Judgment :- The Order of the Court was as follows : S. M. Lawrence, the petitioner herein, has filed this writ petition praying for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus by calling for the records, pertaining to the order bearing No. 21693/90/K4 dated 6-12-90 in confirming the order No. R.C. 16602/88/K4 dated 14-9-90, dismissing the petitioner from service, and to quash the same and direct the respondent-Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation, Madras to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and with full backwages. The minimum facts that are required for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows :- "(A) The petitioner joined the respondent-Management as Warehouse Manager Grade-I on 6-12-1964. He was promoted as Regional Manager with effect from 4-9-1982. When he was working as Regional Manager at Trichy, he was served with a Charge Memo bearing No. R.C. 16602/88/K4 dated 21-7-1988. In the said Memo, sixteen specific charges were framed under Regulation 14(2) of the Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation General and Staff Regulations, 1965 for various irregularities committed by the petitioner relating to the misuse of his official power and receipt of illegal gratification, etc. (B) The additional charge No. 17 was also framed against the petitioner for abusing his powers to draw without conforming to the financial discipline. These charges were framed based on the report of Vigilance Officer one Mr. Kathirvelu. The petitioner was also, subsequently, placed under suspension by an order dated 19-8-1988. As against this order, he filed a suit before the Sub-Court, Trichy. Ultimately, the suit was dismissed as withdrawn on 23-12-1988. (C) The Management, thereafter, on the representations made by the petitioner, cancelled the suspension order reinstated him in service pending disposal of the disciplinary action already taken against him. Then, he was furnished with the copies of the references, which form the basis of the charges, on 11-7-1989. He was also instructed to submit his explanation in questionnaire form.(D) On 1-8-1989, the petitioner requested for the copies of the report of the Vigilance Officer and sought one month's time to submit his explanation. Accordingly, he was furnished with all the copies of the report of the Vigilance Officer and granted 15 days time to offer his explanation by a letter dated 19-8-1989. (E) By a letter dated 28-8-1989, the petitioner requested copies of some other documents without giving the details. Accordingly, he was furnished with all the copies of the report of the Vigilance Officer and granted 15 days time to offer his explanation by a letter dated 19-8-1989. (E) By a letter dated 28-8-1989, the petitioner requested copies of some other documents without giving the details. When he was asked about the details of the documents, the petitioner failed to make any reply for that. At this stage, on 22-2-1990, one Mr. Parthasarathy, Assistant Manager (Technical) was appointed as Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry with regard to the charges framed against the petitioner and make a report. The petitioner was also further directed to submit his explanation before the Enquiry Officer by letter dated 30-6-1990. Till then, the petitioner did not choose to offer any explanation to the charge memo dated 21-7-1988. The Enquiry Officer conducted enquiry on 24-5-1990 and 27-5-1990. After the enquiry was over, he submitted his report on 23-8-1990. (F) On consideration of the enquiry report and other materials produced against the petitioner as well as the statements made by the petitioner before the Enquiry Officer, the respondent passed an impugned order on 14-9-1990 accepting the Enquiry Officer's report holding that out of 17 charges framed against the petitioner., 16 charges were proved and dismissed the petitioner from service of the respondent-Corporation. Along with the impugned order, a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer was also sent. (G) On receipt of the impugned order and the copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer, the Petitioner filed an appeal before the Executive Committee, Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation on 13-11-1990. The said Committee, after consideration of the representations contained in the Appeal Memorandum, impugned order dated 14-9-1990 and other records, dismissed the appeal on 6-12-90 confirming the dismissal order, by holding that the charges have been proved and the petitioner deserved to be dismissed. Hence, this present writ petition as against the orders mentioned above." Mr. Jayesh B. Dolia, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while attacking the impugned orders dated 14-9-1990 and 6-12-1990 would contend the following : "(i) The enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer was irregular and no proper opportunity was given to the petitioner. The charges framed against the petitioner were fabricated and false as the same were foisted on the petitioner by the Vigilance Officer, against whom he made complaints. The charges framed against the petitioner were fabricated and false as the same were foisted on the petitioner by the Vigilance Officer, against whom he made complaints. The petitioner had given proper explanation for each and every charge framed against him. The evidence of the witnesses were not recorded and the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses was refused. The statements made by the witnesses were recorded behind the back of the petitioner under coercion and compulsion and therefore, the statements of those witnesses, could not be relied upon. (ii) The Regulation envisages that for imposing extreme penalty of dismissed, concurrence of the Chairman should be obtained. But, in the instant case, the concurrence was not obtained. Regulation 14(2)(b) provides for giving an opportunity to the petitioner before imposing a punishment of dismissal. But, in the instant case, no such opportunity was given to the petitioner before issuing of orders. (iii) Furthermore, the respondent who passed the original order of dismissal, disposed of the appeal preferred by the petitioner as an Appellate Authority as he happens to be the Chairman of the Warehousing Corporation. Since the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority is one and the same and the procedure contemplated under the Regulations has not been followed, the entire proceedings are wrong and the impugned orders 14-9-1990 and 6-12-1990 have to be quashed and consequently, the petitioner has to be reinstated." Mr. S. A. Hafiz, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would vehemently oppose the above contentions stating that there is no irregularity either in the matter of observing the formalities or in the competency of the Authorities concerned who passed the impugned orders. The submission by way of reply, made by the counsel for the respondent in brief is as follows :- "(A) All the witnesses were produced before the Enquiry Officer. When they were questioned by the Enquiry Officer in the presence of the delinquent, the petitioner herein, they told the Enquiry Officer that they confirm their statements and further told that they gave their statements according to their own free will, without compulsion from anybody. Then, the opportunity was given to the petitioner for cross-examining those witnesses. He categorically said that he did not want to cross-examine all the witnesses. He particularly asked to cross-examine one witness by name Parthasarathy. Accordingly, permission was granted. Then, the opportunity was given to the petitioner for cross-examining those witnesses. He categorically said that he did not want to cross-examine all the witnesses. He particularly asked to cross-examine one witness by name Parthasarathy. Accordingly, permission was granted. In the course of enquiry, he was allowed to cross-examine one Madasamy also. (B) Even before the witnesses, produced before the Enquiry Officer, were examined, the delinquent was thoroughly questioned by the Enquiry Officer and his statement was recorded. Even after the end of the enquiry, the delinquent was asked to give a statement and the statement was also recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, proper opportunity was given to the delinquent. (C) Both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority went through the enquiry proceedings and the enquiry report and passed orders dismissing the petitioner from service, by giving valid reasons. It cannot, be said that both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are one and the same. The Disciplinary Authority is the Managing Director of Warehousing Corporation and the Appellate Authority is the Executive Committee which consists of several members including the Managing Director and Chairman of the Warehousing Corporation.(D) It is the Executive Committee, the Appellate Authority, that rejected the appeal. It cannot be said that the appeal was considered by the same Disciplinary Authority. Moreover, the relevant Regulation, which was prevailing then, does not contemplate for furnishing the Enquiry Report to the petitioner before imposing penalty. As a matter of fact, the Regulation 14-2(b) which came to be introduced on 12-11-1987 would clearly provide that it shall not be necessary to give the person charged any opportunity of making representation on the penalty to be imposed. (E) When the records would show that the opportunity was given to the petitioner in compliance with the procedure contemplated and the reasonings given in the impugned orders for dismissing the petitioner from service are valid, this Court by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may not take a different view by involving in the process of appreciation of evidence or by going into the inadequacy of the same." In the light of the rival contentions, let me now go into the question regarding the scope of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 to go into the validity of the impugned orders challenged before this Court. It is the settled position of law that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge of facts and in case, an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has also the power and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion. Once findings of facts, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Authority is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty.In the light of the above principles formulated by the Apex Court in 1999 2 Mad LW 691 : (1999 Lab IC 918) (Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A. K. Chopra), this Court is constrained to deal with the questions raised in this writ petition while challenging the impugned orders. Out of seventeen charges framed against the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority concluded that sixteen charges were proved. The proved charges are very serious, which involve misuse of office, irregularities in appointments, receipt of illegal gratification for appointments, receipt of monthly payment from subordinates etc. Admittedly, when the charge memo was served on the petitioner, asking him to give an explanation, he never sent any explanation, instead he went to Sub-Court. Trichy and obtained interim injunction against the suspension and disciplinary proceedings and subsequently, the petitioner chose to withdraw the said suit. On his request, the Management reinstated him on sympathetic consideration and continued to proceed to disciplinary proceedings. Even then, he did not send any explanation for the abovesaid seventeen charges. Trichy and obtained interim injunction against the suspension and disciplinary proceedings and subsequently, the petitioner chose to withdraw the said suit. On his request, the Management reinstated him on sympathetic consideration and continued to proceed to disciplinary proceedings. Even then, he did not send any explanation for the abovesaid seventeen charges. Even before the Enquiry Officer, when important witnesses were produced and when they stated before the Enquiry Officer that all they had stated against the delinquent-Officer were true and they were made out of their own volition and without compulsion, there is no reason to completely brush-aside their statements, especially when the delinquent-Officer made a statement to the Enquiry Officer that he did not want to cross-examine any witness except one Parthasarathy. Accordingly, the said statement was recorded. Parthasarathy was allowed to be cross-examined and thereafter, one Madasamy also was cross-examined. It is the case of the petitioner that the statements from those witnesses were obtained under threat and coercion. There is no basis for the said argument. The records would show that they specifically stated before the Enquiry Officer that their statements, accusing the petitioner in respect of various charges, regarding the misuse of his office and receipt of illegal gratification, are true and voluntary.The Enquiry Proceedings would show that after the enquiry was over, the petitioner requested a conditional permission from the Enquiry Officer for cross-examining several witnesses. Since the Enquiry Officer was not convinced of his statement, the request was rejected. As correctly pointed out by both the Enquiry Officer in the report and the Disciplinary Authority in the impugned order dated 14-9-1990, there is no reason given by the petitioner for the request to cross-examine those witnesses again when they were allowed to be cross-examined by the petitioner earlier. On the other hand, the Enquiry Officer got the statements from the petitioner recorded then and there, while giving opportunity for cross-examining of the witnesses and the same was declined. The said conduct on the part of the petitioner would show that he was not at all interested in the cross-examination of the witnesses. When such being the position, it cannot be contended that no opportunity was given to the petitioner for cross-examination. As indicated above, the petitioner was allowed to cross-examine two witnesses as per his request. The said conduct on the part of the petitioner would show that he was not at all interested in the cross-examination of the witnesses. When such being the position, it cannot be contended that no opportunity was given to the petitioner for cross-examination. As indicated above, the petitioner was allowed to cross-examine two witnesses as per his request. Regarding the contention that the Enquiry Report was not furnished to the petitioner before imposing penalty, it is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the Regulation prevailing then does not contemplate for the supply of the Enquiry Report before imposing proposed punishment. As a matter of fact, the perusal of the relevant Regulations dated 12-11-87 would clearly show that it shall not be necessary to give to the person charged any opportunity of making representation on the proposed penalty before imposing the same. Furthermore, the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in 1991 1 Lab LJ 29 : (1991 Lab IC 308) (SC) (Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan) would not apply to this case, as the principle laid down by the Apex Court, relating to the furnishing of the Enquiry Report to the delinquent before the proposed penalty is to be imposed, is that the said rule shall have only prospective application, which was pronounced on 20-11-1990 while the impugned order was passed on 14-9-1990 itself.As regards the contention that the witnesses produced by the Management, before the Enquiry Officer, were not examined and therefore, their statements should not be relied upon as they were made under compulsion, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, on the strength of the decision, reported in 1996 2 Lab LN 1180 (G. Anandam v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board), that the witnesses were questioned by the Enquiry Officer and they were specifically asked to confirm their statements and that the witnesses would state, confirming the statements, that those statements were made by them out of their own volition and there was no compulsion from any quarters. The perusal of the records also would show that there is some substance in the submission made by the counsel for the respondent which is in the light of the view expressed by this Court in the decision in 1996 2 Lab LN 1180 (cited supra). The perusal of the records also would show that there is some substance in the submission made by the counsel for the respondent which is in the light of the view expressed by this Court in the decision in 1996 2 Lab LN 1180 (cited supra). Furthermore, it is obvious from the reading of the Enquiry Proceedings and Enquiry Report that the petitioner did not choose to challenge the witnesses' statements and he specifically told the Enquiry Officer that he was not inclined to cross-examine the witnesses. Under those circumstances, the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, reported in 1977 2 Lab LJ 163 : (1977 Lab IC 1449) (W. B. Correya v. Deputy Managing Director, Indian Airlines) and 1979 2 Mad LJ 259 : (1979 Lab IC NOC 91) (Deputy Managing Director (Tech.), Indian Airlines v. W. B. Correya), would not be in any way useful to the petitioner. On a thorough reading of the entire records, I am of the view that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer appears to be fair on the whole and therefore, there is no reason as to why I should reject the Enquiry Report and the consequential order in the absence of any mala fide attributed against the said Enquiry Officer and the Authorities.As indicated earlier, the jurisdiction of this Court is very limited, especially when on sufficient evidence, conclusions have been arrived at by both the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority, this Court cannot embark upon the scrutiny and circumstances, and reassess the same. Once the findings of facts, based upon some evidence, are recorded, this Court is unable to hold that the evidence is inadequate and therefore, the impugned orders are illegal. On the other hand, in my view, there is no perversity in the impugned orders and it cannot be contended that no opportunity was given to the petitioner. Therefore, the order of the respondent, confirmed by the Appellate Authority does not suffer from any infirmity. In the result, writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.