction. It is also his submission that the learned Appellate Judge has erroneously held that the petitioner cannot work contrary to the interest of the joint family being the Karta though the defendant applicant had not admitted to be the Karta of the family. It is also urged by him that even assuming for the sake of argument that the defendant petitioner is the Karta of the joint family, he cannot be restrained from alienating the property at the instance of a coparcener. Resisting the aforesaid submissions Mr. It is also urged by him that even assuming for the sake of argument that the defendant petitioner is the Karta of the joint family, he cannot be restrained from alienating the property at the instance of a coparcener. Resisting the aforesaid submissions Mr. Awadh Tripathi, learned counsel for the non-applicant has contended that the Courts below have appreciated the basic ingredients for passing an order of injunction, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury and as they have found that all the ingredients are in existence for passing an order of injunction the orders passed by them should not be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 7. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar, I have perused the orders passed by the Courts below with utmost anxiety. It is admitted at the Bar that the parties are governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. It is the submission of Mr. Kohli that the non-applicant being a female by no stretch of imagination can be regarded as a coparcener and, therefore, a suit at her instance is not maintainable. In this connection I may profitably refer to a decision of Madras High Court rendered in the case of Sudarsanam Maistri Vs. Narasimhulu Maistri, (1902) ILR, 25, Mad. 149, wherein the Madras High Court observed thus: "The Mitakshara doctrine of joint family property is founded upon the existence of an undivided family, as a corporate body (Gansavant Bal Savant Vs. Narayan Dhond Savant, (1883) ILR 7 Bom. 467 at p. 471 and Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage, 6th edition, Paragraph 270) and the possession of property by such corporate body. The first requisite therefore is the family unit; and the possession by it of property is the second requisite. For the present purpose female members of the family may be left out of consideration and the conception of a Hindu family is a common male ancestor with his lineal descendants in the male line, and so long as the family is in its normal condition viz. the divided state - it forms a corporate body. Such corporate body, with its heritage, is purely a creature of law and cannot be created by act of parties, save in so far that, by adoption, a stranger may be affiliated as a member of that corporate family." 8. the divided state - it forms a corporate body. Such corporate body, with its heritage, is purely a creature of law and cannot be created by act of parties, save in so far that, by adoption, a stranger may be affiliated as a member of that corporate family." 8. In this context, I may also refer to a decision rendered in the case of Rameshwar Mistry and another Vs. Bebulal Mistry, AIR 1991 Patna, 53, wherein it has been held as under: "Under the Hindu Family a female cannot be a member of coparcenary governed under the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law." 9. In view of the aforesaid it is crystal clear that a female member of the family is not a coparcener. It is also submission of Mr. Kohli that assuming the non-applicant is a coparcener she is also not entitled to an order of injunction. It is put forth by him that the defendant/petitioner has taken the plea that the property in question is self acquired property and he is not the Karta. In this context, I may proceed to state that even if it is assumed that he is the Karta an order of injunction cannot be passed against the Karta restraining him from alienating the undivided property. In this connection, I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Sunil Kumar and another Vs. Ram Parkash and others, AIR 1988 SC 576 , wherein it was held that a suit for permanent injunction by coparcener against the Karta from restraining him from alienating the house property belonging to the joint Hindu family would not be maintainable. In this context, I may usefully reproduce what was expressed by K. Jagannatha Shetty, J.: "It is true that a coparcener takes by birth an interest in the ancestral property, but he is not entitled to separate possession of the coparcenary estate. His rights are not independent of the control of the Karta. It would be for the Karta to consider the actual pressure on the joint family estate. It would be for him to foresee the danger to be averted. And it would be for him to examine as to how best the joint family estate could be beneficially put into use to subserve the interests of the family. A coparcener cannot interfere in these acts of management. It would be for him to foresee the danger to be averted. And it would be for him to examine as to how best the joint family estate could be beneficially put into use to subserve the interests of the family. A coparcener cannot interfere in these acts of management. Apart from that, a father - Karta in addition to the aforesaid powers of alienation has also the special power to sell or mortgage ancestral property to discharge his antecedent debt which is not tainted with immorality. If there is not such need or benefit the purchaser takes risk and the right had interest of coparcener will remain unimpaired in the alienated property. No doubt the law confers a right on the coparcener to challenge the alienation made by Karta, but that right is not inclusive of the right to obstruct alienation. Nor the right to obstruct alienation could be considered as incidental to the right to challenge the alienation. These are two distinct rights. One is the right to claim a share in the joint family estate free from unnecessary and unwanted encumbrance. The other is a right to interfere with the act of management of the joint family affairs. The coparcener cannot claim the latter right and indeed, he is not entitled for it. Therefore, he cannot move the Court to grant relief by injunction restraining the Karta from alienating the coparcenary property." 10. The present controversy has to be adjudged on the touch stone of the aforesaid enunciation of law. Though I have already held that the non-applicant cannot be treated as a coparcener qua joint Hindu family, I do not intend to advert to the issue at this stage whether a suit for partition would be maintainable at her instance or not. I only observe that at her instance the relief of injunction against the defendant-petitioner is not tenable in view of the law laid down in the case of Sunil Kumar (supra). 11. In view of my preceding analysis the orders passed by the Courts below are unsustainable and deserve to be set aside and accordingly I so do. 12. Consequently, the civil revision is allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 13. Civil Revision allowed.