Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 103 (AP)

P. v. Ranga Rao VS Union of India, New Delhi

2000-02-16

BILAL NAZKI

body2000
BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned Counsel for the parties. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the State Government on 26-11-1999. This order reads as under:-"i am to invite attention to the letter cited and to state you that more than adequate time has already been given in the past. The High Court also directed to vacate the premises on or before 30-10-99 which time is also over. In the circumstances you are requested to vacate the premises at the earliest. " ( 2 ) THIS order is mainly challenged on the ground that the petitioner is the son of a former Prime Minister and because of the security threats to the former Prime minister and his family the petitioner was given the accommodation which could secure the petitioner s life. It is submitted that the petitioner is entitled to safeguards and protection provided under a Central act viz. , The Special Protection Group Act, 1988 (as amended in 1991 and 1994) (for short "the Act" ). Special reference has been made to Sections 2 and 14 of the Act during the course of arguments of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner. The arguments, which have been advanced before this Court, are out of place in view of the history of this case. The petitioner was earlier asked to vacate the premises by order dt. 6-2-1999 and he filed a writ petition in this Court being W. P. No. 7019 of 1999 which was decided on 2-4-1999. This court while disposing of the said writ petition directed the petitioner to vacate the premises on or before 1-7-1999. The order further clarified that the petitioner shall not seek any further extension of time under any circumstances. In spite of this order the premises was not vacated. The order of this court was not challenged by the petitioner and the said order has become final not only as against the petitioner, but even for this Court. ( 3 ) AFTER the time granted by this Court expired the petitioner moved an application being W. P. M. P. No. 16071 of 1999 for grant of extension of six months time for vacating the premises on the ground of ill-health. ( 3 ) AFTER the time granted by this Court expired the petitioner moved an application being W. P. M. P. No. 16071 of 1999 for grant of extension of six months time for vacating the premises on the ground of ill-health. This Court disposed of this application with the following direction:-"according the W. P. M. P. is disposed of and the petitioner shall vacate the premises on or before 30th September, 1999 as directed above. No petition for extension of time shall be entertained by this Court, as this extension itself is under very compelling circumstances namely health condition of the petitioner. " ( 4 ) THE petitioner did not comply with the orders of this Court, but moved another application being W. P. M. P. No. 25615 of 1999 for extension of three months time for vacating the premises. This application was disposed of by this Court on 29-9-1999 with the following observations:-"in view of the facts and circumstances explained and as a special case, the time is extended upto 30-10-1999. The learned Counsel for the petitioner undertakes that he shall not file any separate petition for extension of time and that the petitioner shall vacate the premises on or before 30-10-1999. " ( 5 ) THEREAFTER the petitioner did not vacate the premises and the respondents issued the impugned order. If one goes through the impugned order, it is abundantly clear that the impugned order is a consequence to the orders passed earlier by the State Government against the petitioner and challenged in the earlier writ petition. It is also a consequence to the orders passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition. It is well known at law that orders passed by the High Court cannot be challenged by way of a writ petition. As a matter of fact, by this writ petition what the writ petitioner wants is quashing of the impugned order passed as a consequence to the orders passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition which cannot be done in any circumstances. If the petitioner was aggrieved of the order passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition, he had remedies available to him, which obviously he has not availed. If the petitioner was aggrieved of the order passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition, he had remedies available to him, which obviously he has not availed. The judgment of this Court, as already pointed out, had become final by which the petitioner was directed to vacate the premises and he had also undertaken to vacate the premises by a specific date. In stead of following the undertakings and obeying the orders of this Court, the petitioner has filed this fresh writ petition. On these reasons, I do not find that the petitioner is entitled to any extraordinary relief from this Court, as decidedly his hands are unclean. The writ petition cannot also be entertained on any ground whatsoever as the controversy in between the parties has finally and conclusively been decided. Therefore, this writ petition is dismissed. The stay granted by this Court on 29-11-1999 is vacated. No order as to costs. ( 6 ) WHILE examining the record of this case I am of the prima facie view that, the petitioner is in contempt of this Court as he has not obeyed the orders of this Court for vacating the premises; neither has he complied with the undertakings which he had given in this Court while applying for extension of time on various occasions. Therefore, the Registry shall frame a rule against the petitioner to show-cause as to why he should not be convicted for committing the contempt of this Court. Since the earlier orders have been passed by the Hon ble Mr. Justice G. Bikshapathy, the contempt matter be placed before his lordship. ( 7 ) THE learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks one week s time to vacate the premises in order to enable him to file an appeal. Since this Court has not asked the petitioner in this writ petition to vacate the premises, there is no need of passing any such order. This request is also negatived on the ground that if time is granted, that will amount to negation of orders passed in W. P. No. 7019 of 1999.